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French,  challenged  my  fieldwork  methodology  and  kept  urging  me to finish the dissertation. I am 
sorry that I did not  manage to do so, before she lost the battle against her  cancer  in  1997. 
Two  companions  who  joined  me  during  the  process are not  inclined to leave  me  in  a  foreseeable 
future: although their contribution to the dissertation  must  be  described as overwhelmingly 
negative, my sons, Jonatan  and  Tobias,  have  made it all bearable. By their very specific demand 
for  my  instant  attention,  they  have  prevented  me  from  sinking to the  bottom  every time theoretical 
and  practical  problems  seemed  unsurmountable. Thanks to them the only  sleepless nights I have 
known are those caused by their  teething  and  other  problems - they  have  been  quite  a  few,  though. 
Finally,  Lars, my beloved, has been - and still is - my major source of inspiration and my main 
critic.  Being  a  development  researcher himself, who in the same period as me has carried  out 
fieldwork in three countries different fiom Mali, he has an in-depth  knowledge  of the ever 
ongoing game of negotiating travel arrangements and working hours and a considerable 
experience in the role as a  single  parent.  When our common conditions necessitated  that at a 
certain  stage  one of us had to apply  for  a  more  remunerative  occupation,  the  task  fell on him,  and 
I got the privilege of being  supported while finishing my dissertation.  This, I can  hopefully pay 
back  by kicking him to do the final  editing of his dissertation ... 
Usa  River,  Tanzania, May 1999 
Tove  Degnbol 
INTRODUCTION 
Scholars of development  often  vent theirjiwtrations by idenh&ng  the culprits  that  keep 
the theoriesfiom working. ..instead of the peasant clinging to traditional values ... or the 
multinational  manager&nnelling  surplus  back  to  headquarters ..., the state bureaucrat, 
strangling the golden goose of entrepreneurship  and  lining  his pockets with unproductive 
rents, has again become  the  central villain” (Evans, 1 9 8 9 ~ .  561-562). 
State  bureaucracies under pressure 
Since the 1980s Afiican bureaucracies  have  increasingly  come  under  attack. Public sector  cuts, 
often involving retrenchments in the form of firing employees and decline in bureaucratic 
incomes,  have  been  accompanied  by  demands o  the bureaucracy to function  more efficiently and 
effectively (Mukandala, 1992;  Lienert,  1998). 
Government  extension  agencies  are not an exception  to  the  general  view  of state bureaucracies 
as major  culprits  for  economic  and  political  development  problems.  Thus,  extension  agencies  are 
being  criticised for not doing  enough,  not  doing it well  and for not  being  relevant. Its agents  are 
said to spend only  a  very  small  part of their working  time  actually  meeting  farmers  and to 
concentrate  on  better-off  farmers  at  the  expense of the  poor.  Their  failure to convince  farmers to 
follow  researchers’  recommendations is believed to have  had fatal  consequences for agricultural 
production in many  countries  @vera,  1991;  Hulme,  1992; Sims and  Leonard,  1990;  Jacob & 
Delville,  1994). 
The prevailing  view  of  civil  servants,  and  notably  field  staff, a  he source  of failure is based on 
a  perception of them  as  purely  self-interested. As Judith  Tendler  puts  it, t is  generally  believed 
that “civil  servants  are  self-interested,  rent-seeking a d  venal  unless  proven  otherwise”  (Tendler, 
1997). Consistent with this view,  recent  reforms  have  mainly  aimed  at  reducing their discretion 
and  thereby  their  opporhmities  to  misbehave  (Christoplos, 199%; Tendler,  1997). In the field of 
agricultural  extension, the literature is concerned  with  how to plan and  constrain  the  actions of 
field  personnel.  While the attention to ‘farmer-first  approaches’ has implied that the mainstream 
view is now to acknowledge  farmers to be  creative  managers,  extension  agents are still seen as 
mere  implementors of plans.  The  promotion  by the World Bank of  the  ‘training  and  visit’  system 
(T&V) in more than 30 &can  countries  can be seen as an attempt to standardise  and  routinise 
the tasks of extension  agencies in order to limit  the  risk of self-serving  behaviour  by  individual 
agents (Christoplos & Nitsch  1996). 
While government  employees in the  bottom of the  hierarchy  are  increasingly  pressed  from 
superior levels of their organisations,  the  recent  upsurge in rural  organisations in many f i c a n  
countries  has implied that they  are  often  squeezed  from  opposite  sides. Structural adjustment 
programmes  and  a  decline  in  both  state-sponsored  service  provision  and  control by the state of 
rural populations are believed to have been important factors behind the creation of new 
organisations (Bretton & Binged,  1994;  Jacob & Delville,  1994). Through their demands for 
influence on production  and  marketing  conditions,  new  organisations are increasingly  putting 
pressure on extension  agents,  who  find  themselves  caught  in  the  middle,  trying to respond to both 
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the supply  agenda of their central agency and the demand agenda emerging from the  new 
organisations  (Christoplos & Nitsch,  1996;  Christoplos,  1996;  Christoplos,  1997a). 
‘Street-level  bureaucracies’ as mediators of relations  between  state  and  society 
The  much criticised and  presently  hard-pressed  state  bureaucrats  in the bottom of the hierarchy 
have generally  received little attention  in  development  studies. This observationwas made  by 
David  Leonard  in 1977 in  his  seminal  work on extension  organisations in Kenya  (Leonard,  1977), 
and more than 20  years  later it is still  true. Thus, the  general  denunciation of civil  servants  has 
made  few  researchers  enquire  into  the  pressures  they  are  facing  and  particularly  into the possible 
ways of changing  conditions of their  work  (apart  from  limiting  their  discretion)  (Tendler,  1997). 
Some  scholars,  however,  have  pointed  out  that  government  agents  who  meet  local  populations 
face-to-face on a  daily  basis  are  extremely  important as mediators  of relations between  state  and 
society.  Through their actions  and  reactions to local  populations, the so-called  ‘street-level 
bureaucrats’  (Lipsky,  1980)  represent  specific  expressions  of  government  policies. It is also 
through them that the majority of the  population  has  access  to  influencing  both  the 
implementation  of  state  policies  and  the  more  fundamental  role  of  the  state  by  either  collaborating 
with  them or by turning  their  back on them.  Equally  important,  street-level  bureaucrats  contribute 
significantly  to  the  image of the  state  held  by its populations.  The  ways  they  relate  to  people  shape 
perceptions of the state which again affect the way people  more  generally  respond to the state. 
Thus, when  people  interact  with  e.g.  extension  agents,  they  perceive of them  both as persons  and 
as representatives of the state as a symbolic totality. If the services they provide do not 
accommodate the needs by the  population, it negatively  affects  both the image of the particular 
government  agency  and  the  image  of  the state as such  (Leonard,  1977;  Lipsky,  1980;  Gupta, 
1995;  Christoplos & Nitsch,  1996;  Mare&  1987). As Christoplos  and  Nitsch  have  argued:  “for 
these  reasons  alone,  consideration f the  role  of  these  front-line staff should  be  seen as more  than 
a peripheral administrative  appendix to  overall  rural  development  planning”  (Christoplos & 
Nitsch,  1996). 
The African  state 
The  widespread  negative  view on civil  servants  reflects  a  general  perception of the African state 
as the major  cause  of the economic  and  political  crisis in the  region.  For  almost two decades  the 
Ajiican state has been  under  severe  attack from virtually all comers of the research  community, 
bi-  and  multilateral  donors,  NGOs  and  from its own populations.  During the 1980s,  people  who 
otherwise had little in common  such as e.g.  marxist-inspired  and  liberal-oriented  researchers, 
World  Bank  advisors,  and  farmers  in  remote areas of Mali  could  agree that the  state  was  to  blame 
for all calamities  experienced.  Researchers  described it as patrimonial,  predatory,  rent-seeking 
and even  cleptocratic  (Ergas,  1987;  Callaghy,  1987; MCdard, 1990;  Bayart,  1993;  Bates,  1981). 
Led  by the World  Bank,  donors  prescribed  radical  government  retrenchments in the form of 
privatisations, public sector cuts, reduction of staff and minimisation of public rules and 
regulations. Its citizens first shunned  the  state  by  withdrawing  from  official  marketing  channels, 
reducing  the  agricultural  production,  avoiding  any  contacts  with its representatives  and  ridiculing 
it. Late in the 1980s they sometimes changed t h i s  strategy to open revolts in the fight for 
democratisation  and  a  more  fundamental  change  in  the  role of the state (Chazan,  1988;  Bratton 
& van de  Walle,  1992). 
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While an  overwhelmingly  negative  image of the state persists in many  analyses  and  policy 
prescriptions, large parts of  the  research  community during the  recent  decade  have  gradually 
revised  the  view of the state. Already in 1989 Tony Killick described the attacks on the state  as 
‘a  reaction  too  far’  (Killick,  1989).  Later  also  the  World  Bank  has  openly  acknowledged that an 
effective  state  apparatus i a condition  for  the  development  ofwell-functioning  market  economies 
(World Bank,  1997a). A consensus  now  seems  to appear about the need for a state to  regulate 
markets, protect the environment,  support  small fann agriculture,  operate  legal  systems  and 
provide  public  goods  such ashealth,  education  and  social  safety  to  alleviate  poverty.  Whereas  the 
parole  of  the  1980s was ‘the  less  state the better’,  the  agenda  of  the  1990s  have  been  characterised 
by the search  for  a  better state (Grindle & Hilderbrand,  1995). 
The  apparent  consensus,  however,  covers  profound  disagreements  both  about the real  content of 
the  better  or  ‘enabling  state’  and  about  how  to  achieve these objectives. In the debate ofthe 1990s 
on  themes  such as democracy,  decentralisation,  good  governance,  civil  society and public sector 
reforms,  a  major l i e  of division can be  found:  one  stand is represented by proponents of 
institutional  reforms  aiming at strengthening  the  ability of the state  to  increase  performance,  while 
another  group  advocates the need for empowerment of civil  society  to  allow it to put pressure  on 
the  state. 
The first stand includes both the various public administration strengthening initiatives to 
restructure  work,  defme  missions,  describe jobs and train staff  (Numberg & Lindane,  1994)  and 
calls  for  institutional  reforms  which  focus on changing the attitudes  of  state  agents to allow them 
to take rural people’s  knowledge  serious  (Chambers,  1983;  Chambers,  1991).  After 
macroeconomic  reforms  associated  with  stabilisation  and  adjustment in the 1980s, a  wave of 
‘second  generation’  reforms  in  the  1990s  has  focussed on improving  efficiency,  effectiveness  and 
responsiveness of the  public  sector through civil service  reforms.  Although the attention  paid  to 
societal  forces  varies,  proponents of institutional  reforms  share  a  focus on the state and  state 
structures.  Merilee  Grindle has described this as a  ‘supply-side’  understanding of how good 
government is achieved  (Grindle,  1997a p. 6;  Grindle, 1997b p. 481). 
The  second  stand  has  been  inclined  to  apply  a  ‘demand-side’  perspective  and  instead see a 
changed  development  coming  from the emergence of a civil society  which  put  pressure  on  the 
state.  Inspired by the  debate  on  political  opposition i the former  communist  regimes in Eastern 
Europe  and  social  movements inLatin America,  many  scholars  have  expressed  great  expectations 
to  the  possibilities  for  grass-root  non-governmental  organisations to force the state to change its 
role.  While  numerous  interpretations  of the concept and its usefulness  have  characterised  the 
debate, an influential  position  has  tended to view civil society as a key  brake on state  power 
payart, 1986). In a rural context this has sometimes been translated into studies of the 
possibilities for fanners’ movements to put  pressure on the state. 
It  has  been  argued that also the  ‘good  governance’  agenda  of the World  Bank  reflects the same 
understanding, as it aims at helping  empower  society to keep a  close  eye on the state,  while it 
does  little tosupport the  legitimacy of the  state  and its ability to handle social conflicts  (Moore, 
1993).  Similarly,  critical  voices have perceived of the many  initiatives to promote  democratic 
decentralisation as attempts to improve  the  influence of civil  society, while disregarding  that 
decentralisation  needs  to  go  hand i  hand with strengthening  of  central  administrative  structures 
and  more  sophisticated  political skills at the national level (Tendler,  1997). 
3 
Theories about state-society relations 
As suggested  above, the debate  about  the  African  state  and  possibilities  for  changing its role is 
very much characterised by  stereotypes.  Either it is bad pervaded by greedy  and  unscrupulous 
individuals  who  steer its actions  down  to  the  smallest  details  and  out  in its most  remote  provinces, 
and, therefore, may just as well  be  given  up,  while  one is instead  concentrating on the civil 
society.  Or it  is maybe  reformable  if  only  one  can  get  a fm hold of its self-serving  employees. 
To  move  beyond  the  cliches, it is  necessary  to  ask  about  the  fundamental  nature of the  state:  what 
constitutes the state?  what is inside it? what  determines its policies?  how are its relations to 
society?  and is it relevant in all contexts  to talk about the state? 
In the  extensive  theoretical  debate  on  these  issues,  however,  many  stereotypes are rediscovered. 
There has been  a  general  tendency  to  treat  the  state a  n  undifferentiated  unit whose relations to 
society  can  be  portrayed in an  unambiguous  way.  Thus,  the state has  been  described as captured 
by society  (Hyden,  1983), as cut  off  from  society  @arbon,  1990)  or as having  mainly  person- 
based relations to  societal  actors (Mkdard,  1990;  Bayart,  1993). State constituencies are often 
considered  to  be  the narrow interests  of  those  directly  allied  with  state  bureaucrats and political 
leaders.  Reflections  about  the  possibilities  for  broader  societal  forces  of  influencing the state and 
its policies are few. 
Inside the state,  many  researchers  have  found  a swarm of individuals  who are busily  pursuing 
their personal  interests  and  those  of  their  relatives,  ethnic or regional affiliates (Bates,  1981; 
Callaghy,  1988;  Clapham,  1982).  State  policies  are  seen as mainly  determined  by  the  personalities 
of  the  top  figures  of the regime and the  deals  they  have  struck  with allies inside  and outside the 
state  apparatus  (Sandbrook,  1985;  Jackson & Rosberg,  1982a). 
A different approach has concentrated on societal  structures  (notably  class  structures) and has 
tried to deduce the  character of the  state  from  these,  while  paying less attention  to the inner 
dynamics of the state  apparatus  itself  (e.g.  Martinussen,  1980).  More  recent  societal-oriented 
approaches have  focussed  mainly on the  community  level  where  survival strategies of various 
groups  and  individuals  are  described as reactions  to  the  policies  of the state.  The state, however, 
often remains a  black box in  these  analyses  which  do  not  consider the possibilities of societal 
influence on state  structures  and  policies  but  only on their implementation  (e.g.  Arce & Long, 
1989). 
While all the above-mentioned  approaches  tending  to  focus  either on the state or on societal 
forces  may  contribute  bits  and  pieces  to an understanding  of  the  nature of the  state, it is found  that 
a  relatively  recent  approach  has  considerably  more  to  offer. A number  of  researchers have called 
attention to the limits both to  the  possibilities of reforming the state  without  a  pressure  from 
society  and  to  the  possibilities  of  civil  society  to  put  pressure on the  state  without  being  supported 
by this very state. In other words: state and society are closely connected and cannot be 
understoodandanalysedas separate  entities (Jacob & Delville,  1994;  Chandhoke,  1995;  Chazan, 
1994). 
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Instead  of  focussing  either on the  state  or on societal  relations  it is suggested  to  focus  on  relations 
between state and  society. The concepts  of the ‘interactive approach ’ or the ‘state-in-society 
approach ’ cover  attempts to understand  patterns of domination,  persistence  and  change  in  terms 
of the mutual  interaction  between  state  and  society  and,  more  specifically,  between  a  multitude 
of different  structures  embodied  in the state and  a  variety ofmovements, networks,  groups  and 
formal as well as informal organisations constituting society (Migdal, 1994; Chazan, 1994; 
Bratton,  1994;  Azarya,  1988;  Rotchild & Foley,  1988;  Harbeson,  1994;  Kohli & Shue,  1994). 
The interactive approach sees the state as  anchored  in socieiy but  not  determined  by  societal 
structures. Thus,  any  understanding  of  the state begins by comprehending  the  social  structures 
of which the state is part, but the state  will  never be a  mere  reflection  of its societal  base, as 
important  state-internal  dynamics  considerably influence its structures  and  policies. 
contrary to prevailing  treatments of the state as a unitary actor,  the  state is understood as both an 
abstract entity, dependent on a  certain amount of legitimacy in the eyes  of  societal  groups, and 
as a muZtipZicity ofstpuctures with  varying  objectives  and  different  ways ofmutual interacting  and 
of relating  to  non-state  actors. 
Similarly,  the  concept of society must  be  broken  down  to  understand  how  different  elements  pull 
in  many  different  directions. Social forces which make up  society  embrace  a  wide  variety of 
movements, networks, groups, cells and formal and informal organisations which differ 
substantially in size,  scope,  purpose,  composition  and  resources.  Of the many  different  forces, 
only those who have a political  project in the sense that they are trying to engage  the  state, i.e. 
trying to change the fundamental  relations  between state and  society,  qualify for the  designation 
of civil society. 
According to the  interactive  approach,  thus, the challenge to studies of state-society  relations is 
how to ‘unpack’ states and societies, to  begin to capture the diversity of their interactions. 
Application of the  interactive  approach to the study of  relations  between  government 
extension  agencies and farmers 
The  understanding of state  and  society  as two closely  connected  concepts  which  cannot be 
understood  and  analysed as separate  entities has a parallel  in  a  number of recent  contributions to 
the  debate about how to improve  agricultural extension agencies. 
After  years of discussion of ‘supply-side  issues’ of agricultural  extension  (what  packages  to 
extend,  what  organisational  set-up  to  establish,  etc.),  these  contributions stre s that performance 
of the agencies  cannot  be  improved  without he existence of demand  pressures  from  farmers 
forcing them to adjust and  improve.  Articulation of demands, on the  other  hand,  often  results 
from previous technical and organisational support from the extension service which has 
gradually  strengthened  the  capacity of fanners  to put demands  on the state  (Tendler,  1993; 
Tendler & Freedheim,  1994;  Tendler,  1997; Christoplos & Nitsch,  1996,  Christoplos,  1996). 
The contributions do not have a state-and-society angle to the study of relations between 
extension agencies and farmers. Instead, they draw their inspiration from theories on the 
importance of close relations  between  service  providers  and clients for organisational 
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performance. This inspiration is reflected in a strong focus on personaZ relations between 
extension agents  and  farmers. Thus, researches  introduce  the  issues of work satisfaction by 
government  agents  and  mutual trust between  agents  and  farmers as important  factors  contributing 
to efforts of the agencies to improve performance and to the ability of their clients to 
communicate  a  demand. 
While this is considered an interesting  approach, it is important  to  stress that personal  relations 
between  government  representatives  and  farmers  are  but  one  expression of overall  state-society 
relations.  If  a  government  extension  agency is dealt  with  only  as an organisation l i e  any  other 
organisation,  the  important  dimension of the state as an abstract  entity is lost.  A  government 
extension  agency is never  only an organisation.  Being  part  of  the  state,  it is both an organisation 
with a range  of  individual  characteristics  different  from  other  organisations and an  expression of 
the abstract  state, It therefore  depends  not  only of its own legitimacy  but  also  on  the  overall 
legitimacy of the state in the  eyes of the population. 
It  represents an interesting  theoretical  challenge to combine  the  two  perspectives by studying 
government  extension  agencies as both  organisations  and aspart of  the state. 
Whatever  perspective is applied,  however,  the  study of government  extension  agencies  will  have 
to  consider  a  broader  range  of  issues than just their  relations  to  farmers.  Like  the  state is not just 
a  reflection of its societal base  but is shaped also by  state-internal  dynamics,  an  organisation is 
not just a  reflection of its relations to clients.  A  range of organisation-internal  factors  which  affect 
the  way an organisation  relates to its clients  need to  be considered,  too. 
Similarly, farmers’ demands on extension agencies are not just products of their previous 
interaction  with these and  other  government  agencies.  What  may  be  called  ‘society-internal’ 
dynamics  such as e.g.  social  organisation  at  village  level,  class  and  ethnic  relations  may  contribute 
to shape  particular  expressions of the  demand. 
Objectives of the  dissertation 
The  understanding of the  African state and of its government  agencies can be  summarised  as 
follows: the state is both an abstract  entity  and  a  multiplicity of structures  pulled  in  different 
directions  by  constant  interaction  with  a  multitude of social  groups,  organisations  and  networks. 
Relations  between  the  state  and  societal  forces  are  complex  interactions  which  have  implications 
on the  characteristics of each  party but do  not  fully  explain these characteristics.  A  government 
agency  is  both  an  organisation  with  particular  characteristics of its own and a specific  expression 
of the abstract  state. 
While  interaction  between  state  and  society is a  highly  complex  phenomenon,  operationalisation 
of the interaction  between  government  agencies  and  farmers  can  take  the  point  of  departure  in  the 
definition of performance by government  agencies as their ability to  accommodate clients’ 
demands. For  any  organisation  the  performance is the result of both  a  range of organisation- 
internal factors and of the  character of demand  pressures.  The performance o f a  government 
agency is the result of both  a  range of organisation-internal  factors, of the character of specific 
demand  pressures that it faces, andof a  range of factors relating to its status as being  part of the 
state. 
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Based on this understanding of the  African  state  and  of  its  government  agencies,  it is the 
theoretical  objective of the present  dissertation to establish  a  conceptual h e w o r k  to explain 
the differences in interaction between government agencies and their clients as a result of 
different  pressures  being  exerted  upon  the  agencies.  The  pressures  are  seen to be  co ditioned  both 
by their characteristics as being part of the abstract state, by their specific organisational 
characteristics  and by the character of the social  forces with which  they  interact. 
Three  sets of research  questions  are  guiding  the  theoretical  analysis: 
- how  to  understand overall state-society relations 
- how to analyse factors conditioning the performance of government agencies and 
- how  to analyse societal forces interacting  with  and  influencing  government agencies. 
It is the empirical  objective to illustrate and further explore the theoretical  fiamework by 
identifying  explanations  for  the  different  experience  of  interaction  between  farmers  in  the Sikasso 
region  and  four  extension  agencies all referring to the  same  government  ministry. 
The  empirical  objective is dealt  with by studying  the  pressures  put  on  street-level  bureaucracies 
in each  of the four  agencies  and by  assessing  how  these  pressures  affect the performance of  the 
agencies  (i.e. their ability to accommodate  farmers’  demands). 
Subsequently this analysis is put in perspective  by  an  analysis  of  the  character  of the social  forces 
in the Sikasso  region  which  interact  with  and  influence  the  four  agencies. 
While  these  very  broad  objectives are guiding  discussions  and  analyses in the  theoretical  section, 
a set of more precise research questions to the empirical investigations are found in the 
conclusion to the theoretical  section. 
Focus on extension  agencies 
Extension  agencies  constitute  an  excellent  opportunity to study  encounters  between the state and 
rural  populations. As the presence  of  government staff in  rural  areas is often  limited,  extension 
staff account for a considerable  share  of  directly  visible  state  representatives. This has  become 
even  more  pronounced  during  the  years of structural  adjustment that have  often  seen  a  significant 
reduction in the number of  government staff. Due to the promotion  by the World  Bank of the 
T&V extension system,  extension  agencies  have  often  been  treated as an exception  to  general 
public  sector  cuts. This has implied  that  in  many  Afiican  countries  extension  agents  are  now  the 
only government  representatives  left in rural areas  (Hulme,  1991;  Christoplos,  lecture  given  at 
IDS, Roskilde, November 1996). 
Furthermore, in most  countries  (including  Mali)  extension  agencies  have  existed for a  sufficiently 
long period to make it possible to assess  their  present  interaction  with  farmers in a  historical 
perspective. 
And  finally,  given  their  involvement  in  the  management  of na ural resources  providing  the  living 
for  the  majority  of  the Afiican populations,  extension  agencies  are  important to s udy  in  their own 
right  (Leonard,  1977). 
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Mali 
The  above  references to ‘the  Afkican  state’  cover  a  considerable  variance of specific challenges 
facing the highly  different  states  in Africa Diversities  regard  their  existing capacities, the  degree 
of  centralisation of government  structures, the existence of democratic traditions, the 
socioeconomic  fabric of societies  and  not  least their access  to  economic  resources. 
Measured  against  virtually all possible  standards,  the  Malian  state  (together  with  other  states  in 
Sahelian  countries)  represents an extreme  situation.  Being  landlocked,  resource  poor,  dependent 
on international  aid  and  export of a  few  primary  products,  Mali  had  a GNP per capita of a  mere 
260 USD in 1997  (World Bank, 1999).  Literacy  levels  and  health  standards of its 11.5  mio. 
inhabitants  are  among  the  lowest in the  world,  placing  the  country  only four positions from the 
bottom  in  the Human Development  Index (LTNDP, 1998; EIU, 1998).  As  a  former  French  colony, 
the  state  after  independence  inherited  an  administrative  apparatus  characterised  by  a  high  degree 
of  centralisation  and  hierarchy.  While  the  private  sector is negligible,  public  sector  performance 
is poor, and in many  rural  areas  government  services  are  virtually  nonexistent. No less than 23 
years of military  rule  from  1968  to  1991  have  left  a  large  part  of  the  population  with an image  of 
the state as a repressive  and  threatening  institution  which  rarely  provides them any  services  or 
support in return for the taxes  they  are  forced  (sometimes  physically) to pay. 
Despite this bleak backgroun4 however,  important  changes  are  currently  taking  place  in  relations 
between state and  society  in  Mali.  After  a  public  upheaval  in  1991  made an end to the  military 
regime,  the new democratically-elected  regime has initiated  a  wide  range  of  democratisation  and 
decentralisation initiatives. Among these an administrative reform to establish new rural 
communes run by elected rural councils  has  been  ongoing  since  1995.  Freedom of speech  and 
freedom of organisation  have  made it possible to openly  question  state  authorities,  and  a  wide 
variety of political  parties,  independent  new  papers,  radio stations and  new  social  organisations 
have seen the light of day. 
The Sikasso region 
In the Sikasso region in the southern part of the country, confrontations between state 
representatives  and  farmers  have  been  more  articulate  than  elsewhere  in  the  country.  Immediately 
after  the  change  of  regime in March  1991,  farmers’  reckoned  with  the  most  hated  representatives 
of  the  state,  the  highly  repressive  forestry  service,  by  physical attacks on its members,  including 
in  some  cases  the  application of ‘necklaces’ of burning tyres. A few months  later,  farmers  formed 
an independent movement  and  presented the leading  agricultural  extension  agency,  CMDT 
(Compagnie  Malienne  pour  le  D6veloppement  des  Fibres  Textiles), with demands for influence 
on production and  marketing  policies.  Today  SYCOV  (Syndicat  des  Producteurs de Coton et 
Vivriers),  the  farmers’  movement,  has  subcommittees  in  most f the  region,  and it has managed 
to  obtain  representation  in the board  of  CMDT  and in all its subsections. 
Apart flom direct  confrontations  between  state  representatives  and  farmers,  changed  relations are 
also reflected in a  general rehsal by the  population  to pay taxes. Thus, for several  years  after 
1991 tax incomes in the region  went  down  to 30-40% of  government  claims.  Furthermore, it has 
become difficult for extension staff to  call  meetings, as villagers  no  longer  obey  the  orders of 
government  representatives  but  refuse  to  waste their time on meetings  without  a clear purpose. 
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Much  of the everyday  contacts  between  government  representatives  and fanners may  seem little 
affected  by the sometimes  dramatic  events  immediately &erthe change  of  regime,  but ; n p o m t  
changes  are  taking  place in the perception of the state  held  by the population.  The  experience  of 
being  able  to  raise  demands to the state  and  to  fight  back  against  repression  by  its  representatives 
has provided  at  least  part  of the population  with  a  confidence  in  their  ability to influence  the  state. 
While this is the  experience  of  some  people,  others  express  fear  for  the  changes  ancl  nostalgia  for 
the old days  when  state  representatives  ruled  and  people  followed.  Others again do not want to 
have  anything to do with the state  and  declare  to  be  able  to  do  entirely  without its services. 
Extension  agencies in the Sikasso region 
Different  people  relate  differently  to state agencies,  but the ways  agencies  have  historically 
interacted  with  the  population  also  vary  considerably. 
With  the  most  abundant  rainfall  pattern i Mali  and  fertile  soils,  the Sikasso region  accounts  for 
a  considerable  share of total  agricultural  production in the country.  Its  economic  importance, 
notably  related  to  its  substantial  production of cotton,  has  historically  been  reflected  in much 
more  attention  from  government  extension  services thanthat  received  by  less  prosperous  regions. 
Four  extension  agencies are involved in activities  related to management of natural  resources, 
hence  may  potentially  contribute  to  state-sponsored  assistance  to  improved  natural  resource 
management.  However,  their highly varying  performance - and  the  extremely  poor  performance 
by some  of  them - constitute  serious  constraints to such  a  contribution. 
They all refer to the same ministry, the Ministry of Rural Development and Environment 
(MDRE), but  have  different  mandates,  resources,  organisational  characteristics  and  very  different 
ways  of  relating  to  local  populations.  While  three  of  the  agencies  (namely the forestry  service,  the 
livestock  service  and the cooperative  service)  are  clearly  defined as government  agencies  (i.e. 
departments)  in MDRE, CMDT  has  a  particular status as both  a  public  agent  of the ministry  and 
a  private  sector  actor  with  economic  interests  in  cotton  production,  processing  and  marketing.  The 
extent to which CMDT shares the characteristics of other government agencies is further 
discussed in the empirical analysis, and its mixed status is taken into consideration in all 
comparisons  of  the  agencies. 
Since  the  1950s CMDThas pursued  a  strategy  of  integrated rural development  and has taken up 
a  wide  range  of  development  tasks. In addition  to  organisation of  all  aspects  of  production  and 
marketing  of  cotton, the agency is also responsible  for  extension  activities in relation to  cered 
production.  It is involved in the organisation  of  farmers at village  level,  it runs literacy  and 
account  courses,  and it has previously  had  an  important  role in provision of credits  and  of rural 
infrastructure  such as roads and water  supply. 
The foresm service was  a  very  active - and  extremely  repressive - agency  until  the  political 
changes in 1991. In the past  it  concentrated  almost  entirely  on  enforcement  of  forestry  laws. 
During the first years  after the change  of  regime its activities  came to a  virtual  standstill,  but in 
recent  years  it has gradually  resumed its tasks, now  with  emphasis  put on extension  activities. 
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The livestockservice, until  1992  part  of  CMDT,  has  traditionally  concentrated on supporting  the 
maintenance of draught  oxen for cotton  production. In recent  years there has  been  a shift of 
emphasis  towards animal production  and  water  supply,  while  large  parts of the  activities  related 
to  animal  health  have  been  privatised. In the  past  the  livestock  service  covered  a  substantial  share 
of even remote  villages  in  the  region.  Since it was dissociated  from  CMDT,  however, it has 
experienced  a  significant  reduction of resources  and  consequently of activities. 
The  mandate of the  Cooperative sewice, CAC,  greatly  overlaps with the activities undertaken by 
CMDT.  Given its general  lack  of  resources,  activities n the  Sikasso  region  are  few  and  scattered 
and  mainly  involve  a  limited  number of gardening  and  sheep-fattening  projects. 
CMDT  and  the  forestry  service  (until  1991)  represent th  two extremes with regard to their  way 
of interacting  with  local  populations.  Already  in the early  1970s,  CMDT  adopted  a  strategy of 
close  collaboration  with  farmers  with  a  view  to  gradually  off-load  many of its tasks on village- 
level  farmers’  associations.  The  forestry  service, on the other  hand, has sought  to  insulate  itself 
from  public  reactions  and  has dealt with  farmers in a top-dom and  often  highly  arbitrruy  way. 
Practices  used by the  livestock  service  and  the  cooperative  service  are  somewhere  in-between  the 
two  extremes.  Livestock agents have  more  discretion  than  most  other  government  staff  and  have 
sometimes  been  able to use  it  to  provide  highly  appreciated  services  to  farmers.  The  cooperative 
service is so crippled  by  lack  of  funds that farmers do not  bother  to  have any relations  to it at all. 
The period covered 
The  fieldwork  was  initiated  in  August  1993,  and the last visit  to  Sikasso was in  February  1996. 
The  description of the interaction  based on primary  data,  therefore, relates to a  period of about 
three years in the turbulent time after the change of regime. To understand the historical 
background for the findings,  the  presentation  of  the  context  both  regarding  Mali  and  the  Sikasso 
region  goes  back  to the early  years of colonialism,  while  emphasis is put on the  years  since  the 
change  of  regime in 1991.  Also, the analysis  of  the  characteristics of each of the  four  extension 
agencies is put in a  historical  perspective by references  to  their  situation  during  the  1970s  and 
1980s. 
Whereas it has been  attempted to extend the period  covered  back in time, the empirical  analysis 
stops by  mid-1996. After this time a  major  institutional  reform of the  MDRE  has  been  initiated 
resulting in the integration  of  agencies  belonging to the ministry  into an integrated  extension 
service.  As  implementation  of  the  reform  started  after th  last  fieldwork  had  been  carried out, it 
is only  briefly  mentioned,  and no analysis of its implications  has  been  attempted. 
Another  major  change  having  taken  place  after  the  fieldwork  was  finalised is the  implementation 
of  a  large  administrative  reform  replacing  former  arrondissements  by  new  communes  headed by 
elected  councils.  The  process of establishing new communes was initiated in mid-l995 and 
finalised by late  1996,  and  only in May  1999  elections to the  new rural councils have  been  held. 
While it is  possible that more  recent  data  on  the impact of this reform  would  have  changed  the 
analysis  of  social  forces in the Sikasso region, it has been  decided to let  also this analysis stop by 
the  period  covered by  primary data from  the  fieldwork. 
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Structure of the dissertation 
The dissertation has  two  main  parts:  a  theoretical  fiamework  and an empirical  analysis. 
The theoreticd section opens by a  review of central  theoretical  contributions  to  the  understanding 
of African state- society relations in chapter I .  Four main typologies are used to structure 
presentations  and  discussions  which  provide the background  for  a  more  thorough  investigation 
of  the interactive approach in chapter 2. 
Chapter 2 is structured  according to the  same four typologies  presented in chapter 1 and  contains 
a critical investigation of the contribution by the interactive  approach to the  understanding of 
African state-society  relations.  The  chapter  concludes  that  the  fiamework  provides  a  constructive 
theoretical point of departure for analysis of interaction  between  state  and  society. To provide 
guidelines for a specific empirical  investigation,  however, it has to be filled in by theories  at  a 
lower  level of abstraction. 
Dealing  with  the  disaggregated  concept of the state, chapter 3 introduces  organisation  theory  to 
operationalise the sketchy  framework  of  the  ‘anthropology  of  the  state’. A fiamework for analysis 
of  the  performance of government  agencies is established.  It  considers  both  a  range  of  contextual 
issues outside the control of the individual organisation (‘the action environment’, ‘the 
institutional context of the public sector’  and  ‘the  task  network‘)  and  a  range of organisation- 
specific  issues. 
As a  perspective of the analysis of agency  performance, chapter 4 discusses the disaggregated 
concept of society  with  a  view to establish  a h e w o r k  for  analysing  social  forces  interacting 
with  and influencing government  agencies. 
Guided  by the hypotheses  presented in the conclusion  to  the  theoretical  section, the empirical 
anaZysis opens by an analysis in chapter 5 of the ‘action  environment’ of Malian  government 
extension  agencies,  i.e.  the  degree  of  political  stability  and  legitimacy of the  government, the rate 
and structure of economic growth, and the human  resource  profile of the  country. 
The next step in the analysis of the  shared  environment of the  agencies is an assessment in 
chapter 6 of ‘the institutional context of the public  sector’. This includes an assessment of the 
budgetary support which significantly  influences  the  capacity of the  public  sector through its 
impact on salary levels and  funding for other recurrent  costs  and  capital  investments.  Other 
aspects  regard the overall  institutional  set-up of the public  sector, its management  practices and 
existing structures of formal  and  informal  influence. 
Chapter 7 and chapter 8 provide  the  background  for  analyses in chapter 9, 10 and 11 of the 
interaction between extension agencies and farmers in Sikasso. Chapter 7 gives a general 
description of the agro-ecological  and  socioeconomic  setting  in  the Sikasso region,  while  chapter 
8 deals with ongoing  social  and  political  changes in the region. 
While the shared  environment of the  agencies is analysed  in  chapter 5 and 6, chapter 9 contains 
a thorough analysis of organisational-specific  factors  which  condition the performance of each 
of the  four agencies.  Based on the conceptual  fiamework  established in chapter 3, the analysis 
1 1  
considers six main issues,  viz.  authority,  rewards,  organisational identification, peer pressure, 
work satisfaction by staff, and demand  pressure. The chapter  opens by a  brief portrait of the 
Ministry of Rural Development  and  Environment  describing the ‘task  network’ of the four 
agencies under study,  i.e. relations of  collaboration  and  coordination  among the agencies. 
Chapter IO presents  farmers’  assessment  of  services  provided by the agencies.  Based on a  village 
survey in ten villages in the Sikasso regioq the chapter  assesses  the  degree of demand  satisfaction 
by different groups of  farmers. The analysis  considers  frequency  and distribution of contacts 
between agencies and farmers,  reliability of services,  farmers’  assessment of the usefulness of 
services, and their description of personal  relations  between  extension agents and their clients. 
Providing  a  wider  perspective on the analysis  of  agency  performance, the final chapter I I deals 
with some of the societal forces interacting  with and influencing the agencies working in the 
region.  Based on the conceptual  framework  established  in  chapter 4, an analysis of the fanners’ 
movement SYCOV is carried  out o see if it corresponds to the definition of a ‘civil  association’. 
The existence of a particular set of ‘civil  norms’ is discussed  in  light  of answers obtained in the 
village survey. Finally, an analysis of possible  class-based  identities is carried  out. 
The two conclusions to the theoretical section and to the empirical section give  systematic 
accounts  of  conclusions to each of the chapters.  While  drawing on these, the final conclusion is 
not  structured as a  chapter-by-chapter  presentation of findings.  Instead, conclusions concerning 
main  points of the theoretical  framework  for  analysis of tate-society relations are presented  and 
illustrated by reference to empirical  findings.  Five  main  points  of the h e w o r k  are highlighted: 
1)  the concept of interaction, 2) the engagement-disengagement  framework, 3) the perception  of 
the state as both a multiplicity  of  structures  and  a  symbolic  totality, 4) the fi-amework for  analysis 
of performance by government agencies, and 5) the understanding of societal forces as 
characterised by a wide variety of movements,  networks,  groups,  cells and formal and informal 
organisations of which those trying to engage the state have  a  particular political potential. 
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SECTION I: THEORETICAL  FRAMEWORK 
SECTION  I : THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
Some  would  maybe  argue that an empirical  analysis of the highly  different  performance of four 
extension  agencies  does  not  require  much  more  than  the  selection of an appropriate  organisation 
theory  to  explain  why  performance of hierarchical,  centralised and insulated  organisations  such 
as the  forestry  service is inferior to that of more  flexible  and  client-oriented  organisations  such 
as CMDT. Others  would  claim that all it takes to understand the interplay  between  government 
bureaucracies  and rural communities in Sikasso is a  comprehension of the potential of the 
farmers’  movement  to  put  pressure on the  state. 
It is,  however, the ambition of the  present  dissertation to move  beyond  the  view  of  government 
agencies  only as organisations  serving  a  well-defined  group of clients.  Government  organisations 
are both organisations with particular characteristics and expressions of the abstract state. 
Similarly,  their  clients  (farmers)  are  social  forces  with  highly  different conditions and  strategies 
for interacting  with the state. It is, therefore, the objective  to  anchor the study  of  interaction 
between  extension  agencies  and  farmers in a discussion of the more  fundamental  nature  of 
Atiican state-society  relations  and to unpack  the  notions of both ‘state’  and  ‘society’ in order  to 
understand  their  mutual  interaction. 
When  perceiving of the state as both a  multitude of different  structures and an abstract  entity 
dependent  on  a  certain  amount of legitimacy in the  eyes  of societal groups, it is not  satisfactory 
to understand the four  extension  agencies  simply as four  different  organisations  with  each  their 
characteristics.  The  challenging  aspect  about their varying  performance is that they  are all part 
of the  same  state,  i.e.  part of a  larger  symbolic  totality.  While in some  respects  they may seem to 
be  fairly  independent units, they  are  also  highly  dependent on each  other  and on other  parts  of  the 
state,  both  with  regard  to  a  range of structural  features  and  with  regard  to  perception of them  held 
by the  population.  Similarly, an approach  that  concentrates on analysing the farmers’  movement 
as an expression of ‘farmers’,  i.e. all farmers’,  strategy vis-&vis the  state  would  miss  an  important 
dimension. If  the  farmers’  movement is not analysed as an expression of a  particular  kind of 
societal  forces that can  be  understood  only in relation to the state and in relation to the specific 
social  fabric  in the region  where it emerged,  there is a  serious risk of  misjudging  the  potential  of 
the  movement. 
It is the objeetive of the theoretical section  to provide a  conceptualframework for analysing the 
differences in interaction  between  government  agencies  and their clients as a  result of different 
pressures  being  exerted  upon  the  agencies. 
Based  on  the  hypothesis that these  pressures  are  conditioned both by their characteristics as part 
of the abstract  state, by their specific  organisational  characteristics and by the character  of  the 
social forces  with  which  they  interact, the theoretical  section  deals with three sets of issues, 
namely 
- how io understand overall state-society relations 
- how to analyse factors conditioning  the  performance of government agencies and 
- how to analyse societal forces that  interaci with and  influence  government agencies. 
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A  few  comments are necessary  about  the  understanding of ‘theory’  and  ‘theoretical  framework‘ 
that is guiding  analysis  and  discussions  in  the  following.  With  Nicos Muelis (who  builds  upon 
the work  by  Louis  Althusser),  a main distinction  can  be  made  between 
1) theory as a  tool to enquire  about social phenomena  (theory as a  ‘conceptual  framework’)  and 
2) theory as an end-product that establishes  universal  connections  or  laws  between  particular 
social phenomena  (‘substantive  theory’)  (Muezelis,  1995  p. 1-1 1,  p.  42). 
While the second type of theory,  substantive  theory,  can be  proved  empirically right or wrong, 
the first type,  the  conceptual h e w o r k ,  can  only  be  assessed  by its methodologically  linkages 
and the utility of the tools it offers  to an empirical  investigation  of  the  social  world. 
In the present dissertation it  is the  understanding of theory as ‘conceptual  framework‘  that is 
being applied.  The objective of the theoretical section is  to  generate  a  series of theoretically 
informed  research  questions  that  can  structure  the  empirical  investigation of nteraction  between 
extension  agencies  and  farmers in Sikasso. This implies  that  discussions by  no means  pretend  to 
be exhaustive in the sense that they  cover  all  relevant  issues  related  to  particular  phenomena. 
Instead,  they  should  be  seen as contributions  to the establishment of a  framework that points  out 
some questions to some phenomena that may or may  not turn out  to  be  useful in an empirical 
analysis. 
The  interactive  approach  presented  in  chapter 2 is a  clear  example  of  a  framework that does  not 
try  to  establish  universal  connections  or  laws  between  variables  and  phenomena under study  but 
provides  only  a set of guidelines for further  theoretical and  empirical  enquiry.  Contrary to this, 
many  of the  theories  about  state-society  relations  reviewed  in  chapter 1 ve  a  ‘substantive  theory 
character’, as they contain general  statements  about  e.g.  implications of clientilistic  relations in 
the African state,  profit  maximisation as a  universal  motive,  or  the Afican state as unable  to 
capture  the  peasantry.  Similarly,  contributions to organisation  theory  discussed in chapter 3 and 
to theories about social forces discussed in chapter  4  often  have  a  substantive  theory  character, 
but are used  to inspire the establishment of more open conceptual  frameworks. 
Within the ‘conceptual  framework’  understanding of theory,  a  distinction  can  be  made  between 
macro-level  and  middle-level theories that reflect  different  levels  of  abstraction. An abstract 
theoretical  framework  that  operates  with  notions of ‘state’  and  ‘society’  may  be  useful  as  a  point 
of departure for further theorising  about the different  parts  that  constitute  state nd society, but 
it is of liited direct  operational  use  for  a  specific  empirical  analysis.  Middle-level  theories that 
indicate  a  more  limited  empirical  context  for  the  relevance  of  the h e w o r k s  established  contain 
more  directly  applicable  tools  for an empirical  analysis.  The  attempt in chapter 3 to  operationalise 
the ‘anthropology of the state’ by use of organisation  theory  reflects  a  movement from abstract 
macro-level  theory to more specific  middle-level  theories  that  define  a  more l i i t e d  realm of 
relevance. Organisation theory, thus, can be considered a refinement of the very sketchy 
framework of the anthropology of the  state  presented by researchers  applying the interactive 
approach. 
It  should be noted that it has been  decided  to  concentrate on the  study of state-society  relations, 
i.e. Mali-internal  relations,  whereas  external  factors are dealt  with  neither  theoretically  nor  in  the 
empirical  analysis. This does  not  reflect  the  view that external  relations  are  not  important  and do 
not influence the interplay  between state agencies  and  farmers.  The  economic  dependency of Mali 
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on the international cotton market and on economic trends in CBte d’Ivoire are but two 
expressions of the relevance of considering  also  external  factors.  The  decision,  therefore,  has  been 
made  only with a  view  to  focus on those  relations  that  fiom  the  beginning of the  study  have  been 
my main interest. 
The  section  opens  by a review of central  theoretical  contributions  to  the  understanding of &can 
state-  society  relations in chapter 1. Four main typologies  are  used  to  structure  presentations  and 
discussions that provide the background for a  more  thorough  investigation of the  interactive 
approach  in chapter 2. 
Chpter 2 is  structured  according to the  same  four  typologies that are  presented in chapter  1  and 
contains a critical investigation of the contribution by the interactive approach to the 
understanding of African  state-society  relations.  The  chapter  concludes that the  framework 
provides  a  constructive  theoretical  point of departure  for  analysis  of  interaction  between  state  and 
society  but  that it has to be  filled in by theories  at  a  lower  level of abstraction in order  to  provide 
guidelines for a specific empirical  investigation. 
Chapter 3 that deals with  the  disaggregated  concept  of  the state introduces  organisation  theory 
to operationalise the sketchy  framework of the  ‘anthropology  of  the  state’.  A h e w o r k  is 
established  for an analysis of the  performance of government  agencies  that  considers  both  a  range 
of contextual  issues  outside  the  control  of  the  individual  organisation  (‘the  action  environment’, 
‘the  institutional  context of the  public  sector’  and  ‘the  task  network‘)  and  a  range of organisation- 
specific  issues. 
As  a  perspective of the analysis of performance by  government  agencies, chapter 4 discusses  the 
disaggregated  concept of society  with  a  view  to  establish  a e w o r k  for  analysing  social  forces 
that  interact with and  influence  government  agencies. 
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CHAPTER 1. APPROACHES TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF AFRICAN STATE- 
SOCIETY  RELATIONS 
Introduction 
During  the  recent 40 years, an intense  debate on &can  state-society  relations has resulted in a 
wide  range of higbly  different  theories. To a certain extent the sequencing of new theories  has 
reflected  international  economic  and  political  trends.  Thus,  optimistic  assessments ofthe potential 
for  state-managed  development  in  the  first  two  decades  after  political  independence  were  replaced 
by severe  theoretical  attacks on the  African  state during the  economic crisis in the 1980s. Later 
negative  consequences of structural adjustment  policies  provoked  more  positive  reconsiderations 
of the role of the state. And  recently  processes of popular  protest and political reforms  have 
inspired arenewed theoretical  interest  in  the  area  between  the  state  and  society,  notably  expressed 
in the  growing  interest in the concept  of  ‘civil  society’. 
Much of the theoretical  debate,  however,  cuts  across this historical  sequencing and rather relates 
to  different  interpretations  of  the  same  empirical  phenomena. In the present chapter a  number of 
contributions  to  the  debate are reviewed  in  order  to  assess  weaknesses  and  insights.  The  relatively 
thorough review is considered  necessary to move  beyond the simplicity that characterises  the 
general  debate. This appears  to  derive  from a tendency  of  many  contributions to concentrate  either 
on analyses of the state or  on  analyses  of  society,  whereas  attempts  to  understand  interrelations 
are  few.  By  discussing  these  deficiencies, the review  provides  the  background for investigating 
the  interactive  approach  in  chapter 2. The  interactive  approach  builds  upon  contributions  to  state- 
oriented  and  society-oriented  theories,  but it is still  a  new and not  very  elaborate h e w o r k ,  and, 
therefore, it can be  difficult  to  understand its implicit  or  explicit  opposition  to other contributions 
and its qualitatively  different  approach  without  a  review of previous  contributions. 
Various attempts have  been  made  to goup the many  different  approaches in order to establish 
an overview  over  central  controversies. In the  following  four  typologies  that  are  found  particularly 
relevant to sketch the main limes  of the  debate will be  presented  and  discussed.  The  typologies, 
either  suggested in the  literature  or  used by  me to  summarise  important  disagreements and areas 
of consensus,  are  presented  under  the  following  headings: 
1. State  vs.  societal-oriented  approaches 
2. Approaches  based on a  state-society  dichotomy  vs.  approaches  questioning the dichotomy 
3. Focus on state autonomy  vs.  focus on state/society  capture 
4. Actor-oriented  vs.  structure-oriented  approaches 
They  are  found usell because  they  deal  with  four  very  fundamental  questions for any  theorising 
about  state-society  relations,  namely 
- whether the influence of one  of  the  categories on the other  party is particularly  important 
- whether it ,is relevant at all to  distinguish  between the analytical  concepts of state and  society 
- whether the two categories are best  perceived of as highly  autonomous or closely l i e d  
- and  whether an actor-oriented  or  a  structure-oriented  perspective s most suitable for the analysis 
of their mutual  interaction. 
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It should be  noted that the  fourth  typology,  actor-oriented  vs.  structure-oriented  approaches, 
differs from the three others, as it does not relate specifically to the issue of  relations  between 
state  and  society. It represents  a  crosscutting  perspective  that  applies to all social  science  theories 
regardless  of  their  level  of  abstraction. The reason  for  including it here is that positions in this 
controversy  have  obvious  implications for understanding  state-society  relations. 
While the above-mentioned  questions are considered  appropriate  starting points for an enquiry 
into the nature of state-society  relations, it is not the intention to attempt  a  combination of the 
typologies  into  a  coherent  model for classification  of  theories.  Multidimensional models tend to 
lose  many  theoretical  nuances in their  effort to make  theories fit a  matrix',  and it is judged more 
fruitful to use the four  typologies  only as entrance points in their own right to a  theoretical 
enquiry. 
This implies that there is no systematic  attempt to relate the contributions  dealt  with to all the 
typologies.  While this would  have  been  possible in the  case  of  the  structure-agency  typology, it 
does  not  make  sense e.g. to squeeze  all the theories  dealt  with  into  the rather narrow  autonomy- 
capture typology.  Instead,  the  various  contributions are presented  only  where  they  are  found 
illustrative  of  theoretical  dividing  lines. 
Given the purpose of the present  chapter of providing  background for the discussion of the 
interactive  approach  in  the  next  chapter,  only  a  brief  presentation of pr minent  exponents of the 
various  theories will be  made  here. It should  be  stressed,  therefore, that the chapter by no means 
seeks to do justice to all the  insight  contained in the  various  contributions. 
Although it has  been  attempted to concentrate on theories  developed in relation to the African 
context,  a  few  contributions that draw on lessons  from  Asia  and  Latin  America  have  been  found 
useful as illustrations  of  the  main l i e s  of debate.  Theories  that  concentrate on Francophone  West 
Africa are particularly well-represented as it has been considered important to explain my 
reservations  against  most  of  these  theories that otherwise  could  have  been  seen as relevant to a 
study of state-society  relations in Mali. 
1.1. State-oriented vs. society-oriented theories 
The most commonly  presented  typology of theories about Aliican state-society  relations is the 
distinction  between, on the one  hand, theories that  focus on the impact of societal forces on the 
state and, on the  other  hand,  theories that focus on the impact of the state on societal  processes 
(e.g.  Grindle  and  Thomas, 1989; Healey and Robinson, 1992; Rothchild  and  Chazan, 1988; 
Martinussen, 1992). Although  descriptions  of the two approaches  vary, it is a common  feature 
that society-oriented  approaches are seen as theories  analysing the state as aproduct of societal 
struggles,  while  state-oriented  (or statist) approaches  regard  the  state as an independent actor. 
' For an example  of  a  multidimensional  model of theories  about  the  state,  see Martinussen, 1992 p. 9-12,  where 
theories me classified  according to three parameters:  1)  their  understandin of the state as either an actor in its own 
ri$t or an arena for interaction  and  conflict  between  contending  socia  forces 2) their  character as either  state- 
onented  or  society-oriented  and 3) their  understanding of the  state as either  a  manifestation of structures or a product 
of  class  struggles. 
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1.1.1. Society-oriented theories 
Society-oriented theories dominated the debate in the 1960s and 1970s. Despite significant 
differences the many  marxist-  and  structuralist-inspired  theories  shared  a  view of policy  changes 
as a  result of power relations  and  competition  among  individuals,  groups  and  classes  in  society 
rather than the result of interactions  and  perceptions of policy  elites2.  The  highly  influential 
dependency  theories grew out of the Latin  American  structuralist  tradition  and  gained  widespread 
popularity also among  researchers  focussing on Africa3.  It  added an international  perspective  to 
state-society  analyses as it saw  the  African state not only as a product of national  social  forces  but 
to a  large  extent as a  superstructure  determined by its ‘extra-societal  base’4. An important  part  of 
the  debate dealt with the implications for accumulation  processes  and  the  role  of the state  of 
external  relations and the absence of ‘clearly  articulated  classes’  (notably  a  national  bourgeoisie 
and  a  working class)’. 
1.1.2. State-oriented  theories 
The  severe  economic  crisis in the 1980s and  dissatisfaction  with  apparent  deficiencies of ocietal- 
oriented theories made  many  researchers turn to more state-oriented approaches. Instead  of 
seeking  economic and  structural  explanations  to  the  crisis, it was  now  a  common  conclusion  that 
most of the calamities experienced during that  decade  were  attributable  to  the  state or more 
specifically to state  bureaucrats  and state leaders.  Sharing  a  view  of the state as the driving  force 
behind  processes  of  social  and  economic  change,  a  wide  range of hi hly  different  versions of the 
approach has been presented. It has been  suggested that a  main  distinction  can be made  between 
the organic approach and  the configurational approach (Chazan  et  al.,  1992  p.  40-41).  Whereas 
the  organic approach views the state as directly  influencing  social  and  economic  processes,  the 
configurational  approach  sees  the  impact  of  the  state a  more  indirect by its provision  of  the main 
framework in which  social  groups form and  political  action  is  made  possible.  The  African  debate 
and in particular the debate about the state in Francophone  West Afiica has  been  dominated by 
the organic statist approach6, whereas the configurational  approach  has  been  applied  mainly  in 
relation  to the East Asian  and  Latin  American  economies  and  has  had  only  indirect  implications 
for the understanding of African  state-society  relations.  As  a  special  version of the organic 
approach also the so-called  ‘New Political Economy’ will be  discussed  below. 
’ For examples of the application  of  a  structuralist  perspective on the  sfudy  of  state-society  relations i  Mali,  see 
Meillassoux,  1970;  Amselle,  1985;  Bagayogo,  1987;  Amselle & Gregore, 1987. 
’ For aprominent example,  see Samu Mi, 1979. 
See e.g. Martinussen,  1980. 
‘The  Kenya  debate’  was  a  heated  discussion  among YsFchers in thejate 1970s  about  whether  capitalistic 
development is poss!ble III the  ‘penphery’ of the world cap1tahtsgem. An qnportant  aspect of the  debate was ,the 
discussion  about  an  mternal  capltallst  class as a  necessary or a S clent  mn&tlon for capltahst growth (for  a renew 
ofthe debate, see Leys, 1996ap. 143-154). 
For a  few of a large number of examples of the  a  plication of the organic  approach to analyses  of  Francophone 
West A6ican countries, see e.g. Giri, 1993;  Otaye!!,  1989. 
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‘The organic approach 
It is a  general  feature of researchers  writing  along  the limes of the organic  approach  that  they t nd 
to  emphasize the total  inability  of the Afiican state to undertake  policies  that  reflect the long-term 
interests  of  society  in  general.  They  either emphasize the absence of relations  between state and 
society  or they stress the person-based character  of these relations. In the latter case, politics is 
seen as a game  played  by individuals  and  groups who are pursuing their various self-interests by 
invading the state eitherfrom outside  (through  clientilistic  networks) orfrom above  (the  invasion 
of the bureaucracy by political leaders). 
The following key characteristics of the African state are  generally  highlighted as particularly 
important: 
- power is highly  centralised  and the coercive  apparatus  plays  a  central  role  in  attempts to control 
ethnic,  regional,  religious  and  other  particularisms. 
- patron-client relations form the basis of power at all levels of the state apparatus. Big  men 
provide  their  followers  with  access to state resources which  makes institutionalisation of power 
difficult and leads to arbitrariness and a tendency to authoritarianism (Midard, 1991a p. 339; 
Callaghy, 1987 p. 90;  Sandbrook,  1985 p. 93-94). 
- the  state  is  a  major  avenue of upward mobility as access to the state means access to economic 
resources  (Callaghy,  1987 p.  89). 
Differences  between the contributions  are  reflected  in the labelling of the  state as either  predatory, 
patrimonidneo-patrimonial or characterised by personal rule’. Among  researchers  that  point to
the absence of state-society relations the notion ofpredatory  state has sometimes been  used to 
describe a purely bureaucratic structure completely cut off from society’. Researchers that 
emphasize the patrimonial character of the Afiican state represent a  different position as they 
stress the close person-based relations between  bureaucrats and wider social interests’.  Medard 
has suggested  that he particular  combination of traditional  and  modem  (especially  bureaucratic) 
characteristics  of the African state is better captured by the term ‘nm-patrimonialism’ (Midard, 
1991ap. 331-333,  p.335).  Finally,  researchers  who stress the dependency ofthe bureaucracy on 
political  leaders  rather  than on societal  groups  suggest  that the termpersonal  rule  is used instead 
’ Even  pathological  terms  such as e.g. cleptocratic  (e.g.  Bayart,  1993  p.  88) or pathological  patrimonialism  (e.g. 
Ergas,  1987  p. 9)  have  been  used. 
See e.g. Darbon,  1990;  Darbon,  1991.  According to Dominique  Darbon,  only  a  small  bureaucratic  elite  benefits 
from the  existence  of  a  state as they  e  loit  public  positions  to  their  personal  advanta  e  they  live  as  ‘predators’ 
on the  rest of society.  The  state, thergore, IS best  understood as nothing but a  simpfe  bureaucratic  structure of 
return the services necessary to justify its existence (Mtdard, 1990 p. 28). His analysis, however, differs 
exploitation. Mtdard uses  the  term  ‘predatory state’ to describe  a  state  which is nounshed by  society  but  does  not 
considerably  from the one  proposed  by  Darbon as it will  appear  below. 
The  concept  of  patrimonialism is derived  from the defmition  by  Max  Weber  of  a  particular  form of traditional 
domination  where  an  individual ruer is subject to obedience  from  both  clan  members  and  a  wider  network  of  clients. 
It  is a highly personalised form of  rule  based  partly on tradition  and  partly  on arbiixq case to case  decisions.  It  is 
a  central  feature of pabimonialism that a  clear  distinction  between  private  and  public nghts and  properties  does  not 
exist. According to Zaki Ergas, African states despite differences in ideologies, economic development and 
the patrimonial  characteristics of the African  state  include  e.g.  Callaghy,  1986;  Callaghy,  1987;  Callaghy,  1988; 
leadership  style  all  have  a  ‘patrimonial  core’  in  common (Ergas, 1987  p.5).  Other  contributions  to he  theories  about 
Clapham,  1982. 
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to portray the highly  personalised form of rule found in Africa”  (Sandbrook,  1985;  Jackson & 
Rosberg,  1982a). 
‘The New Political  Economy’ 
The  so-called  neoclassical  counter  revolution or New PoZiticuZEconomy  that in the  1980s  became 
very  influential in the debate about the  role of the African  state  represents aparticular  variation 
of the  organic  approach”.  Although t is theoretical  framework  does  not  explicitly offer a  theory 
about the state as it is primarily  occupied  with  economic  processes,  considerations  about  the  role 
of the state constitute  a  core  element of the theories. 
It  differs  from  the  above-mentioned  contributions  by its emphasis on profit-maximisation  as  the 
prime  motive of economically-calculating  individuals  and  interest  groups,  whereas the particular 
African characteristics of clan and ethnic based  networks  stressed by authors  such as Mkdard, 
Callaghy  and  Sandbrook  are of limited  importance  to  the  analysis.  However, it shares  with  these 
authors an understanding of the state as  invaded  from  outside,  hence  state-society  relations  are 
seen as primarily  mediated  through  individuals  and  interest  groups  penetrating the state  with  a 
view to appropriate its resources.  According to the New  Political  Economy,  a  complete  capture 
of the state by  narrow  interests  prevents it from  maintaining  interests of the  ‘general  public’. To 
achieve their objectives various  interest  groups use a  wide  range of means  to  extract  benefits 
(rents) from the state. Likewise,  political leaders and  bureaucrats  (elected  and  unelected  public 
officials) are seen as purely  self-interested  their  major  concern  is  to  remain in power  where  they 
derive rents from  providing  favourable  access to public  goods  to  the  various  interests  groups  (the 
theories are critically  discussed  in e.g. Toye, 1992; Grindle & Thomas, 1989; Killick 1989: 
Manor, 1991; Sindzinge, 1996). 
‘The  configurational  approach’ 
The configurutionul approach differs  from the organic  approach by a more  positive  view  of  the 
state, as it considers a  strong  and  active  developmental state12 a  precondition for economic 
de~elopment’~. A  major  work within this line of thought is the  book  “Bringing  the state back  in” 
(Evans et al., 1985), written as a  reaction  both to society-oriented  theories  and  to  the  then 
Clientiliic ties are seen as personal  networks  that  forces  bureaucrats  to  act  according  to  the  will  of  the  ersonal 
ruler, whereas  societal  groups are influencing  the  behaviour  of  the  state  mainly through ethnic  and  familial Yoyalties 
to  the  ‘prince’,  ‘autocrat’,  ‘prophet’ or ‘tyrant’  (Jackson & Rosberg,  1982a). 
Afican context aftasobert Bates  in the  early  1980s  applied  them to  a  study  on  agricultural  marketing  interventions 
‘ l  Originally develo ed in analyses of  industrialised  countries, public  choice  theories  gained  importance  in an 
(Bat?,  1981).  According to Bates,  rent-seeking activities are especially  detrimental  to the A f i m  state and the 
solutlon  recommended  was  to  roll  back  the  state:  to  abolish  marketing  boards,  devaluate  currencies  and  cut  down 
public activities to the extent  ossible.  The  influence  of the analysls  has  been  reflected  in  the  way  adjustment 
promoters  (the  World Bank andhF) at least  in  the  initial  phases  (1980  to  1988)  have  approached  reform  processes 
m the  majority  of  African  countries  (Engberg-Pedersen  et al., 1996). 
The  notion‘of  ‘the  developmental  state’  was ineoduced by  Chalmers  Johnson in a  study on Japan to describe  a 
state  characterised bv stable  rule bv a  uolitical  bureaucratic  elite  that  eniovs  a  substantial  autonomv.  The  conceut 
has  been  further detelo ed  by  autl;ors’such as Alice  Amsden, Gordon W t e ,  Robert  Wade  and  P&er  Evans (fsr 
a  further  discussion of tE e  concept,  see  e.g.  Lauridsen,  1992;  Lefhvbich,  1994;  Rapley,  1994). 
~~~~~ ~ ~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~ ~ ~~~~ 
I’ It should be note  that  Richard  Sandbrook,  mentioned  above as representin  an  organic  approach to the  study of 
state-society  relations, in a  more  recent  book  shares  with the configurationafapproach  the view  of  effective state 
intervention as a  prerequisite  for  sustained  capital  accumulation  (Sandbrook,  1993). 
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prevailing view of the state as an obstacle  to  economic  development.  The  authors  wanted  to 
introduce a more actor-oriented perspective on the role of the state, and they wanted to 
demonstrate that effective  state  intervention is a  prerequisite  for  sustained  capital  accumulation 
(Skocpol,  1985  p.4-5  and  p. 20). 
Whereas  society-oriented  approaches  tend  to see states as political  expressions of class  interests 
and  conflicts,  the  configurational  approach h u n s  the  analysis  upside-down  and  sees  the  formation 
of interest  groups as depending in significant  measures on the  structures  and  activities  of  the  state: 
state structures and  activities  condition  or  configurate  what may  seem to be  purely  socioeconomic 
phenomena  (Skocpol,  1985  p. 25-27). To the  extent  that  state  structures  are  affected by non-state 
factors,  the authors deny  the  relevance of general  theories  about  relations  between  the  social 
formation  and the state  and  instead  call  for  specific  analyses  of  historical and  geopolitical  factors 
that have  shaped structures of  a  particular state14 (Skocpol,  1985  p. 28). 
When trying to understand the role of a specific  state, the Configurational  approach  focuses on 
two core  concepts: state capacity and state  auronomy. State autonomy  refers  to the formulation 
and pursuance of goals by the state which  are  not  simply  reflective of the  demands of interests 
of social  groups,  classes, or society.  Conditions for state autonomy  may  either  be  divisions within 
dominant  interest groups or  special  loyalties (e.g. ethnic  loyalties)  that  bind  together those who 
control the state apparatus  and  separate  them fkom powerful  external  constituencies 
(Rueschemeyer & Evans,  1985  p.65).  State  capacity is the ability of the  state to implement  the 
goals (Skocpol, 1985 p. 9). The key to the state's capacity is the existence of an  effective 
bureaucratic machinery,  while  other  conditions  include  plentiful  financial  resources  and  sheer 
sovereign  integrity of a  given  temtory Fueschemeyer & Evans,  1985  p.51;  Skocpol,  1985  p. 16). 
Also later contributions to  theories  based on the configurational  approach  have  mainly  been 
oriented  towards  analyses  of  Asian  and  Latin  American  countries,  but the influence of the 
approach on the Afiican debate  has  not  been  insignificant.  Thus,  the  problems  of  African 
development  processes  have  often  been  explained  by  the  lack  of the very  same  factors that have 
contributed to  the success of  many Asian  economies:  a  high  degree  of  state  autonomy  and  a 
coherent and efficient bureaucratic  state organisati~n'~. 
It  should  be  noted that more  recent  contributions by authors  writing  along the lines  of  the 
configurational  approach  have  tended to soften  up the issue  of  state  autonomy.  Some  now  use  the 
concept of 'governed  interdependence' to describe the need  for close links between the state 
14 For  an  example  of  such  analyses of specific conditio? for the formation  of states, see Nordhaug 1996 whFe the 
autonomy  of  the  Taiwanese  state IS related  to the Guommgdang  control of  the state  apparatus an the  msolatlon  of 
Guomingdang  fiom  other  ethnic  groups,  while  the  capacity  of  the state is  partly explmed by the  inflow of foreign 
military  aid as a  consequence of the  geopolitical  position of Taiwan. 
In a further development of the M e w o r k  Evans n@es a  direct  comparison  of  African  deficiencies to Asian 
strengths  focussing  on  autonomy  and  capaclty of the vanous states.  He suggests that state charactenstics can be seen 
g along  a  continuum  from  predatory to develo  mental states. In one  end  of the spectrum Zaire  exemplifies 
a  r tory state that totally lacks autonomy as well as E ureaucratic M aci  whereas  South  Korea in the  other  end 
ofthe spectrum has a  considerable  degree of autonomy  and  a  high P y  e 2. c m t  bureaucratic  organisation  (Evans, 
1989). 
s vz 
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bureaucracy  and  business  elitesI6  (Weiss & Hobson, 1995 p. 138). Evans has gone  one  step 
further  and  stresses  the n ed for close  connections  not  only  between  the state and business elites 
but also between  the  state  and  a  broader  range of groups  and classes17 (Evans, 1995 p.234-235, 
p.247-250). 
Discussion 
A main problem of society-oriented theories is their lack of analysis of what goes on inside the 
state apparatus, i.e. the inner workings of power politics. The attempts to refer all state 
characteristics  to  societal  dynamics  and  to  generalise  about  state  features  and  functions  shared by 
all states  within  a  mode  of  production  or  a  position in the world  capitalist  system fail to  explain 
the significant differences between states belonging to the same theoretically constructed 
category.  Furthermore,  the  preoccupation  with  modes of production  and classes as the relevant 
concepts in analysis  of  societal  characteristics  downplays  the  political  importance of other social 
cleavages such as e.g. ethnic  and  regionally-based  conflicts. 
The organic approach, including  the New Political  Economy, suffers from the inverse problem: 
it tends  to  neglect  socioeconomic  factors and  instead  refer all explanations  for  present  conditions 
in Africa  to the state,  state  policy  and  reactions to state  actions.  It  represents  a  highly  top-down 
perspective that concentrates on what  goes  on i  and  around  the  presidential  palace,  while  societal 
actors are only considered  relevant  to  the  analysis in so far as they  make  part of the  destructive 
forces  that  penetrate he state  apparatus  for  their  own  benefit”.  Hence,  societal  actors  are  not  seen 
as capable of influencing state structures  and  policy  processes  in  ways that could  possibly 
strengthen the capacity  of  the  state.  The  view  that all social actors are  guided by narrow motives 
of either  profit-maximisation or political  and  economic  influence  to  clan  or  ethnic-based  networks 
results in an extremely instnunental understanding of politics.  Hence,  politics is seen as a zero- 
sum game  played for the personal  benefit of those involved  where the most successful manage 
to create structures of domination  that  allow  them  to  reap  personal  gains t the expense of the 
losers, i.e. the majority  of the population. 
The  approach  shares  with t e society-oriented  theories the problem of not  being  able to explain 
the many differences between African states. While society-oriented theories ignore the 
The  dichotomy of states  versus  markets  that  dominated  earlier  analyses  have  increasingly  been  replaced  by the 
emphasis of the potential  syner  between  states  and  markets Wess & Hobson,  1995  p.  138).  Whereas  previous 
contributions  stressed  the neegor the  state to provide  disci  jined su port  for  the  market,  Linda  Weiss  uses  the 
concept of ‘governed  interde  endence’  to  descnbe  not  only %e need &r l i s  between the state and the business 
communit&but also $e  need P or a strong business  community. As she  expresses  it:  “Bringing the state  back  in  does 
not entail ckm  socle@  back out” p e w  & Hobson,  1995  p.  138;  Weiss,  1995:  Weiss  in a  lecture  given on 1  June 
1995  during a i$ordic researcher w i n g  course  held  in  Humlebaek,  Denmark). 
the  state  and the pnvate sector, is necessary for  the  state to implement its olicies  (Evans,  1989  575  576,  p.  582). 
”Already in  1989  Evans  concluded  that  ‘embedded  autonomy’,  meaning  the  existence  of  institutional l i i  between 
In a more  recent  contriiution he  stresses  that  the  state  needs  to  develoD a $ense  network of ties k t  bi it  to  societal 
allies consisting not just of elite oups As he  puts  it:  “Even  the m06 bureaucratically  coherent  state  cannot  effect 
transformation’without  a networfof ti& to soclal groups and  classes  with  which  it  shares a project.  Connectedness 
is as important as coherence and  cohesion”  (Evans,  1995  p.  248-249). 
city  andypalace  politics, he readlly a h t t e d  that III his opinion this is  where the important art of olitics takespice. 
At m direct  question  to  M+iard  whether  he,could  subscribe  to  the  view of his  theories as focussing  on  ca  ital 
He  did  not  see any point in carrying out  village-level  studies  since  people  in  remote ruraf)areas Rave a very  llmited 
influence  on  polltics  (Medard,  lecture  given o 24  October  1995  dunng  a  Nordic  researcher  training  course  held 
in Jylliige, Denmark). 
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differences  resulting fiom the  specific  character of state  internal  power struggles and  alliances, 
the  organic  approach  concentrates  on  exactly this and disregard fundamental differences in 
historical and socioeconomic  conditions. 
m e  conjigurational  approach seems to have  considerably  more  to  offer in an analysis  of  state- 
internal  dynamics as it replaces  the  focus  on  personal ties by a  more  structural  analysis  of state 
organisations and their interactions with other social organisations. The concepts of state 
autonomy  and  state  capacity  allow an analysis  of state power  that  goes  beyond  the fatalistic view 
of  the state by the  organic  approach as inevitably  condemned to poor  performance. 
In its earlier  version,  however,  the  configurational  approach  shares  with  the  organic  approach the 
limitation of not  being  able to analyse  the  importance of societal  actions for the features  and 
functions of the  state.  When  disregarding  interactions  between  the  state  and  societal  agents  (other 
than business elites), this version  applies  a  top-down  perspective and has  a limited analytical 
potential for understanding  the  role  of  social  forces.  Recent  revisions,  notably  by  Evans,  have 
remedied this problem.  His  description of state-society  relations  as  mutually  constituting each 
other,  sometimes by reinforcing  each  other  and  sometimes by weakening each other,  bear  much 
resemblance to the  interactive  approach  that is presented in the  next  chapter. 
1. 2. Approaches based on a state-society dichotomy vs. approaches questioning the 
dichotomy 
Whereas the theories  presented  above  are all based  on the assumption that it is fruitful  and 
possible to operate  with an analytical  distinction  between  the  concepts of state and  society, a 
number of otherwise  highly  different  approaches  share  the  characteristic  that  they  either  implicitly 
or explicitly question  the  state-society  dichotomy.  Many  schools  of thoughts and  individual 
authors can be counted  in this group,  including the political  systems  approach of the 1950s and 
1 9 6 0 ~ ’ ~  and the theory of ‘&atisation’  and  ‘d6s6tatisation’  by  Jean-Franqois  M6dardzo  that  are  both 
stressing the fluidity ofthe limits  between  state  and  society.  The  following  presentation,  however, 
concentrates on two approaches which both represent valuable contributions to the issues 
subsequently  discussed  in  relation  to  the  interactive  approach. 
imprecise  and  excluded im ortant aspects of the  political  process.  Instead the  concept of political  system was found 
Thepolitical systems approach argued the  abandoning  of  the  concept of the  state on the g~ounds that  it  was  too 
more  suitable to examine $e complex  interaction  between  society  and  government  inshtutions.  With  the  ambition 
to  develop a  grand  theory  applicable to all  political systems, David  Easton  presented  a  model  describing  the  mutual 
influence by society  and  the  political system (Easton, 1965  p.6-S and p.  25-33).  While h y i n g  the  usefulness of the 
concept  of  state,  the  theory  operates  on  the  remlse  that  it IS possible to analytically  separate  political  life rom its 
social environment  (Easton,  1965 p.  18 an8p. 21-25). This has  made  critics of the ap  roach  oint  out  that  it  does 
nothing  but  replace  the  roblems of state  limits by the  problem of how  to  define  the h i t s  orthe political  system 
(Mitchell,  1991  p.  79-Sf). 
Mdard who  has  been  presented  above as an  important  contributor to state-oriented  theories in fact  operates  with 
a very fluid distinction between state and society, based,on an und,erst,and!ng of the state as a process of 
institutionalisation of power - ‘6tatisation’  -rather %an a  gwen  set of mtltutlons. The  pFocess of.&ataation is 
described as a  process  of  reducing  the  number of ohttlcal units  and  a  correspondmg extension of thelr  dunenslons 
in the sense that relations  between institutions are\ecoming  increasingly rulebound (M&rd, 1991b p.  357;  Lund, 
the sphere of the state. The process can move both ways: power can become increasingly. m$tutionaliied 
1995  p.  33).  State-society  relations, in other  words,  can  be  seen as an  ongomg  process of increaseg OF decreasing 
(&atisation), or the  central  power can lose  control  over s o c d  and  economic  processes  (des6tahsatlon)  (Medard, 
power.  Power  relations  are  increasingly  governmentalised in the sense that  they  are  elaborated,  rationalised  and 
1991b  p.  363-364). This view  comes very close to the defmition by Foucault of the state as a  mode  of  exercise  of 
p. 272-274). 
centralised in the form of or under  the  auspices  of  state institutions (for  a  discussion of this  view,  see  Ferguson,  1990 
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The strategic  relation approach 
Thejirsf group of theories  can  be labelled fhe strategic relation approach. Researchers in this 
group  have  attacked  the  idea of distinguishing  between  what they  consider  two  deeply  intertwined 
parts of a whole. The concept of the state  should  not  be  abandoned,  but  attempts to identify its 
borders are inevitably bound  to  be  futile as the state-society  divide  exists  inside  all  realms  of 
practice. 
Thus, Bob Jessop and  Timothy Mitchell, contributing to general  debates  about  the  abstract 
concept of the  state,  criticise both statist  and  societal  approaches for implying  that  state  and 
society  exist as independent entities which  are  fully  constituted,  internally  coherent,  mutually 
exclusive and that one always  unilaterally determines the other  (Jessop, 1990 p. 287; Mitchell, 
1991  p. 88). This  is a false  dichotomy,  they  argue, as states  never  achieve full closure  or  complete 
separation  from  society  and  their  precise  boundaries  are  usually in doub?’  (Jessop,  1990  p.  342, 
346,351,361; Mitchell, 1991  p.90). 
In their  view,  theories  that  operate  with an analytical  distinction  between  the  concepts  of  state  and 
society are unable to capture the overlap  between  state  and  society  in the form  of  corporatism, 
policy networks, joint involvement of state  and private institutions in the  financial  sector,  in 
schooling, health care,  scientific  research,  etc.  (Jessop,  1990  p. 288; Mitchell,  1991  p.  90). 
Peter  Geschiere  who has applied the approach to the study  of the  African  state  furthermore  reacts 
against the idea of some  authors  that  it  is possible for any societal  agents  to  move  outside  the 
‘sphere of the state’  or to make  use  of an ‘exit  option’ in relation to the state. It is  wrong,  he 
argues, to believe that  informal  networks  are  located outside the state. The success of a person 
in the so-called i n f o d  sector  depends to a large extent on his or her  relations  to the state.  The 
same  goes  for  e.g.  the  possibilities of smuggling:  only  people  with  strong  relations  to  government 
officials  can expect to be  successful (Geschike, 1990  p.  157-158). 
Discursive  construction of the state 
The  second upproach questions the relevance of the state-society  dichotomy  from a completely 
different  angle.  Focussing  on the discursive  construction of the state,  Akhil  Gupta  argues  that  in 
a third  world context boundaries are blurred by the lack of distinction  between  the  role of 
government  agents as public servants and as private  citizens  and by the style of operation  applied 
by  government agents.  Contradictory  behaviour of multiple  layers  and  diverse  locales  and  centres 
of the state confuse the  image of the state held  by the population  and  make  the  categories of 
‘state’  and  ‘civil  society’  inadequate.  He discusses comption as an example  of  such a mixture 
of roles  and  practices of government  agents  which  strongly  affects thepercepfion of  the  state by 
the population  (Gupta,  1995 p. 384,  p.391). 
21 Jesso insists with  Gramscj on a  perception of the se in  its  inclusive  sense as olitical  society and civil  society. 
He de&es the state as: “a &+nct V b l e  of insutut1ons  and or izations w R ose. socially  acce ted function is 
to defme  and  enforce,  collectwely  bindmg  decisions  on  the mem ers of a society in the  name optheir common 
interests or general wdl” (Jessop,  1990  p.  341).  Mitchell,  on  the  other  hand,  suggests  that  the  state IS analysed  as 
a  shuctural  effect in the sense of a  ‘’powerful, metaphysml effect of pracbce that make  such  structures  appear  to 
exist”(Mitchel1,  1991 p. 94) 
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According to Gupta, the perception of the state by the individual citizen results from a 
combination of on  the  one  hand his or her  personal  encounters  with  local-level  bureaucracies  (the 
most important ingredient)  and on  the other  hand  a  more  general  image  of  the state derived 
mainly from written  and  electronic mass media  (Gupta,  1995 p.  392). At  the  local  level  people 
have  a  practical  knowledge of the state as fragmentary:  they  know  that  multiple levels of state 
authority exist, and through their encounters with such different institutions as village 
development workers, the police, and the electricity board the existence of a ‘translocal’ 
institution such as the state comes to  be imagined  (Gupta,  1995 p. 383-384). 
Discussion 
The  strategic  relation  approach  stresses  the  obvious  truth  that  state-society  relations  are  fluid and 
that clear  borders  are  impossible to establish.  The  view  of  the  state-society  divide as a  divide 
existing inside all realms  of  practice,  however,  confuses  the  possibilities  of  identifying  the 
interrelations  between the analytical  notions of state  and  society.  Thus,  the  overlaps  between  the 
two ‘spheres’, in the form of e.g. corporatism  and joint financing of health  and  education,  are 
better  understood through an analysis of why and how state and society come together in 
particular situations than through the a  priori  assumption that state  and  society are always 
intertwined.  Most  important, the explicit denial  of  the  theoretical  possibility of the absence of 
relations between state and  society  constitutes an important  analytical  lacuna. If all actions by 
societal  agents  to  withdraw from the state in the form of  avoidance of government  agents, 
withdrawal  from  state-controlled  markets,  etc. are interpreted as highly  dependent on the  state, 
the scope of societal protests and influence on the state becomes extremely limited. This 
eventually  makes  the  approach  resemble  the  top-down  perspective by the organic  approach  that 
tends  to  exclude the possibility of any constructive  societal  influence on the  state. 
As  regards the suggestion by Gupta to view  the  state as a  discursive  construction, the approach 
seems to have  much  to  offer  to an analysis  of why societal  and  state  agents  behave as they  do.  The 
perception of the  state by  societal  agents as well as by  state  agents  clearly  influences  their  mutual 
interaction,  and it seems plausible to suggest that this perception  results  from  a  combination f 
personally  experienced  encounters  and  more  abstract  images of the  state  transmitted  e.g.  through 
the media. 
However, at least two objections  to  Gupta’s  analysis  can  be  made.  First,  unlike  the  suggestion  by 
Gupta, the approach does not necessarily  seem to exclude an analytical  distinction  between  the 
notions of state and  society.  When  analysing  encounters  and  perceptions by the  various  actors, 
it would still seem  useful  to operate with state and  society as analytical  categories in order  to 
identify  their  interrelations. Thus, the suggestion that the state  concept  has  to  be  abandoned as a 
necessary  consequence of the  existence  of  state-internal  differences  (multiple  layers  and  diverse 
locales and  centres of the state) cannot be  accepted.  And  second, by giving  systems of thought 
and discourse the same theoretical  status as any other kind of social  practice”,  a  discursive 
22 In  the  words  of  James  Ferguson to whom  Gupta  refers: “S stems of discourse  and  systems  of  thoughts  are  thus 
bound u in  a  complex  relationship  with the stream  of plannedsld unplanned  events  that  constitute he  social  world. 
The chaienge is to  treat these systems of thought  and  discourse l i e  any  other  kind of structured  social  practice, 
neither dismsing them as ephemeral  nor seekkt in g e e  products  the  master plans for  those  elaborate,  half-mvvisible 
mechanisms of structural production  and  repro  uchon m which they  are  engaged as component  parts”  (Ferguson, 
1990 p. 276-277). 
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analysis  contains an inbuilt  risk of underplaying  the  importance  of  other  ‘visible’ forms of social 
practice.  By  moving  the  focus of the  analysis  from  social  practices  and  structures to perceptions, 
one  ends  up  studying a complexity  of  conflicting  discourses  about  which  various statements can 
be  made,  but  where  no  statement  can  claim  to  be  more  true than others23. This is not analytically 
satisfactory, and it must  be  considered  a  condition  for the relevance of a discourse analysis that 
it is combined  with  analyses  of  social  practice  and  social  structures. 
1.3. Focus on state  autonomy vs. focus on statehociety  capture 
A third  classification of theories  dealing  with  &can  state-society  relations has been proposed 
by John Harbeson  (Harbeson,  1994).  He  distinguishes  between, on the one  hand, theories that 
postulates an unfortunate  degree  of state autonomy from  society  and  economy  and, on the other 
hand, theories that focus on the capture of the state by society  or the capture of society by the 
state. 
Focus on state  autonomy 
The theory  by  Goran  Hyden  about  the  implications for development  processes of ‘the  un-captured 
peasantry’ represents a  prominent  example of an autonomy-oriented approach. According to 
Hyden,  the fact that the  colonial  state  was  imposed  on Afiican societies implies a  lack of 
correspondence between  societal  structures  and a state “as a  balloon  suspended  in  midair” 
(Hyde4 1983 p.19). The  dominance of a  particular  peasant  mode of production  characterised  by 
a logic  completely  different  from  that  of  the  capitalist  mode  of  production  significantly  limits he 
ability of the state to  influence  society and vice  versa24  (Hyden,  1990 p. 248). 
Darbon expresses a  view  of the African  state  fairly  similar  to that of Hyden,  stressing the 
importance of the  imposition of the  state  ‘from  outside’  for  the  present lack of relations between 
state  and  society. He replaces Hyden’ S picture of a balloon  state by the  picture of the state as a 
simple  bureaucratic  structure  of  exploitation  that  totally  lacks  relations  to  society  (Darbon, 1990 
p.  43-45)”. 
zi In a critical discussion  of  ost  structuralism  Mouzelis  has  convincingly  argued  against  its  rejection  of  notions  of 
representation  and  empiric2reference.  While  accepting  that  an  absolutely  objective or ‘correct’  interpretation is an 
impossibility, he describes  it as absurd  to  declare  it  impossible to compare two interpretations  in order to assess 
research, he says,  and  concludes:  ‘there is a  reality  out  there’@ouzelis,  1995  p.  48-53). Also Coln Leys has 
which  of  them  ‘represents’  a certain text more  accurately. A relativism so extreme  hinders  rather than helps  empirical 
discussed tbis issue  and  has f d y  declared  that  “it re resents an intellectual retreat  not to stud  practice”  (Leys in 
a lecture given  at the University  of  Roskilde on 1 8ovember 1996). By this he means  that x e  abandonment  of 
exclu es any  political  implications  of  research W s ,  199&r 54-56). For  a  very  powerful mti ue of post-modem 
‘realig’  as a  field of research  rules  out  that  normative  assessments  about  right  and wrong can be made,  hence 
development  research for being based on ‘voyeurism’ instea of  amtudes, see also Corbridge,  1894. For a  criticism 
of  Ferguson’s  approach  for  obscuring  the  issue  of  responsibility, see de Vries,  1997. 
It  is  worth  noticing  that  Hyden’s  conclusion is exactly  the  opposite of that  reached b the earlier  versions  of the 
configurational  approach  stressing  a  high  degree  of  state  autonomy as a  precondition P or economic  development. 
It can be argued  that  also  contributions by e.g.  Christopher  Clapham  and  Richard  Sandbrook  belong to autonomy- 
oriented  approaches as they  both  explain  the  functioning  of  the  African  state  with  reference  to  prevailing  forms of 
accumulation, in  particular  the  dommance  of  peasant  forms f production  (Clapham,  1982 p. 3 1; Sandbrook,  1985 
p.  63-82). This  would  solve the problem  of  scholars  who  have  found  it  difficult  to  classify  them as either  state-or 
society-oriented  and  therefore  have  had  to construct an  interim  category  of  societal-oriented  researchers  who  accord 
‘analytical  priority to the state’ (see Martinussen,  1992  p.  28-29). 
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Focus on capture 
The opposite view, that the state is  captured by socieg, is  represented  by  Joel  Migdal’s  theory 
about the weakness of the African  state  being  a  result of the  existence of numerous  competing 
power  centres.  Although  the  African  state  has  demonstrated  a  remarkable  capability to penetrute 
society, Migdal characterises it as weak because its other abilities - to extract resources, 
appropriate and use resources in determined ways and most importantly to regulate social 
relations - are  very ~003~. According to Migdal,  the  reason for the difficulties of the state is its 
lack of integrated  power,  forcing it to  rely  on an extensive web of local  strongmen who act as 
intermediaries to local  populations. This ensures  the  necessary  consolidation of state power,  but 
at  the  same  time it undermines  the  very  same  attempts as the price of  support is usually  a  minimal 
interference in strongmen’s  exercise  of  their own rules  (Migdal,  1988  p.  4-9,  p.247-248,  p.  263- 
264). 
Migdal  presented  the  theory  in  a  book  published  in  1988.  Later he h s partially  revised  the  theory 
and developed a  more  extensive  framework in which  the  outcome of the struggles between 
components of the  African state and  societal  forces  is  not  inevitably that of  the  capture  by  society 
of  the  state. In the revised  version this outcome is considered only one  option  among  many,  and 
even in situations  where  the state must  be  seen as co-opted by particular  social  forces,  he  leaves 
open the possibility that the engagement between state and society may have mutually 
empowering  aspects. In the  revised  version also the  possibility of the  capture of society by the 
state is mentionedz7  (Migdal, 1994 p. 24-26). 
It can be  argued  that  also  the  earlier  presented  theories  about the African  state as patrimonial  or 
nCo-patrimonial  can  be  counted  among  the  theories  that focus on  the capture of the state by 
society.  Despite  the view of  the  state as directly  influencing social and  economic  processes,  the 
description of the invasion  of the state by clientilistic  networks  bears  much  resemblance  to 
Migdal’s  (earlier)  theory  about  a  weak  state  depending  on  a web of  local  strongmen. 
The view that society is captured by the  stare can  be  found also in the  contributions to the  New 
Political  Economy  (notably  Bates,  1981)  where  difficulties of rural development are explained 
by the  control of the economy  by  members  of the state  apparatus  who are purely  self-interested. 
Instead of supporting  farmers by  increasing  producer  prices,  political  leaders  and  bureaucrats  give 
priority to economic  activities that allow  them to derive  personal  benefits. 
Migdal  expresses  the dilemma of  the &can state as follows:  “States  have  become  a  formidable  resence  in  their 
sociebes,  but  many  have  experienced  faltering  efforts to get  their  populatmns  to d what state PO P ICY makers  want 
them to do”  (Migdal,  1988  p.9). 
27 China  during  the  Cultural  Revolution  is  mentioned as an example  of  capture  by  the state of  society.  Migdal 
presents in the new  version  four  ideal types of outcomes  of  state-society  interaction: 1) total  transformation of 
society by the state (e.g. China in the 1960s). 2) state incorporation of existing social forces. 3) society’s 
incorporation of the  state (what  he  earlier  described as the  typlcal  situation  in Afnca). 4) a  total  failure  of  the 
attempts  by  the state  to mehate society.  Migdal stresses that only rarely  have real cases  approached  the two extreme 
ideal-types:  total  trans&rmation or total  disengagement  (Migdal,  1994 p. 24-26). 
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Discussion 
The revised  version of Migdal’s  theory  seems  to  be  a  very  constructive  response  to  the  objections 
that  can  be  raised against both  theories  that  focus on an unfortunate  degree of sfafe autonomy and 
theories that focus on the capture of  either the state or society. 
Whereas the former approach excludes the possibility of  mutual  influence  by  state  and  society 
on the other  party, the latter  considers  state-society  relations  a  zero-sum  game  where  ‘the  winner 
takes it all’.  Both approaches have  been  severely  criticized for failing  to  describe  the  African 
reality  (e.g.  Berry,  1993  p.44-45’*). Furthermore,  they are analytically  unsatisfactory as they  are 
unable to explain how social changes  occur. If the interaction  between  state  and  society is 
considered  either  absent or characterised by  ‘one-way  traffic’, it becomes  difficult to  explain  how 
the  state  can  achieve  a  new  role  over time and  why  different  countries  develop  differently. This 
in  fact  seems to be the problem of both  Hyden and Migdal  (in  his  1988  work)  when  they  resort 
to ‘external factors’ as major  explanations for changes in relations  between  state  and  society. 
Hence,  Hyden  refers  to the need  to  break  down the economy of affection  through the integration 
into a world  market  economy as a  condition  for  a  changed  role f the state (Hyden,  1993  p.202), 
whereas  Migdal  mentions  war,  revolution  and mass migration  among  the  catastrophic  shocks  that 
provide  necessary  but  not  sufficient  conditions for the emergence  of strong states  (Migdal,  1988 
p. 271) 
1.4. Actor-oriented vs. structure-oriented  approaches 
The  structure-agency  debate  offers  a  fourth set of perspectives on state-society  theories.  While 
in the 1970s the issue of structural limits to  the room of manoeuvre for individual  actors 
constituted a central line of demarcation  between  marxist  approaches  and  classical  pluralist 
theories,  the  issue has been  less  debated  after the retreat of marxist-inspired theories in the  mid- 
1980s. 
Recently,  however, a number  of  researchers  have  again  confronted  the  issue.  According  to  David 
Booth,  the  earlier  predominance  of  marxist  approaches  has  provoked at least two very  different 
reactions (Booth, 1994p.  12-15):  one is the Ipost-Marxist’ critiques that maintain  a  stmctural 
approach but reject part of the  classical theoretical h e w o r k  such as e.g. the tendency  to 
essentialism,  determinism,  unilinear  view  and the overriding  attention  to  class  and  class  struggle. 
The other is the actor-oriented approaches that reject  the  relevance of analysing  macro-level 
structures understood as ‘explanans’ of social change and  instead  concentrate on local-level 
analysis of encounters  between  individuals  and  groups”.  Although few of the theories  explicitly 
deal  with  relations  between state and  society, the various  positions  have  obvious  implications  for 
the  understanding of these relations. 
28 Sara Beny criticizes  Bates’  analysis for overlooking limits on government  ability to control  economic  changes, 
whereas the problems of Hyden’s ap roach are sumprised as follows: “The,implication that peasants are 
uncaptured  because  they  want to be unakrestimates Afncan fanners’,eagemess  to  unprove  their  access  to  market 
opporhmities,  and  overestimates  their  ability to control  their  economlc  cucumstances” (Beny, 1993 p. 44). 
29 As a  third  reaction is mentioned post-shuckrul, u prouches, including  the  discourse  analysis  developed by 
Foucault stressing the  diversity of outcomes  of,socIa P processes  and  arguing agamt theones that  seek structural 
explanations for social  practice  and  power  relanons. 
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Agency-orientation 
In the one  end of the structure-agency  spectrum,  Norman  Long despite a  declared  attempt to 
bridge  the  structure-agency  debate  represents  an  agency-oriented  approach.  He  defines  structures 
as ‘We  product of the ongoing  interlocking,  interplay,  distantiation  and  mutual  transformation  of 
different  actors’  projects”  (Long & van der Ploeg,  1994  p.  81).  It is believed  that all individuals 
pursue  their  personal  interest  and  that e only  limiting  factors  to heir various projects  are  their 
confrontations  with the projects of other  actors.  Other  factors  such as socioeconomic  differences 
for the capacity of the various agents to pursue their projects are considered of limited 
importance”. 
The  analytical  focus on the interface, i.e. the face-to-face  encounter,  between  the  various  actors 
is  applied  also  to the study of relations  between  government  representatives  and  local  populations 
(Arce & Long, 1989 p.  214).  Hence,  these  relations  are  studied n the  form of the  direct  encounter 
between individual government agents and farmers. According to Long, farmers “modify, 
transforrq adopt or counteract the projects of state  agents”  (Long & van der Ploeg,  1994  p.  74). 
Given the confiiement of the analysis to the micro  level,  however, little scope is left  by  the 
approach  for an analysis  of  the  possible  influence of farmers  on  state  structures  and  state  policies. 
Basically,  farmers are seen as agents  operating  only at the  local  level  and  operating  mainly on an 
individual basis3’. Likewise, government agents are understood as individuals having a 
considerable  leeway to define  their own way of interacting  with  farmers  rather  than as members 
of a particular government  agency  that sets a  number of limits to their behaviour. This implies 
that organised responses by farmers to government initiatives and structural changes in 
government  organisations  that  result  from  farmers’  initiatives re of little  interest  to  the  analysis”. 
Also the approach by  Jean-FranGois  Bayart  can  be  said to apply an actor-oriented  approach. 
Contrary to  Long,  Bayart  has  dealt  extensively  with  relations  between state and  society.  His 
theory  about  the  African  state  as  defined  by  ‘the  politics of the  belly’  (Bayart,  1993)  has  further 
consolidated his position as one of the most  influential  authors in the debate  on  the state in 
Francophone  Africa. 
30 The  understanding  by  Long is reflected in a study of relations  between  government  extension  workers  and  fanners 
in  Jalisco,  Mexico  by Arce  and Long. They conclude  that  despite  evidence  of  increasing  social  differentiation  in  the 
area, all fanners,  whether  rich  or  poor,  share the same  perceptions of government as an  institution  workin  against 
them.  Strategies  by  farmers  vis-a-vis  government  a ens, therefore,  are  not  seen as very  much influencefby their 
socioeconomic  situation  but  conditioned  rather  by  t%eir  personal  experience  of  whether or not  government  agents 
have  been  able to establish  relations of trust  (Arce & Long,  1989 p. 231-232). 
Although  Long stresses that  individuals  are  not the only relevant  actors  but  that  collectivities  such as political 
parties, state agencies  and  church  organisations  should  also  be  considered  actors,  there is an  overly focus on the 
encounter  between  single  individuals  in  the  empirical  examples  used to explain  the  approach  (Long &van der  Ploeg, 
1994  p.  68;  Arce & Long,  1989  p.  232-243).  It  should  be  noted  that in a  more  recent  contribution  Lon  elaborates 
on the  issue of ‘collective  actors’  and  explicitly rejects that  an  actor  analysis  is  primarily  interested in face-to-face 
confrontations or interactions  or  only  in  local  situations (Long, 1997 p.  6-10). 
While  applying an actor-oriented  approach,  seemingly  similar  to he one  applied  by Lon Magdalena  Villareal 
is much  more  open to the possibility  of  local  opulahons  influencing  also  govemment augorities at the  national 
level. She stresses,  however,  that this deman B S a  level of organisation  which is usually  not  present in rural  areas 
(villareal  in  a  lecture  given  during  a  Nordic  researcher  trainmg  course  held  in Siiiaranta, Finland  May  27th-3 1st, 
1997). 
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Bayart  explicitly  subscribes to the methodologically  individualistic  approach33  (Bayart, 1993 p. 
xx). He takes  the  point of departure  in  the  strategies  applied by the various  individual actors and 
abstains from attempts to analyse their behaviour in terms of their  affiliation to other social 
categories than ‘interest  coalitions’  formed  to  increase their share  of  mainly state resources.  His 
description of the  way  individuals  get  access to the  state  bears  much  resemblance to those 
presented by the  New Political Economy.  Thus,  clientilistic  relations  or  ‘ethnicity’ are seen as 
agents of accumulations  both ofwealth and  political  power,  and  Bayart playllly defines  ethnicity 
with  Bates as ‘’winning coalitions  with  a  wide  enough  margin to  guarantee profits in the struggle 
for the division of spoils but also  sufficiently  restructured to maximise  the  per capita return of 
these  profits”34  (Bayart, 1993 p. 56). 
Bayart  shares  with  the New Political  Economy  Bayart the view of the state as a prize to be  won 
by rent-seeking individuals and  coalitions.  The state has  a  pivotal role in  capital  accumulation 
processes as the  most  important  source of wealth  (mainly  funded by international aid agencies), 
and all strategies of state and societal agents  relate  to  the  state  with the aim of maximising the 
share of its resources35  (Bayart, 1993 p. 87). 
It makes an importance  difference,  however, that Bayart  does  not  solely  base the analysis of 
individual  motives, intentions and  interests on the hypothesis of a  universal  mode of behaviour 
(the  interest in utility  maximisation).  Instead, he presents an extensive  analysis of the historical 
and cultural particularities of the formation  of identities and strategies  that  sometimes  lead to a 
utility maximisation strategy  and  sometimes  generate  different  reactions. 
Structure-orientation 
In the other end of the  structure-agency  spectrum, Stuart Corbridge  represents  the view that 
capacities of social  agents to pursue  their  projects  are  severely  limited by structural  inequalities. 
Whereas  Long  and  Bayart  are  concerned  with  the  study of iversity resulting from the variation 
in the strategies applied by social  agents, inequuZity, exploitation and conhadictions are core 
concepts in the analysis proposed by Corbridge (Corbridge, 1994 p. 102). Although his 
contribution represents a considerable revision of marxist theo$6, Corbridge shares with 
marxism a  commitment  to  causal  analysis,  a  concept of determination  and the view that the 
’’ The \Nlitings of  Bayart  could  have  been  discussed also in  relations  to  the  other  typologies  presented  above. Thus, 
his a poach shares with  the  organic  state-onented approach the  view  of the  state as the most  important  social  actor 
that k c t l y  influence all social  and economic  rocesses.  W& the  strategic  relational  ap  roach it shares a perception 
of the state-society  divide as a  division insi at the many different  realms of practice &ayq, 1993 p.  163). Thus, 
Bayart has develo  ed the wncept of ‘shaddling’ in analyseqof how  African  politics  are dnven by  %e  combined 
and  conflicting  e orts of mdivldual  agents  who  are  optnmsmg  their  resources  by  simultaneous  actwities  in  the 
gook of 1 9 g  and later Tevmd) the yiew that %e stat? captured  by the extensive  webs of patron-client  relations 
ublic and  ‘vate  sphere payart, 1993  p. 98-99,69).  Fmally, it shares  with the theory of Migdal  (presented in his 
that significantly l i t  ~ts ablllty to mplement 1ts pohcles. 
34 According to Bayart,  the  contem rary force of ethnic  wnsciousness  rather  than  deriving  from the colonial  past, 
comes fiom its”reappropriati0n  by p” ocal people,  circurnscnbmg  the  allocation of state  resources  (Bayart,  1993  p.  51). 
35 “We can now take it for  granted  that  it  is  their  relationship to the  State  which  largely  enables  actors to get  rich  and 
dominate the social  scene. If this is true on a  local  level, m the villages, it is even  more  true on the  regional and 
national  scene” (Bayart, 1993 p. 87). 
36 According to Corbridge,  a  post-marxist  ap  roach  replaces  the  labour  the0  of  value  by  analyses of unequal 
distribution of  pro erty, while  the  focus  on ckses  is  replaced  by  an  +crease 7 ’  sensitivity to the  multiple  sites  of 
oppression  and un!aimess in terms of gender,  age,  locatlon,  etc.  (Corbndge,  1994  p.  102). 
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economy  is  structured  by  a  systematically  unequal  distribution of assets and  powers  (Corbridge, 
1994 p. 113). Furthermore,  he  shares  with  the  marxist-inspired  dependency  theories f the 1970s 
the lack of an explicit discussion  about the role of the  state.  The  main point on  state-society 
relations to be  read &om his  analysis  is that national  and  not  least  global  structures  are  important 
determinants  for  local-level  conditions.  Thus,  the  room  of manoeuwe of agents  operating at the 
local  level is considered severely l i i t e d  by ‘extra-local’  structures  (Corbridge, 1994 p. 11 1). 
While Long and Corbridge represent two very explicit positions in the structure-agency 
controversy, it is possible to group  the  majority of the  contributions to the  state-society  debate 
discussed above as either  primarily  structure-oriented  or  primarily  agency-oriented.  Thus, the 
configurational  approach  is  a  prominent  example  of  a  structure-oriented p r~pective‘~, while also 
the  contributions by  Hyden,  Clapham  and  Sandbrook  belong  to this group. 
The  actor-oriented  perspective is applied  among  others  by Medard,  Jackson  and  Rosberg  and by
the various contributions to the New  Political  Economy. 
Discussion 
Despite their considerable  differences,  the  above-mentioned  versions of agency-  and  structure- 
oriented  approaches share the  problem  of  downplaying  the  influence of local  populations on state 
structures  and  policies.  Corbridge’s  version  of  the  structure-oriented  approach  tends to stress the 
extra-local  determination  of  local  conditions so much  that  little  scope is left for local  populations 
to react to and influence external factors, including the interventions by the state. Long’s 
confinement of the  analysis to the local  level,  on  the  other  hand,  risk  resulting in a  portrait  of  local 
populations as victims of state initiatives  which  at  best  they  can  hope to modify  and adjust 
according  to their preferences  but  which  they  are  unable  to  fundamentally  influence. 
With  Bayart,  Long  shares the problem of over-stressing the capacity of individual  actors to 
influence their own living  conditions  and  thereby  fails to see important  patterns of structurally 
generated inequalityis. By studying  individuals  rather than groups,  there is a  serious risk of 
overlooking the similarities of their  strategies  and  of  the  constraints  they are facing.  The  declared 
interest in diversiiy rather than inequuliiy tends to lead to interesting  but  analytically  not  very 
powerful studies of the particular  at  the  expense  of  a more general  understanding of social 
dynamics of persistence  and  change. 
’’ In a  recent  article Jens Peter Frerlund  Thomsen discusses  the  theoretical  framework of Thelda  Skocpol  and 
colleagues  and  compares  it  to  that of Eric  Nordliiger.  He  criticizes  Skocpol’s  approach  for  an  overly  focus on 
structural  explanations to the  actions by political  agents  (the  focus on organisational  and  institutional  conditions 
i n s i d e  the  state),  while  at  the  same  time  he oints out  that the approach suffers from a  disregard  of  societal  structures 
(a  discussion  of  implementation  mblems P or state  policies  is  absent)(Thomsen,  1996  p.  100  and  103).  Nordlinger, 
on the other hand, is criticise8for defming  the  state as a  set  of  mdividual  actors  with  preferences  that  can  be 
deducted  neither  from  societal  structures nor from  internal  state  structures  (Thomsen,  1996  p.  105-107). 
As argued  by  Jean-Pierre  Jacob &Philifpe Del$!e; “ On s’aperqoit  que  le  de@  d‘adaptation  au systlme d’aide 
luraliite est  plus ou moins  grand  selon  a farmlmte des  paysans  avec ce systlme et  leur  formation.  Les  paysans 
pes moins  form&, ceux qui  ont eu peu de contacts  avec  les  lntervenants  ou  les goupes les  plus  pauvres ..., peuvent 
&e parfaitanent disorientis par les  informations  nombreuses  et  parfois contradictores qu’lls  reqoivent, tandis que 
d’awes o es  peuvent riagir avec  aisance  et irer profit de l’absence de concertation entre  interven  ants...”  (Jacob 
& Delvig, 3 9 4  p.  259). 
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The core  of the problem  seems  to be  an oversimplified  understanding of structures as  products 
of the  interplay  between  various  (individual)  actors’  projects39.  Anthony  Giddens  has  suggested 
that  structures  are  seen aspatterns of repeated interactions  (and  non-interactions),  i.e. ashaving 
a degree of stability depending  upon  the xtent to  which  interactions  become a matter of habit 
or  routine.  While structures are  created by  human  actions,  they  also  constrain the choice  that 
humans make about their activities (Giddens, 1984). In the writings of Long and Bayart, 
structures  are  described as fluid  and  changeable outcomes of the various  interactions. 
Regarding  consequences of the  agency-oriented  perspective  for  the  analysis  of the state,  the  major 
problem  seems to be that of dissolving the concept of the state as a  unity. If the state is seen 
mainly  as the aggregation of the  projects of individual  actors,  hence  individual state agents  are 
considered the most  important units of analysis, an important  dimension of state structures  and 
state policies are cut off the analysis. As discussed in relation to Gupta’s  contribution,  societal 
actors  tend  to  relate  not just to  an  individual  state  agent  encountered  face-to-face  but  also  to  the 
agency  he  or  she  represents  and  often  also  to  a  more  abstract  image of the  state as such.  Likewise, 
internal state dynamics will be  insufficiently  understood  through  a view of its agents as flies in 
a  bottle  seemingly  busy  pursuing  their own individual  projects  without  relating to constraints  set 
by  e.g. the  routines for interaction  between  various  agencies  and  between  the  hierarchal  levels. 
While  the  structure-oriented  view  contains the obvious  risk of overlooking  the role of  agency  in 
the analysis of state-society relations, it is believed, nevertheless, that a study based on 
structurally  defined units of analysis  has  considerably  more to offer than studies focussing  on 
agents  (whether  individuals  or  groups)  defined  only by their strategies,  i.e.  agents  defined  only 
as empirical  agents. The challenge  to  a such approach is to avoid the predetermination of the 
outcome  of  the  strategies  applied  by  such  categories as government field stafF, government 
regional  management, the rural population,  poor  farmers, the population in disfavoured  regions, 
the  young,  people  belonging  to  larger  households,  etc.  For each of the categories  the  strategies 
and their outcome  have to be  analysed  with  a view to  understand its logics and assess  the 
relevance of the category  constructedm. 
Conclusion 
The  chapter  has  reviewed an extensive  range of contributions to the debate  about AEcan state- 
society  relations.  Among  their  very  valuable  insights is the  insistence by society-oriented  theories 
that  societal  forces  play a considerable role as determinants of state structures  and  policies.  The 
attention  by  state-oriented  approaches to state-internal  dynamics is a  constructive  complementary 
perspective to this. Furthermore, the point by Migdal that state-society relations are not 
necessarily  characterised  either by capture or by autonomy introduces some  much  needed  light 
and  shade  into the debate.  And  finally,  the  observation  by  Gupta th t the state in the perception 
by the population is not an entity but a multifaceted structure is found to provide a very 
constructive  perspective. 
For  further  discussions of Long’s  approach,  see  Madsen,  1994;  Webster,  1997. 
40 This oes  directly  against the advice  given  by  Villareal  who  warns  against  the  definition  of cateyries  @its of 
d y s i s ~  before  a  study is initiated According to her,  the  oint of departure  should  be  taken  in the Ife hlstones of 
based  on  the  strategies  described ( V i l l a r e a l  in  a  lecture  given  during  a  Nordic  researcher  training  course  held in 
individual actors and  only  when  a  sufficient amount of &ta has  heen  collected,  the  categories  can  be  constructed 
Siiiaranta,  Finland May  27th-31st,  1997). 
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Despite  these  and  several  other  insights,  however,  the  review  leaves  a  general  dissatisfaction  with 
the  prevailing  either-or  approaches  to  understanding  state-society  relations.  Many  of  the  theories 
discussed have  a  ‘substantive  theory’  character in the sense that  they are postulating  general 
context-independent  relations  between the variables  studied. 
Least fruitful is considered the choice by  many  authors  to  perceive of the relations as generally 
dominated  either by the state or by societal  forces.  Instead  of  seeing  relations as an interplay  that 
may  have  many  different  outcomes,  the  a  priori  expectation  that  one of the  parties  dominates  the 
other,  considerably limits the analytical  perspective.  The  organic  approach  that  has  strongly 
influenced the writings  about  Francophone  West Afiica is found  particularly  problematic. By 
concentrating on the  state  and  state  actors, this approach  provides an excellent  entrance  point  to 
the  study  of  corruption  and  informal  relations  within  the  state  apparatus,  but it tends  to  ignore  the 
influence of societal  forces on state structures and  policies.  Changes in the role  of  the  state, 
therefore,  must be expected to be  generated by state-internal  factors. As state bureaucracies, 
however,  are  seen as representing  only narrow clan and  ethnic-based  interests,  the  approach 
hardly  leaves  any scope for major  changes of state-society  relations. 
A similar problem is found in theories that focus on  an unfortunate  degree of state autonomy or 
on the capture of either the state or  society.  The view of state-society relations as  a  zero-sum 
game  makes it very  difficult  to  explain  how  social  changes  occur.  Furthermore,  these  theories  are 
found  to  share  with the state-or  society-oriented  approaches the tendency  to  portray  the  state as
an  entity  that relates to society in an  unequivocal  way. 
The contribution by the strategic  relation  approach  is  not  found to solve the problem of a 
simplified  picture  of  state-society  relations.  The  suggestion by these theories not to distinguish 
between  the  analytical  concepts  of  ‘state’  and  ‘society’  avoids  the  problems  encountered  by the 
state-  or  society-oriented  approaches  but  confuses the possibilities of identifying  interrelations. 
Fmally,  extreme  versions of structure-  and  agency-oriented  approaches are found  to  share the 
problem of downplaying  the  influence of local  populations on state  structures  and  policies.  While 
there  are  limitations to both  perspectives, it is considered  useful  to  approach the analysis  of  both 
state  and  societal  forces from a structure-oriented  perspective,  implying that units of  analysis  are 
structurally  defined  rather than being  actors  defined  only by their  strategies. 
Taking  the  point  of  departure  in  dissatisfaction with these  deficiencies,  chapter 2 will  present  and 
discuss  the  interactive  approach  that  differs rom the  majority of the  contributions  reviewed  here 
by its ‘conceptual  framework  character’. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE INTERACTIVE APPROACH 
Introduction 
After having  reviewed  and  discussed  a  number  of  contributions  to the state-society  debate,  a 
recent approach to  the study of state-society  relations  in an African  context  will  be  thoroughly 
discussed  in the following4’.  Instead  of  applying  a  traditional  approach  of  focussing either on the 
state or on societal relations, it focuses on the area between state  and  society.  Concepts like the 
‘interactive approach ’ or the ‘state-in-society approach ’ cover  attempts  to  understand  patterns 
of domination,  persistence  and  change  in terms of a  mutual  interaction  between  state  and  society 
and, more specifically, between  a  multitude of different  structures  embodied in the state and  a 
variety  of  movements,  networks,  groups  and formal as well as informal  organisations  constituting 
society.  As stated in one of the major  works  within this theoretical  framework, the objective is 
to  understand: 
“how transactions between  social  groups  and  state  institutions  are  carried  out  and  how 
these, in turn, alter the nature of public  institutions as well as of  social  formations’” 
(Chazan et al., 1992 p.  41). 
In particular this new approach  offers  two  very  fruitful  perspectives on a  state-society  analysis: 
firstly, an emphasis put on interaction as opposed  to  a  dominating  role  ascribed  a priori to either 
state or society and, secondly, its insistence on studying the multipliciiy of state  and  societal 
structures as opposed  to  commonly  used  simplifications  where  either  state  or  society or both  are 
treated as organically undifferentiated  units43. 
2.1 Definition of the state 
The definition of the state  proposed by  many  authors  draws on the  definitions by Skocpol  and 
Weber, as they open by the statement  “the  state is an organisation  within  the  society  ”(e.g. 
Bratton, 1994a p.234; MigdalJ988 p.19, Azarya, 1988 p. 10) or the state is “the organised 
aggregate of relatively  permanent  institutions of govemance”  (Chazan  et al., 1992 p.  39).This is 
further qualified by the suggestions  that  the  state is only  one  form of organisation  among  many 
and that state elites do not  automatically  enjoy  a  monopoly of political  power  (Migdal,  1988  p.28- 
41 Although differences in  several  respects  exist  between  the  authors,  a  common  ap  roach  to the study  of  state- 
society relations is expressed in: Azarya, 1988; Azarya, 1994; Azarya & Chazan, lh7; Bratton,  1989;  Bratton, 
Chazan, 1993; Chazan, 1994; Chazan et al., 1992; Harbeson, 1994a; Harbeson, 1994b; Kohli & Shue, 1994; 
1994a; Bratton, 1994b;  Bratton & Rothchild,  1992;  Chazan,  1988%  Chazan,  1988b; Chazan, 1992%  Chazan  1992b; 
Marenin,  1987;  Marenin,  1988;  Migdal,  1988;  Migdal,  1994;  Rothchild,  1987;  Rothchild & Foley, 1988;  Rothchild 
& Lawson,  1994 
‘’ The  quote is a  rephrasing  of the formulations  used  in one of the  lirst  contributions to the framework “There  is 
a  need  constantly to look back  and  forth  between  the  top  reaches of the  state  and local society.  One  must  see  how 
?$:=ow the state (often in  unintended  ways)  changes  society”  (Migdal,  1888:  prologue  p. XVII). 
tion of society,  even  in  remote areas, may dictate the character  and  ca  abilities of politics  at he centre, 
43 The approach has a  lot  in  common  with  the  view of Berry  that  there is “neither  an  effective state control  of  the 
countryside  nor  a  captured  peasantry,  but  rather  multiple l g e s  between  farmers  and  states  which  affect  patterns 
of resource  allocation  and agricultural performance  partly  by  encouragin  mobility  and  diversification of networks 
and  income  sources” erry, 1993  p. 66). Also Jonathan Fox has  approac  ed  the  issue  of  state-society  relations from 
a similar angle. He ormulates the challenge of understanding  rural  democratisation as follows:  “How  do  we 
‘unpack’ states and rural societies,  to  begin  capture the diversity  of ther interactions?”(Fox,  1990 p.  11). 
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29;  Migdal,  1994 p.9;  Bratton,  1994a  p.234).  What  makes  the  state  different  from  all  other 
powerful  decision-making  structures in society,  however,  is  its  claim to represent  the  public  good 
and its  entitlement  to  exercise  powers  and  authority  needed  to  implement  that  claim,  for  example 
a  monopoly  of  legitimate  coercion,  international  sovereignty  and  the  powers to tax and  conscript 
(Mare&  1988  p.217; Azaryq 1988 p.10). Elaborating onthe definitions, Naomi Chazan et al. 
suggest  a  useful  distinction  between  the  notions  of  state,  regime  and  government:  while the  state 
is a set of associations and agencies claiming control over defined territories and their 
populations, the  regime refers  to the rules,  principles,  norms,  and  modes  of  interaction  between 
social  groups  and  state  organs  (the  form  of  rule),  and the term government relates  to  the  specific 
occupants  of  public office who are in a position to make  binding  decisions at a  given time 
(Chazan  et al., 1992 p. 39). 
The  emphasis  put  on intemction as opposed to a  dominating  role  ascribed  a  priori  to  either  state 
or  society  and  on the rnuztiplicity of state  and  societal  structures as opposed to commonly  used 
simplifications of both  makes the interactive  approach  fall  outside the four typologies  of  theories 
about  state-society  relations  presented in chapter 1. As it  will  appear from discussions  in the 
following,  it  builds  upon  the  insights  of  many  of  the  contributions  reviewed  in  chapter 1 bu  tries 
to  combine  them in a  qualitatively  different way. 
2.2, Both state- and society-oriented 
The  approach  differs fiom state-oriented  theories of the 1980s by its insistence  on  the  anchorage 
of  the  state in society. The authors  reject the tendency of these  theories to refer all explanations 
for  present  conditions  in  Afiica  to  the  state,  state  policy  and  reactions  to  state  actions.  Instead  they 
stress  the  importance of understanding state power as generated  from  outside the state itsel?. 
State-oriented  approaches  are  criticized  for  applying  a  top-down  perspective  where  societal  actors 
are  seen as subject to state  initiatives  but  not as actors  capable  of  influencing  state  structures  and 
policy  processes in return4’.  Furthermore, the tendency  of  some  state-oriented  theories  to  treat  the 
state  as an organic  unitary  actor is considered  oversimplified. 
On the other  hand,  the  interactive  approach  differs  substantially fiom society-oriented  theories 
prevailing  in the 1960s and 1970s, as the  authors seek to  build  on the insights of statist  theories 
on  the  importance  of  state-internal  dynamics.  Moreover,  the  interest  in all kinds of “movements, 
networks,  groups  and  formal  and informal organisations”  represents  a  considerably  broader  scope 
of analysis than the predominantly  class-oriented  interest of earlier  studies.  Hence, the authors 
do not share the view of marxist-inspired  scholars  that  interests  and  objectives  of  particular 
economic  actors  rather than those of political  actors are the main  sources of social  change. AS 
compared  to  more  recent  society-oriented  research  that  focuses  on  community-level  studies, the
44 According to Migdal:  “There can be no understanding of state  capabilities  in  the  Third  World  without fmt 
comprehendmg the social structmes of which states are only one  part“  (Mlgdal,  1988 p. 33-34). 
” As  expressed  by  Atul  Kohli  and  Vivienne  Shue: “.. a faii amount of the real  drama of social  chan  e  continues to 
be  located  in social realms  reacting with, but in  important  ways  residing  also  ‘beyond’  the  state.”  &ohli & Shue, 
1994  p.308). 
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approach differs by the attempts  to  relate  micro-level  processes  to  macro-level  processes  and 
activities  emanating  from the state46. 
2.3. Analytical  distinction  between  the  concepts of state and society 
Furthermore,  the  interactive  approach  differs  from the contributions to the debate about African 
state-society  relations  which  criticize the theoretical  relevance of a  state-society  dichotomy. 
Authors  applying the interactive  approach  acknowledge  the  fluidity  of  state-society notions4’,  but 
use them as analytical  concepts  to  identify  exactly  the  interrelations  asked for by the critics of  the 
dichotomy.  Kohli  and  Shue  put  it as follows: 
“we  begin  also  by  asserting  the  analytical  separation  of  state  and  society,  even as we  urge 
special  attention to the  linkages  between  them  and to their often ‘recursive’  relationship” 
(Kohli & Shue,  1994 p.295). 
And  Chazan  further  explains: 
“State and society  are  conceptualised ...as two intersecting  and  potentially  independent 
variables with  political  processes as the  dependent  variable. Thus, the state entity does 
have an existence of its own, and its actions may  have  a  profound  bearing  on  social 
organisation  and  economic  enterprise.  Social  groups,  similarly,  maintain an institutional 
and resource  base  which  permits  them to act independently as well as conjointly  with 
structures in the public domain. These political, social end economic fields may 
intertwine in a  multiplicity  of  ways”(Chazan,  1988  p.123). 
2.4. Interaction  instead of capture or autonomy 
Contrary to views  expressed  by  theories  that  focus  either on state  autonomy  or  on  capture  of  state 
or society, the interactive  approach  suggests  that  state  and  society  may  ‘come  together’ to fu ther 
the  common  interests  of  various  societal  and  state-based  groups. This reflects  the  understanding 
that state-society relations are not  necessarily a zero-sum game but that both  negative  and 
positive-sum  outcomes  may occur4’  (Bratton,  1989  p.428-429). 
Inspired  by  Albert  Hirchman’s  concepts  of exit and voice, the  interactive  approach stresses that 
both state and society can ‘choose’ one of  two basic  options in their  mutual  interaction:  either to
influence  the other party or to  avoid  it ( A z a r y a ,  1988  p.  12-13).  Hirchman  originally  developed 
46 As exam les of such  community  level studies, Migdal  mentions  studies  on  peasant  communities,  patron-client  ties, 
urban  nei$bourhoods,  etc.  (Migdal,  1988  prologue  p. XVI). 
“As an i l l k t i o n  of the difficulty oftelliig whether  a  specific  institution  belongs to the  state or society,  Migdal 
mentions the incorporation  by  the Bnbh  colonial  power of trad$ional  chiefs as pad officials  (Mlgdal,  1994 p.26- 
27). Azarya draws  attention t? the  fact  that  individuals  play multyle roles  and  that  relations are constantly  changing 
as  state  and  society are intedlnked in a  dynamic  network of actlon and reaction (Azarya, 1988 p. 15). 
48 Migdal‘s  (previous)  view that +e A@% state is weak because of the strength of the many competing  power 
centres  in  society  represents  a mqor devlabon fiom th~s understandmg (MvIlgdal, 1988). 
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the concepts in relation  to  studies of organisations in market ~ituations~~, but  has  also  dealt with 
the  importance of exit from  the  state in the  form of attempted  secession,  emigration  and  outflow 
of capital (Hirchman, 1978). Whereas Hirchman concentrates on exit options that imply a 
physical  withdrawal from the  country as a whole,  authors  applying  the  interactive  approach have 
been  interested in the  phenomena  of  exit  from  the  state by citizens  that  remain in the country. The 
broader concepts of engagement and disengagement have  been  introduced to characterise the 
possible strategies by the two  parties”: 
- state-sponsored engagement refers  to  efforts by the state to regulate  social  behaviour  (e.g. 
efforts to plan economic  production,  distribution  and  exchange,  pacification of the national 
territory). 
- state-sponsored  disengagement refers  to various forms  of  withdrawal  by the state  (e.g.  reforms 
to liberalise and privatise  economic  activities,  physical  escape of the state from its territory, 
acceptance by public officials of bribes and their involvement in various forms of illegal 
activities5’) 
- society-sponsored  engagement refers  to  collective  action by citizens to influence the state or to 
gain  control of state power  (e.g.  voting,  demonstrations,  strikes,  civil  war  and  regional  separatism 
which attempt to capture the  centre of the  state). 
- society-sponsored disengagement refers  to  actions by  ordinaxy citizen to withdraw from the 
realm of state  authority  (e.g.  apathy,  fatalism,  indifference,  informal  trade,  noncompliance with 
laws,  cynicism,  satire,  ridicule  of  the  state,  refugee  flight,  regional  separatism  with the objective 
of detachment from the state). 
All  authors stress the fact  that  the  concepts  represent  a  considerable  simplification.  Thus, Victor 
Azarya  notices that it can  be  very  difficult  to  differentiate  between the phenomena in a  specific 
context  and  mentions informal sector  activities as an example  (Azarya  1988 p.  11). Chazan draws 
attention to the simultaneous  adoption of a  multitude  of  strategies by the same  groups: e.g. the 
rural population may  at the same time augment  connections  with  agencies  which will improve 
their well  being  and  shun  contacts  with  other  parts of the  state  which  may  limit their scope of 
autonomy  (Chazan  1988 p.  137).  Finally,  Bratton  points  to the  fluctuation of relations  over  time: 
state-society  relations ebb and flow with  changing  socioeconomic  circumstances  (Bratton 1989 
p. 415,  p.  430). 
However, the concepts  are  useful to portray  both  overall  state-society  relations  and  relations 
between  particular  groups.  Thus,  Bratton has used  the  framework  to  portray  historical  relations 
between  state elites and  peasant  producers  which  he  considers the two most  politically  relevant 
49 For an individual  member  of an organisation or somebody  that  does  business  with  an  organisation,  voice  refers 
to  overt  complaints,  while  the  person 1s continuing as a member or customer,  whereas  exit  refers to the withdrawal 
from the  organisation (Hiichan, 1978  p.  90). 
The concepts of en  agement  and  disengagement are extensively  discussed  in  Azarya BC Chazan,  1987;  Azarya, 
1988; Bratton, 1989; 8 hazan, 1988; m 1994;  Migdal,  1994;  and Bratton, 1994a There is a  slight  disagreement 
on terminology as Azarya prefers the notlon of incorporation to  that  of  engagement  (Azarya  1994  83 , whereas 
Michael  Bratton argues that this word  carries  unfortunate  overtones of ‘incorporatism’ (Bratton 19k9  p.)424). The 
authors,  however,  attach  the  same  meaning to the  concepts,  and  the  list  of  examples  of  the various strategies of state 
and  society  is  collected fiom several  different  contributions. 
Acceptance  b  public offi@als of  bribes  and  their  invplvement  in  various  forms f illegal  activities  contribute  to 
the  reduction ,?state authonty rather  than to Its  extension  and are thereby  forms  of  state-disengagement (Brattoq 
1994%  p.247). 
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categories  of  social  actors in Africa.  Immediately  after  independence  policy elites and  peasants 
expressed  a  common  political  agenda  and  their  strategies  could  be  characterised as mutual 
engagement. As the  state  tried  to  expand  its  reach  across  the  countryside  (e.g. through marketing 
cooperatives and  heavy  administrative  regulation  of  agricultural  markets),  peasant  producers 
became  disillusioned  and  withdrew their support to the state (a strategy  of  disengagement).  The 
outbreak  of  the  fiscal  crisis n the  1980s  resulted in the mutual  disengagement  by  both  state  and 
society,  when  the crisis lead  to  cutbacks  in  public  services  and  regulatory  activities,  increased 
comption and  absenteeism.  The  recent  emergence of farmers’  associations in a number of 
countries  can  be  seen as an  attempt  to  engage the state  which  under  specific  circumstances  may 
lead  to  a  situation of mutual  engagement  (Bratton,  1994ap.240-251). 
As regards  the  specific  mediation  between  state  and  society,  all  authors  base  their  theories  on  the 
assumption  that  a  regime  cannot exist over time without  internal  support. Even if the coercive 
apparatus is extensive,  regime  viability  will still depend  on its internal  support and on the  kind 
of methods it uses to sustain its social  base  (Chazan  et  al, 1992 p.  170). In the African  context 
where  the  diversity  of  class,  ethnic  and  regional  interests is considerable,  there is a  particular  need 
for  the  government  to  regularise  the  pattern  of  interaction  among  the  contending  elements in order 
to  reduce  threats  to the leadership  of the destructive  effects  of  the  struggles. V i l y  all regimes 
have  met this challenge by trying to make arrangements for the representation  of  key  interests. 
This has usually  implied  the  co-option  of  leading  class  and ethnic representatives  into the ruling 
elite for instance by a widespread  use of ‘ethnic  arithmetic’ in appointments  to  the  government 
and top-level  positions  in  the  state  apparatus  (Rothchild & Foley,  1988  p.  233-248). 
Despite considerable variations between modes of inclusion of key interests” (‘coalition 
constructi~n’~~), it is a  common  feature for the  majority of regimes  (with  pluralist  regimes as a 
possible  exception)  that  they  have  all  involved  ways  to limit participation. In particular,  the 
peasantq and  emerging  class-based  interest  groups  have  tended  to be excluded.  Hence,  ongoing 
socioeconomic  changes  represent  a  growing  threat to virtually all regimes as these  are  cleavages 
that can rarely  be  accommodated  by  existing  systems  of  mediation.  When  such  non-represented 
groups grow stronger  and  their  discontent  rise,  social  conflicts  may be expressed as overt  protests 
against  the  regime as it has  been  witnessed in a large  number of &can  countries since the early 
1990s  (Chazan  et  al.,  1992  p.  177;  Rothchild & Foley,  1988  p.255-261). 
2.5. Both structure- and agency-oriented 
The  interactive  approach also cuts across the last typology that distinguishes  between an actor- 
and  a  structure-oriented  perspective.  Hence, the various  contributions  apply  a  wide  range of 
52 Based on an initial  work by  Donald  Rothchild  and  Michael  Foley  (1988), Chazan et  al.  suggest a distinction 
between at  least  seven  different  es  of  regnnes  whlch haveeach ap  lled a dlfferent  strategy  for  lncorpor?tion, of 
key interests.  They  vary from P. ellberate  attempts  to esgbllsh mecl!anims to manar conflicts (admuushatye 
hegemonic and pluralist regmes) over monopol1stlc mclples for  mclu?lon @arty-mo Illsmg and party-centralist 
regimes)  and  articipatory  exchanges  based on we structures (populst r e p e s  and  neo-hadlhonal  regimes) to 
the  absence o clear or anislng principles for political  interchange  (personal-coercive  regimes)(Chazan  et  al.,  1992 
p. 139-151,p.170-176~. 
53 The  concept of con tct coalitions used  by Opin Marenin  differs from the concept of coalition  used  by Chazan 
et  al.,  1992  and  Rotc EIld & Foley,  1988.  Followmg hsmore actor-oriented  approach,  Marenin  uses the notion of 
by attempts to penetrate and control  the state i.Marenm,  1987  p.74; Marenin, 1988  p.220). 
conflict  coalitions to descriie all  alliances  of  groups and md1vlduals  who  have  come  together  to further  their  interests 
P a: 
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different  approaches of which some stress the  actor-perspective  while  others  attempt to anchor 
the actions of the  various  agents in socioeconomic  structures.  Marenin  represents the most 
explicit application of an actor-oriented  perspective as  he rejects  the idea of understanding  the 
state  by  reference  to the nature  of  the  social  formation,  and  instead  focus n human  agency as the 
location of dynamics of change and reproduction  (Marenin,  1988 p.  228): 
“The  state  is  created  by  human  agency,  changed  by  agency,  and destroyedand recreated 
by  agency”  (Marenin,  1987  p.  69). 
Other  contributions  express  a  more  implicit  agency-orientation  when  they  describe  actions  and 
reactions by groups  and  organisations,  including  the  interaction  between the state and  societal 
agents,  without  explaining  what  motivates  the  various  actions. A complex pattern of actions and 
reactions  seems  to  be  driven by dynamics that do not refer  to  the  structural  positions of the 
various actors (e.g. Azarya, 1988). Still other  contributions  place themselves somewhere  in- 
between an agency-  and  a  structure-oriented  approach  when  reference is made to some  broadly 
described  socioeconomic  phenomena  such as the  emption of social  and  economic  crises,  initiation 
of  structural  adjustment  policies  and  the  emergence of ew  social  classes,  whereas  a  more  specific 
anchorage of political  actions  in  economic  structures i not  attempted (e.g. Chazan, 1994). 
Bratton  differs  from  such  approaches by trying to relate political actions to socioeconomic 
conditions.  He  suggests  that  the  choice of strategy is mainly  conditioned  upon the actors’  access 
to power which  refers to a  combination ofpoZiticuZ  autonomy andpolitical capuciq. Political 
autonomy is defined as the  latitude of social actors to take political initiatives unconstrained by 
the  claims of others.  Political  capacity is the  ability to implement  political  decisionss4  (Bratton, 
1994a  p.235-239).  Economic  factors are important  dimensions of both  autonomy  and  capacity, 
and  although  Bratton carefdly avoids a direct  anchorage of political  actions in specific  economic 
structures  or  classes, his socioeconomic  rooting of political  concepts is clear.  Thus,  peasants’ 
political  autonomy is seen as mainly  depending on access to land and control over labour. 
Capacity is generally  conditioned  upon  the existence of resources  such as hum- financial, 
material,  coercive  and  symbolic  resources  required for implementation,  and  in the case  of  peasant 
political  capacity  to  engage  the  state,  conditions  include  a  strong  set  of  shared  economic  interests, 
a  tradition for collective  action,  the  availability of models of economic interest association  and 
a  favourable  economic  environment  (Bratton, 1994a p.235,  p.248). 
Conclusion 
As it has already  been  established, the interactive  approach is considered  a fruitful attempt  to 
overcome  many  deficiencies  found in theories  about state and  society  that  do  not  sufliciently  take 
account of the mutual interaction between the two parties. State and society are deeply 
interrelated, but not in any simple and predictable way. The actions of state agents have 
implications for society  and the actions of societal forces have  implications for state  structures 
Political  autonomy  and  political  capaci are considered  analytically  distinctive  properties of social  organisations: 
autonomy  may exist  without  capacity (W x. ich IS ’ the  usual  case of e.g.  farmers’  organisations),  while  capacity ma  
exist  without  autonomy.  The two dimensions are notequally  important  to  power  but  autonomy  takes  precedence  over 
capacity. An organisation  that has autonomy  but lmted capacity  has  at  least  the  negative  ower of withdrawal 
their own political  agenda (sratton, 1994a  p. 236). 
(dlsengagement),  whereas  an  organisation that has a cemm capacity  but  no  autonomy  will finiit difficult to pursue 
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and  policies.  How the state  relates to society  and how society  relates to the state,  however,  can 
be read  neither  from the personality  of  top  politicians  and  bureaucrats,  inter-elite  fights,  class 
analyses,  economic  analyses, the associational  scene  nor  from  other  similar  factors. This has to 
be  established  in  each  particular  case  based  on  studies  of  the  main  actors,  their  various  strategies 
and the structures that condition their strategies. 
In the empirical  study  of the interplay  between  extension  agencies  and  farmers in the Sikasso 
region  the  interactive  approach points to the  need to study  both  parties.  Farmers  cannot  be S en 
as reacting  only  to  initiatives  taken  by  government  agencies,  but  societal  dynamics i  the farming 
community  (the  mutual  interaction of fanners) are  also  important  conditioning  factors for their 
strategies.  Similarly,  government  agencies  respond  to  farmers’  strategies  to  a  certain extent but 
their  way  of  relating to farmers is also  very  much  dependent  on  state-internal  factors  such as the 
institutional  set-up of the state, the interaction  between  the  various  state  agencies,  etc. 
By pointing  out some main  tendencies in the way  society  and  state  can  relate  to  each  other, the 
engagement-disengagement  framework  provides  a  useful  methodological tool to  an  empirical 
study.  It contributes to an  understanding  of  how  actions by  one  party  may  generate  particular 
reactions by the other  party.  What is most  importan%  it  introduces  a  main  distinction  between th  
qualitatively different situations of mutual engagement and mutual disengagement for the 
possibilities  of  both the state  and  societal  forces  to  pursue  their  political  agenda. In the  study  of 
the Sikasso region the framework is used to  inspire  the  analysis  of  highly  different  strategies 
pursued  by each of the four  extension  agencies  (chapter  9) as well as the  analysis  of the way  the 
various  societal forces interact  with  state  representatives  (chapter  11). 
The  engagement-disengagement h e w o r k  is very  rough,  though,  and  may invite many  critical 
comments for simplifying highly complicated processes. Peter Gibbon has criticised it for 
exaggerating the similarities of the phenomena  characterised as either  engagement or 
disengagement.  He  argues that ‘disengagement  trends’  such as informalisation,  smuggling  and 
black  marketing  have  little in common as they  involve  different  people  with  different  strategies 
who relate to different state  institutions.  Moreover, he  questions  the  conscious  preference  by  a 
large  group of people of particular  strategies.  Many  forms  of  engagement  and  disengagement,  he 
argues,  reflect a structure of  opportunities  given by  political  and  geographical  conditions  rather 
than  conscious  choices.  And  finally,  Gibbon  finds  the  tendency to treat  disengagement as absolute 
and  unconditional  highly  problematic  (Gibbon,  1992 p. 10-1 1). 
One has to  agree with Gibbon  that the use  of  the  engagement-disengagement  framework  as  a 
simple  model  with  only  four  options is not  very  desirable.  It is important,  therefore, to stress  with 
Chazan that the same  people  may  simultaneously  adopt  a  multitude  of  strategies  involving  both 
engagement  and  disengagement  of  different  state  agencies.  And  to  notice, as Bratton has pointed 
out, that strategies are constantly changing. Rather than as a model offering a simplified 
representation  of  a  complex  reality, he framework  should  be used to generate  questions  that  can 
guide  an  empirical  analysis. In a  study of African  farmers,  a  highly  heterogenous  group  subject 
to many  different  conditions, this implies  that  neither as a  group  nor as individuals  they  can  be 
fitted  into a model. Instead, the framework should be used to analyse their many different 
sometimes  overlapping  and  sometimes  contradictory  interests  and  strategies.  Unlike  the  tendency 
by many  scholars to focus  only on one dominating  strategy,  i.e.  the  various  disengagement 
strategies  adopted  by  Afiican fanners (e.g.  Bates,  1981;  Hyden,  1983;  El&  1990),  such an analysis 
40 
will reveal that disengagement  strategies  represent  only  part  of  farmers’  interactions with the 
state. In many  cases Aliican farmers  have  cooperated  with t e state  or  parts of the state because 
they  have  realised  that  they  could  benefit  from its assistance.  And  throughout the  history  farmers 
have  reckoned  that  there  are  limits  to  what  individualised  acts  of  everyday  resistance  can  achieve 
and  have  constructed  formal  organisations to make  direct  demands on the  state”. 
Gibbon’s  criticism  of  the  tendency to see  (particularly  disengagement)  strategies a purposive and 
intentional  popular  reversals of dominating  trends  touches  on  a  very  central  problem.  There is a 
risk  that the engagement-disengagement  framework  and  the  interactive  approach  in  general  invite 
purely  political  interpretations of all social  phenomena.  The  general  lack of reflection about the 
influence of structural  conditions on social  actors  tends  to  result  in  a view of political forces as 
completely  autonomous  from  socioeconomic  conditions. As described  above, this particularly 
applies to some interpretations of the  framework  (e.g.  Marenin,  1987;  Marenin,  1988; Azarya, 
1988), where the explanatory  power of the  concepts is significantly l i i t ed  by  referring the choice 
of engagement or disengagement options only  to  a  complex  pattern of actions  and reactions by 
state and societal agents.  When  criticising the framework,  Gibbon  particularly relates to the 
writings of Azarya. 
The attempts by BraRon to relate political actions to socioeconomic conditions, however, 
represent  a  constructive  response to the criticism.  Bratton’s  concepts of political  autonomy and 
political capacity suggest  some of the links  between  structure  and  agency  disregarded  by  other 
contributions.  Still,  Bratton’s  reflections  are  very  general  and  thereby  difficult  to  apply  to  specific 
studies of the strategies of either  state  or  non-state  organisations.  It  remains  a  considerable 
challenge  to  operationalise  the  analysis by drawing on attempts by others to anchor the analysis 
of both state capacities and the emergence of societal forces ready to engage the state in 
assessments of the role of structural  conditions. 
This leads to the second  objection to the framework,  namely  that its openness  to  many  different 
interpretations  makes it a  sketchy  and  all-encompassing  ‘model’  prone to lose  explanatory  power 
as no factors are  pointed  out as more  important  than  others: it is open to both  structure- and 
agency-oriented  analyses  and  to  theories emphasiziig both  political,  organisational  and 
socioeconomic factorss6.  The  framework,  thereby,  represents  only an initial  starting  point  for 
analyses that can  move in very  different  directions.  It is worth  noting that most of the  authors 
” In a critique of Ferguson’s  analysis  of the state as an  ‘?ti-politics  machine,’ Ferguson, 1990),  Pieter de Vries 
notices  that It represents  a  ma’or  problem  to  reduce  the  opnons  of  peasant  orgamsanons to two p s ible  alternatives: 
that of engaging in politic a action  against the state  by  forming  organisations  ready to confront lt, and  that  of 
submitting to it.  The  peasant  organisations  which  he  himself  has  studied  in  the  Atlantic  zone  of  Costa  Rica  are 
point when he notes  that  focussing  either on peasant  rebelllon  and  revolubon or on everyday  forms  of  reslstence 
always  ready to negotiate  with  some  state  agencies  while *?k ng  others  (de  ,Vries, 1997  p.  93). Fox makes a .similar 
excludes  a  great  deal  of rural polincal  activity  (Fox,  1990 p. 3). 
56 The opposite criticim - that  important  dimensions  are  excluded - has  been  raised  by  some of the authors 
themselves as they  adnnt  that international fuctors are b!md spots in a  state-in-society  approach  (I$o!di & Shue,  1994 
p.294).  Although  an  attempt to integrate  such.lssues p the  approach has, not  yet  been,made, It IS bel!eved to be 
theoretically possible to include a range of mternahonal erspectlves m the analysls of how parhcular state 
institutions  interact  with arange of (national  and intemationdsocietal act?rs  (Kobli & ShueJ994 p.324).  Contrary 
to the view of authors  themselves,  Ferguson  claims  that  the  state-in-soclety  a  proach  does in fact  deal  with  the 
international  level  by  a  description  of  international  encies “as the policemen o Atates - regulating  their  functioning 
he has reached this interpretation o the framework. 
and rolliig back ther excesses ‘structural $ushnent”’ (Ferguson, 1998  p.  52). I find  it  difficult  to  see how 
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would  subscribe  to  the  view  of  the  interactive  approach as   conceptual  framework  that  provides 
a  series of theoretically  informed  questions  to  empirical  research  but does not  pretend  to  be  yet 
another ‘grand  theory’  about  state-society  relations  (e.g.  Migdal, 1994 p.8). Considering the 
limitations of many  of  the  ‘substantive  theory  contributions’  reviewed in chapter 1 that  tend  to 
be  very firm on the possibilities  of  generalising  about  the  characteristics  of  state-society  relations 
in  Africa,  the  approach is considered  a  constructive  point  of  departure for further  investigations. 
While the interactive  approach is considered  a  qualitatively  different  and  more  constructive 
approach  to  the  study  of  state-society  relations  because  it  focusses  on  interaction instead of  either 
the state or  society, the challenge,  thus, is twofold:first, tofill in theframework  andsecond, to 
integrate  considerations  about the  influence of structural  conditions on state and  societal actors. 
Concerning  the  operationalisation  of  the h w o r k ,  the  authors  go  some of the  way  themselves 
by their  suggestion to disaggregate the concepts of both state and  society. Instead of seeing the 
state  only as a  totality  that  confronts  society or societal  groups in an unequivocal way, it is seen 
also as a  multitude  of  different  structures  with  varying  objectives  and  different  ways  of  mutual 
interacting  and  of  relating  to  non-state  actors  (Marenin,  1987  p.61;  Migdal,  1994  p.17).  Similarly, 
societal  forces  are  seen as encompassing  a  wide  variety  of  movements,  networks,  groups,  cells 
and formal and informal organisations that differ substantially in size, scope, purpose, 
composition  and  resources  (Chazan,  1994 p. 256;  Migdal,  1994  p.20). In chapter 3 and  chapter 
4 the  implications  of this understanding  will be further  discussed  with  a  view to get  some  more 
specific  theoretical  guidelines for the analysis  of the interaction  between  government  agencies 
and  societal  forces in the  Sikasso  region. 
In both of  the  chapters  the  issue of the relationship  between  actors’  strategies  and  conditioning 
structures is integrated  into  the  discussions. In chapter 3 on  ‘the  anthropology  of the state’  the 
theoretical  unpacking  of  the  concept of the  state is sought  operationalised  by  use  of  organisation 
theory  with a clear  contextual  focus.  And in chapter  4  the  discussion  of  contributions to the 
theories  about  societal  forces  includes  theories that anchor  political  analyses in studies of class 
and  economic  structures. 
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CHAPTER 3. DISAGGREGATION OF THE STATE 
Introduction 
It is the  purpose  of  the  present  chapter  to  further  discuss  suggestions  by the interactive approach 
to disaggregate  the  concept  of  the  state.  Thereafter  an attempt is made to operationalise  the 
‘anthropology  of  the  state’  by  drawing  on  a  range of contributions  to  organisation  theory.  While 
organisation  theory is used to refine  the  disaggregation  of the state, the notion of organisational 
performance  defined as the  ability of an organisation to respond to demand  by its clients is used 
as an  entrance  point  to  operationalise  the  more  abstract  concept of interaction.  The  chapter, thus, 
establishes a framework for analysing  performance of the four extension  agencies  under  study. 
Drawing on a  model  proposed by Merilee  Grindle  and  Mary  Hilderbrand,  a  structure for the 
analysis  of  the  agencies is presented.  It  includes a contextual analysis of  the shared environment 
by government  agencies in the form  of the economic,  political  and  human  resource  situation of 
the  country,  the  institutional  characteristics of the  public sector and  the  interplay  among  the 
various agencies which are part of the state. In addition to this, it points to a number of 
organisation-specz3c factors such  as  structures,  processes  and  management  style of a particular 
organisation  and its human  resources. 
The analysis of organisation-speczjk factors is broadened  by  combining  contributions  to  revised 
agency  theory  with  more  recent  contributions  focussing o  issues such as work  satisfaction  and 
demand  pressure.  Six  organisation-specific  elements  are  highlighted as particularly  important  to 
organisational  performance,  namely  1) authoriw, 2) rewards, 3) OrganisationaZ identificaion, 4) 
peerpressure, 5) worksatisfaction, and 6 )  demandpressure. These  elements  provide  the  structure 
for the analysis in chapter 9 of  each of the four agencies under study. 
Finally,  the  chapter  ends by a  discussion  of  advantages  and  problems  of  a  particular  organisational 
model, ‘the mechanical model’, that provides the basic organisational features of the four 
agencies under study. 
Only few  examples are found  in  the  literature  of  attempts to apply  organisation  theory  to  studies 
of  extension  organisations in developing  countries.  Therefore,  much  of the discussion in this 
chapter  refers  to  theories  developed in other  contexts,  but  wherever possible general  points  are 
sought  illustrated by examples related  to  agricultural  extension. 
Before  opening  the  chapter, a few  comments on the  combmation of state  theories  and  organisation 
theory  are  necessary. As explained in the introduction to the theoretical  section,  attempts  to 
operationalise  the ‘antl~opology of the state’ by use of organisation  theory  reflect  a  movement 
from  abstract  macro-level  theory to more  specific  middle-level theories defining  a  more  limited 
realm  of  relevance.  The  combmation is not  commonly  seen,  hence  none of the researchers 
contributing  to  the  interactive  approach  have  worked  with  organisation  theory,  and  none  of  those 
contributing to organisation theories discussed in the following apply a state-and-society 
perspective.  The  danger of combining the two may be that the shift in level of abstraction 
becomes a shift also from a conceptual framework kind of theory to substantive theories. 
Operating  closer  to  empirical  realities,  organisation  theory tends to point out a  limited  number 
of factors which are  ‘always’  decisive  to  organisational  performance  (e.g.  work  satisfaction  or 
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authority or demand  pressure). This is reflected in the fact that  organisation  theory  tends to be 
more  prescriptive than state theories.  Much of the  field is occupied  by  the  issue of organisational 
change: how to improve the performance of organisations, e.g. by changing structures, 
management strategies or attitudes of the staff. The challenge, therefore, is to pick from 
organisation  theory  the  points  which seem  useful  to  establish a more  open  conceptual  framework 
that  does  not  predict  empirical  findings  and  prescribe  solutions  but  generates  a  series ofres arch 
questions to  an empirical  investigation. 
3.1. The anthropology of the  state 
A combination of the  suggestions by  Migdal  and  Marenin  to  an  analytical  dismantling  of  the  state 
(‘anthropology of the state’) points to  at least three types  of  distinctions: 
- between the various state agencies. 
- between the various levels of the state  hierarchy. 
- between  individual state agents. 
State agencies tend to assume identities and interests of their own. In the  interaction  with other 
agencies and with societal groups  a  certain  team spirit is developed  which  can  be  enforced by 
shared socialisation (e.g.  common  educational  background)  and  fierce  competition  with  other 
agencies for resources and power  (Marenin, 1987 p.73;  Migdal,  1988  p.209-211). 
Pressures on the various levels of the  state  hierarchy differ  markedly.  At each  level  state-internal 
pressures come from superiors, underlings and peers, while state-external pressures are 
significantly  different for the top  executive  leadership  and  for  field  level staff supposed  to  execute 
state  directives  directly in the face of possibly  strong  social  resistance”  (Migdal,  1988  p.  206-259; 
Migdal,1994 p.16-17). 
Individual state agents may  respond as much (or more) to the  distinctive  pressures  they face as 
they do  to the  rest of the  state  organisation  (Migdal,  1994  p.9). In particular,  the  ‘trenches’ of the 
state in the form of front-line  officials (tax collectors, police officers,  extension  agents  etc.)  are 
often subject to pressures to throw in their lot with local people against the impersonal 
requirements of the state and their agency  (Marenin,  1987  p.70-73;  Migdal, 1994 p.9). 
In addition to this structure-oriented  anthropology of the state, Marenin  suggests the need for an 
understanding of the state as also a conceptual  construct composed  of  many  different  parts: 
“The  primary  social  reality of the  state - its coerciveness,  its  consensual  nature, its moral 
legitimacy - is the state as a  person, as police officer, as postman,  as  bureaucrat, as 
schoolteacher.  Yet  people also perceive  standing  behind  such  agents  a  legitimate  power 
and have an image,  however  simple, of what  that  power  represents.  The  state, thus, 
Migdal o erates with four main levels of the state hierarchy  xgdal, 1994 p.16): 
the fxencges:  government field staff with direct contacts to c Y’ ~ents, targets  and  beneficiaries of state  policies. 
the d i s p e r s e d  field offices: regional and  local  bodies. 
the agencies central  offices:  offices in the  capital  city  which are technically  responsible to the  top  political 
leadership. 
4) the  commanding  heights: the top executive  leadership. 
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presents itself and is experienced  simultaneously  as  agent  and as symbolic totality”. 
(Marenin, 1987 p.70) 
The  suggestion  by  Marenin  comes  very  close to Gupta’s  view of the  state,  referred  to  earlier,  as 
a discursive construct  resulting  from  a  combination of people’s  encounters  with  local-level 
bureaucracies  (e.g. village development  workers, the police  and  the  electricity  board)  and their 
more  general  image of the state derived  mainly  from the media  (Gupta,  1995  p.  383-384). 
The state is both  abstract  and  specific: it is a symbolic fofality and it is specific  organisations and 
individuals who  meet  societal  agents  in  face-to-face  encounters. 
The implication of this understanding of the  state is that  street-level  bureaucracies  (Lipsky,  1980 
p.3) play a particular role as mediators between state and society. Through the day-to-day 
relationship  with  government  representatives  people  develop  a  perception of their  relationship 
with the state”. 
The  personalised  relation,  however,  never  stands  alone. The specific  encounter  between the 
extension  officer  and the farmer is both  a  person-to-person  relation  and  a  reflection of a  relation 
between  state  and  society.  As  Hyden  has  expressed  it:  “The  extension  officer is a  person  and at 
the same time  a  representative of something  larger”  (Hyden,  lecture  given on 23  October 1995 
during a  Nordic  researcher  training  course  held in Jyllinge,  Denmark). 
Furthermore, farmers may  have  a  perception of the state  irrespective of their dealings  with 
individual  government  agentss9.  Abstract  relations  mediated  through  price  and tax structures or 
derived from the handling by the  government of regional  conflicts  or  international issues may 
influence  the  image of the state held by the population. 
The particularity of the discursive  construct  of the state  relates to its special  character as an 
organisation which  differs from all other powerful  decision-making  structures in society by its 
claim to represent  the  public  good  and its entitlement  to  exercise  the  powers  and  authority  needed 
to implement that claim (for example a monopoly of legitimate coercion, international 
sovereignty  and the powers to tax and  conscript)  (Marenin,  1988  p.217; Azarya, 1988  p.10). 
It is both an  entity  depending on a  certain  amount of legitimacy in the eyes  of  societal  groups and 
a  complex  structure  constituted by  many different  parts.  People may, therefore, relate to  it both 
as a  symbolic  totality  and as an agent  in  the  form  of  a  particular  organisation  (or  even  a  particular 
individual) or they  may  combine  many  sets of perceptions  to an overall  image  of the state. 
’* In the literature  on  extension  services  scholars  have  called  attention to the  importance  of  extension  service 
personnel to  the  rception  b farmers of  their  relationship with the  state  (Christoplos &Nitsch, 1996 p. 40). In  his 
autobiomDhv. Elson Man 2 ela  touches  on  the  same  issue:  “The  most  imDortant  Derson in anv  Drisoner’s life is not 
the mkster ofJustice, not  the  commissioner  of  p+ons,  not  even t h e h d o f  ris&, but the w;?der in one’s  section. 
If  you are cold  and  want an extra  blanket,  you  mlght  petition  the mmster opjustice, but  you  will  get  no  response. 
Ifvou EO to  the  commissioner  of  urisons. he will say. ‘if I give YOU an extra blanket I must  give  one to evervone’. 
Y I ,,. 
B& if you approach the warder in yo&  corridor, &id oii are-on good terms with.hm, hewill simply  go-to  the 
stockroom  and  fetch  a  blanket”  (Mandela, 1995 p. 4973: 
” Norman Long raises this issue in a  discussion  about  how  people’s  perceptions  of  the  actions  and  agency  of  others 
shape  their own behaviour Gong, 1997 p. 4, p. IO). 
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The  advantage of disaggregating  the  notion of the state is obviously that it constitutes a tool to 
identi@ its different  parts  and  thereby  to  understand  the  complexity of the interplay  between  state 
and  societal  agents.  It  counters  the  criticism of Skocpol-inspired theories that they tend to draw 
a  clear-cut  boundary  between  state  and  society  and  in  consequence  hereof  tend  to  endow  the  state 
with an image of unity as a  policy-making actor standing apart fiom society  (see,  e.g.  Mitchell, 
1991 p.86-88).  The  interactive  approach  demonstrates that it is possible to operate with an 
analytical (as opposed  to  empirical)  distinction  between state and  society  and at the same  time 
avoid the view of the state only as a unitary  agent. 
The  danger  related  to  the  disaggregation,  however, is the risk of overemphasizing the question 
of  state-internal  differences  at  the  expense  of  the  concept of state-entity. This is particularly true 
for an approach  which  emphasizes  the  need  for  a  disaggregation  down t  the individual level. In 
empirical analyses  one is often  faced  with  a  tremendous  temptation  to  present  individuals  as 
explanations in themselves.  Glaring  differences in behaviour  among  individual extension agents 
and  farmers  may  lead  to  quick  conclusions  about  the  importance of p rsonality and individual 
strategies. E, however,  one  wants an analytical h e w o r k  which  goes  beyond the anecdotal  and 
is able to capture patterns of behaviour, individual state agents  cannot be considered  the  most 
important units of  analysis  (Leonard,  1977 p. 16; & Fivelsdal,  1996 p. 172). A similar danger is 
related to an approach containing an overly focus on differences among the various state 
agencies6'. 
Thus,  the major risk  of  theories  which  attempt an unpacking  of  the state into its various (either 
structural  or  conceptual)  components is the  risk  that  they are not  able  to  deal  with  the  particularity 
of the  state as both a  multitude  of  different  structures and an abstract  entity  dependent on a  certain 
amount of legitimacy in the  eyes  of  societal  groups. If the  latter  dimension is cut  off from the  state 
concept, it has a  number  of  very  serious  consequences for empirical  analysis: if a  disaggregated 
concept of the state  stands  alone,  the  study  of  local-level  processes of interaction between  state 
agencies and groups of societal  actors will comprise  only  those  processes  which  directly  relate 
to  the  particular  state  agencies n question. This will leave  out all actions and reactions that can 
be referred to the  experience by societal actors of interacting  with  other state agencies.  The 
analysis will also  not  be  able  to  capture  the  perception  by  societal  actors of he agency as part of 
a  larger symbolic totality or legitimate  power but will  tend to assume that they see it as a  more 
or less autonomous  actor. 
Similarly, the study of internal  processes  among the various agmcies and  the  different  hierarchal 
levels  within  the  state  misses an important  dimension if all these structures are not seen as both 
pursuing their individual goals and relating to some kind of common overall objectives. 
Accordingly, it must  be  considered  a  major  challenge to the interactive  approach to operate  with 
a multifaceted state concept  which  includes both the state as a complexity of structures and  the 
state as a unity. 
A second challenge to the approach is to move beyond the still fairly sketchy framework 
suggested by Migdal  and  Marenin.  By  pointing  out  the  various  internal  cleavages in th  state,  i.e. 
MI Crawford  Young  mentions  the politid systems  theories  and  certain  versions f organisation  theory as exam les 
oftheories which through an  overly  focus  on  subsystems or government  branches  have  contributed to the decyine 
of the state  concept  (Young,  1994 p. 22-23). 
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by suggesting the units ojana2ysis6', they  indicate  an  entrance point to the analysis.  When 
wanting to understand  the  interaction  between  specific  state  agencies  and  farmers,  however, it is 
not enough to know that the state is a  complex  and  multifaceted  structure  where  different 
elements  are  pulled in different  directions. A specific analysis  necessitates  some  more  specific 
guidelies for  the  study  of  relations  among  the  various  elements  and  between  state-internal  actors 
and  external  actors.  Such  guidelines  are  provided by organisation  theory which deals with how 
different  parts  of an organisation  such as the state relate to each  other  and to external  actors. 
3.2. The relevance of organisation  theory 
Organisation  theory is an extensive  field  characterised by multiple perspectives  and  inspiration 
from all kinds of fields  ranging &om political  science,  engineering  and  biology  over  culture 
studies and social anthropology to architecture and linguistics (Hatch, 1997 p. 3-8). While 
attempts  have  sometimes  been  made  to  define  organisation  theory  more  narrowly,  e.g. as theories 
dealiig with  the  structures - or  the  sociology - of organisations, only', the  notion of organisation 
theory in the  following  will  be  used  in its broadest  sense  to  describe all  theories dealing with the 
question ojhow  to understand  the  actions  and  interactions ojorganisation-internal groups  and 
the interactions between these groups and external agents. Drawing on broad field of 
organisation  theory, it is attempted to approach the issue of how to understand the performance 
of government organisations in developing countries in general and extension agencies in 
particular. 
The  relevance of organisation  theory  in  analysis of organisations  in  developing  countries is a 
much debated issue, and the application of organisation theory to analysis of government 
organisations in developing  counties is even more controversial.  Although in many  specific 
organisation analyses only l i i t e d  attention is paid to the environment of organisations 
(Brinkerhoff,  1994 p.  144-14963),  there  has  been  a  widespread  theoretical  agreement  about its 
importance at  least  since  the 1 9 6 0 ~ ~  (Hatch, 1997 p.  76-97).  Roughly  speaking,  the  more  the 
" In specific  analyses  of  a  number of countries,  mainly  in  the  Middle  East  region,  Mi  dal has demonstrated how 
the various  units might relate  to  each  other,  but  he  has  not  suggested  a  more  specific % amework  for  the  analysis 
(Migdal,  1988  p.  206-259). 
When  organisation  theory  is  defined  more  narrowly as theories  dealing  with e structures - or the  sociology - of 
organisations, only, the notion of 'organisational  development'  is  used to designate  the  literature  which  focus on 
attitudes and  motwation  of  individuals  and goups, wide 'orglisational, d e s I & r e f F  to  management  science 
(Hage & Feerbusch, 1987 p. 3-4, p. 19-20 p. 24-47). May J0 atch ldentlfies mqor theoretical perspectives 
n orgams&on theory as the machine  perspective,  the  organic  perspective  and the cultural  perspective,  respectively 
(Hatch, 19978 51-56).  @d  others  have  suggested a  distinction  between  theories  focussing on structure,  processes 
and  culture ( akka & Fwelsdal,  1996  p.  21-24). 
" In the analysis  of  a  random  sample  of 80 World Bank rojects  (carried  out  in  the  period  1983-1990),  Derick 
Brinkerhoff found  that  the  vast  majority of staff appraisa?  reports on the projects  pald  minor or no  attention  to 
reference to the  social  context  of  the  projects (Bderhoff, 1994 p.  145). 
assessing the  degree  of  stakeholder or public  sup ort to the projects,  whlle about half  of the reports made no 
M Already  in  the  late  1950s  the  emergence  of  contingency  theory  introduced t  organisation  analyses  the  concept 
of  environment. Prior to  this  a  closed  systems  a  roach  prevailed  which  treated  organisations a  if  their  internal 
o erations were  the sole  concern  of  management  %arch, 1997 76 78 Scott,  1992  p.88-100; Bakka & Fivelsdal, 
l$96 p. 64-74).  Further  development  of  what  has  been calle8;thepin systems  approach'  has  followed  various 
different  paths,  including  the  suggestion by  W.  Richard Scott of a main  distinction  between  the  open rational systems 
models  and  the  open  natural  systems  models (Scott, 1992 29 34 p  5 1 56 p  104  122 . Althouf  widely a q t e d  
as a  useful typology of  approaches,  Scott's  descri tion o the open  natural  systems  perspective  as  been cntused 
for  being  based U on a  set  of  assumptions  about  armony  and  organisational  survival as major common  goals for 
an  organisation.  &e  picture  of an organisation as an entity  which  relates to its environment  can be said to contain 
l! 
p. - , .  - ' .  - ) 
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environment is believed to matter,  the less relevant  it  will  be to import  theories  developed in a 
completely  different  setting  to  studies of African  organisations.  Analysis  of  African  state-society 
relations by researchers  applying  the  organic  approach  (discussed  in  chapter  1.1)  points  to  a 
completely different functioning of agencies in developing countries and in industrialised 
countries due  to the  importance  of  patron-client  relations  and the economy  of  affection in the 
former6'. 
In addition to  the importance  of  the  general  environment,  the  growing  interest in organisation 
culture since the 1970s  (Hatch,  1997 p. 206-236)  has  made  many  researchers  warn  against  the 
application of organisation  theory,  particularly  management  theories,  developed in a  western 
context to developing  countries. It is argued  that  while at the  structural  level  organisations  are 
becoming  increasingly  similar,  the  behaviour  of  people within organisations  shows  considerable 
country-specific  variation  (e.g.  Child,  1981;  Hofstede,  1980). 
Against  these  reservations  other  researchers  have  argued  that the  distinctive features of 'African 
behaviour' derive >om an essentially  universal  mode of response  to  the particularities of the 
Apican environment (Leonard,  1977  p.  23  1). In consequence  thereof,  they  pay  less  attention to
Africa-specific  cultural  factors  and  concentrate more on  understanding  the  characteristics  of  the 
environment. They hold that the  striking  similarities  between  public  organisations  in  industrial 
and  developing  countries  makes  it  appropriate  to  gain  inspiration  from  organisation  theory  when 
trying  to  understand the characteristics of bureaucracies of the latter (e.g.  Uphoff,  1994a p. 5; 
Vengroeff et al. 1991 p. 108; Blunt, 1990 p. 302; Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 1992 p. 375; 
Leonard,  1977  p. 17; Leonard,  1987  p.  905-906,  Hage & Finsterbusch,  1987  p.  1-7;  Tendler,  1997 
p.  1-8; Christoplos &Nitsch, 1996  p.  40-43). 
While these researchers draw on many different parts of organisation theory66, a group of 
researchers have concentrated  particularly  on cases of good organisational performance. Based 
on the assumption that all people are likely to perform  well  under  certain  conditions,  David 
Leonard  and  Robert  Wade  discuss  among  incentives  to  encourage  good  performance  a  particular 
set of management style, a system of rewards based on merits, the encouragement of 
organisational  identification  and  the  existence  of  peer  pressure  encouraging  group  performance 
(Leonard,  1977;  Wade,  1995). 
Contributions by  authors  such as Judith Tendler,  Ian  Christoplos,  Merilee  Grindle  and  Mary 
Hilderbrand follow the  same  line  of  reasoning but concentrate  on  factors  such  work  satisfaction 
and  demand  pressure.  When  arguing for the applicability  of  theories  about  workers'  motivation 
to developing  countries,  Tendler  notes  that the mainstream  development  field  has  not  been 
an  inbuilt closed systems perspective  even if the intention  has  been to define it as open.  Majken  Schultz uses the 
conflicting interests and loose l i i  es both inside the organisation and between the organisation and other 
label of the 'loosely coupled'  perspective to describe  an  alternative view of organisations as characterised  by 
organisations (Schultz,  1986 p. 19-34?, 
Based on a  study of a  wide  range of elements of the  environment  influencing  administrative  and policy behaviour 
models of management  structure  and  action  imported  from  the  West" (Turner & Hulme, 1997). 
in developing  countries, Mark Tumer and  David  Hulme  conclude  that  "we  should  be  extremely  cautious  in  applying 
Two influential  approaches  are  represented by the  various  attempts  to use either strategic rnanaqernent theories 
or contingency  theories to  analyse  and  improve  public  and  private  organisations in developmg countries (Brinkerhoff 
& Goldsmith, 1992 p. 372-375; Hage & Fmterbusch, 1987  p. 4, p. 232-236). 
48 
reluctant  to  import  ideas  and  practises  from  industrial  countries  and  the  private  sector  with  regard 
to macroeconomic policies, development strategies and management strategies. She finds, 
however, that the  development field has  picked up only  half of the  lesson  when it ignores  the 
extensive  literature on workers’  commitment as a  key  to  increasing  productivity  and the need to 
increase  the  discretion  of  workers  instead  of  reducing it (Tendler,  1997  p.  3-8;  Tendler  in a  lecture 
given in Espoo,  Finland, May 199767). 
All the above-mentioned  authors view organisations  in  developing  countries as sharing  with 
organisations in  industrial  countries  the  characteristics of being  complex  and  heterogeneous 
structures consisting of many different parts which are often pulling in several different 
directions.  Internal  conflicts  at various levels,  and  many  types of contacts  between  internal  and 
external  agents  make it difficult to view  organisations  only as entities.  The  specific  characteristics 
of the structures,  conflicts  and  pressures  may  vary  considerably  from  one  organisation to n ther 
and  from  one  point in time  to  another  for  the  same  organisation.  It is too  simplified,  therefore,  to 
describe  a  set  of  common  characteristics  to all rganisations in a  group  of  countries  (developing 
countries) and  oppose them to those of another  group  of  countries  (industrialised  countries).  It 
is also  a  simplification  to  characterise  a  whole  country  as  a good  or  a  bad  performer, as some 
agencies may be doing well, while others are doing less well. By assuming that people 
everywhere may express ‘unself-interested’  behaviour if allowed  to  do so, the  challenge is to 
understand how the particular  environment  may  sometimes  limit  the  possibilities  for letting it 
thrive (Tendler, 1997 p.  3; Tendler & Freedheim,  1994 p. 1783;  Grindle,  1997b  p.  483). 
In the following, insights of the  above-mentioned  authors  are  presented  and  discussed  in two 
sections dealing with the impact of the environment on organisational performance and 
organisation-speczjic factors infuencingperformance, respectively. 
While  none of the  authors  present  a  clear  definition  of rganisationalperformance, the  definition 
used here is the ability of an  Organisation to accommodate  client  demands. In other  words: 
clients’ assessment of the degree of their satisfaction is the measure of organisational 
performance. This definition  has  been  chosen  because it assigns an active  role  to  both  parties  in 
the  interaction:  the  organisation tries to  accommodate  a  demand,  and clients raise a demand  and 
subsequently  assess  the  level  of their satisfaction.  The  definition  differs,  thus,  from  measures  of 
organisational  performance  which  consider  only the actions of the  organisation  and  disregard  the 
role of clients such as, e.g. measurement of output  in  quantitative  terms,  or  economic  and 
financial measures such as  efficiency and cost-effectiveness. 
In practice. it can  be  difficult  to  establish  the  degree of satisfaction  of  demands  because, as Lipsky 
has w e d ,  any  questions to clients  concerning their satisfaction  with  services  provided  are  likely 
to be answered  negatively, as needs  tend to  be indefinite  and  therefore  never  properly  satisfied 
(Lipsky, 1980 p. 34-35). In a specific study, therefore, the issue of satisfaction has to be 
approached by asking a  series of more specific questions related  both to the  quantitative  and 
67 Tendler’s  lecture was given during the Nordic  researcher trainiig course on ‘The  political  economy of local 
change:  emerging  relations  between civil  society and local  governments  in  the south’. Espoo,  Finland,  Ma  27th 3 1st 
interest as an  explanation of human  behaviour  and  an  overly focus by the development  literature  on  bad  performanct 
1997. Tendler  explains the lack of attention  to  the  other half of the lesson by  the  almost  religious bezef  inself- 
in developin  countries  (Tendler,  1997 { 2-5). Grindle touches  on,the  same  roblem  when  she  points  out  that  ‘‘focus 
on the pathokgies of development  can  lmd  researchers to situanons  whic g do  not conform to e  ectations  about 
inefficiency, ineffectiveness,  unresponsiveness,  rent-seeking, and  predation”  (Grindle,  199%  pl(Bs3). 
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qualitative  aspects of services  provided.  Based on the literature on agricultural extension and 
interviews with farmers in the Sikasso region,  it is proposed  that  questions  to clients to assess 
quantitative  dimensions  of  extension  services  regard thefrequency of  contact  between  agencies 
and their clients and the reliability of the services,  i.e.  whether the services  are available when 
they are needed.  Qualitative  dimensions  of  extension  services  regard  the usefirrness of the 
assistance  provided  and  the  churacter  ofpersonul re ations between  extension  agents and clients 
(e.g. is advice given in the form  of  orders by agents  feeling  superior to farmers or based  on  a 
dialogue  with  farmers). 
3.3. The  impact of the environment on organisational  performance 
Grindle  and  Hilderbrand  have  proposed  a framework for the analysis  of the influence of various 
environmental  factors  on  the  performance of public  sector  organisations in developing  countries. 
They argue that in developing  countries it is  more  likely  that  organisations  will  be products of 
their environments  than  masters  of  their own fates  and  add  that these environments are rarely 
benign.  Therefore,  poorly  performing  officials  and  organisations  may  only  be  symptoms of 
dysfunctions rooted more deeply  in  political,  social  and  economic  contexts.  The  framework is 
meant  to  guide the assessment  of  how  and to what  extent  various  environmental  factors  influence 
organisational  performance by identifying  five  dimensions,  and  correspondingly, five levels of 
analysis which affect the ability to perform appropriate tasks effectively, efficiently and 
sustainably  (Grindle & Hilderbrand,  1995  p.  445-448;  Grindle, 1997ap. 11; Grindle, 199% p. 
483). 
The five  dimensions  include: 
1) the action environment  (the  rate and  structure  of  economic  growth,  the  degree  of  political 
stability  and  legitimacy  and  the  human  resource  profile  of a country6*) 
2) the  instikttional context of the public  sector (e.g. rules  and  regulations  concerning  recruitment 
procedures,  budgetary  support  and  management  practicess9) 
3) the  task  network  (interaction  among  different  organisations  involved in accomplishing  related 
tasks, between  central  administration  and  lower  administrative  levels  and  between  designers  and 
implementers of plans) 
4)  the organisation (structures,  processes,  management  styles, the strength and orientation of 
organisation  culture)  and 
5) human resources (managerial,  professional  and  technical  talent  and the appropriateness of 
training to existing  needs). 
The  action  environment  includes economic factors  such as growth, labour  market,  international.  economic 
relationships  and  conditions,  private  sector  and  development  assistance,political  factors  such a leadershlp  support, 
mobilisation  of  civil  society,  stabiety,  legitimacy  and  political instiFtions and social factors such  overall human 
resource  development, soclal wnfhct, class  structures  and organisation of civil  society  (Grindle &Hdderbrand, 1995 
p. 446). 
69 The institutional  context of the  public  sector  includes  factors  such as public  service  rules  and  regulations, 
budgetary  sup ort, role  of the state,  management practices and  formal  and  informal  power  relationships  (Grindle 
& Hilderbranx 1995 p. 446). 
50 
Based on research  carried  out  in  six  different  countries70,  Grindle  and  Hilderbrand  conclude  that 
constraints  either  in  the  action  environment  or  in  the  institutional  context  of  the  public  sector  may 
be so detrimental  to public sector  performance that little can be  done  unless  these  problems are 
first  addressed. Thus, an action  environment  characterised by  economic  stagnation,  low levels of 
human resource development and extensive social  conflict may cause  a  situation  where the 
potential for effective public sector performance is virtually nonexistent, no matter what 
interventions are being  made  at  other  levels7’.  Similarly,  a  situation of low budgetary  support, 
continual public sector  cutbacks,  inadequate  recruitment  procedures  and  few  rewards  for  good 
performance may be so constraining that remedies introduced at the inter-organisational, 
organisational or human resource level may not produce any improvement^^^ (Grindle & 
Hilderbrand,  1995  p. 448-453). 
These  findings  confirm  what  other  studies  have  documented  in  terms  of he impact of economic 
and  political crisis and  structural  adjustment  policies on public  sector  capacity,  and  despite the 
lack of attention  to such factors in  many  specific  analyses,  they  may  seem  obvious73.  The  really 
interesting finding is, however, that in situations where the action environment and the 
institutional  context of the public  sector,  although  far fiom ideal,  are not completely  dysfunctional 
to development,  organisation  culture  and  the  provision  of  people with meaningful jobs can 
compensate for constraints  rooted in more general  problems.  While  the  implications of this will 
be  discussed in further  details below, it is important to notice  that  Grindle  and  Hilderbrand  do  not 
use this conclusion to return to  a closed perspective  where  organisation-internal  factors  are 
highlighted at the expense  of  environmental  factors.  On  the  contrary,  they  stress the importance 
of external factors for the creation of a sense of organisational  mission  and  meaningful  work. 
Thus, they  mention that the participation of clients  in  service-oriented  organisations  can  help 
reinforce  a sense of mission and  commitment to it,  and  pressure  and  feedback  from  clients  can 
help  organisations to provide timely and  effective  service  and  thereby  increase th  feeling of job 
satisfaction  (Grindle & Hilderbrand,  1995  p. 457-461). 
The  contribution by Grindle  and  Hilderbrand draw on many  different  heoretical  and 
offers a  framework with an extensive  range of prioritised  factors  applicable to an empirical 
analysis.  Its  contextual  focus  makes it particularly use l l  to an analysis  that  takes  the  theoretical 
point of departure in the interactive  approach as it considers  both  societal  and  state-internal 
’’ Bolivia, the Centralpfrican Republic, Ghana, Morocco,  Sri  Lanka  and  Tanzania.  The  country  studies  included 
a  total of 29 organisatlonal case studies. 
The Central African Republic is mentioned as an example of a country where the action environment is 
particularly  dysfunctional to development. 
’* Tanzania is mentioned as an  example of a  country  where  the  public sector institutional  context is a serious 
constraint to improvement of public sector  performance. 
73 Grindle herself has  contributed to the  discussion  about  the  relationship  between  general  economic  and  political 
conditions  and the capacity of the  state in developing  counhies to perform  its  core roles. Based on thorough  analyses 
of Kenya  and  Mexico, she concludes  that the combined  impact of economic  and  political  crisis  in  the 1980s 
undermined  institutional, a d m i i v e  and  political  capacities of the  state,  whereas  it of en increased their technical 
capacity  in  macroeconomic  analysis  and  management  (Grindle, 1996). 
74 It draws  i.a. on elements of resource  dependency  theory,  nehvork  theories,  theories  about  organisation  culture, 
and  theories  about  workers’  motivation. 
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factors, while countering  the  tendency of authors applying  the  interactive  approach to lack 
reflection on the influence  of  structural conditions on social  actors7'. 
Considering the view of the  state,  however, as both an entity  depending on a certain amount  of 
legitimacy in the  eyes of societal  groups  and  a  complex  structure  constituted by many different 
parts, there is a  risk that the  model  neglects  the  discursive  dimension f the state as a symbolic 
totality.  Inspiration to deal  with this dimension can be gained  from institutional theory  which 
approaches  the  study of linkages  between an organisation  and  its  environment  from  a  perspective 
not very different from the one applied by Grindle and Hilderbrat~d'~. Institutional theory, 
however, singles out legitimacy as the  core  variable  decisive  to  organisational  performance 
(Hatch,  1997 p.  83-87).  Thus,  Uphoff  points  at normative linkages between an organisation  and 
groups  throughout  the  public as the  most  critical  relationship  because  they  provide ts generalised 
legitimacy.  According  to  Uphoff,  possessing  more  legitimacy  means  that an organisation will  be 
more  fully,  reliably  and  cheaply  complied with by the general  public.  Hence,  legitimacy  enhances 
performance.  Legitimacy  also  reflects its past and present  performance as the usefulness of its 
services and products  are  important  to  the  assessment of the organisation by the public.  In 
situations where  legitimacy  does  not  exist, an organisation is complied  with only for purely 
utilitarian reasons but not  because  of  any  normative  obligations. This is an extremely  fragile 
situation that threatens the  existence  of the organisation  (Uphoff, 1994b p.207-211). 
For  government  organisations  the  lack of legitimacy is particularly  detrimental  to their continued 
existence.  Government  organisations  speak in the name of the state and  can claim that their 
actions are ipso facto  legitimate  because  they  have  a public charter and can invoke public 
authority to enforce  decisions.  The  state,  however, may lack legitimacy,  either for a  minority 
(ethnic  groups,  political  factions) or for the majority of the  population,  and the individual state 
organisation  itself  may  not  be  considered of any use by the public. A government  organisation, 
thus,  cannot take legitimacy for granted. In a  heterogeneous  society it is difficult to satisfy all 
societal norms and  expectations as they  are  unlikely  to be mutually consistent, but a  certain 
degree of consensus is likely  to  provide an organisation  with  the cognitive and ethical basis 
necessq to operate. In extreme  situations  where  any  degree of consensus is lacking  and  the  state 
possesses no legitimacy at all, organisations will exist as empty structures virtually  unable  to 
operate"  (Uphoff, 19941, p.  208-209). 
While Grindle and  Hilderbrand  provide an appropriate  framework for a structural  analysis  of 
factors affecting  the  performance  of  particular  government  organisations,  the  contribution  by 
Uphoffadds the  discursive  dimension by pointing  out  that  a  government organisation cannot be 
The  focus on structures, i.e. sites  of  action,  rather than on processes and  actors has made  actor-oriented  researchers 
criticise  the Wework  for  being too static  to  rovide  an  understanding of or anisational  changes, e. in the  form 
of  capacity-building  initiatives. Thus, James T? rosle  et  al.  have  suggested  an  a%mati?e m e w o r k  wfich focusses 
on  actors,  actions  and  events  (Trostle e al., 1997 p. 63-71). Drawing  on the above discussions about  structure  and 
agency,  it is found  that  the  framework by Grindle  and  Hilderbrand  has  considerably  more t  offer. 
76 Norman  UDhoff distineuishes  between  four  main Woes of linkaees between  an  oreanisation  and its environment: 
~ ~ ~ . ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ ~~~ 
1) enabling lznkuges &lationships throug whi& .the OrgGisation obtains hancial, personnel resources, 
information and authority), 2)~ficnctionul lin ges (reciprocal exchange  relationships  with  key  groups), 3) d m e  
linkages general  relations v& the public) aid 4). nolmative linkuges (emotional  and  intellectual  connections 
between tL e  organisation  and groups that  value  the mhtuhon for ~ t s  duect and induect benefits). 
In Uphoff s terminology;  organisations - structures of roles - will persist,  while  institutions are being  dissolved. 
He  mentions the disintegrated  state  of  Somalia as an  example  of  such  a  sltuatlon. 
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understood  only as an organisation  relating  to  a  range of structurally-defined  external  and  internal 
factors.  Being  part of the  state,  the  performance of such organisations is very  much  affected by 
the  legitimacy  enjoyed  not just by the organisation itself but by the state as such. 
3.4.Organisation-specific factors  influencing  performance 
Two of the elements in the model  proposed by Grindle  and  Hilderbrand regard,organisation- 
specific factors rather than the shared environment of many different organisations: the 
organisation (structures,  processes,  management  styles,  the  strength  and  orientation of 
organisation  culture)  and human resowces are  issues  which  have  been  dealt  with  by  many  authors 
and from many  different  perspectives. 
Traditionally  the  issue  of  work  performance by mployees,  which  Grindle  and  Hilderbrand  relate 
mainly to work satisfaction, has been approached from a very different angle. Instead of 
discussing  the  work  satisfaction  perceived by workers  at  lower  levels of the hierarchy,  much of 
the literature has concentrated on how to control the self-serving behaviour of subordinate 
workers  to  insure  that  the  interests  of  owners,  external  stakeholders or management are protected. 
The  so-called ugencyproblem is defined as the risk that agents  (workers)  will  shirk  unless their 
actions contribute  directly to their own economic  self-interest. Agency theoPy deals with the 
control  strategies that can be applied by principals to reduce  the  problem.  Most of the literature 
concentrates  on  three  core  elements of such  strategies: contracts which  specify  expectations  to 
performance  and  promise r wards, and information that  allows  principals  to  know  whether  agents 
are  fulfilling  the  contracts  agreed  upon.  If  the  output is difficult to measure,  information  can be 
provided  by  designing  simple  routine jobs allowing  principals  to  observe  the  behaviour of agents 
and  reward  them  based  upon  behaviour  (the  mechanical  model,  to  be  discussed  below), or it can
be  provided  by  using  advanced  information  systems to monitor  more  complex jobs (Hatch, 1997 
p.  334-336). 
With  the  growing  interest in the  importance  of  organisation  cultures  (Hatch,  1997 p. 202-220), 
it has been suggested  that  also  cultural  values, norms and  expectations  can be used as control 
systems.  It is argued  that  socialisation of employees to a  particular  set of norms  and  values  will 
result in an internalisation  of  control by  members and ensure  a  high  level of commitment  even 
when  they  have to sacrifice  some  or all of their self-interests  (Hatch, 1997 p.  337-241; Bakka & 
Fivelsdal,  1996 p. 136-145). Mintzberg, thus, describes organisation culture (‘the system of 
ideology’) as the glue that binds an organisation together and counteracts dividing  forces.  He 
gives various examples of specific means to support the system of ideology, including 
socialisation  and  indoctrination  (Mintzberg,  1983 p.  156-158;  Mintzberg, 1989 p. 272). 
Newer contributions to the theories about how to tackle the agency  problem  combine the 
traditional focus on control  and  rewards  with theories about the importance of organisational 
identification.  Wade  argues  that  agency  theory  needs  to  be  supplemented by the  concept of social 
capital in  order to understand  those  features of the functioning of organisations which are not 
reducible to individual  contracts  (Wade,  1992  p.  53-54).  And  Leonard  defines  the  problem as that 
of combining  stimulation of motivation  through  incentives  with an atmosphere of mutual trust 
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(Leonard, 1977 p. 118)”. The revised agency theory focusses on four elements of special 
importance to  organisational  performance:  1) authority, 2) rewards, 3) organisational 
identiSfication and 4)peerpressure (Simon,  1991 p. 30-43;  Wade,  1995  p.  4-  5;  Leonard,  1977 
p. 23-24;  Mintzberg, 1983 p.  141-16279). 
It is found that the insights of the  revised  agency  theory  and those of more recent  contributions 
that focus on work satisfaction and demand pressure complement each other (Tendler & 
Freedheim, 1994 p. 1773-1774, 1781; Tendler, lecture given in Espoo, Finland, May 1997; 
Christoplos,  1996  p.  208-209;  Grindle,  1997b  p.  484-487;  Lipsky,  1980  p.  210-21  1).  They  differ 
by their view of workers’  discretion as either  impeding or encouraging  good  performance.  Instead 
of a  priori  assuming  that  reduced  discretion is desirable,  Tendler  and  Freedheim  suggest to “start 
with unself-interested  behaviour as the  given, and then ask what  allows it to  thrive”(Tend1er & 
Freedheim, 1994 p.  1783).  Christoplos goes one step further  and  formulates  the  core issue as  a 
question  about  ‘how  fiont-line  agents  (street-level  bureaucrats)  can  develop  trust’  (Christoplos, 
lecture given  at IDS, Roskilde,  November  1996)80.  Several  authors do not  deny,  however, that 
authority  and  rewards  may  be  of  importance  to  organisational  performance  but  stress  that hi  will 
happen  only if the incentives  are  not  general  but  designed  to  be  performance-  and  results-oriented. 
Meritocratic  recruitment  and the granting of job security as a  reward for good  performance  are 
mentioned as examples (Tendler & Freedheim,  1994 p. 1779-80;  Grindle,  1997b p. 490-491). 
When  combining  insights of the  revised  agency  theory  and those of more recent  contributions, 
six  elements appear to  be of special  importance to organisational  performance: 
1) authority 
2) rewards 
3) organisational identzjkation 
4) peer pressure 
5) work satisfaction 
6) demandpressure 
’* The  contributions  by  Leonard  and  Wade re particularly  relevant to the  present  study  of  extension  organisations 
in  Mali, as they  discuss  the  issues  in  relation to public  service  workers  who  interact duectly with citizens  in  the 
course Of their Jobs. Comparing  the  characteristics of channel  irrigation  patrollers in India  and  South  Korea, Wade 
describes  channel irrigation organisations as exposed to severe  agency  roblems  (Wade,  1995  p.  16). In his seminal 
work on  an agricultural extensLon organisation in Kenm Leonard has aescribed  the  difficulties  of  monitoring  tasks 
carried out by front-line  extension staff (L.eonard, 1977  p.67-74). 
” Mintzberg  adds to these  factors thepower ofprofessiomls and the dimensions of internalpolitical divisions as 
two imuortant sources of dismtemtion in  oreatllsabons  that will reduce  uerformance  iMiitzberz.  1983 D. 163-217). 
Leinard has athorough discussi&  about pegonal motivation  of  the  indiqidual  employke as an ad&tionaffactor. n i s  
will be dealt  with in relation to the  discussion  about work satisfaction  below  (Leonard,  1977  p.107-108). 
I~~ ~~~ ~~ 
The  difference  between this and  Leonard’s a  proach  may  seem  negli  ible  when he asks ‘:How  c? we  proyide 
the  worker  with  satisfaction  which  he  will me& to his em ioyer  and wfich create  on hls mmd soclal obllgatlons 
that  he can repay through increased  productivity?“  (Leonarf  1977  p.  116). In contrast to Tendler  and  Christoplos, 
however,  Leonard  takes his point of departure in the  assumption  about  a  self-interested  worker who needs  to  be 
persuaded  by  incentives  in  the  form  of  work  satisfaction  to  perform.  He  suggests  various  ways  the  worker  can  avoid 
to  credit work satisfaction to the  employer and thereby  avoid to increase  performance.  The  recommendations 
resulting  from  the two approaches  reveal  their  differences:  while  Leonard is looking for a  particular  organisational 
mechanical model’. see the  discussion  below). Tendler  and  Christoolos  rely on the  combination  of increased 
design that will allow work satisfaction to be translated into increased performance (called ‘the intelllgent 
motivation by workers who are granted  more  &scretion  and  the  moniioring ortheir work by external  agents  such 
as clients,  local elites and  others. 
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These  elements  are  further  explained  and  discussed in the  following. 
1) Authority 
Henry  Mintzberg  defines  authority as formal  power  or  legitimate  power  and  describes  it as a 
source of coalition building in an organisation. In his view, control of behaviour by the 
management is not  only  desirable for the performance  but  a  basic  condition  for  avoiding the 
disintegration of an organisation. He discusses  a  range  of  different  modes of using  authority, 
including  direct  orders,  the  issuing  of  guidelines,  review of decisions  and  resource  allocation. 
Applying  a  contingency  theory  approach,  however,  he  abstains  from  any  generalisations  about 
the  relationship  between  the  various  modes  and  the  performance  of  an  organisation  (Mintzberg, 
1983  p.  140-144). 
Wade  and  Leonard  attempt  such  a  generalisation  when  both  discuss  the  considerable  differences 
in  performance  obtained  through, on the one  hand,  authoritarianism  (or  low-trust  management) 
and, on the other hand,  high-trust  management.  Authoritarianism  implies  that  authority  operates 
through  control  and  application  of  sanctions.  Low  trust  from  supervisors  only  obliges  employees 
to  perform  duties  assigned  to  them in accordance  with  minimum  standards.  This  tends  to  result 
in  lack  of  responsibility  and  initiative by workers,  and  if  the  risk  of  detection s low,  shirking is 
likely to be a  serious  problem  (Wade,  1995  p.  28-29,  Leonard,  1977  p.  87-88).  Contrary  to this, 
high-trust  management  and  an  ongoing  close  dialogue  between  supervisors  and  workers  are liiely 
to  encourage  good  performance  (Wade,  1995  p.  31;  Leonard,  1977 p. 89-94,  p.  118). 
The  findings by Leonard  and  Wade  are  confirmed by Grindle  and  Hilderbrand. In the  study 
referred to above,  they  found  that the majority  of  poorly  performing  organisations  had  managers 
whose  style  was  characterised by top-down  decision  making,  favouritism  and  lack  of  consultation. 
Among the better  performing  organisations,  on  the  other  hand,  the  majority  was  characterised  by 
an open and non-hierarchical style of interaction between management and staf f  which 
encouraged  participation,  teamwork,  flexibility  and  problem  solving  (Grindle,  19971,  p.  486-487, 
p. 489-490). 
2) Rewards 
In traditional agency  theory  and still in the new  institutional  economics,  rewards  are  seen as 
playing a crucial  role  to  work  performance. It is an extremely  narrow  perspective  if  it  stands 
alone", but  most  scholars  agree  that  when  discussing  organisational  performance,  rewards camot 
be  disregarded  altogether. 
The most  common  rewards  mentioned in the literature are salary  and  promotions  which,  when 
related to merit  on  the job, may  constitute  significant  incentives  to  performance  (Leonard,  1977 
p.  118-123;  Wade,  1995  p. 20-26; Simon,  1991  p.  33-34).  The  importance,  however, is highly 
dependent on the  context in which  incentives  are  used. In industrialised  countries  it has become 
common to consider  general  working  conditions,  including  salary,  background  factors  which  may 
*' Wade  notes  that from the  perspective of the new $~titutional economics, the wonder  about  street  level  bureaucrats 
model as &better  at  explaining  why/&eaucrats  shlrk than why  some of them  do not shirk  (Grindle,  19979  p.  482). 
is that the  work  at  all  (Wade,  1992 5 1) A siml!ar point is made  by Grindle who describes  the  princi  al-agent 
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cause  general  satisfaction or dissatisfaction  with  the  job. Such conditions,  however, are not seen 
as determinants of the motivation  for  work.  Factors  motivating the performance  rather refer to 
such characteristics as esteem, responsibility and the feeling of meaningfulness @&a & 
Fivelsdal, 1996 p. 158-173).  Leonard  argues  that this may  be  different in developing countries 
where  the  need to satisfy  basic  material  and  security  needs is usually  more  urgent.  It  is  reasonable 
to assume that esteem and work satisfaction are important factors of motivation also in 
developing  countries,  but  the  issue of pay  and  advancement  are liiely  to overshadow  such  factors 
(Leonard,  1977 p. 1 10- 1 1 1). 
The  discussion by  Grindle  and  Hilderbrand  about five dimensions of public sector  performance 
points to a  useful  solution to the  question  about  material  incentives  (notably salary) versus 
immaterial factors of motivation. They agree  with  Leonard  that salaries must  be provided at a 
level  which  at  least  allows  public  employees  to  know that they will make enough  money to live 
on. If salaries  are  below this level  or  are  not  regularly  paid, this will  seriously  hamper their work 
performance  and other factors  will  be  unable  to  compensate  for this. They  do  not  agree,  however, 
that  material  incentives  in  developing  countries  will  always  be  more  important than f c ors such 
as  work satisfaction. Salaries  even  at  a  relatively low level may  be  considered  satisfactory, 
considering the general  context,  and other factors of motivation will be decisive (Grindle & 
Hilderbrand, 1995 p.  452-453;  Grindle, 1997b p. 486)”. 
3) Organisational  identification 
When  addressing the issue  of  organisational  identification,  scholars  leave  the  specific  terminology 
used for discussions of structures and interests  and  switch  to  rather  misty  descriptions of ‘a 
mission-focussed  mystique’  (Grindle & Hilderbrand,  1995  p.  457), ‘a sense of calling’  (Tendler 
& Freedheim, 1994 p. 1773) and ‘pride in work’ (Simon, 1991 p. 34). Grindle has tried to 
approach the phenomenon by  describing the perception by  employees that they themselves and 
their  organisation are unique.  They  tend to believe  that  they  have  been  selected for their position 
because of their  high  level  of  competence  and  unique  skills. A o included  in the organisational 
mystique is a strong sense of service and a feeling among employees of belonging to an 
organisation which is contributing  something  ‘good’  to the country  (Grindle, 19971, p. 489). 
The  intangibility of the  phenomenon  makes it difficult  to  explain  exactly  what  encourages 
organisational identification, but a number of authors have pointed to conditions such as: 
widespread use of team  work,  limited  wage  differences  between the top and the bottom of the 
hierarchy, issuing of prizes for good  performance, use of radio  and  TV to inform about the 
importance of the organisation,  recruitment  and  training of employees  based on meritocratic 
selection,  establishment of sports  teams to compete  against  other  organisations,  and  repeated 
statements by the management  about the importance of the  work  carried out (Miitzberg, 1983 
p. 156-158; Grindle &Hilderbrand, 1995  p.  457-459;  Tendler & Freedheim, 1994 p. 1773, p. 
1778;  Wade, 1995 p. 26, p. 32;  Blunt, 1990 p. 310). 
82 Leonard  explicitly  and  Grindle  and  Hilderbrand  implicitly  relate to the  theory  about  a  hierarchy of human  needs 
developed b Abraham Maslow. Ordering five basic needs in a hierarchy which reflects their impoltance 
(‘prepotency$,  Maslow  be& by physiological needs such as food  and  sleep,  which are followed  by  security  needs, 
hierarchv is that  a  satisfied need is not  a  motivator. Thus. when needs  for  food  and  securitv are satisfied.  onlv  the 
love  needs, esteem  needs and m the  top of the hierarchy  the need  for  self-actualisation. The  basic  idea  of the 
attempts’to satisfy  love  needs,  esteem  needs  and  the  need  for sel  actualisation  can  genera&  motivation  @&a & 
Fivelsdal,  1996 p.  161-163). 
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While  management  interest is obviously  to  evoke  a  general set of norms, it is commonplace  in 
organisations that a  person’s  organisational  identification will shift with his or her position 
(Simon, 1991 p. 37-38). Studies have shown that employees in supervisory positions or 
possessing  a certain amount  of  authority  and  responsibility,  and  employees with greater  length 
of service will report  higher  levels of organisational trust than  other  employees (Camevale & 
Wechsler,  1992 p.  475-480).  This has made  some of the  critics  of  theories  about culture as a 
controlling force point out  that  such  theories  tend to overlook the many  internal  contradictions 
and  conflicts  in  organisations.  By  portraying an organisation as a homogeneous  entity  where all 
employees are pulling  together  for  a  common  purpose,  one  misses  the  important point that not 
only one culture exists,  but  most  organisations are characterised by the coexistence of many 
different subcultures.  While  the  upper  levels of an organisation  are  likely to  be influenced - 
controlled - by an organisation  culture  induced by  management, the strategy  will be less efficient 
as an attempt  to  control  workers at lower  levels  who  have  different  interests  and  possibly  different 
values  and  norms  (Hatch,  1997 p. 225-229, p. 342). 
The  point  about  organisations a complex  constructs  with  many  different  parts  pulling in various 
directions  is  highly  valid.  The  argument  for  the  importance  of an overall  organisation culture is, 
however, that it may  be  possible to bridge  the  many  internal  differences by the generation ofa  
feeling  that  an  overall  purpose - a  common  mission - is more  important  than  the  specific  interests 
of groups  and  individuals. This issue  will be  dealt with  in  further  details  below in relation  to  the 
discussion about  the  importance of work  satisfaction. 
4) Peer  pressure 
Whereas  arguments  for the importance  of  organisation  culture  may  seem  to  contradict  the  view 
of organisations as characterised by conflicts, theories about  peer  pressure are clearly  based on 
such a  view.  Thus,  Mintzberg  sees  peer  pressure as resulting  from  conflicts  among  groups  at 
different levels or links  between  members of the  organisation  and  ‘external  influencers’. In his 
writings, peer pressure is considered part of the ‘system of politics’ which is a source of 
organisational  disintegration,  hence  a  destructive  force  that  may  threaten the survival  of the 
Organisation  (Mintzberg,  1983  p.  180-181). 
Leonard more or less follows  the  same l i e  of argument  when  he  notes that conflicts  between 
management  and  subordinates  resulting  fiom  authoritarianism,  alienation,  large  physical  distance 
and differences in life-styles  may  cause  workers to limit their productivity by agreeing on the 
delinition of ‘a fair days’s  work’.  He  mentions a range of conditions  which makes groups  better 
able  to  control  their  output:  cohesive  groups  who  share  common  living  and  working  conditions, 
small groups, and groups  where  the  complexity of monitoring tasks is not too big are all more 
likely to engage in output  restriction  than  large  and  heterogenous  groups.  He  acknowledges, 
however, that under  certain  conditions  these  characteristics  may  encourage  groups  to  adopt the 
opposite strategy, i.e. to encourage staff to raise their levels of production. Thus, a strong 
friendship in a  group may spill  over  into  positive  sentiments  towards  the  work  and  lead to better 
performance. Also groups  who  are  involved in decision-making  processes  governing their work 
and experience a certain  discretion  may  encourage  each  other to increase  productivity.  Finally, 
providers  of  public  services  who  live  in  close  contact  with  their  clients  (such as some  agricultural 
extension workers)  may  identi@  with  their clients and try to  improve  performance in order  to 
serve  the  communities  (Leonard,  1977 p. 43-80). 
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Wade is much  more  explicit  about  peer  pressure as a  positive  source of improving  performance 
and  discusses  a  range  of  means  which an be  used to support it. First  of  all,  group  cohesiveness 
can be  encouraged  by  recruiting  people  who  have  shared  experiences  such  as,  e.g.  having  grown 
up in the  same  geographical rea. As fast  rotation  seriously l i i t s  peer  pressure,  stable  boundaries 
of a  group  can  be  ensured  by  avoiding  rotation of staff  out of the group.  Individual  rewards  can 
be made  dependant  upon  group  rewards,  and, as Leonard  also  suggests, the organisation  can 
encourage  close  contact to clients  (Wade,  1995 p. 5 ,  p. 19,24-36) 
Whether  peer  pressure results in improved or reduced  performance  seems to depend  upon  a 
number  of  factors  of  which  the  general  work  satisfaction is one,  while  the  degree  of  conflict with 
the  management  and the character of relations with clients are other  (Leonard,  1977 p. 73-80; 
Wade,  1995 p. 32-36;  Lipsky,  1980  p.  47). 
Summing  up  the  difference  between  the  traditional  agency  theory  and the various  contributions 
to its  revision  discussed so far,  the  latter  see  organisation  culture  and  peer  pressure as positive 
factors  which  may  improve  organisational  performance.  They  also  pay  more  attention  to  the  need 
not to hamper  workers’  motivation  by  low-trust  management  and to the context-dependency  of 
material  incentives  such as salaries.  The  premisses  of  the  contributions,  however,  still  rest  on the 
assumption  that  workers’  discretion is a  problem  which as to be  reduced=. 
5) Work satisfaction 
When  arguing  for the importance of worker  dedication  to the performance of an  organisation, 
Tendler  draws  on the literature  on  industrial  performance  and  workplace tran~formation~~. In this 
literature greater  worker  discretion  and  autonomy,  greater  cooperation  between  workers  and 
management  and  greater  trust  between  workers  and  their  customers  are  seen s desirable,  because 
it  increases  worker  dedication  and  thereby  organisational  performance.  Although the research  on 
these  subjects  refers  mainly to manufacturing firms and to some  extent  to  large  service  firms, 
Tendler has found the conclusions applicable also to public organisations in developing 
countries”  (Tendler,  1997  p.  4-8,  p.  169;  Tendler & Freedheim,  1994  p.  1771-1773).  Christoplos 
refers to newer  management  literature  on  professional  service  organisations  which  focus  on the
relationship  between  customers  and  the  fiont-line  personnel  who  are in direct  contact  with  them 
as a condition for success  (Christoplos,  199%  p.  3;  Peters,  1992  p.  11). This will  be  further 
discussed in the section on demand  pressure  below. 
Their  findings  are  supported by  other  studies  of  public  sector  organisations in industrialised 
countries.  Based on an  extensive  study of public  service  workers in the USA, Michael  Lipsky 
concludes  that staffwho control  their  work  processes  and  who  have  good  relationships  to  clients 
will  experience  basic work satisfaction  and  struggle  to  do  a  decent job even under  adverse 
g? In the  words of Wade: “This argument  suggests  that  countries  with  weaker stat!s than  East  +ia  might  improve 
the  performan& of canal irrigation  systems by introducing  technological  changes m system  deslgn  that  reduce  the 
discretion of staff  and  increase the incentives of fanners to intervene”  (Wade,  1995 p. 40). 
Tendler refers to  the literatwe as  the  IPWT  literature  (mdustrial  performance and  workplace  transformation). 
In Brazil  Tendler has carried out studies of ublic  health  progammes  (Tendler & Freedheim,  1994), govement- 
run extension  services  (Tendler,  1993a)  an g an  extensive  review  of 22 World  Bank  supported  integrated rural 
development  projects  (Tendler,  1993b). 
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circumstancess6  (Lipsky,  1980  p.  210-21 1). Staff  facing  too  many  conflicting  objectives in their 
job and  generally  lack job satisfaction, on the other  hand,  are likely to  reduce  performance.  This 
may  happen  by  concentrating  only  on  clients  who  are  relatively  easy  to  reach  (and  blame  the  lack 
of contact to others on the clients themselves)*’  or by adopting  a  mental exit option  in  the  form 
of absenteeism, slowdowns, etc. (Lipsky, 1980 p. 143, p. 151-153). Also a study by David 
Camevale  and  Barton  Wechsler of trust in public  sector  organisations  concludes  that  trust  enables 
effective  performance  because it encourages  the  exchange  of  relevant  information  and  determines 
whether  team  members  are  willing  to allow others  to  influence their decisions and  actions.  The 
study  found  clear  correspondence  between, o  the  one  hand,  a l rge degree of discretion  and  the 
perception  by  employees of their jobs as enriched  and, on the  other hand, their  organisational  trust 
(Camevale & Wechsler, 1992 p. 471,  p.  475-480). 
Only  few  studies of public  sector  performance  in  developing  countries  have  taken  up  the  question 
of work satisfaction. In addition to the  many  other  aspects dealt with in Leonard’s  study on 
government-run  extension in Kenya,  it  represents  one  of  a few examples of thorough  examination 
of this issue.  Leonard finds a clear relationship  between job satisfaction  and  commitmentss and 
points  out that the most  important  determinant  of job satisfaction is the degree  to  which  the 
characteristics of the work  conform  to the individual’s  image of himself in his working  role. Or 
in other words:  ”is the job worthy  of him or is it beneath him?” (Leonard, 1977 p.  107-108). 
Among  other factors contributing  to  work  satisfaction for extension workers,  he  mentions  their 
possibility of drawing  a  salary  while  farming  and  staying with the family  instead of migrating, 
the security of tenure, their relatively  high status in  rural  areas  and  the  satisfaction  of  working 
with farmers who are responsive  and quick to  understand  (Leonard, 1977 p. 108-110).  The 
considerations about the  worthiness of the job in the  perception of the  employee  leads  Leonard 
to an extensive discussion  about  higher  education  and  training as factors that may  decrease  the 
meaningfulness of a  job,  and  consequently he performance,  if  employees  perceive  of  themselves 
as overqualified for their  positions  (Leonard,  1977 p. 102-128). 
Grindle  and Hilderbrand3 study  on  public  sector  performance in developing  countries  also  takes 
up overeducation as a  serious  constraint o the perception  of  meaningfulness.  They  agree  with 
Leonard  that  professionals  are  very  sensitive to whether  their jobs are meaningfd and  appropriate 
to their level of training. To the extent  employees  believe that they are using  their  talents  to 
accomplish tasks which  they  consider  meaningful,  they are more motivated to contribute  to  the 
organisation.  The  ‘problem’ of human  resources,  they  argue, is therefore  not  mainly  a  problem 
of insufTicient  education  and  training  but more a  problem  of utilisation (Grindle & Hilderbrand, 
1995 p.  459-460). 
A focus on meaningfulness helps to explain the apparent  contradiction  between  considering  an 
organisation  a  complex  structure  characterised  by  conflicts  and the view of organisation  culture 
“Although  Lipsky’s  study on the  so-called  street-level  bureaucrats  dates  almost 20 years  back  and is based  on  public 
service workers m the USA, many of  his  observations are highly  relevant  for  studies  of  present-day  problems in 
Af~ican state organisations. 
” In the  late 1980s, Niels Roliig noted  that  at  that  time  nearly all agricultural extension  service in the world  operated 
a  progressive fanners strategy  implying  that  they  concentrated  on  the 10% of farmers  who  were  easiest to reach 
(Rolmg, 1988 p. 66-  69). 
Although  the  relationship  is  found  to  be  clear,  Leonard  argues  that  there is no simple  and  causal link between job 
satisfaction  and  dedication. 
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as  a  phenomenon that binds together the  different parts. Grindle  and  Hilderbrand  argue that 
perceived meaninalness of a job may  cause  employees at the  lower levels of the hierarchy to 
struggle against the odds to perform  the  best  they  can.  It is obviously  much easier to find 
inspiration to perform  well  in  pleasant  and  convenient  offices,  but  examples  were  found in their 
study of workers in poor premises  who  found their job so rewarding  that it even made them 
contribute  to  the  upgrading of their  physical  environment  (Grindle & Hilderbrand, 1995 p.  456- 
458).  Like Tendler and  Christoplos  they  point o a  large  discretion of workers,  organisational 
flexibility, use of teamwork, provision of incentives for goal-focussed  performance  and  a close 
contact to clients as factors contributing to the perceived  meaningfulness of the work  (Grindle 
& Hilderbrand, 1995 p, 455-459;  Grindle,  1997b p. 487-488). 
6 )  Demand pressure 
As it has already been mentioned,  demand  pressure  from  people outside the organisation is 
considered an important  aspect  both  of  workers’ job satisfaction and of keeping a  certain  check 
ontheir performance  (Tendler & Freedheim, 1994 p. 1773-1774;  Wade,  1995  p.  34-39;  Lipsky, 
1980 p.  9-1 1). Especially  in the design of agricultural  programmes  a  supply-side  approach has 
traditionally been pursued, but Tendler finds that clients as well as local elites, national 
governments,  other  public  agencies  and  donors  may  be  important  demanders  driving  for  example 
research and extension to do better  (Tendler,  1993  p.  1568).  She  mentions both the dramatic 
example  of  farmers in Brazil  who  invaded  a  research  station  to  demand  a  more  relevant  research 
agenda and the example of less spectacular demands by local and regional actors for a 
concentrated  effort to combat  a  spreading  crop  disease  (Tendler,  1993  p.  1573-1577).  Pressures 
may  be  communicated  to an organisation through many  different  channels  but  organised  pressures 
in the form of farmers’ or client  organisations are particularly  forceful.  Tendler  gives  the  example 
of  producer  organisations  which  have  been  supported by  government  agencies to which  they  have 
had  a  contractual  relationship.  Strengthening  capacity of such  groups  has  gradually  allowed  them 
to  raise  demands  that  have  lead  to  striking  improvements  in  the  performance of support  agencies 
themselves  because of continuous  requirements by producers for more  flexible  and  customised 
services (Tendler, 1997 p. 152-153; see also  Lipsky,  1980 p. 46, p. 119). 
External  pressure  in the form of specific  demands,  however, is not  all.  Authors  dealing  with t e 
issue of relations  among  members of an organisation,  notably  street-level  bureaucrats,  and their 
clients, all stress the  crucial  role  of mi to  the  performance  of  the  organisation.  Work  satisfaction 
is considerably  increased by expressions of gratitude  by  clientss9. This enhances  performance,  and 
as the usefulness of services is decisive to the legitimacy of an organisation in the eyes of the 
clients,  improved  performance is likely  to be reflected  in  increased  legitimacy  which  again  may 
Tendler  gives the example  of  local  research  stations  which  are  more  eager  than  large  donor-funded  stations to do 
applied work because their prestige  and status come fiom makii  thiigs work  where  they  live  (Tendler, 1993 p. 
1575). Another  example is gven by  a German-fund4  project in Zimbabwe hoducin the  adoption  of  participatory 
the motimon and  dedication  of  extension  workers.  Most  extension  workers  grew  up in fanning families,  but  their 
extension  approaches.  The  project  found  that the experience  of  working  together W& fanners as equals  increased 
working  together  with farmers increased their  own  culhr$identity  and  pride (Hagmann et  al., 1997 p. 12; Hagmm 
formal  education  and  the  low  value of farmers in socie  made  them  look  down  upon  farmers. The new  way of 
et  al., 1998  p. 47). 
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contribute  to  increased  performancego  (Tendler,  1997 p.  6;  Christoplos, 1997a p.  11; Christoplos, 
1997b p. 18;  Wade,  1995  p.  34-38;  Lipsky,  1980  p. 59; Uphoff,  1994b  p.  209-213). 
While none of the authors attempt  to  present  a defrntion of trust but  seem to use  the notion 
interchangeably  with  ‘legitimacy’,  the  delinition  used in the  following is inspired by the  definition 
of  legitimacy  by  Uphoff  referred  to  above. Trust  is  considered an expression of a relation where 
the parties are  collaborating because of normative obligations  rather  than for purely utilitarian 
reasons. 
As trust often  makes  workers  spontaneously  take  up  a  large  number  of  new  tasks,  the  work is very 
difficult  to  supervise. In a health  programme  in  Brazil,  Tendler  and  Freedheim  found  that  workers 
sometimes  assisted  mothers  alone  with  young  children  with  cooking,  cleaning  and  childcare. This 
help was crucial  to  gaining  the  trust  of  the  mothers as well as that of the  community in general, 
but  agency  theory  would  clearly  see this as an  exposure  to  self-serving behaviod’. Tendler  and 
Freedheim  point  to two factors  which  might  counterbalance  such  a risk one is monitoring from 
the community that can  be  encouraged  to  report on all violations of rules.  The  other is simply 
workers  embedding in a  set  of  trust  relations  with  clients  (Tendler & Fr edheim,  1994  p.  1773-74, 
p. 1783). 
In cases where trust does  not  exist,  public  service  workers  have  a  wide  range of possibilities of 
exercising control  vis-a-vis their clients.  Lipsky  mentions  that  they  are  usually in a  position  to 
distribute  benefits  and  sanctions  and  to  give  priority  to  certain  favoured clients at the expense of 
others.  They  may  decide to let  clients  wait  in  long  queues,  provide  them only with the minimum 
service required or look for means  to  reduce the general  service  (geographically,  by  closing 
outreach  services or otherwise).  And  they  may  withhold  information  or talk down  to clients in a 
language  which  these do not  understand  (Lipsky,  1980  p.  60-65,  p.  90-94,  p.  102-104; see also 
Leonard,  1977 p. 81-82).  The  possibilities  for  clients  to  put  pressure on bureaucracies  to  change 
such  behaviour may  be  severely  limited in cases  where  they  have  nowhere else to go for this 
service,  where the workers do not  depend on apositive feedback  from  clients  for  promotions,  and 
where  workers  are  generally  alienated fiom clients by  physical  distance and large  differences in 
life  styles  (Lipsky, 1980 p. 55-56,  p.  76-80). 
In such  situations  clients  will  usually try to  iind  individual  solutions  to  influence  the  organisation 
to  their  advantage.  Leonard  mentions  the  so-called  ‘squark  factor’  that  implies  that  better-off  and 
well-connected clients are more likely to complain about poor service to superiors in the 
organisation  and  therefore  generally  receive  a  better  service  than less powerful  clients Geonard, 
1977 p.188-190).  Clients  who  do  not  dare or do  not  have the possibility to complain are usually 
left with the possibility to pay for services  supposed  to be free of charge.  Bribing  rendered 
extension  agents is sometimes  referred  to as ‘privately  contracted  extension’,  and con- to  what 
may be expected, most authors agree that bribery may actually mitigate inequality in the 
The  usefulness  of  services - and  thereby  the  legitimacy  of the organisation - can  be  increased also b  improving 
the  character of the  service  rendered. In the  case o f y c u l t y +  extension  service, it has proved i i u i d o  combine 
extension  messages  with  other  services  such as CI It rowslon (Gustafson,  1994 p. 129-130;  Christoplos,  1997a 
p.  7;  Tendler,  1993  p.  1577;  Tendler & Freedheim, l954 p.  1782). 
91 Gustafson  gives  a  similar  example kom Assam where  extension  workers  spent  considerable  time on other  duties 
than conveying the extension  mess es and  thereby  gained  confidence  and  fellow-feelimg  among  farmers,  even 
though  it diminished the extension g o r t  originally  envisaged  (Gustafson,  1994  p.  130). 
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distribution  of  benefits.  Thus, a heavy  socioeconomic  bias  of  extension  services,  favouring  elites, 
has been documented in many  studies9’,  and the possibility for poorer  farmers of  paying  for 
services  which  they  otherwise  would  not  get is believed  to be to their  advantage  (Tendler,  1993 
p.  1576-1577;  Christoplos & Nitsch,  1996 p.  8-10,  von  der  Liihe,  1991  p.253;  Leonard,  1977 
p.187-189). 
The  development  of  trust  between  front-line  officers  and clients can be  actively  encouraged  by 
an  organisation. An important  means is to  ensure  that  workers live in  the  area  where  they  work. 
In case of extension workers, the identification with farmers can be further supported by 
encouraging  extension  workers to farm  themselves  (Wade, 1995 p. 18; Tendler & Freedheim, 
1994  p.  1778). This happens in the Korean  channel  irrigation  organisation  where other measures 
include  selection  and  reappointment of patrollers by village chiefs (before their approval by  the 
organisation),  information  to  farmers  about  organisation  budgets,  easy  contact  between fanners 
and  patrollers,  and  involvement  of  farmers  in  maintenance  activities.  The  Indian  system,  to  which 
the  Korean  model is compared,  represents  exactly the inverse  priorities,  i.e.  attempts  to  minimise 
identification  between  patroller  and  locality and maximise  identification  with the irrigation 
organisation:  patrollers are selected by the organisation  without any  hearing  of  farmers,  they 
cannot  be  posted in the  jurisdiction  where  they  were  born,  they ar  quickly  rotated  to  new  posts, 
and  they  must  be  full-time  employees,  hence  cannot  farm  more  than  a  marginal  amount  of  land. 
Wade  describes the different  outcomes  of  the  systems a a  high-performing  system in Korea  and 
a  poorly  performing  system in India,  characterised  by  a  large-scale  and  well-organised  system  of 
(Wade, 1995 p.  18-19,  p.  34-38). 
Christoplos takes a  different  point  of  departure  when  discussing  how  to  encourage  trust  between 
service  providers  and  clients.  Instead of trying to adjust a hierarchical  system to allow  the 
development  of  closer  relations  between  lower-level staff and  clients,  he  suggests to change  the 
basic  premises for their  encounter.  Inspired  by the newer  literature  on  professional  service 
organisations,  notably  the witings by  Tom  Peters  (peters,  1992), he argues for the  need  to  bring 
service  providers  and  clients  together  on  a  more  equal  basis.  Hitherto senice workers  have  either 
dictated  clients  an  agenda or been  told  to  uncritically  serve clients according  to their demands. 
While in the  early  1980s the ‘customer-first  approach’  revolutionised  mainstream  management 
thinking,  newer  management  literature has abandoned this approach  and  has  replaced  it  with  a 
new  model  of  more  active  discussion.  According to Christoplos,  there is a  need also to replace 
the  ‘farmer-first  approach’  by a different  model for encounters  between  extension  workers and 
S@. Acknowledging the multiplicity  of  actors and institutions  involved in rural development, 
there is a need to develop  platforms for negotiation in which the various  actors  can  meet  to clarif~ 
92 Based on his  study  of  an  extension  a  enc  in Kenya and  with  references to other  studies on the distribution of 
extenslon  efforts,  Leonard  concludes &t Keap;.bly of a  skewed  dlstnbution  of  benefits favounng better-off 
farmers  at  the  expense of the oor 1s general to agnculhual extension  services in the  world,  and  only  the  degree 
varies  (L.eonard, 1977 p. 1175. 
93 Wade  has  found  that net illicit  incomes  at  higher  levels of the Indian  irrigation  organisation  amounted  to  at  least 
seven  times annual salaries of employees  (Wade,  1995  p. 35, see also Wade,  1982;  Wade,  1985). This extent of 
corruption  is far beyond  the system of  ‘pnvately  contracted  extenslon’  described by other  authors as advantageous 
to  poorer  farmers. 
For an  early  and  radical  formulation  of  the  ‘farmer-fmt  strategy’,  see  Chambers & Ghildyal,  1985.  Inspired by 
Mons mons, 1991), Christoplos  argue  that  farmers  do  not  want to hear about their  indigenous  knowledge.  They 
already  have  it and I f  they are to invest ther time  and effort in working  with  an  extension  agent,  they do not  want 
him  only to sit  and  listen  (Christoplos &Nitsch, 1996  p.  42). 
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their  interests and  intentions.  The  extension  service  should  have  a  central  function in organising 
and ensuring participation also by the poor in such platforms (Peters, 1992 p. xxxi-xxxii; 
Christoplos,  1996 p. 200,  p.  208;  Christoplos &Nitsch, 1996 p. 35-36,  p.  41-42). 
The  radical  difference  of  Christoplos’  approach lies in its abandonment  of  the  search  for a 
particular  organisational  set-up as the solution to the  problem  of  organisational  performance. 
Instead  of  striving for control of the behaviour of the various actors, it acknowledges the 
unpredictability  of  the  organisational  environment  and  points to the need  for  more  discretion  and 
negotiation fora for the many different  actors95.  Christoplos  supports his focus on  change  and 
unpredictability  with  reference  to  Tendler’s  findings  about  the  importance  of  external  shocks  to 
the  performance of an organisation.  She has found  that  few  agencies  can be said to perform 
consistently  well or consistently  bad  during  a  longer  period.  Agencies  tend to perform  well  in 
turbulent situations where extraordinary demands are put on them, while performance is 
stagnating or d e c l i i g  in  periods  of  stability. In her various  studies  of  public  organisations  in 
Brazil  she  has  found  that  for  example  a  crop  disease  threatening  a  particular  region  may  raise the 
performance  of  even  mediocre  organisations to excellence  for  a  shorter  period.  The  combined 
efforts of national and regional actors and of highly motivated extension agents who are 
struggling to save the economy of their region may result in a considerable increase in 
performance  even  though  much  of  the  organisation  structure  remains  the  same  (Tendler,  1993a 
p. 1569-70,72; Tendler,  1993b  p.  xx). 
Combining  characteristics 
The list  of six factors  of  particular  importance  to  workers’  performance  has  been  compiled from 
several  different  contributions, and  none  of the authors  referred to above  mention  them  all. 
Leonard  and  Wade  concentrate on authority, rewards, peer pressure and organisational 
identification.  While  acknowledging  the  importance  of  these  factors,  Tendler  gives  priority to 
demand  pressure  and  work  satisfaction.  Lipsky  deals  with  several  aspects  but  concentrates  on 
work  satisfaction  and  trust in relations to clients.  Finally,  Christoplos  goes  rather  far  when  he 
suggests  that  other  organisational  characteristics are of  limited  importance, if only  trust  exists  in 
relations  between  front-line staff and  clients. 
Although  particularly  interested  in  the  issue  of  work  satisfaction,  Grindle  and  Hilderbrand  come 
closest  to  dealing with all of the factors96, and they  make  the  important  point  that he various 
factors  tend  to  ‘go  together’.  They  have  found  that  in  better-performing  organisations  it is li ely 
that  several  of  the  performance-encouraging  factors  are  present,  whereas  poorly  performing 
organisations  are  generally  characterised  by the absence of these  factors  (Grindle,  1997  p.  487- 
488). 
Christoplos has suggestedthe  notion  of  ‘sense-making’ to describe  the wa an  individual fmds a way  forward  in 
an environment of conflicting  pressures  and  oppoftunities  where  it s di x ]cult  to  define  a  set  of  clear  interests 
(Christoplos,  1997a 16). This way  of thinking socletal dpnucshas g e e d  inspiration  from chaos theory which 
seeks to explain non!kear dynamic  processes.  It  deals wth situations whlch are always  otentially  changeful  and 
with  outcomes  likely to be discontmuous,  not  proportional to thee %uses (Uphoff, 1894~ p. 220-221;,Roche; 
Christoplos,  lecture at IDS, Roslalde, November  !996). For an analysls qred by chaos themy of  the  imphcabons 
for NGOs of the increasingly  unpredictable nwonment m which  they  work, see Roche,  1994. 
Although  their  headings  differ kom those used above,  Grindle  and  Hilderbrand  discuss  the  same  factors  with  the 
exception  of  ‘peer  pressure’  (Grindle & Hilderbrand,  1995;  Grindle,  199%). 
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This implies that it is not  enough for an organisation  to  provide its staff  with  a large degree of 
discretion,  if it totally lacks demand  pressure.  Instead of an increased  performance the outcome 
is  likely to be  arbitrary  decisions  to  the  personal  benefit  of staff members themselve~~~. A strong 
demand  pressure in an understaffed  and  under-supplied  organisation  with low work satisfaction, 
on the other hand, may  result in an even  lower  morale  among  employees  (Grindle,  1997b  p.  486). 
While it seems  useful  to  presume  that all factors  matter  and  are  mutually  reinforcing, it does not 
necessarily  mean  that  they  will  all  be  equally  important  in ll situations.  Instead of a checklist of 
factors which have to be present in any well-performing organisation, the list should be 
considered  a framework for empirical  investigations  which may generate  interesting  findings. 
And when the framework is used in a  study  of  government  organisations, it should be recalled 
that it considers only  a  list of organisation-specific  characteristics. Thus, conditioning factors 
relating  to  the role of  the  organisation as a part of the  state  and  to  the  special  character of societal 
forces  with which they  interact  have  not  been taken into  account. 
3.5. The mechanical model 
As the  four  agencies  under  study all have  significant  structural  features of the  mechanical  model, 
it is relevant  to use the  insights  referred to above  to  discuss  the  advantages  and  problems of t h i s  
organisation form. 
Originally  described by  Max  Weber  in his theory  of  bureaucracy as the most  rational  and  effective 
way to structure an organisation9*  and  later  presented by contingency  theory as one of two basic 
organisational  configuration^^^, the mechanical  model  still  constitutes an important element in 
all  attempts to present  typologies of organisation forms (e.g.  Hage & Finsterbusch,  1987  p.62-73; 
Mintzberg, 1989 p.  95-252). Thus, the  model is common  both  in the  industrial  sector  and in state 
organisations and it is widespread in both  developing  coun@ies  and  in  indus@ialised  countries””. 
Characteristics of the  mechanical  model  can be  summarised as a  high  level of complexity, of 
formalisation and of centralisation.  Management,  authority  and  communication are structured 
” This goes against the suggestion  by  Christoplos to start with increased  discretion  and  see  what  comes  out  of  it. 
He argues that  if one is first  looking  for  a structural  model  for rebuildqg a col!apsed bureaucracy,  little  can  be 
expected to happen.  If,  however, one 5ve  people  room to act, somethmg  poslbve may happen. It may not  be 
sustainable,  but It is a  place to start (Christoplos,  199% p. 3). 
’* In Weber’s description  of the ideal  type  bureaucracy,  core  cl!aracteristics  included  an office hierarchy  based on 
clear liies of super- and suborbation, appointment of candldates,for  office  based on  tec$ical qualificatlons, 
promotions  granted  according to senionty or achxevement,  remunerabon  of staff by  tixed salanes, clear  separabon 
of  officials’  public  life  from  their  private,  life,  a  general set of  more or less  stable  rules  governing the performance 
of  staff  and  strict discipliie and  control m the  conduct  of the office  (Hatch,  1987  p.  171;  Harmon & Mayer,  1986 
The  earliest  contributions  to  contingency theory inpoduced  the  distinction  between  the  mechanical  and  the  organic 
model of organisation.  While  +e m e c h c a l  model !s characterised  by a  high  level of complexity, of formalisation 
and  of cenkalisation  and is beheved to be effective  m  stable  environments, the organic  model is a  less  specialised, 
less formalised and less  hierarchical  organisation  form  which  better  responds to rapidly  changing  environments 
(Hatch,  1997 p. 76-78; Scott, 1992  p.88-100; Ba!& & Fivelsdal,  1996 p.  64-74). 
the  rapldly S 1 ‘“g conditions  and  demands  of  the  post-mdustnal  society, BlFt  notes  that “hierarchcal oms  of 
Axping Peters’ view of hierarchical organisations as gradually dying out because of their kade uacy to 
orgarusations are llkely to remain part  of  the  institutlonal  landscape  for  some t  to come”  (Blunt,  1990 p. 302). 
p.  68-71). 
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according  to  a  hierarchy. Tasks are standardised  and  highly  specialised,  and  individual t sks are 
carried out in relative  isolation,  while  a  coordination of tasks  takes  place  at each hierarchical 
level.  All  roles  and  responsibilities areclearly  described  and  usually  defined  by  superiors.  Hence, 
subordinate staff are  left  with  little  discretion.  Authority is based  on  position,  and  loyalty  towards 
superiors is demanded by all staff members.  All  information is concentrated in the top of the 
hierarchy,  and  there is a tendency  to  emphasise  control  (Hatch,  1997  p.  76-78,  p.  169-170; B&a
&Fivelsdal, 1996 p. 69;  Hage & Finsterbusch,  1987  p.  63-65;  Mintzberg,  1989  p.  131-152). 
The mechanical  model is ofkn described as an appropriate  organisation form in situations when 
the  organisational  environment is simple and  stable  because  of  the  efficiencies it can generate by 
using  standard  procedures  to  perform  routine  activities.  It i  most  effective  when  the  demand  for 
its  service or products is large  and the level  of  skills  which  is  needed to provide it is low. Thus, 
it tends to be  associated  with  characteristics  such  as  large  size,  capital  intensity,  employment  of 
unskilled labour and use of machine  technology. In addition  to  industrial  mass  production,  the 
mechanical model is often used  to  produce  certain  services  such as insurance  and  banking  and 
public  services  such aspost  offices, railroads and  telecommunication'"'.  Mintzberg  points  out  that 
organisations in the business of control (e.g. regulatory  agencies,  custodial prisons and  police 
forces) often draw on this model,  maybe  because of its strong  orientation  towards  control 
(Mintzberg,  1989 p. 137-138;  Hatch,  1997 p.  76-77;  Hage & Finsterbusch p. 64). 
As a  general  risk of the mechanical  model,  Mintzberg  notes  that  the  obsession  with  control  not 
just  of the internal  organisation  but also of its environment  may  lead  to  a situation where it 
becomes  increasingly  immune to external  influence - in other  words it becomes  more  and  more 
closed.  State  organisations  in  the  former  Soviet  Union are mentioned as examples  of such closed 
mechanical  systems.  Even  if  the  model  does  not  develop  into  a  closed  system, its ins nsitivity  to 
customers and  to  individual or local  needs  may  constitute  a serious problem.  Other  general 
concerns  include  problems of communication  and  difficulties of coordination in a  system  based 
on  narrow  functionalism.  There is a risk of  excessive  centralisation of power  in  the  top,  while  the 
necessary  knowledge is often in the  bottom from where it reaches  the top only  with  difficulties 
and  considerable losses on its way  through  the  many  hierarchical  levels'''  (Mintzberg,  1989  p. 
138-148;  Hage & Finsterbusch, 1987 p.64). 
Drawing on the above  discussions,  one may  add that  low-trust  management  systems aregenerally 
likely to result in poor performance.  The  very  limited  discretion  of  Subordinate s aff and their 
l i i t e d  contact  to clients may  further  add  to this problem  by  reducing the meaningfulness of their 
work.  Insensitivity to demand  pressures  implies  that  they  lack  the  urge  to  improve  services to 
become more flexible and  customised. This may  have  fatal  consequences for service  quality. 
lo' General  Motors,  McDonald's  and the Swiss railroad  are  mentioned as typical  examples  of  the  mechanical  model 
(Mintzberg, 1989p. 131). 
I O 2  As an exam  le of the  loss of information  in  hierarcbically  structured  organisations, Roliig mentions  a study *om 
Nepal  which P ound  that  agricultural  extension.officers  only  recalled  34%  of  the  information  they  had  been  given 
on extension  messages.  Junior  technicians tram4 by agricultwal  extension officers recalled 26p/o of the original 
message, the village  agricultural  assistant  recalled 20%,  contact  farmers  taught  by  vllla  e  agncultural  assistant 
p. 113-1 14). For a  further discussion, see  also Leonard, 1977  p.  138, p. 155, p. 162. 
recalled 13% and follower farmers,taught by contact farmers  recalled  only 7% ofthe  origndmessage (Roliig, 1988 
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When  the  model  is  applied to public  service  organisations,  these  problems  are  believed  to  be  even 
larger. Orientation towards control usually means that quantitative performance criteria are 
prefened to  other  goals  which are  more  difficult to measure such as good  service,  satisfied 
customers  and  pride in work.  There is a  considerable  risk  that  the  organisation  becomes  “at  best, 
socially  unresponsive,  at  worst,  socially  irresponsible”  because  measurable  (economic)  goals  are 
favoured  to  intangible  social  ones  (Mintzberg,  1989  p.  169-171’03).  The  discussion  above  about 
possible  consequences  of  lack  of  trust  between  street-level  bureaucrats  and  their  clients  supports 
these  reservations.  When  denied  a  certain  discretion  and  discouraged  from  developing  relations 
of  trust  to  clients,  public  service  workers  are  likely to use  their  power  to  distribute  benefits  and 
sanctions  to  give  priority  to  certain  favoured  clients at the  expense of others.  The  cases  presented 
by Leonard and Wade suggest that the resulting socioeconomic bias may be countered by 
disfavoured  clients  by  corrupting  the sM. 
The  application  of  the  mechanical  model to service-providing  state  organisations in developing 
countries is considered  particularly  problematic.  The  implicit  assumption i the model about  the 
possibilities  for  linear  planning  has  little to do  with  Afiican  realities,  and  the  model  lacks  the 
flexibility  necessary  to  respond  to  the  complex  and  rapidly  changing  conditions  characterising 
these  settings“  (Moris,  1991  p.  33).  Tendler’s  fmdings  about  the  impact  of  external  shocks  on 
organisational  performance  show  that  stability is not  only  unlikely to prevail,  but it may  also  not 
be  desirable. 
The  World  Bank-promoted  Training&Visit  extension  system  (T&V  system)1o5 has often  been 
discussed  as the ultimate  example of the  mechanical  model  and aheated  debate  over its merits 
and  demerits  reflects  a  more  profound  disagreement  about  the  usefulness  of the mechanical 
model. Thus, Jerald  Hage  and Kurt Finsterbusch  advocate  the  model  on  the  grounds  that in 
developing  countries  many  mechanical  organisations  would  often  perform  better if they  were 
made  more  mechanical.  Their  argument is that many  state  organisations in developing  countries 
lack  a  clear-cut  system of records,  supervision, job descriptions  and  other  managerial  tools  which 
could  counter  the  negative  impact of the  patrimonial  relations  penetrating  the  organisations. 
Extension  organisations in areas  where a technology  package  has  to be delivered  to  many  farmers 
over a wide area are  examples  of the appropriateness  of  a  such  increased  mechanical  orientation1o6 
(Hage & Finsterbusch,  1987  p.  106-  113,  p.  239-241). 
lo’ Although  Mintzberg  discusses the negative come uences  of,control  orientation  in  relation  to the so-called 
‘diversified  organisation’,  it  applies to his  analysls of t l  e  mechanlcal  model,  too. 
be by means of a  professional  e of senice delivery  which  puts  ?u@y  trained staff into direct touch  with  farmers. 
As Jon Moris argues: “If African ovemments  do  decide  to contkue with  publicly  supported  extension,  it  should 
The  ‘machine  bureaucracy’ mo Y el favoured  by civil senice agencies 1s not what Afnca needs” (Mons, 1991 p. 33). 
widespread  appllcation ofthe system m Asm comOies,  it was mtmduced  to A f i i m  countnes fiom the mid-1980s. 
‘Os The  T&V  system  was  developed by a World Bank ad+sor,  David  Benor,  in  the e,arly 1970s  and  after  a 
The T&V system  consists  of  a  unified  extension  service  where  all  village  extension  workers  (VEWs) are brought 
under  a  single l i e  of  command  within  a  structure  whlch  permits su ervision  at all levels. VEWs follow  a fxed 
rogramme  of field visiis overseen  by supervisors who have an equ&y  rigid  schedule  (Hulme, 1991 p.  219-224; huh, 1992;  Venkatesan,  1993; Moris, 1991  p.  135-136;  von  der  Liihe,  1998  p.  14). 
India as an  example  of  a  well-designed  mechanlcal-bureaucmhc  organisation. The ar  e  that  clients  are  better 
I O 6  Hage  and  Finsterbusch dacribe the implement?ion  of  the Tra;+g and  Visit  model  of  agricultural  extension  in 
served by a  centralised  and  hierarchical  organisation,  ,characterised by simplifie J ?  an formalised tasks, close 
supervision  of  extension  who are allowed only lmlted disnetlon and control over  what they do and  how they 
do  it  (Hage & p.  106-  113, p.  239-241). 
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Surprisingly,  Leonard  follows the same  line  of  argument  when  he  concludes the analysis ofthe 
Kenyan  extension  organisation  by  characterising  the  society as under-bureaucratised.  Despite the 
emphasis put  in the analysis on motivations and means to encourage  work  satisfaction,  he 
mentions as one  of  the virtues of  the  mechanical  model that it does  not  depend  on  goal  orientation 
which he considers  rare to find among the  field staff in Kenyan  development  agencies’07. His 
basic  premiss is that extension is about  disseminating  technological  innovations  which  are  readily 
available &om the research  centres and  which  represent  a  profitable  improvement in the way 
farming is done by the majority of Kenyan  farmers. This involves  a lot of routine  tasks  which  can 
be  mechanically  structured to the great  benefit  of  organisational  performance,  He  ends  up, 
however,  by  suggesting the need for an  ‘intelligent  mechanical  model’, as he  acknowledges the 
fruitfulness of integrating  such  aspects  as  flexibility,  programming by negotiation  and 
consultation in the setting of  work  tasks. 
While also World Bank advisors at least until recently have unconditionally praised the 
appropriateness of the T&V extension  system  (e.g.  Verkatesan, 1 993)’08, the majority  of other 
authors  dealing  with  extension  problems  are  highly  sceptical to the  usefulness of the  mechanical 
model for extension purposes  and  particularly  reject its applicability in an African  context. 
Among  the  general  arguments,  Daniel  Gustafson  has  pointed out that the “simple  application of 
a  standard  technological  package is rarely  what  extension  is  called on to do. It is the  complexity, 
heterogeneity and  unpredictability of agriculture  that  makes  an  extension  service  essential” 
(Gustafson,  1994 p.  125). 
In addition to reservations  regarding  the  lack  of  attention t  motivation  and  work  satisfaction of
extension agents  who  are  used as mere  implementers of preconceived  plans,  a  main  argument 
against the system  regards its lack  of  possibilities  of letting extension  be  driven by problems 
defined by farmers. It is difficult  for  farmers to become  involved in any  kind of dialogue  with 
extension agents  conveying  standard  messages  according to a  rigid  work  schedule.  Hence,  the 
intended two-way  linkage  between  farmers  and  extensionists is often weak. As a  particular 
problem to the dialogue  between  farmers  and  extension  agents it has  been  mentioned that the 
system neglects the potentially constructive role played by fanners’ organisations. Other 
reservations  against it regard its lack  of  attention to the need for collaboration  among  many 
different  state  agencies,  its  bias  towards  better-off  fanners10g  and  its  priority to the communication 
of extension messages at the expense of the provision of a broader  range of services,  including 
also agricultural  credits‘1°  (Gustafson,  1994  p.  124-125; Gustafson, 1990 p.  201-208;  Hulme, 
lo’ This seems to be  diametrically  opposed  to his statement  elsewhere in the  book  that  the  distinctive  features of 
African behaviour  derive  from  an  essentially  universal  mode  of  response to the particularities  of  the  African 
environment  (Leonard,  1977  p.  231). 
but  new  T&V-based  rojects  and  rogrammes  have  still  been  initiated in the  field  (C?ristoplos &Nitsch, 1996 
I O 8  In the  1990s  the  World Bank at the  policy  level has become  more  reserved  about  ualities  of  the  T&V  system, 
44).  A  large  World {a&- fundefT&V-based extension  programme was initiated in 1994 in all  regions in M$ 
except Sikasso. 
The T&V  model  implies  that  extension  workers  concentrate  their  efforts on selected  contact  farmers  who  then 
farmers r  resent  a  cross-section of their  community,  active  commercially-oriented fanners are  over-represented ass on recommendations to around ten follow  farmers.  As  the  methodology  applied  does  not  ensure  that  contact 
(Hulme, 391p.221; Moris, 1991 p. 139). 
availability of ‘off-the-shelves-technologies’  to be communicated to farmers (Moris, 1991 p.  136-137). 
In addition to these  problems, it has also been  stressed  that  the  T&V  system is very  expensive  and  supposes the 
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1991  p.  224-230;  Hulme,  1992  p.  435- 444; von  der Liihe,  1991  p.  248;  von  der  Liihe,  1998  p. 
15-17;  Tendler,  1997  p.  139-140; Mons, 1991  p.  136-142). 
In a rainfed Afiican setting these problems are even more pronounced: a complex and 
unpredictable ago-ecological environment calls for  much  more  flexibility  and  adjustment  to 
local  conditions than the  mechanical  model is able  to  provide,  Farm  and  household  decisions 
must  constantly  be  adjusted to changing  conditions,  and  a  high  socioeconomic  heterogeneity  at 
local  level  makes  the  application  of  standard  solutions  inappropriate  (Hulme,  1991  p.  224-  230; 
Hulme,  1992  p.  441;  von  der  Liihe,  1998  p.  16). As Christoplos  points  out  “the  field  level  realities 
of  most  agricultural  service  organisations in developing  counties  could  be  described as a parody 
of  the  organograms  which  have  been  designed  to  control  them ... there is an  assumption  that 
unpredictability can be  addressed  by  more  planning”  (Christoplos,  1996 p, 200,  p.  202). 
While the massive  criticism  of  the  mechanical  model in general  and  the T&V model  in  particular 
regards  the  models in their  ‘pure’  form,  many  researchers  stress  that  the  principles  are  often 
modified  somehow in practice to allow  adjustment  to  the  particularities  of  local  conditions”’. 
Gustafson  observes  that  those T&V programmes,  which  have  moved  beyond  the  mechanical  stage 
of  systematically  delivering  messages and have  incorporated  some  degree of learning  from 
farmers and f?om the experience of the extension agents, have sometimes induced real 
improvements  (Gustafson,  1990 p.  20 1 ; Gustafson,  1994  p. 13 1-1  33).  Others  have  found  that 
even  hierarchically  organised  and  seemingly  unresponsive  state  organisations  have  sometimes 
unintendedly  increased  the  capacity  of  local  farmers  to  put demands  on  the  organisations.  Thus, 
after  years  of  extension  activities  producers  may  gradually  obtain  the  technical  knowledge 
necessary to challenge  the  top-down  approach  of  the  agency or even to take  over  some  of  the 
tasks of  extension  agents. Also the organisational  experience of being  included in state-controlled 
cooperatives and village associations may provide farmers with the strength to organise 
independently  and  change  the  relationship with the  state  organisations  (Jacob & Delville,  1994 
p.  9;  Gentil,  1986  p.  260; L a c h e n m a  1994  p.  75;  Tendler,  1997  p.  152-153;  James  Bingen, 
personal  communication  Aug.  1996). 
Conclusion 
The  disaggregation of the  concept  of  the  state,  proposed  by  the  interactive  approach, is considered 
a very fnlitful approach  to  the  study  of  its  interactions  with  societal  forces.  It  directs  the  attention 
towards  the  particular  pressures  faced  by  street-level  bureaucracies s compared to other goups 
in the state apparatus,  and it opens  for a distinction  between the different  agencies  of  the state. 
Thereby it provides  some  very  useful  entrance  points  both to the  empirical  analysis of the 
pressures  faced  by  extension  agents  and  to  the  analysis  of  the  differences of performance  among 
the  four  agencies. 
The  discussion  about  the  ‘anthropology  of  the  state’,  however,  concluded  that  the  challenge of 
using  a  differentiated  concept  of  the state is not to overemphasise  state-internal  differences at the 
expense ofthe concept  of  state-entity.  There is a  need to deal  with  the  particularity  of  the  state 
as both a multitude of different  structures  and as an abstract  entity  dependent on a  certain  amount 
‘‘l The majority of Afican counpies now a ply a  ‘modified T & V system’  where the princi  les of concentrating 
on contact farmers  and on prowhg  agncu%ural infomatlon only  have  been  abandoned (H & e, 1992 p. 439). 
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of legitimacy in the  eyes of the  population.  Thus,  the  state is also  a  discursive  construct  resulting 
&om a  combination of people’s  encounters  with  local-level  bureaucracies  (such as e.g. extension 
workers)  and their more  general  image of the state.  Both  perspectives  have  to  be  present  in an 
empirical analysis. In the operationalisation of the ‘anthropology of the state’ by use of 
organisation  theory it has been  attempted  to keep this understanding of the state in mind by 
drawing on Uphoff s point about  legitimacy  being  the  core  condition f r performance. 
Organisation  theories  reviewed  have  taken  the  ‘anthropology of the state’  considerably  beyond 
the sketchy framework suggested by the interactive approach. General conditions for state 
performance as well as conditions for the performance of particular  agencies  have been spelled 
out  in  sufficient  details to provide  the tools necessary for an empirical  analysis. 
At the  general  level,  Bratton’s  not  very  specific  suggestion  that  there is a  linkage  between  socio- 
economy and  state  capacity  has  been  elucidated  by  the  introduction  by  Grindle  and  Hilderbrand 
of  ‘the  action  environment’, ‘the public  sector  institutional  context’  and  the  ‘task  network‘ as 
important  dimensions of state  capacity.  Their h e w o r k  suggests  a  step-by-step  investigation of
factors affecting  capacity,  including  1)  the  general  economic  and  political  context, 2) the overall 
public  sector  situation  with  regard  to  funding  and  rules  and  regulations, 3) relations  between  the 
organisation  and  other  parts  of the state  apparatus  and  non-state  organisations, 4) characteristics 
of the  organisation  itself  with  regard  to its management  style  and  organisation  culture,  and 5 )  the 
perceived  meaningfulness of the work  by its employees. 
The three fust-mentioned elements are directly applicable to an analysis of the shared 
environment of the  four  Malian  agencies  under  study.  The  framework  makes it possible  to 
distinguish  between situations where, on the one  hand,  government  agencies are inevitably 
doomed  to poor performance due to  macroeconomic  trends,  lack of legitimacy or fundamental 
institutional  constraints  and, on the other  hand, situations where  problems  generated by  general 
economic, political and institutional problems may be overcome at the level of individual 
government  agencies. 
Uphoff s emphasis on legitimacy as a  core  variable  is an important  supplement o  the structure- 
oriented  framework  provided by  Grindle  and  Hilderbrand.  It calls attention to the fact  that 
government  agencies  cannot  be  analysed as autonomous  organisations  which  relate  only  to  their 
own direct clients. The particularity of these agencies is that they are both individual 
organisations  with  proper  structures,  cultures  and  relations  to  external  agents and part of a  larger 
symbolic totality or  legitimate  power.  Therefore,  they do not depend only on the legitimacy 
gained  trough their own interactions  with  societal  groups  but  also on the general  legitimacy of the 
state in the eyes of the population. 
Concerning the analysis of organisation-specific factors (4 and 5 in the framework  proposed  by 
h d l e  and  Hilderbrand),  the  discussion was broadened by drawing on a  range of contributions 
to  revised agency theory  and on more  recent theories about workers’  performance  focussing  on 
work  satisfaction  and  demand  pressure. Six elements  were  found to  be of special  importance  to 
organisational  performance,  namely 1) authori& 2) rewards, 3 )  organisational  identification, 4) 
peerpressure, 5 )  work satisfaction and 6 )  demandpressure. 
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While all of  these  elements  are  considered  important  and ll of  them  will  be  used to structure  the 
analysis  of  the  four  agencies  in  chapter  9,  contributions  that  deal  with  the  importance  of  work 
satisfaction  and  demand  pressure  are  found  particularly  interesting.  The  hypothesis that lack  of 
discretion  instead of too  much  discretion by street-level  bureaucracies  is the core  problem  is  a 
refreshing  contrast to the  mainstream  view  of  government  agents a purely  self-interested. As it 
was  discussed  in  chapter 1, the  organic  state-oriented  approach  which  since  the  mid-1980s  has 
been  highly  influential  in  the  general  debate  about  the  African  state  is  based  on such a  view  of 
government  agents.  It  provides an extremely  instrumentalist  understanding of the  functioning  of 
state  organisations as caught up in a  game  played only for  the  personal  benefit  of those  involved. 
Viewed through these lenses, the suggestion that government agents should develop close 
relations to clients  would  appear  to  be v ry dangerous,  as  the  problem  at  the  outset  is  defined as 
too close  personal  relations  between  government s aff and  external  groups. 
As it has  been  discussed  in  chapter 1 and 2 on  general  state-society  relations,  the  limitation  of 
approaches  that  claims  universality  to  the  theory  about  self-interested  individuals  is  their  inability 
to  understand how  the  capacity  of  the  state  may  also be positively  influenced by societal forces. 
Self-interested  agents may  be found  in  some  situations,  and it seems  reasonable to accept  that 
many  empirical studies have  found  them in African  state  bureaucracies. It is a  simplification, 
however,  to  expect  to  find  them  in all situations,  regardless  of  the  specific  context.  Under  certain 
conditions  societal  forces  may  positively  influence  the  state.  Thus,  the  interactive  approach  argues 
that the pressure  put  on  state  organisations by  engaging  societal  groups  may  contribute to an 
important  strengthening ofthe state.  Tendler  specifies this by  explaining  how  organisations  which 
are  open  and  responsive to demands  from  clients may develop  the  ability to adjust to new 
circumstances  and  thereby  achieve  a  better  performance. 
The  emphasis  put on demand  pressure as an important  factor  of  influence on organisational 
performance,  thereby,  directly  links  to  the  interactive  approach.  The  state is not an organisation 
which  supplies a range of services  that  citizens may  take  or  leave  without  influencing  the state 
through  their  choices.  The  state offers a  set  of  policies  expressed  through  the  actions  of its various 
agencies to which  societal  groups  respond  and  thereby  change.  Societal  groups  are  not stable - 
and  very  far from  homogeneous - but  are  constantly formed through interaction  with  the state and 
with  other  societal  groups.  Tendler’s  example of the  strengthening  of  producer  organisations 
through  a  contractual  relationship  with  a  government agency is a useful  illustration. 
Relating these conclusions to the mechanical  model  providing the core  organisational features 
of the  four  agencies  under  study  would  suggest  that very  poor  performance  can  be  expected. The 
insensitivity  of  the  model to demand  pressures  implies  that  the  agencies  are  likely to lack  the  urge 
to  improve  their  service to become  more  flexible  and  client-oriented.  The  very  limited  discretion 
of  subordinate staff and  their  limited  contact to clients may cause a feeliig of  meaninglessness 
among  the staffwhich may  have  fatal  consequences  for  the  quality  of  service.  The  agencies  could 
be expected to lack  the  flexibility  necessary to respond to the  complex  and  rapidly  changing 
conditions ckc t&ing  rural African  settings in general  and  the  recent  social  turbulence in the 
s j ~ s o  region h particular. The extent to which  these  stipulations  hold true will be  investigated 
in  chapter  9  where  each of the  agencies is examined. 
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CHAPTER 4. DISAGGREGATION  OF  SOCIETAL  FORCES 
Introduction 
Like the notion  of  the state must  be  disaggregated  and  each  of its parts  be subject to further 
examination, there is a need to  break  down  the  concept  of  society "to understand  how different 
elements  pull in different  directions"(Migdal,  1994  p.8).  Social  forces  making  up  society  embrace 
a  wide  variety  of  movements,  networks,  groups,  cells  and  formal  and  informal  organisations  that 
differ  substantially  in size, scope,  purpose,  composition  and  resources (Chazan, 1994 p. 256; 
Migdal,  1994  p.20). 
It is the  purpose  of  the  present  chapter to suggest  a  number of approaches  to  the  study  of  societal 
forces that can be applied  to  the  analysis  in  chapter  11 of  social  forces  that  interact  with  and 
influence the four  extension  agencies in the Sikasso region. 
In a  proposed  overview of the  main  layers  of  social  structure  Chazan  et  al.  distinguish  between 
a) groups  based on identity andafinity such as kinship  organisations,  hometown  associations  and 
cultural  Organisations.  b) organisations  based  onprinciples of afiliation such as professional  and 
occupational  groups,  religious  communities,  student  groups,  women's  groups,  and  c)  analytically 
constituted  categories such as ethnicity  and  class (Chazan et d., 1992 p.  77). 
Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s  many  scholars  spent  a  considerable  energy  arguing  for the 
preeminence  of  one of these  organising  principles  in d y s e s  of  African  social  relations"',  it is 
a fundamental  assumption by researchers  applying  the  interactive  approach  that  identities are 
coexisting  rather than mutually  exclusive. An individual  member  of  a  particular ethnic group is 
at the  same  time  involved in various  economic  roles  such asworker,  professional,  business  person 
or administrator  and  therefore  develops  crosscutting ties of  ethnic  identity,  economic  class, 
religion,  region  etc.  Identities  are  not  stable  but  are  constantly  shaped  and  reshaped t rough the 
mutual  interaction of societal  forces  and  through  their  interaction  with state actors.  Or  in  other 
words: while  all  people have multiple  identities, the impoItance of each  of  them  depends  on the 
situation (Chazan et al.  1992, p. 105-107). In th is  respect  the  approach is very  similar to that of 
other scholars  who  have  stressed the fluidity and  multiplicity  of  African  social  relations  (e.g. 
Bangura,  1994 p. 17-20;  Berry,  1993  p.6,  p.196;  Bayart,  1993  p.  47-59,  p.96-99;  Chambers,  1997 
p. 162-174). 
Strategies  of  various groups tied  together by  common identities  are  affected by relations  to  the 
state but  are not just a product of t h i s  interaction. Mutual interaction  among  societal  groups 
constitutes  important  dynamics  in  the  forming  of  identities  and  of  the  strategies  applied  both  vis- 
a-vis  other  groups  and in relations to  the state. 
m E.g. the  discussion  about class or ethnicity as the main  social  identi  and  the.  discussion  about  the  relevance of 
analyses focussing on kinship orgmsahons as a means to understan  the  patnmomal  character  of the state. For 
es of African  social  relations  that  apply  the  class  analysis as the  major  anal  cal  tool,  see Sklar, 
? % p ~ % ~ ~  1982. For applications of this  a  proach  to  the  Malian  context,  see Amsec, 1985;  Bagayogo, 
1987;  Amselle & Gregoire,  1987; Meillassow 1978 For athorough critique of approaching  class  and  ethnicity as
mutually  exclusive  categories,  see Kasfir, 1976 p. 67-83. 
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While  all  social  groups  are  seen as contributing  more  or  less  significantly  to  processes  of  change 
and  persistence,  depending  on  the  context,  there  has  been  a  particular  interest  among  researchers 
in  identifymg  forces  with  a  more  substantial  impact  on  processes  of  political  change,  i.e.  changing 
relations  between  state  and  society.  Many  contributions  to thi  issue  have  moved  beyond  context- 
specific  analyses  of  dominant  identities  and have attempted  to  establish  general  rules  about  the 
character  of forces that  have  a  particular  political  potential.  While in some of the  earlier  works 
applying  the  interactive  approach  class  and  ethnicity  are  described as the  most  effective  identities 
for  demands on the  state  (Rothchild & Foley,  1988;  Chazan  et  al.,  1992),  more  recent  debate has
been  almost  entirely  dominated by authors  who  have  found  inspiration in the  renewed  debate 
about  the  concept of  civil  society  (e.g.  Chazan,  1994; Azarya, 1994;  Harbeson,  1994;  Bratton, 
1994b). 
Contributions  by  researchers  inspired  by  the  interactive  approach  relate  to an x ensive  theoretical 
debate  about  how  to  analyse  societal  forces. Th  brief  review in the following of two main  issues, 
namely  the  debate  about  the  role of  class  and  ethnicity  and  the  more  recent  debate  about  the 
notion of  civil  society,  therefore,  compares  and  discusses  the  writings  of  the  above-mentioned 
researchers to many  other  contributions. 
4.1. Class and ethnicity 
Authors  concentrating  on  class  and  ethnicity as those  identities  most  suited to make  demands  on 
the state explain  political  changes as the  result of  changes in social  and  economic  structures. 
While  insisting  that  class  and  ethnicity  are  changing,  overlapping  and  sometimes  intertwined 
categories”’, their  analyses  focus  on  the  growing  lack  of  compatibility  between  ethnic  and  class 
structures  and the prevailing  mechanisms  for  channelling  state-society  relations  (Chazan et al. 
1992 p.  170-177).  Since  independence in many  African  countries,  ethnic  groups,  defined  as 
culturally  based  social organisation^"^, have  tended to be a useful  instrument  for  mobilising 
interests in competition  with  other  groups for state  resources.  As  discussed in chapter  2,  many 
regime  types  have  responded to the  need  for  representation  of  key  interests  by  co-opting  ethnic 
representatives  into  the ruling elite i.a by a  widespread  use  of  ‘ethnic  arithmetic’  in  appointments 
to  the  government  and  top-level  positions in the  state  apparatus  (Rothchild & Foley,  1988  p. 233- 
248).  With  ongoing  socioeconomic  changes new social  forces  emerge  that  are  not  amenable  to 
control in the old ways.  Among the  new  social  cleavages  mentioned,  the  growing  urban-rural 
divide  and  the  acceleration  of rural social  differentiation  are  highlighted asconflicts  that  may  lead 
to  overt  political  protests  against  existing  regimes  (Rothchild & Foley,  1988  p.  256-257)’15. 
‘‘I Class  and  ethnicity  are  variable  categories  thar  are som&i?nes reinfoxkg each  other,  sometimes  acting  alone  and 
sometimes  working  against  each  other,  dependmg on the situation. By ~ t s  capacities to allocate  resources  and set 
informal  guidelines for relations  between  interest  groups  and the state,  the  state  plays  a key role  in  mfluencing  the 
nature of class  and  ethnic  identities  (Chazan et al., 1992 p.  124-127).  This  understanding  draws on works by  e.g. 
Nelson Kasfr who  states  that  “there are likely  to  be  situ?ti?ns  in,which  economic  interests  and  ethr$city are both 
important  factors - either  relnforcing  each  other or confl@ng wth each  other. In other  cases,  posslbly  involvmg 
the  same  individuals,  one.or  the  other  may  be  the  sole sipficant consideration.  Any  one of these four  possibilities 
may be relevaht to a partmlar case” (Kasfr, 1976 p. 76-77). 
li4 Ethnic  groups unitd around  the  subj+ve  perception of shared  histories, traditions, beliefs,  cultures  and  values 
mobilise  its  members for common pol~hcal, economlc and socd  purposes  (Chazan et al., 1992 p.  106). 
l i s  It is interestinit? note @t Gibbon  describes t h ~  inverse  trend  from  class  formation to a  strengthening of 
familialim and in vlduahsahon  after  the  implementahon of structural adjustment  programmes  since the mid-1980s 
(Gibbon,  1992  p.  22). 
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It is important  to  notice  that  the  definition f class  by  authors  applying  the interactive approach 
differs significantly &om the  Marxian  definition that inspired  many  of the class analyses of 
African  countries  produced in the 1970s and 1980~”~.  According to the authors, class identities 
may develop  around  conflicting  interests  and  lifestyle  resulting fiom such variables as income, 
occupation  and  education in so far as there is a  conscious  recognition of membership of a  class 
by  individuals  with  similar  backgrounds. Thus, the rural population or part  of  the m a l  population 
may  develop  class  interests  vis-a-vis  the  urban  elite,  but this only  happens if the rural  population 
develops  a  conscious  recognition of shared  economic  and  political  objectives  (Chazan et l.,  1992 
p. 119). 
4.2. The notion of ‘civil society’ 
Since  the  1980s the reintroduction of the concept of civil  society has taken  the  debate on African 
state-society  relations  in  many different directions. The debate has roots  in  classical  philosophical 
thinking  (e.g.  Locke,  Hobbes,  de  Tocqueville,  Hegel)  and  in  the mor recent debate on political 
opposition in the  former  communist  regimes  in  Eastern  Europe and social  movements in Latin 
America.  Numerous  interpretations of the  concept  and  highly  different  opinions on its usefulness 
to an understanding  of  political  changing  processes  have  characterised  the  debate  (Cohen & 
Arato,  1992;  Gibbon,  1996;  Young,  1994). 
To  mention  but a few of the many definitions  proposed  in  the  debate: in its broadest d e f ~ t i o n  
civil society is simply seen as society at large:  “what is not of the state becomes  civil  society” 
(Chabal,  1986 p.  15). In a  still  very  broad  definition,  civil  society is sometimes seen as the 
organised non-state  sphere,  i.e. all  organisations  based on principles of affilation (e.g.  Ngaware, 
1997  p.  238). This d e f ~ t i o n  isnarrowed  down by a  number  of scholars for whom civil society 
refers to a particular type of civil associations. For Gordon White the definition is: “an 
intermediate  associational  realm  between  state  and  family  populated by organisations  which  are 
separatefiom the state,  enjoy  autonomy in relation  to  the state and  are formed voluntarily by 
members  of  society  to  protect  or  advance  their  interests  and  values”  (White,  1996  p.  5).  For  others 
the  definition  stresses  the  tendency of civil  associations to engage  the  state rather  than  disengage 
fiom the  state:  “individuals,  groups  and  associations ... are  part of civil society to the extent that 
they  seek  to  define,  generate  support for, or promote  changes in the basic working rules of  the 
game by which  social  values  are  authoritatively  allocated ...”( Harbeson, 1994a p.4;  see  also 
Chazan,  1994  p.256-278).  Finally,  a very  commonly applied defmition draws on the 
Tocquevillian  meaning of civil  society to describe the assertion of society against  the state: “civil 
society  exists  only in so far as there is a self-consciousness of its existence and of its opposition 
to the state” payart, 1986 p. 1 17)’17. 
Whereas all these  definitions may  be  characterised as definitions of ‘actually existing civil 
societies’ (White, 1996 p. 4), other scholars have  attempted to reserve the notion to  theoretical 
ideal type  definitions.  Drawing on Hegel’s  works,  Bratton defines civil  society as “a public 
Class analyses  roduced in the 1970s and  (early) 1980s were  often  inspired by Karl M m ’  defmition  of  a  class 
by its relations to k e  means of  production (a class ‘an sich’) and  its  class  consciousness (a class  ‘fiir-sich‘) (Mm 
& Engels, 1976 p. 326-327). 
‘l’ For an aiplication,otthis,approach to an em irical analysis of social  movements  in  Senegal, see Lachemnann, 
1994 who i  enhfies awl  soclety  by  its  logic di 8 erent from the  logic of the state (e.g.  the  persuasion of a  different 
development  model). 
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sphere  of  collective  action between  the  family  and  the  state  that  coexists in a  complex  relationship 
of creative tension with the state”  @ratto&  1994b  p.75).  Azarya  also  moves  beyond  empirical 
definitions  by  suggesting  that  civil  society is a non-state public realm  defined by a set of  norms 
about  collective  responsibility to the  common  goods  and  the  positive  values  of  activities  meant 
to safeguard  it (Azarya, 1994 p.90-91). 
Thus, civil society is defined both theoretically  and  empirically (White,  1996  p. 5) and  both by 
its location (between the state and the citizen),  by  its  functions (e.g. defending the interests  of 
private  memberships  against the state), by its  institutions  (the  associational  scene)  and by its  logic 
(a  set of ‘civic’  norms)  (Hutchful,  1995 p. 56-57).  Chazan  summarises  the  application ofthe 
m a y  different definitions in the African context as follows: 
“...it has been  concep tualized... as a  necessary  precondition  for  state  consolidation, as the 
key  brake  on  state  power  (and  consequently in constant  conikontation with the state), as 
a benign  broker  between  state interests and  local  concerns, or as a  medley  of  social 
institutions that interact  with  each  other  and  with  formal  structures in ways  that  may 
either facilitate or impede  governance  and  economic  development”  (Chazan,  1994  p. 
255). 
Authors writing along the lines of the interactive approach have applied several different 
definitions  of civil society.  But  given  their  search for forces  that  have  a  more  substantial  impact 
on  processes  of  political  change,  i.e. forces that  have apoliticalproject in the  sense  of  trying to 
influence  fundamental  relations  between  state  and  society,  they  all  tend  to  consider it a relational 
concept (defined  by  its  relations  to  the  state)  rather han a  locational  concept  (defined  by  its  non- 
state character)”8 (Chandhoke, 1995 p. 39-40; Chazan, 1994 p. 256). Instead of a priori 
considering civil society  ‘good’  for  democracy,  for  economic  development, for ‘good 
governance’,  etc.,  most of  these  authors  use the notion  of  civil  society  to  identify  forces  that  have 
a  more  substantial  impact  on  processes of political  change in its broadest  sense,  i.e. for better  or 
for  worse  (Chazan,  1994  p.  255-256,  see  also  Tendler,  1997  p.  156-157). 
4.3. Criticism of theories  about  class  and  ethnicity  and of theories  about  ‘civil  society’ 
When  comparing theories about  important  political  forces to descriptions  of  empirical  realities 
in  the  recent  decade,  scholars  concentrating  on  class  and  ethnicity  seem  to  find l i i t e d  empirical 
backing in the majority  of  analyses  of  the  various  political  movements  that  have  contributed  to 
initiation of democratisation  processes in Africa. Thus, the suggestion  by  Rothchild  and  Foley 
that  the  growing  urban-rural  divide  and the acceleration  of  rural  social  differentiation are likely 
to  lead to overt  political  protests against existing  regimes  find  only i i t ed  support in the scarce 
literature on peasant  organisations’  role in recent political  changing  processes in Afiica. Instead 
most  empirical  analyses  concentrate  on  urban  groups  such as students’  movements  and  trade 
unions and  religious  groups  such as e.g. the  Catholic and the  Protestant  church  when  pointing  out 
the  organisations  that  have  been in the forekont of confkontations  with  authoritarian  regimes  (e.g. 
Gyimah-Boadi,  1994;  Fay,  1995;  Tripp;  1992;  Tengende,  1994). 
l l*  m a  makes an important exception as discussed in the following (Azarya, 1994). 
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This does  not  mean,  however,  that the value  of  theories  that  emphasize  class  and  ethnicity as 
important  identities for political  mobilisation  should  be  rejected  altogether.  It  seems  that  the  field 
is somehow  empirically  under-researched  because  mainstream  research  has  concentrated  on the
concept  of  civil  society. As documented  by  Michael  Bratton  and  Nicolas van de Walle,  political 
protests have  often  developed  out  of  what  initially  began  as  demands by interest  groups for 
improved  material  conditions. In many countries the first confrontations with authoritarian 
regimes  took  place  when  students  protesting  against  cuts in government grants were joined by 
civil servants,  workers  and  professionals  who  all  suffered  from  economic  austerity  measures. 
When  governments  responded  with  repression  and  threats,  the  protests  were joined by larger 
segments of the urban populations and protesters  began to call  for  systemic  political  change 
(Bratton & de Walle, 1992 p. 31-35). If class identities are understood in the broad sense 
suggested by Chazan  et  al. as identities  developed  from  differences in income,  occupation and 
education,  indeed such identities  have  been  important  to  political m~bilisation"~. 
An important  theoretical  reservation,  however,  can  be  made  against  both  the focus on  class and 
ethnicity  and  the  concentration  on  civil  society  in its various  definitions.  Acknowledging the 
multiplicity  of  identities  in  Afiica  (and  elsewhere),  it  is  theoretically  unsatisfactory  to  expect  that 
certain  identities  will be of  particular  importance  to  processes  of  political  change,  regardless  of 
the  context.  If political mobilisation is expected  to  take  place  only  along class and  ethnic  lines, 
one risks overlooking  other  important  social  identities  such as those  emerging  from  religion, 
geography,  gender,  etc.  Furthermore,  one  risks  ignoring  important  social  cleavages  inside groups 
defined as social  categories  according  to  their  class  and  ethnic  identities,  e.g.  the  considerable 
differences between farmers' potential for political action, depending on geographical and 
ecological  factors, their particular  relations  to  government  agents,  their  experience  with  social 
organisation,  etc. 
A similar risk is associated with the overwhelming interest in civil society, notably in its 
associational  form. As some  authors  have  pointed  out,  the  focus  on  visible  political  actions  in  the 
form of  demonstrations,  strikes,  the  emergence  of  a  range  of  new  associations, the emergence  of 
a critical press,  etc. risks ignoring the political  economy  aspects  of  particular  forms  of  politics 
(Callaghy,  1994  p.233-234;  Abrahamson,  1996).  When  applying  very  broad  definitions  of civil 
society  and  ascribing acommon  political  potential  to  these  broad  categories,  there is a  serious  risk 
of  overlooking  important  social  conflicts within civil  society.  Civil  societies  tend  to  be  highly 
segmented  and  very  often  factional  interests  by  elite  groups  have  managed to dominate  political 
actions  at  the  expense of other  interests  (Chandhoke,  1995 p. 37-38;  Gyimah-Boadi,  1996  p. 120- 
122;  Rothchild & Lawson,  1994 p. 256; Tendler,  1997 p.  157-163).  Furthermore, it has been 
pointed out that the picture  of  a  strong  civil  society  emerging fTom below  and  striving for 
democracy  finds  relatively little empirical  support in African  countries.  It has been  argued  that 
the  observed rebiah of civil  society  only  partly  results  from  a  process  of  organisation  fiom  below 
but is rather the result of a  detachment  of  certain  organisations  from  the  state  (Gibbon, 1993 p. 
26).  Others  have  stressed  that  civil  society is generally  too  weak to contribute to a  democratic 
consolidation as internal cleavages, co-optation by the government, lack of organisational 
capacity  and  financial  autonomy  limit  its  potential  (Gyimah-Boadi,  1996;  Gyimah-Boadi,  1994). 
'l9 John Hutchfd oes one step further  and argues that  the  anchoring of the  democratic  movement in state-connected 
and  middle-class iements may spark the  view that civil  soclety  is really a form of class  politics  (Hutchful,  1995 p.
70-71). 
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The  obvious  problems  related  to  the  construction of general  theories  about  particular  important 
social  identities  make  it  relevant  to  consider  the  normative  connotations  of he various attempts. 
While l i t a t ions  of the marxist  focus  on  class identities have  been  extensively  debated (e.g. 
Booth, 1985),  a  number  of  scholars  have  also  called  attention  to  what is referred to as the  entirely 
normative arguments  used in some  analyses of civil society. In neoliberal  uses of the notion 
concepts of freedom  and  autonomy  from the state fit neatly  into the agenda  of rolling back  the 
state,  hence the notion  of  civil  society is simply  equated  with  capitalist  market  policies. In neo- 
populist  approaches  the  concept is used to  highlight the virtues  of  grass-roots  non-governmental 
organisations  (Gibbon,  1992 p.  11-15;  White,  1996  p.3;  Chandhoke, 1996 p. 39;  Hutchful,  1995 
p.  64-65). The  problems  are  summarised by Crawford  Young as an unarticulated  major  premise 
of the innate  goodness  of  civil  society as opposed to an  increasingly  negative  portrait  of  the 
African  state  resulting in a  picture  of  ‘a  satanic  state  juxtaposed  to  an  angelic civil society’ 
(Young, 1994 p.  47). 
4.4. Contributions  by  the  theories 
Despite  the  limitations  related  to  the  ‘substantive  theory  character’  of  the  contributions  discussed 
above,  they still contribute  valuable  insights  that  can  be  used in the  establishment  of  a  more  open 
conceptual  framework  meant  to  guide  empirically-oriented  research. Thus, it is useful in a 
particular  empirical  case  to  look for class  and  ethnic  identities as potentially  important  for 
political  mobilisation by testing  the  empirical  relevance  of  theoretically  constructed  categories 
such as farmers,  the state bureaucracy,  the  trade  bourgeoisie, the Minyanka  population,  etc.  It is
also useful to look for socioeconomic cleavages inside groups sharing a common identity 
different  from  class  and  ethnic  identities.  Furthermore,  it  seems  useful to approach the analysis 
of  politically  important  non-class  based  social  organisations  (call it civil  society or something 
else) by the application of a tangible and operational definition of possible important 
characteristics.  Finally,  some of  the  contributions to the civil society  debate provide valuable 
inspiration  to  analysis of the  norms guiding different  social  groups in their  interaction  with  each 
other  and  the  state,  i.e. to the analysis  of the kind  of  relations  between  state  and  society  that  are 
furthered by various  groups. 
In the following  insights  provided by  some of the contributions are used  to  identify  a  series  of 
questions that it  will  be  worth  pursuing in an  empirical  study of politically  important  social 
identities in a case  such as the  Malian.  The  framework  established  by  no  means aims at covering 
all the potentially  relevant  identities or dl the questions it may be useful to ask.  Based on what 
appears  to  be  the  heuristic  utility  of the tools  they  offer,  a  limited  number of contributions  have 
been  selected  to  guide the empirical  investigations. 
‘Civil society’ as civil associations 
To begin  with  the  definition of  politically  important  non-class-based  social  organisations,  the 
suggestion  by  Chazan  and  Harbeson  to  define  such  organisations  by  their  tendency to gage fhe 
state rather .than disengage from the state  avoid the serious  pitfall of seeing state and society as 
antagonistic categories (‘the  more  of  the  one, the less of  the  other’).  The  understanding  by  the 
interactive  approach  of  the  possibility of  mutually  supportive  state-society  relations  (mutual 
engagement)  opens  the  possibility  that  the  existence  of  a  strong  civil  society  may  strengthen  the 
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state  and  vice  versa  (Chazan, 1 9 9 2 ~  see  also  Grindle,  1996 p.  194;  Tendler,  1997 p.  156-157; 
Evans,  1995 p.  249). 
The  definition  of  civil  associations s very  specific  and  tangible:  in  addition o the  criteria  of  being 
associations  that  take  part  in  rule-setting  activities  (Harbeson,  1994a  p.4),  Chazan  mentions  that 
civil  associations  express  an  aggregation  of  interests  beyond  the  local level and  thereby  connect 
local-level  forces to the state.  Thus, civil associations  do  not  include  parochial  associations  that 
do  not  evince  an  interest  beyond  their  immediate  concerns,  groups that do not have a  concept  of 
the  state  independent  of  their own aims and  groups  totally  controlled  by  state  agencies  (Chazan, 
1994  p.256  and  p.  261). A basic  precondition of the  vitality  of  civil  society is its autonomy  from 
state  structures  and the availability of some  independent  resources  (Chazan, 1994 p.  273). 
In a rural context this definition has much in common with the definition of a ‘peasant 
movement’  (mouvement  paysan),  suggested  by  Dominique  Gentil  and  Mari-Rose  Mercoiret 
(Gentil & Mercoiret,  1991  p.  868).  They  mention  five  criteria: 
1) independent  thinking  and  a  certain  financial  autonomy  from the state and  other  external 
funding  sources,  2)  a  set  of  well-defined  objectives (as opposed to the  multipurpose  economic  and 
social activities  of most rural  organisations), 3) interaction  with  government  agencies or other 
societal  actors  (political  parties,  church  organisations,  other  social  movements)  above the village 
level, 4) a  certain size and  economic  and  political  power,  and 5) a well-established  internal 
organisation. 
If  ‘interaction  with  government  agencies  above  the  village  level’ is replaced  by  ‘the  active  attempt 
to influence  decisions by government  agencies’, this defintion comes very  close to the  one 
proposed by Chazan  and  Harbeson”’. 
Civil  society as a set of norms 
Azarya has objected  that this deiinition  contains  a  theoretical  (even  tautological)  problem as civil 
society is both defined  and  explained  by  its  relations to the  state:  “if civil society is defined  by 
its  relationship to the  state,  all  we  can  say is whether it exists or not or what its components  are; 
we cannot say  how it affects state-society  relations”  (Azarya,  1994  p.89).  While this argument 
may  be  plausible, it seems  overly  ambitious  and  theoretically  problematic to develop  a  concept 
that can  both  identify  societal  forces  that  particularly  affect  state-society  relations  and  predict how
these  relations will be  affected,  regardless  of the context. As explained  by  White,  an  approach  that 
does not predict  the  way  various  associations  interact  with e state is more  appropriate to the 
hybrid  character  of  developing  societies  and  allows f r a  more  complete  picture  of the societal 
forces which  obstruct as well as facilitate  particular  outcomes such as e.g. democratisation 
(White,  1996  p. 5). 
Having  said this, Azarya’s  attempt to approach  the  issue  of n o m  guiding societal  forces in their 
interaction  with  the  state  provides  useful  inspiration  for  specific  analyses of what identified  social 
as decisive  to  its  political potentd (Bratton, 1994a  p. 23fl; Bratton & Bingen,  1994 p. 16-17; Ela, 1990 p. 84; 
Several  other  scholars  dealing yith sural organisations ex  licitly  stress  engagement of the  state  by an organisation 
Haubert,  1991 p. 735-736) 
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groups  are  fighting  for.  Azarya  investigates he ‘civility’ of civil  society  and  concludes  that it is 
a set of norms about  collective  responsibility to the common  goods  and  the  positive  values of 
activities  meant  to  safeguard it’”. Civil society,  consequently, is a non-state public realm defned 
by this set of n0nn.s. Positive  values of civility  are  contrasted by  ‘amoral  familism’  described as 
a  set of norms that does  not  attribute  any m o d  relevance to activities  beyond the family  levellZ2 
(Azarya, 1994 p.  90-92).  Civil  society is different  &om  the  state (anon-state realm)  but  legitimacy 
attributed to the public  sphere has positive  implications  for the legitimacy  of the state,  hence  a 
strong civil society  may  enhance the legitimacy of the state (Azarya, 1994 p. 96-97).  Whereas 
civil society in this definition does not refer to a particular empirical part of society, the 
importance of the  concept,  according to Azarya, is its usefulness as a  means  to  identify  societal 
support for collective responsibility  and  action. 
Hyden  has attempted an operationalisation of an idea similar to Azarya’s  thinking in a study 
carried out in Tanzania. He differs &om Azarya,  however, by pointing out that not all forms of 
‘civility’, or ‘social  capital’  as  he calls it1=, are equally  important  to the prospects  for  economic 
and  social  progress in a  given  country. Thus, a  strong  civil  society in the  broad  definition 
suggested  by  Azarya  may  not  necessarily  enhance the legitimacy of the  state.  He  distinguishes 
between three major forms of  social  capital,  viz. ’civic competence’, ‘political authority’ and 
‘social reciprocities ’. Civic  competence,  defined as the perceived  ability to influence  public 
policy  (engage  the  state), is considerably  more  important  than  political  authority,  defined  as  the 
faith in the government to solve the major problems, and social reciprocities, defined as 
investments in social  relations  only at the  local  level. In the study the issue was approached by 
asking three broad sets of questions to various  groups in the Tanzanian  society  (commercial 
farmers,  pen-urban artisans and  traders,  village  farmers  and  women: 1) what  difference  did  they 
see themselves being able to make to the  problems  they  faced? (civic competence) 2) what 
difference did they see government  being  able to make?  (political  authority) 3) what  prospects 
did  they perceive for cooperating  with others to solve  these  problems?  (social 
reciprocities)(Hyden,  1994). 
In order to capture  the  important  distinction  between  norms that encourage an engagement  of  the 
state  and norms that would  rather  lead to strategies of disengagement, it may  be  useful to slightly 
reformulate the three  questions o that the  distinction is made  between 1) what  difference  people 
see themselves being  able to make  by  trying to influence the state (civic competence), 2)  what 
difference  they  see  government  being  able to make  without  their  cooperation (political authority), 
3) what difference they see themselves  being able to make  without  the  cooperation of the 
government (social reciprocities at the  community level). 
12’ ‘Civil’ is used as an  adjective  and  describes  “those who wait  in line for their tum and follow due  process,  having 
strongly internalized the credo ‘not  to  do to others  what  they do not want  done  to  themselves”‘ (Azarya, 1994 p. 90). 
centric, as civility in soclal conduct may be hard to expect III counfnes  with  acute  sbo*ges  and exFeme gaps 
I n  Azarya’s acknowledges, thai these  definitions may be subject to criticism  for  being  problematic,  and  even ethno- 
between  the levels and  aspirations  and  accomphshments. He argues,  however,  that scarc~ty and depnvaQon are 
relative  concepts,  hence there is no necessary  relation  between  absolute  scarcity  and  civility (Azarya,1994 p. 91). 
Social capital is defined as the n m  that one should forgo self- interest  and  act  in the interest of the  community 
or collectivity of which one is a  member  (Hyden, 1994 p. 88). 
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Conclusion 
Discussions in the present  chapter of a  range of contributions  to  theories  about  societal  forces 
have  pointed  out  the l i t a t ions  of trying to establish general  rules  about the character of forces 
that  have  a  particular  political  potential.  While it is suggested  that all social  forces  have  a  certain 
impact on relations  between  state  and  society  through  their  mutual  interaction  and  through  their 
interaction  with  state  representatives,  the  search for forces  with  a  political  project,  i.e.  forces  that 
try to influence the fundamental relationship between state and society, may follow many 
different  paths,  depending on the context. 
Three possible entrance points have  been  identified  to  an  empirical  analysis of societal  forces 
with  a particular political  potential,  namely 
- analyses of class and ethnic relations. 
- studies of the strategies  and  organisational  characteristics of a particular  part  of  the  associational 
scene (‘civil  associations’). 
- studies  of norms guiding the strategies of various  social  groups  with a view to  identify  a 
particular  set of ‘civil norms’. 
The  various  approaches  supplement  each  other,  but it does  not  make sense to try to  link  them  in 
a  coherent  framework. Thus, class and ethnic  identities  prescribe  neither  specific  norms  nor 
specific  actions.  The  actions  and  organisational  characteristics of civil  associations  do  not  directly 
reflect a prevailing  set  of  norms  but  are  very  much  influenced  by  a  range of constraints  facing  the 
organisations.  And  norms - in particular  norms  about  relations  between  state  and  society - can be 
read neither from the combination of identities of specific social agents (class and ethnic 
identities,  affiliation  to certain associations  with  particular  characteristics)  nor  from the actions 
undertaken by the agents  but are much  more  complex  constructs, as also  suggested by Gupta’s 
contribution to the  understanding of perceptions of the  state. 
While it may  be  useful in a specific analysis to apply all three sets  of  perspectives, it should  be 
stressed that they  are far from exhaustive  but  only  provide an indication of a  limited  number of 
possibly relevant  issues. Social identities not explicitly  considered by the three  approaches 
include  i.a.  those  defmed  by  gender,  generation,  religious  affiliation  and  locational  identities  (e.g. 
hometown  groups) that all may  be of a  certain  importance in aparticular empirical  context.  Some 
of these may  be  identified  when  looking  for  ‘civil  associations’,  but  to  the  extent  they do ot live 
up to  the criteria of engaging the state,  while being autonomous  from  the  state,  they  will  not  be 
considered. 
In the Malian case presented  later,  where  a  wide  range of social  cleavages is coexisting,  the 
framework suggested will be used to analyse  cleavages  between  poor  and  better-off  farmers,  to 
analyse the farmers’  movement as a  possible  example  of  a  ‘civil  association’  and  to  look  for  a 
particular  set of ‘civil  norms’  among  farmers in the region. 
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CONCLUSION TO THE THEORETICAL SECTION IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS 
In the  introduction  the  objective  of  the  theoretical  section  was  defined as the  establishment of a 
conceptual  framework  to  analyse  the  differences  in  interaction  between  government  agencies  and 
their  clients as a result of different  pressures  being  exerted  upon  the  respective  agencies. 
Based  on the  hypothesis  that  these  pressures  are  conditioned  both by their  characteristics as being 
part of the  abstract  state, by their  specific  organisational  characteristics  and by the  character of 
the  social forces with  which  they  interact,  three sets of  research  questions  have  guided  the 
theoretical  analysis: 
- how to understand overall state-society relations 
- how to analyse factors conditioning the  performance of government agencies and 
- how to analyse societal forces interacting with and  influencing  government agencies. 
The  first  question  about how to understand  overall state-society relations has been dealt  with in 
chapter I ,  presenting a review of a range  of  contributions to the  understanding of African  state- 
society  relations,  and  in chapter 2, providing a thorough  investigation  of  the  interactive  approach. 
While theories reviewed in chapter 1 contain many valuable insights contributing to the 
understanding  of  state-society  relations,  their  limitations  are  related to  the ‘substantive  theory’ 
character  of  many  contributions.  It  is  considered  theoretically  unsatisfactory  to  postulate  general 
context-independent  relations  between  the  variables  studied  instead  of  establishing a more  open 
conceptual framework that allows analysis of many different outcomes of state-society 
interaction. 
The  interactive  approach  is  considered a fruitful attempt  to  overcome the many  deficiencies of 
theories  about  state  and  society  which  do not sufficiently  take  account of their  mutual  interaction. 
Chapter 2 argues for an  understanding of the  notions of ‘state’  and  ‘society’ as analytically 
separable  but  deeply  interrelated  concepts.  Instead of a priori  perceiving  of  state  and  society 
relations as dominated  either by the state or by societal  forces, it is considered fruitful to analyse 
their  mutual  interaction as being  open to many  different  outcomes.  The  engagement- 
disengagement  framework,  developed by  the interactive  approach, is found to provide a useful 
tool to point out some  main  tendencies in the  way  society  and  state  can  relate to each  other. 
Contrary  to  the  limited  perspective  applied by theories  that  view  state  and  society  relations as a 
zero-sum game where  one has to  lose to let the other  party win, the h e w o r k  opens the 
possibility of a mutual engagement of state and society. It furthermore contributes to an 
understanding of how  actions by  one  party  may  generate  particular  reactions  by  the  other party. 
Whereas  many  theories  about  state  and  society  relations  apply an agency  perspective that make 
t h m  concentrate on strategies  pursued by  various  individuals  and  groups, it is considered  useful 
to  approach the analysis  of  both  state  and  societal  forces  from a structure-oriented  perspective. 
It is  believed that a study  based on structurally  defined  units  of  analysis has considerably  more 
to offer than studies  focussing on agents  (whether  individuals  or  groups)  defined  only  by  their 
strategies. This would  avoid  the  tendency  of  many  theories  about  the  African  state,  particularly 
those  dominating  analyses of states in Francophone  countries,  to  analyse  state-internal  dynamics 
as mainly  determined by actions of individuals  motivated  only by personal  interests. 
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The  interactive  approach  does  not  entirely  solve the last-mentioned  problem, as many 
contributions  tend to concentrate  on  political  interpretations  of  strategies  applied  by  state  and 
societal  actors,  whereas  there is a general  lack  of  reflection  about the influence of structural 
conditions on the ‘choice’  of  strategies. 
Another  problem  related  to  the  interactive  approach is that  the  conceptual  framework  which  it 
offers is very sketchy and does not provide guidelines directly applicable to an empirical 
investigation.  While  the  framework  represents  a  constructive  starting  point f r further  theoretical 
analysis,  it is considered  necessary  to  fill  it  in  by  theories  at  a  lower  level of abstraction  in  order 
to  generate  appropriate  research  questions for empirical  studies. 
The  operationalisation  in chapter 3 of  the  ‘anthropology  of the state’  by  use  of  organisation  theory 
represents such an  attempt to substantiate the framework.  The  chapter  deals  with e second of 
the  three  research  questions  to  the  theoretical  analysis  concerning analysis offactors conditioning 
performance of government agencies. Performance is defined as the ability of agencies to 
accommodate  farmers’  demands. In a particular  study it is suggested  that the issue of demand 
satisfaction is assessed  by  considering  the  frequency of  contacts  between the organisation  and  its 
clients, reliability  of  services,  the  usefulness of services as assessed  by clients and personal 
relations  between front-lie staff  and  clients. 
The  disaggregation of the  state  concept  suggested by the interactive  approach is used as a  point 
of departure for an  analysis of how  agency  performance  depends  on  a  range  of factors outside 
their own control  related to their  role as being  part  of the abstract state as well  as on a  range  of 
organisation-intemal  factors. An approach  suggested by Grindle  and  Hilderbrand is found  to 
provide a  very  useful  overall  framework for the  analysis.  It  makes  it  possible to distinguish 
between  situations  where,  on  the  one  hand,  government  agencies  are  inevitably  doomed to poor 
performance  due to macroeconomic  trends,  lack  of  legitimacy  or  budgetary  constraints,  and,  on 
the other hand, situations where problems generated by general economic, political and 
institutional  problems may  be  overcome at the  level  of  individual  agencies. 
A combination of this approach to contributions dealing with organisation-specific factors 
conditioning  performance  (revised  agency  theory  and  more  recent  contributions  concentrating  on 
work  satisfaction  and  demand  pressure)  suggests  a  step-by-step  investigation  of  three  sets of 
external factors and six organisation-specific  factors.  The  external  factors  regard  ‘the  action 
environment’,  ‘the  public  sector  institutional  context’  and the ‘task network’  of  government 
agencies,  while  the six organisation-specific  factors  include  ‘authority’,  ‘rewards’,  ‘organisational 
identification’,  ‘peer  pressure’,  ‘work  satisfaction’  and  ‘demand  pressure’. 
The framework is directly  applicable to an  empirical  investigation  such as the one  of the four 
Malian  agencies.  By  stressing  the  importance  of  demand  pressures  for  organisational  performance 
it l i s  to the point  by  the  interaction  approach  that  both  societal  and  state-intemal factors have 
to  be  investigated inorder to  understand  the  interaction.  It furthemore has the advantage  that it 
counters the potential  lack  of  consideration  of  structural  factors  by the interactive  approach, as 
these  are  contained in ‘the  action  environment’  and  ‘the  institutional  context  of he public  sector’ 
The danger of applying the framework, however, is that it may lead to an analysis that 
overemphasises  state-intemal  differences  at the expense of the concept  of  state-entity. Uphoff s 
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emphasis  on  legitimacy as a core  variable to analysis  of  performance  is,  therefore,  considered  an 
important  supplement o the structure-oriented  framework  provided  by  Grindle  and  Hilderbrand. 
It calls attention to the fact that government agencies cannot be analysed as autonomous 
organisations that relate  only  to  their own direct  clients.  The  particularity  of  these  agencies  is  that 
they  are both individual  organisations  with  proper  structures,  cultures  and  relations to external 
agents and pat  of a larger  symbolic  totality  or  legitimate  power.  Therefore,  they  do  not  depend 
only on legitimacy  gained  trough  their own interactions  with  societal  groups  but  also on the 
general  legitimacy  of  the state in  the  eyes of the  population. 
The last research  question that concerns  the analysis of societal forces interacting with ana‘ 
influencing  government agencies has  been  dealt  with  in chapter 4. Based  on  discussions  of a 
range  of  contributions to theories  concentrating  on  class  and  ethnical  relations  and  contributions 
to the debate  about  ‘civil  society’,  it is found to be a limitation  that  many  of  these aim at 
establishing  general  rules  about  the  character  of  forces  that  have a particular  political  potential. 
While  it  is  suggested  that ll social  forces  have a certain  impact on relations  between state and 
society though their  mutual  interaction  and through their  interaction  with  state  representatives, 
the search  for  forces  with a political  project, i.e.  forces  that try to influence  the  fundamental 
relationship  between  state  and  society,  may  follow many different  paths,  depending on the 
context.  Three  possible  entrance  points  are  identified  to  an  empirical  analysis  of  societal  forces 
with a particular  political  potential,  namely 1) analyses  of  class  and  ethnic  relations, 2) studies 
of  strategies  and  organisational  characteristics  of a particular pa t  of  the  associational  scene  (‘civil 
associations’),  and 3) studies  of  norms  guiding  the  strategies o fvarious  social  groups  with a view 
to identify a particular  set  of  ‘civil’  norms. 
The three approaches  are  considered  complementary  rather han mutually  exclusive, and it should 
be  stressed  that  they are not  fully  covering  the  analysis  of  all  potentially  important  social  forces. 
Together the approaches form a conceptual b e w o r k  that generates a series of relevant 
questions  to an empirical  investigation,  but  they  do  not  capture the multiplicity  of  identities  that 
are  at  play  in a particular  empirical  context. 
Implications for the empirical  analysis 
It is the  empirical  objective  of  the  dissertation to illustrate and further  explore  the  theoretical 
fiamework  sketched  above  by  identifying  explanations  for  the  different  experience  of  interaction 
between  farmers in the Sikasso region  and four extension  agencies  that  all  refer  to  the  same 
government ministry. 
The  empirical  objective is dealt  with by studying  pressures  put on street-level  bureaucracies in 
each  of  the four agencies  and  by  assessing how these  pressures  affect  the  performance  of  the 
agencies  (i.e.  their  ability to accommodate  farmers’  demands). 
Subsequently this analysis  is  put in perspective  by an analysis  of  the  character  of  the  social’  forces 
in the Sikasso region  that  interact  with  and  influence  the  four  agencies. 
The research questions derived  from  the  theoretical  framework  are as follows: 
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1) Is the  Malian  action  environment  dysfunctional  to  development i  the sense that government 
agencies  are  doomed  to  poor  performance,  regardless  of  their  various  organisation-specific 
characteristics? 
2) Is the institutional  context  of  the  public  sector  in  Mali  dysfunctional  to  development? 
3) What are the  constraints  imposed  on  government  agencies  by the task network? 
4) For  each  of  the  four  agencies  under  study:  what  are their characteristics  with  regard  to the six 
performance-conditioning  factors:  authority,  rewards,  organisational identificatioqpeer pressure, 
work  satisfaction  and  demand  pressure? 
5 )  To what  extent  are  the  agencies  able to accommodate  farmers’  demands? 
6 )  What is the  economic,  social  and  political  context of the Sikasso  region? 
7) What  are  the  societal  forces of particular  importance in the  Sikasso  region? 
The hypotheses guiding  the  empirical  analysis can be formulated as follows: 
1) in an  empirical  analysis  of  the  interplay  between  extension  agencies  and  farmers in the Sikasso 
region  it is necessary  to  study  both  parties.  Farmers  cannot  be  seen  as  reacting  only to initiatives 
taken by  government  agencies,  but  societal  dynamics in the firming community  (the  mutual 
interaction of farmers) are important conditioning factors for their strategies. Similarly, 
government  agencies  respond  to  farmers’  strategies  to a certain  extent  but  their  ways of relating 
to farmers  also  very  much  depend  on  ‘state-internal  factors’. 
2) As the  state  is  both  an  abstract  symbolic  totality  and  a set of  specific  agencies,  ‘state-internal 
factors’ are both factors  shared by ali parts  of the state and  organisation-specific  factors of its 
individual  agencies.  Among  the  shared  factors, the overall  legitimacy of the state is the  most 
important  because  the  state,  and  thereby its agencies,  depend  on  a  certain  amount of legitimacy 
in the eyes  of  the  population  in  order to be  sustained. 
3) Ifthe action  environment  and  the  institutional  context of the  public  sector are not completely 
dysfunctional to development,  organisational-internal factors in individual  agencies to a  certain 
extent  can  compensate for problems in the environment  shared  by  the  agencies. 
4) Organisation-specific  factors  conditioning  performance  tend to reinforce  each  other  and, 
therefore, it is iiiely that several  of  the  performance-encouraging  factors  are  present in better- 
performing  organisations,  whereas  poorly  performing  organisations  are  generally  characterised 
by  the  absence  of  most  of  the  factors. This does not imply  that all conditions  need  to be present 
for an  organisation to perform  well,  but  only  that  one  factor  cannot  be  expected to compensate 
for the iack of all the rest. 
5 )  Although  organisational  structures  cannot  be  considered  the  single  most  important  factor or 
the performance  of an organisation, the mechanical  model,  constituting the basic  organisational 
feature of the four  agencies  under study, has a set of characteristics  which can be expected to 
negatively  influence  their  performance. Thus, the  agencies  can  be  expected  to  lack  the  flexibility 
necessary to respond to the complex  and  rapidly  changing  conditions  characterising rural African 
settings in general  and  the  recent  social  turbulence  in the Sikasso  region in particular. 
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6 )  Despite its limitations, the mechanical  model  can  develop in many  different  directions.  It is 
possible  for  the  model to move  beyond  the  mechanical  stage  by  incorporating  some  degree  of 
learning  from  clients  and sM. 
7) When  analysing  societal  forces,  many  identities are at play,  and it will  only  be  possible to 
identify  some  of  the  politically  most  important  by  looking  for  ‘civil  associations’,  ‘civil norms’
and  by canying out an analysis  of  class  and  ethnical  relations. 
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SECTION 11: EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS 
SECTION 11: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
Guided  by  the  hypotheses  presented  in  the  conclusion  to  the  theoretical  section,  the  structure  of 
the  empirical  analysis is as follows: 
Chapter 5 presents an analysis  of  the  ‘action  environment’  of  Malian  government  extension 
agencies,  i.e.  the  degree  of  political  stability  and  legitimacy  of  the  government,  the  rate  and 
structure of economic  growth,  and  the  human  resource  profile  of  the  country. 
The next step in the  analysis of the  shared  environment of the agencies is an assessment  in 
chapter 6 of  ‘the  institutional  context  of the public  sector’, This includes  an  assessment of the 
budgetary  support  which  significantly  influences  the  capacity  of  the  public  sector  through  its 
impact  on  salary  levels and  funding  for  other  recurrent  costs  and  capital  investments.  Other 
aspects  regard  the  overall  institutional  set-up  of the public  sector, its management  practices  and 
existing  structures  of  formal nd  informal  influence. 
Chapter 7 and chapter 8 provide  the  background  for  analyses  in  chapter 9, 10 and 11 of the 
interaction between extension agencies and farmers in Sikasso. Chapter 7 gives a general 
description of the  agro-ecological  and  socioeconomic  setting in the Sikasso region,  while  chapter 
8 deals with  ongoing  social  and  political  changes in the region. 
While the  shared  environment  of  the  agencies  is  analysed  in  chapter 5 and 6, chapter 9 contains 
a thorough  analysis  of  organisational-specific  factors  which  condition he performance of each 
of the four  agencies.  Based  on  the  conceptual  framework  established  in  chapter 3, the  analysis 
considers  six  main  issues,  viz.  authority,  rewards,  organisational  identification,  peer  pressure, 
work satisfaction by staff, and  demand  pressure.  The  chapter opens by a brief  portrait of the 
Ministry  of Rural Development  and  Environment  describing  the  ‘task  network’  of  the  four 
agencies  under  study,  i.e.  relations  of  collaboration  and  coordination  between  the  agencies. 
Chapter l 0  presents  fanners’  assessment  of  services  provided  by  the  agencies.  Based  on a village 
survey  in  ten  villages  in  the Sikasso region,  the  chapter  assesses  the  degree  of  demand  satisfaction 
by different groups  of  farmers.  The  analysis  considers  frequency  and  distribution  of  contacts 
between agencies  and  farmers,  reliability of services,  fanners’  assessment of the usefulness of 
services,  and  their  description of personal  relations  between  extension  agents  and  their  clients. 
Providing a wider  perspective  on  the  analysis  of  agency  performance,  the  final ch pter I1 deals 
with  some  of the societal  forces  interacting  with  and  influencing  the  agencies  working in the 
region.  Based on the  conceptual  framework  established in chapter 4, an  analysis  of  the  farmers’ 
movement SYCOV is  carried  out  to see if it  corresponds  to  the  definition  of a ‘civil  association’. 
The existence  of a particular  set  of  ‘civil  norms’ i  discussed  in  light  of  answers  obtained  in  the 
village  survey.  Finally,  an  analysis  of  possible  class-based  identities  is  carried  out. 
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CHAPTER 5. MALI: THE  ACTION  ENVIRONMENT 
Introduction 
This chapter aims at  assessing  the  so-called  ‘action enviroment’ of  Malian  government  extension 
agencies, i.e. the degree  of  political  stability  and  legitimacy  of  the  government, the rate and 
structure of economic  growth,  and the human  resource  profile of the  country. 
As discussed in chapter 3, the  performance  of  public  sector  organisations can be significantly 
affected  and  even  hampered by conditions  in  the action environment that individual agencies are 
unable to  control  or  influence.  The  portrait n the  following of the context shared  by the four 
agencies provides the basis for assessing  whether the action  environment  is so detrimental to 
public  sector  performance  that  the  agencies  are  doomed  to poor performance,  regardless of their 
various organisation-specific  characteristics  and  their  relations to clients.  According to Grindle 
and Hilderbrand, this will be the  case  if the action  environment is characterised  by  extensive 
social conflict,  economic  stagnation  and low levels of human  resource  development. 
5.1. Degree of political  stability  and  legitimacy of government 
The  democratic  regime was newly  established  at  the  time  when  the  study of he  four  agencies  was 
carried out, and the  present  political  situation is difficult to assess without  understanding  the 
heritage itom former  political  regimes.  Furthermore,  memories in Afiica  reach many years  back, 
and the legitimacy of a  government  will  be  strongly  affected  by  the  experience  the  population  has 
had  with  the state in the past. 
In the following, therefore,  a  brief  review of former  political  regimes is given as the  background 
for the analysis of the  present  political  situation.  The  review  serves  at  the  same  time s a h storical 
background to the  description  in  section 5.2. of the  economic  structure of the county. 
Pre-colonial  history’24 
The m a  today known as Mali  has  been  populated at least since 7000 BC. The  establishment in 
200 BC of the city Jenni on  the  bank of the  river  Niger  marked  the  beginning  of an era where  the 
area played  a  prominent  role  not  only i  the  West  African  region  but  also in relations  among  West 
Africa  and  Arabic  and  European  countries.  During  a  period of 2,100 years  (until the French 
colonisation), the  great  empires  and  trading  centres  of  the Mali area  ranged among the most 
important on the African  continent.  The  greatest  and  most famous empires  were the Ghana 
* T h e  brief  historical  overview of the years p r e m g  the  French  colonisation  is  based on my articles in Den  Store 
Danske Encvkloudi (‘The D a s h  Encyclo  &a’ on  the Mall kmgdom, the Ghana kingdom,  the K m  kmgdom, 
the M a c k  kingdom, th? Segou kin dom, R L  ansa usa, J m C ,  DJenne, Gao, French Sudan, French  West  Afiica 
(A.O.F),  the Mali federatmn  and . Important references  include Mann, 1996; McKissack 1994; Imperato, 1986; 
Gaudio,1988; de Benoist, 1989; Joseph, 1974;  Thompson & Adloff,  1958;  Stride & Ifeka,  1971. 
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kingdom’25 (approx. 300-1255 AD), the Mali kingdom‘26 (approx. 1235-1500 AD) and the 
Songhay kir~gdom’~’ (approx. 800-1580 AD). They  were all characterised  by  a  highly  centralised 
organisation,  and  their  enormous  wealth  were  based on extraction  of  gold,  agricultural  production 
on the banks  of  Niger  and  control  of  the  cross-Saharan  trade  of  gold,  salt,  slaves  and  commodities 
such as textiles. All the kingdoms  were  cultural and educational  centres  with  close  links  to  the 
Islamic  world. Also more  recent  and  smaller  kingdoms  such as the Kaarta kingdom  (approx. 
1650-1854),theStgoukingdom(approx.1600-1862),theTukulorkingdom(approx. 1852-1889), 
the  Macina  kingdom  (approx. 1810-1862) and the K6n6dougou  kingdom  (approx. 1650-1898) 
played  an  important  role in the West  African  region. 
The colonial period (1890-1960) 
The  French  colonisation i  the  end of the 19th century  marked the end  of  the  era of great  empires 
and the beginning  of  a  period  where  areas hitherto divided in competing  kingdoms  were  made 
part  of  the  same  administrative  unit.  After  several  years of fighting  the area in 1890 became  a 
French colony under the name of French Sudan. Resistance against the French, however, 
continued for another 25 years,  and  only  around 1916 had the French  achieved an  effective 
control  of the areal2* (de  Benoist, 1989  p.93-94). 
In 1895 French  Sudan  became  part  of  a  federation  including  a  total of eight  French  colonies  called 
1’Afrique-Occidentale  Franqaise (A.O.F)I2’. Under  a  Governor-General  based in Dakar,  each 
colony  was  headed  by  a  governor.  The  system  was  highly  centralised:  only the Minister of 
Colonies in Paris could issue laws,  and no governor  had  direct  access to  the Minister,  except 
through  the  Governor-General in Dakar  (Crowder 1978 p. 235-237). French  Sudan  was  divided 
into 17 ‘cercles’  headed  by  a  French  colonial official (‘le commandant’)  and  further  subdivided 
into  ‘cantons’  each  headed  by a ‘chef  de  canton’.  The  chefs  de  canton,  who  were  usually  recruited 
among  existing local leaders (e.g.  members  of  royal  families),  were  delegated  such  tasks as 
recruitment of forced  labourers  and  soldiers,  collection  of taxes and  report  of  miscreants  to  the 
The  Ghana  kingdom  covered  of the  area  today known as Mali,  Mauritania  and  Guinea-Conalay.  At  the time 
ofwhen it  disintegrated  in  the  md-13th  century,  the  capital,  Koumbi  Saleh, is believed to have had approx.  15,000 
inhahitants,  while the army  counted 200,000 men. 
Mauritanm m the north to part of today’s  Niger to the east, while also covering  Guinea-Conakry, art of  Gumea- 
Bissau,  Sierra  Leone  and  C& d‘Ivore. By  1300 AD, the Malt hgdom was  the  pnme  exporter o P gold  to  Europe 
and the Arabic  world. 
it  covered  parts  of  the  countries  now own as Mali, Mauritania,  Senegal,  Guinea-Conakry,  Guinea-Bissau,  Sierra 
”’ The  Songhay  kingdom was the 1 est of them  all.  Under the rule of Askia  Muhammad  in  the  late  15th  century, 
Leone, CXte  d‘Ivoire, Burkina  Faso,  Benin,  Niger and Nigeria 
to the  French  and  allow  the installation of  a  French prison. After a  siege of two weeks,  the KCnedougou  kmgdom 
In 1898  a major battle  of Sikasso was  caused  by  the,refusal by  the  king  of the K6nCdougou  kingdom  to pay tax 
had to surrender  to the French as the last of the Mall? e g d o m s  on 1 May  1898.  In the BClCdougou area north of 
Bamako  and the Dogon area  there  were  several U nsmgs against  the  French  in  the b e g b i i g  of the  centruy. A 
Tuareg  uprising  agatnst the French III Febnmy P 916 lasted about 3-4 months,  before the French  managed  to 
suppress It (de  Benoist,  1989  p. 94; Gaudio,  1988  p.85-92). 
In addition to French Sudan the members  of  A.O.F.  were  Senegal,  Mauritania,  French Guinea (Guinea-conalay), 
Niger,  C&e  d’lvoire,  Dahomey  (Benm)  and  Upper  Volta  (Burkina  Faso). 
126 golden  age  during the 14th century AD, the Mali kingdom  stretched  from the coast of Senegal in the west, 
”E,
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admini~tration”~. Their generally  unpopular  tasks  and  their  frequent  abuse  of  power  created  a 
considerable discontent among  village  populations  and  seriously  challenged the legitimacy  of 
local chiefsi3’ (Crowder  1978 p.  216-219;  Gellar  et  al.,  1990  p.  9-10). 
The  main  economic interest of the  French in the  colonies  was to ensure the production of cash 
crops  for  export to France. To make  the  population  produce  such  crops,  all  adult  men  and  women 
were  subject o heavy  direct  taxation.  Until  the  introduction  in the 1950s  of  cotton,production  for 
industrial proce~singl~~, seasonal  migration  to the more  fertile  coastal  colonies,  notably  to  Cate 
d’Ivoire,  provided  the  only  opportunity  to  earn  cash  for  tax  payment for the population in a  poor 
and  landlocked  colony  such as French Sudan. In addition  to  payment  of  taxes,  the  colonial  regime 
mainly made itself felt by the population by the introduction of forced recruitment to 
the  French  army  during the wars’34,  and  compulsoly  crop  cultivation  (Crowder  1978  p.  237-238). 
Until the second World War, French  investments in physical  and  social  infrastructure  were 
negligible. As only  areas  that  had  potential for growing  cash  crops  or had mineral  resources  were 
opened  up by roads and  railways,  the  resource-poor  French  Sudan  was  generally  neglected. As 
to the  financing of social  infrastructure such as schools,  hospitals  and  safe  water,  the  colonial 
regime  only  provided  what  could  be  paid for by taxes,  customs  and excise duties in the colony 
itself  without  transferring  money  from  France.  Only  during  the  last  decade  of  the  colonial  period, 
the  French  increased  investments  in  the  colonies  by  transferring  substantial  amounts  from  France 
(Crowder, 1978 p.  244-250;  de  Benoist, 1989 p.  98-99;  Young,  1988  p.  45;  Chazan  et  al.  1992 
p. 235). 
The socialist regime of Modibo  Keita (1960-1968) 
In June 1960 French Sudan obtained  independence  ffom  France  in  a  federation  with  Senegal. 
When  the  federation  was  soon  after  dissolved,  the  independent  republic of Mali  was  proclaimed 
on 22 September  1960  (Gaudio,  1988 p. 101-198). 
Kirk-Greene argues that the  difference between the British  direct  rule  and the French indirect  rule  was  a  matter  of 
’” Contributing to the controversy  over differenw and  similarities  between the  British and  French  colonial  systems, 
kind  rather than de Although also the  French  system was based on the  inclusion  of  local  chiefs,  the  chiefs  often 
had the  role of a s u E d m t e  ‘fonctionnaire’  in the  administrative  structures  and  had  lost  their  traditional fu ctions 
of justice,  policing  and  administerin  the  government of their  peo  le On the  contrary,  the  British  system  was  based 
on the  safeguarding by  District 0 2 lcers  of  the  position  and augonty of the chiefs  (Kirk-Greene,  1995 p.  16-19). 
The  dependence also by the French  on  local  chiefs is illustrated  by  the  limited  number of French  colonial  officers 
in  the  vast  territory of French Sudan. Thus,  %e total  number of French  administrators  in  the  areas  today known as 
Mali  and  Burkina  Faso  made  up  a  mere  158 m 1905  and  281 in 1914  (de  Benoist,  1989  p.  95). 
‘l1 According to Crowder, the French  were  much less concerned  about  le ‘timac of local  chiefs  than  the  British. 
The aDDOintment of a  chief was often  based on his abiitv to admister in # a y  e mo em sense. mticularlv his  abilitv 
to s p a  French.  Hence,  an  old  soldier or retired clerk  would  often  be  preferred to an  &efficient,  $iterate b;t 
legitimate  chief  (Crowder,  1978  p.  213-215). 
A  local  cotton  industry  had  existed in Mali  for  centuries  before  the  French  introduced  the  production of c tton 
In A.O.F. all  able-bodied  men  between  18  and 50 years  had  to  provide  ten  days of labour  every  year for roads 
for  industrial  processing. 
construction  and  maintenance  (Crowder  1978  p.  238). 
Between  1914  and  1918 a  total of41,357 men h m  French Sudan were  sent to fight  for  France,  and  again  during 
World  War I1 a  forced  recruitment of soldiers  took  place  (de  Benoist,  1989  p.  95, p.  105). 
88 
The  radical  wing that dominated  president  Modibo  Keita’s  party,  US-RDA’35,  embarked  upon  a 
socialist  strategy  inspired by Eastern  Europe  and  the  Soviet  Union.  With the aim of  decreasing 
dependence on  France,  relations to these  countries  were  extended.  The  regime  forged  a  highly 
centralised  form  of  government  and  established  a  wide  range  of  parastatals  to  control  import  and 
export of commodities as well as all  sectors  of  the  economy.  The  agricultural  policy  was  based 
on the encouragement  of  cooperatives  and  the  establishment  of  state  corporations for management 
and  marketing of agricultural  produce.  Producer  prices  were  kept  below  world  market  prices,  and 
food prices for urban consumers were kept A one-party system was established, and the 
influence  of  the  party  on  the  state  gradually  increased.  All  organisations  such as trade  unions  and 
youth  organisations  were  controlled by the  party. 
Despite a  certain  economic  assistance  from  Eastern  Europe,  China  and the Soviet Union, the 
Malian  economy  rapidly  deteriorated.  Growing staff numbers  and  incompetent  management  of 
the  many  parastatals  resulted in serious drain in public  finances, the agricultural  production 
stagnated,  and  the  decision  by  the  government to withdraw  from  the  franc  zone  and  establish  its 
own currency had severe  negative  trade  implications  (Gaudio,  1988  p.  108-109;  de  Benoist,  1989 
p.  120-125;  Amselle & Gregoire,  1987  p.  27-34;  Pedler,  1979  p.  163-168; Imperato,  1989 p. 58- 
62; D i d ,  1990  p.  13-20). 
During this period,  strategies  of  social  control  relied  heavily  on  ideological  mobilisation ('acari
socialism’) through national  and  party  identification  and affiliati~n’~’. The government 
bureaucracy  constituted  the  core  of  the  political  basis of the regime,  and  important  alliances 
existed  between  bureaucratic  and  private  trading  interests  which in many cases  were  embodied 
in the very  same per~ons’~’. 
Part of the  peasant  community  could  be  counted as at  least  half-hearted  supporters of the regime 
during its first  years. This support  soon  faded  when  government  policies  became  increasingly 
exploitative  and  repressive  (e.g.  forced  marketing  of  cereal  production at low  government-fixed 
prices,  forced  cultivation  of  collective  fields,  and  restrictions  on  the  free  movement  of the rural 
population).  Independence  had  followed a period  of  relative  prosperity  for the rural  population 
who  expected further increase  of  wealth  during  the  new  regime.  Frustrated  by  deteriorating 
economic  and  political  conditions,  the rural population  reacted  by  disengagement strategies such 
as black m a k h g  of agricultural  produce,  concentration  on  subsistence  crops,  changing  the  mix 
US-RDA stands for Union Soudanaise-Rassemblement Dhocratique Africain. 
Thus, tpms of M e  have g e n J y  been  unfavourable  to  the rural population,  resultin in  what  has  been calid ‘the 
13‘ The Malian  agricultural  poli did  not  differ from that of the  majority of African regimes during this eriod. 
squeenng of  the anw’. A  wide  range of other  measures  to  control the a g r i c u l d  production has included i.a. 
establishment oE-odity production  schemes,  close  monitoring of farmers by ovemment  extension  services, 
state-sponsored rural organisation,  e.g. in the form of Cooperatives  and  imposition o f ,one-p structures on village- 
level  organisations (e.g.  Boone,  1994;  Bates,  1981;  Bratton,  1994a;  Gentil,  1986; Ela, 19%: 
According to a  classification of regime  types  suggested by  Chazan et al., the  Keita  regime  can be portrayed as 
a  ‘party-mobdising  regime’  characterised by a  strong  one-party  domination with centralisation of power  around the 
leader of the  party  coupled  with  bureaucratic  expansion  (Chazan  et l. 1992 p.  142-144). 
over  economic  and  political power as a  classical example o ? & l r y  between  merchant and bureaucratic ‘fraci~ons 
mterpretation  differs from the most often quoted anal es of post-independence Mali  which  see the strugle 
of the dominating  class’,  eventually  won  by  the  bureaucratic  nomenklatura  (Meillassaoux  1970,  Amselle  1985, 
Amselle & Grdgoire  1987, B yogo  1987;  Cisse  et al., 1981). For a  critical  discussion of the contribution by 
Amselle,  see  Morice, 1987 p . 3  
l38 ’ 
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of crops, switching to other income strategies including out-migration of rural areas and 
maintenance of parallel  political  structures at village 
While the discontent of the rural  population did  not constitute  a  serious threat to the continued 
existence of the regime, the undermining by the  economic crisis of its political  basis  among 
urban-based  groups  turned  out  to  be  fatal.  Certain  of  these  groups  were h d  hit by the decision 
to  establish an inconvertible  Malian  currency,  and  many  did  not  receive  what  they  believed to  be 
a fair share of the revenue  from  the  rapidly  expanding  government  sector. In November 1968 a 
group ofyoung officers  made  an  end  to  Keita’s  regime  (Coulibaly,  1994  p.20;  Soke,  1990 p.  9- 0; 
Coulibaly,  1987 p. 68-69,  p.  73). 
The military  regime of Moussa  Traork  (1968-1991) 
The leader of the coup,  Moussa Traori, became the new president of Mali. In many  ways the 
strategy of the new  regime  was  similar  to that of  the  Keita  regime  with e only  exception that 
the state was now  controlled by the  military. In 1974  a  new  party,  UDPM140,  was  established, 
while all other parties  remained  illegal.  By  1979  a  gradual  return to civilian rule  under the 
military-sponsored  party  was  initiated.  UDPM  soon  achieved  a  total  control f all organisations 
in society fIom the village to the  central  level  (Coulibaly,  1994 p.  23-24;  Fay, 1995 p.  20-22; 
Imperato, 1989 p.  64-79). 
While relations to China  and  the  Soviet  Union  were  maintained, relations to France  and other 
western countries were improved, and Mali became a major recipient of international 
development  assistance. This, however,  did  not  prevent  the  outbreak of a  serious  economic crisis 
in the late  1970s:  the  steady  rise n the  number  of  public  sector  employees,  initiation of large  and 
ambitious public  projects,  a  drought  period in the  early  1970s,  deteriorating  terms of trade and 
widespread  corruption  eventually  forced the regime  in  1981  to  accept the demand  by  the  World 
Bank  and IMF that  a  structural  adjustment  programme  was  initiated.  During the 1980s the crisis 
continued as the  country  was  hit by a  new  drought  in  1984,  while at the same time  international 
cotton  prices  declined.  Gradually  the  influence of the  Bretton  Woods  institutions on the  economic 
policy  became visually absolute,  and an extensive  programme  of  privatisation,  liberalisation and
public  sector  cuts  was  initiated  (Gaudio,  1988 p.  110-113; EIU, 97  p.  48-49;  Founou-Tchuigoua, 
1989 p.  26-28 andp. 36-40;  Diarrah,  1990  p.  95-125,  p.  170-180;  Cisse et al., 1981 p.  139-145). 
During its first years the regime was able to maintain a certain political stability through 
bargaining  relations  and  a  widespread  distribution  of  state  resources  primarily  to  urban-based  elite 
groups.  At  the  surface main policy  decisions  seemed  to  be  centralised  around  the  leader,  Moussa 
139 In a  few  cases fanners also  participated in overt pro!es’s such as e.g.  ‘the  revolt  of  Ou6lessebougou’ in 1968 when 
farmers  confronted the regime in an  alliance  with  pnvate  traders.  Such  protests,  however,  were  exceptions to the
general  rule of clandestine  and  hidden  resistance  (Soke,  1990  p.  9-10).  For  a furuler description of the  ways  found 
by A 6 i m  farmers to eyade  some ofthe adverse  consequences  of  governmentpolmes,  see  e.g.  Bates,  1981  p. 82-87;
Hyden, 19838 6-15; Eh, 1990  p.  164-169. Fora, description  of  the  varipus  everyday  forms  of  resistence’  (Scott, 
1985), inch mg ndlculimg  government  authontles III songs and oral hlstones,  refusal to participate in meetings 
visitingtheir villages, @c:, see E 4  1990  p.  155,  p.  159-163;  Bratton, 1994ap. 245.Comi  Toulabor  has  described 
called  by  government representa~ves, rem to send  children  to  school,  use  of  witchcraft to chase  away  state agents 
an  urban  coun art to this in the form  of a  language  of  political  stultification used by the  young  population  in  Lom6 
(Toulabor, 19% 
UDPM stands for  Union Dhocratique du Peuple  Malien. 
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Traore,  and his advisors,  but in practice  leaders of key  interest  groups  such as ethnic,  regional, 
class  and  occupational  groups  took  an  active  part in policy making141. 
The  rural  population  was  poorly  represented in the various  arrangements  made  to  ensure a certain 
representation of key interests in society. This was reflected in a continuation and even 
intensification  of  the  policy  by the former  regime  of  extracting the largest  possible  surplus from 
the rural sector. Thus, farmers’  purchasing  power  rapidly  declined  during the 1 9 7 0 ~ ’ ~ ~ ,  and from 
1977 to 1981 the government pursued a much-hated policy of forced sale of millet to a 
government  monopoly agency’”.  Like in the previous  period,  farmers  reacted  mainly b  silent 
forms  of  resistence,  notably  by selliig their  produce at parallel  markets  (i.e. to private  traders  and 
across the boarders)I4  (Cisse et al., 1981 p. 58-59,  p.  85-96;  Coulibaly,  1994 p. 21; Jonckers, 
1987  p.  192). 
When in the early 1980s the economic crisis became manifest, and international financial 
institutions  forced  the  regime to change  its  economic  strategy, it had important  consequences  for 
its political  basis.  The rural population  experienced  a  substantial  improvement of their living 
conditions as the economic  liberalisation  allowed  them  to  obtain  better  prices  for  the  agricultural 
produce.  At the same  time the transfer of certain tasks from government  structures to party- 
dominated  village  associations  contributed to a gradual strengthening  of  hitherto  powerless 
peasant  organisations  (Coulibaly  1994 p.  27). 
Many  urban  groups,  on  the  other  hand,  suffered  from  generally  harshening  conditions.  While 
privatisation  and  price  liberalisations  paved the way for new  income  sources  for some elite 
groups,  other  groups  such as artisans, hawkers,  students,  unemployed  graduates,  many  public 
sector  employees  and  what is often  referred to as ‘the  urban  poor’ were hard hit by the new 
economic  policies. 
Certain  attempts  were  made to include  urban  groups  such as trade unions and  private  trading 
interests in negotiations  with IMF, but  they  generally  failed,  and  an  immense  discontent  was 
spreading  among  former  supporters  of  the  regime.  Students  were  the  first to openly  protest  against 
the  regime:  the  first  public  manifestations  took  place  already in 1977, and throughout the 1980s 
confrontations  between  students  and  government  authorities  became  increasingly  frequent  and 
violent.  While in the  beginning  their  demands  were  defined by relatively  narrow  interests in 
improving  their own conditions (e.g. increase of  government  grants,  improved  working  conditions 
The military regime  at  least  in tsFtial p*e (1968-1  982)  exposed  characteristiics V ~ I Y  similar  to  those  described 
by  Chazan  et  al. as typlcal  for  ‘admnnstratwe-hegemontc  regmes’(Chazan et a1 1992 p.  137-140). 
According  to  calculations  made by Cise et al., the  price  of  agricultural  equipment  increased  by an annual average 
of 30.96%  during the years  1967-1977,  whereas m the same  period  producer  prices  for  a,gricultura!  products 
increased  by  a  mere  0.2% per  year (Cise et al., 1981 p.  58-59, see also p. 96 on the contnbubon by agnculbe to 
the  government  budget). 
143 Duringphe  period of forced  millet sales, each village  was  given  a  production quota to fuliill, regardless  of its own 
monopoPy  agency, OPAM (Office de Produrnon Agncole du  Mali).  !‘he  policy  caused  conslderable  losses  for 
consum t’on needs.  The  army  was  used to oyersee e t  agriculb?l roduce was sold only to the  government 
price. In certain  cases the policy  even  led to starvabon  (Coulibaly,  1994  p.  21;  Jonckers,  1987 p.  192). 
fanners who  often  had to purchase the same  amount of grain during the famme  months but now  at  a  much higher 
In 1978-1979  illegal  markets  are  believed to have  accounted  for an estimated 6Ooh of all  grain sales (Cisse et  al., 
1981  p.  89). 
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in  educational  institutions,  access  to  employment i  the public  sector),  they  gradually  formulated 
broader  political  demands,  partly as a  reaction to  the repression  by  government  authorities. 
Around  1989-90  students  were joined by  what had hitherto  been  considered the ‘official’  trade 
union of the regime, UNTMI4’, and when in 1990 a Tuareg revolt broke out in the the 
regime  came  under  a  pressure  that it  could  not  stand.  With  students i  he  forefront  and  the  active 
support  by trade  unions, the emerging  democratic  movement,  unemployed  graduates as well as 
other  urban  poor,  demonstrations  developed  into  a  public  uprising n March  1991,  and  eventually 
army  and  security  forces  arrested T m r i  (Courrier de la Plankte  no. 23,  1994  p.  33-34;  Francois, 
1982  p.  22;  Fay,  1995  p.  25-30;  Sveinall & Hardeberg,  1997  p.  21-25). 
The democratic regime after 1991 
Events  leading  to the change of regime in March 1991 were  very violent:  an  estimated  180-300 
people  lost  their  lives and about a h u s a n d  were  injured  when armed forces fired into the crowd 
of demonstrating pe~ple’~’(Jeune &que  no.  1664,  1992  p.  29). In the immediate  aftermath  of 
the  turbulent  days  22-26  March,  violence  continued  in  the  form  of  destruction of public  and 
private  property’48  and  persecution  of  the  most  hated  representatives  of  the  former  regime’49. 
Soon  after,  however,  peace  was  installed. A transitional  government  including both military  and 
civilians was formed,  and  in  July  and  August  1991 a national  conference was held to draft a  new 
constitution  and  prepare the transition  to  democracy.  The new constitution  was  approved  by  a 
referendum in January 1992,  municipal  elections were held  the same month, legislative  elections 
were  held in February  and March and  presidential  elections  took  place in March  and  April  1992. 
Although voter participation was very limited even for an AfXcan co~ntry’’~, international 
observers  assessed  that  the  elections  were h e  and fair. ADEMA, one  of  the  leading  forces in the 
democratic  movement  obtained  74  of 116 seats in parliament  and  formed a majority  coalition 
government.  The party’s candidate,  Alpha 0. Konark,  was  elected  president  (Nzouankeu,  1993 
p.  46-47;  Bertrand,  1992  p.9-22;  Vengroff,  1993  p.  549-560). 
Since 1991 the freedom of speech  and the freedom  of  association have allowed the creation  of 
a  wide  range  of  new  associations,  interest  groups and political  parties’”.  The  media  are  playing 
a  critical  role  in  the  democratic  process:  by  the  mid-1990s  Mali had no  less than eight  nationwide 
’” UNTM stands for Union Nationale  des  Travailleurs Miens.  
In 1990  Algeria  expelled  a  large  number  of  refugees,from  previous ris ng  by the Tuareg  population in 1916  and 
1963,  and senous unrest  broke  out m the  northern  reglons of Gao,  Tnnbouctou  and  Kidal.  See  also  below. 
I+’ The  turbulent days 22-26  March  1991 are still  referred to as ‘les  kvenements’. 
Total  losses  during  the  month of March  1991 are estimated to have  amounted 30 billion  CFA  @rabo,  1993b  p. 
81). 
Certain  custom  officers,  forestry  agents  and  policemen were subject to the so-called  ‘article  320’  where  300 
indicated the price of petrol  and 20 the  price of a box of matches  (Le  Roy,  1992  p.  139). 
‘”From  an initial 40%  during  the  referendum in January, voter  articipation  went  down  to  20% in the second  round 
ofthe presidential  elections m April  1992 pianah, 1996 p.8287). 
month, 45 at  the time  of the national  conference  and  about 80 in late  1997  (Jjertrand,  1992  p.  13;  Sveinall & 
Is’ From the existence of a  mere  three  political  parties in March  1991,  the  number  rapidly  grew to 14  after  one 
Hardeberg,  1997 p.38). 
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independent radio stations  and  eight  provincial  stations,  while  dozens  of  independent  newspapers 
have  appeared since 1991 (Ska-, 1994 p.  310-318;  Josserand & Bingen,  1995  p.  34-45). 
With the important  exception  of  violations  of  human  rights  committed  by  army  forces during the 
Tuareg  conflict  until  early  1996’”  (Amnesty  International,  1994),  the  Malian  government  respects 
the integrity of  the person, civil liberties  and  political  rights  such  as  freedom  of  speech,  press, 
assembly  and  association ( U S  Department  of  State,  1997).  During  1997,  however,  a  series  of 
events in relation  to  new  presidential  and  legislative  elections  discredited  the  generally  positive 
image  of the Malian  democracy. Thus, political  unrest  resulted in the  arrest  of many opposition 
activists and journalists of  whom  some  have  been  subject to ill-treatment or torture  (Amnesty 
International,  1997; US Department of State,  1998). 
While  many  observers  have  agreed  to  portray the Malian  transition to democracy as exemplary 
(Boilley, 1994 p.  119-121;  Bermb6,1995  p.  103;  Boyer  1992 p. 40-43;  Jeune  &que  23-29  April 
1992;  March&  Tropicaux  22  May  1992 p. 1320), it seems  that  the  consolidation  of  democracy 
entered a difficult phase  from  1977.  The  number  of  political  parties  has  rapidly  expanded,  but 
only  a l i i t ed  number  of  parties  have  a  national  base. Th  rest are relatively  small  regionally  and 
locally-based parties that suffer an ongoing fragmentation into even smaller organisations 
(Sveinall& Hardeberg, 1997 p. 38;  Vengroff & Kone,  1995  p.  51; Mozaffar, 1995  p. 14, p.18). 
The  initial  unity in the  democratic  movement  has  been  replaced by a  growing  divide  between  on 
the  one  hand the d i n g   p m ,  ADEMA,  and on  the  other  hand  the  extensive  number  of  opposition 
parties.  After two coalition  governments in two years,  the  government  since  1995  has  consisted 
of members  of ADEMA in a  coalition  with  one  other  party  only. 
Since late 1997 the political situation has been relatively peaceful, but both national and 
international  observers  consider  a  series  of  dramatic  events  during  the  elections in 1997  a  major 
setback for democracy.  After  severe  criticism  the first round of  legislative  elections  held in April 
1997  was  annulled by the  Constitutional Court on the grounds  of  poor  organisation  of the polling 
process. When the government refused to accommodate demands by the opposition that 
presidential  elections  were  postponed,  all  but  one  opposition  party  reacted by boycotting  the 
elections.  Konar6  was  reelected  president in May in an election  described as technically  correct, 
but the conflict between the government  and  the  opposition  was  further  aggravated during the 
following  months.  The  opposition  organised  demonstrations  which  were  suppressed  by  security 
forces, and on two occasions  opposition  leaders  were  arrested and kept  in jail for up to two 
months.  When  legislative  elections  were  undertaken in July  and  August, the boycott by 18 
opposition parties resulted in a  further  consolidation of the ADEMA  majority  in ~arliament”~ 
(Sveinall & Hardeberg,  1997 p.  44-57;  Amnesty  International,  1997  p. 2-7; Jeune Afiique no. 
’”. The Tuareg rebellion broke out in 1990. In J a n  1991, the Traork regime m ed to conclude a peace 
agreement  in  Tamamasset in Algexia, but  it was soon bro ”i: en and fighting  continued thro3out 1991. In April 1992 
the  Konare-government  signed  a  new  eace  agreement  (the  Natlonal Pact) w~th the  Unlted  movement of Azaouard 
(MFUA), but also this was  broken. &en in late 1994 the Songhay  population  became  involved  in  the  conflict in 
the form of ‘self-defense’ militias, the  violence  escalated  considerably.  It  is  a  widespread  suspicion  that  at  least  parts 
of  the Malii  military participated & the severe  violahon of ngl+ committed by the,  Songhay  militias. The 
conflict  apparently  came  to an end m early 1996 w~th a  symbollc  bummg  of  weapons m Tnnbouctou  (Maymann, 
1996). 
presidential  election m A ril to 25% in the  last  legislative  election i August 1997 (Sveinall & Hardeberg, 1997 p. 
Is’ ADEMA  now holds  127 out of 146 seats in  parliament.  Voter  participation  went  down &m 35% in the fmt 
56, p. 61; EIU, 1998 p. B 3-44). 
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1917  October  1997 p.  79-81;  Cauris,  various  issues;  Le  Monde  Diplomatique,  May  1997; EIU 
4* quarter 1997 p.  26-29; EIU, 1998  p.  44-45). 
Problems  encountered  during  the  election  process  reflect  both  the  lack  of a democratic  tradition 
and  the  difficulties  for  a  pluralist  regime  of  accommodating  the  many  often  conflicting  demands 
put on it.  Immediately  after  the  change  of  regime  the  obligation by the  ew  government  to  reward 
its main  supporters  resulted in substantial  wage  increases  to  all  government staff and  increases 
in government grants to ~tudents’’~. Private  traders  successfully  put  pressure on  the government 
and  were  rewarded with tax exceptions,  remission of debts  to the  government-m bank  and 
remission of outstanding  taxes  and  customs. In order  to  restrict  public  spending,  however, the 
government was soon  after  forced to pursue  an  economic  policy  that  disfavoured  those  organised 
urban groups  that  formed the core  of the democratic  movement,  hence  the core of its  political 
basis.  Already  in  1993  students  were  subject  to  cuts,  after  the  devaluation  of the CFA in January 
1994 only limited  compensation  was  given to government  staff,  and  recently the government 
refused  to  accommodate  demands  by  trade unions for  major  wage  increases after prices of  water 
and  power  were  significantly  raised.  These  policies  had  unavoidable  consequences  in  the  form 
of  constant  co&ontations  between  government  and  notably  the  students’  movement  and  to  lesser 
extenttrade unions’’’ (Jeune  Affique  10-16  June  1994;  Jeune  Affique  19-25 May 1998 p. 28-29; 
March&  Tropicaux  March  1994;  Smith,  1997 p.  250). 
While the government  finds  itself in a  difficult  balancing  act in its  relations to  the urban-based 
groups that brought it  to power, large parts of the initially  sceptical rural population  have 
experienced  real  improvements  of  both  their  economic  and  political  situation.  After  a  period  of 
relative  economic  improvements  during  the  last  decade  of  the  Traork  regime, the rural population 
first feared  that  urban-based  groups  would  manage to undermine  the  results  achieved  (Coulibaly, 
1994 p. 27, p. 57-58). Having significantly benefited cotton and livestock producers, the 
devaluation in 1994  have  made many  farmers  change  their  mind  (interviews with farmers  and 
resource  persons  in  the Sikasso region,  February  1996). 
Regarding the access  by  the rural population  to  the  formal  political  system,  much is still  left  to 
be desired. At the national  conference  the rural population for the frst time  were  allowed  to 
express themselves.  They  managed to ensure that another  conference was held to examine the 
problems  facing  the rural population,  but  since  then  their  direct  influence  on  official  policies  has 
been limited.  The  overwhelming  majority of  political  parties  remain  urban-based  and  urban- 
oriented, and only in May  1999  elections to the  new rural councils  were  held.  Among  the  more 
promising changes,  however, is the emergence  of  a  number  of  farmers’  organisations  with the 
SYCOV  movement in the Sikasso region  as the most  spectacular  example.  Although  specific 
achievements  vary, the various  organisations all demonstrate  the  potential  benefits  also for the 
students  increased by  75% (Smith, 1997  p.  250;  Jeune  Afrique  10-16  June  1994;  Marches Tropicaux 22 May  1992 
Government staff were  granted a wage  increased of 50%  immediately  after  coup,  while  government  grants  to the 
p.  1322). 
in violent confrontations in 1993-1994, m early  1996 e d  agam in +e academic year  1997-98. In 1.994 the crushn 
The  continuos  conflicts  with  the stud?&’  movement,  AEEM  (Association  des &lev&  et des Etudiants) resulted 
of the student  leadership  by the prime minister resulted III the  breakmg  up of the  government coalition when C id 
(Cong.3 National d’htiative  Dbocratique) and the smaller RDP (Tbsemblement pour  la d h o m t i e  et  le  progres) 
left the government  (Smith,  1997  p.  249-250, EIU, 1998  p. 46; Jeune  Afrique  19-25 May 1998  p.  28-29). 
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rural population  of  the  increased  political  f?eedomls6  (Cauris  no.  9,  August  1991;  Coulibaly,  1994 
p.  28-33, p. 57-58). 
Despite  the  various diffculties encountered  by  the  democratic  regime,  observers  generally  agree 
that  the  possibility  of  a  sudden  change of regime in the form of a coup is not  very  likely  and  that 
the  present  political  situation  must  be  described as relatively  stable’” @IU 4b quarter  1997 p.  24). 
5.2. Rate and structure of economic  growth 
Mali  has  one  of the smallest  economies in the world  measured  according to GNP (2.7  bn USD 
in 1997),  and  one of the  poorest  economies in the  world  measured  according to GNP/capita  (260 
USD/capita in 1997)  (World  Bank,  1999  p.  190)”*.  The  country is landlocked,  resource  poor  and 
has  a very  poor  infkastructure in the form  of  roads and railways.  The  backbone ofthe economy 
is the production  of  food  crops,  cotton  and  livestock. 
With  an  estimated  population  of  11.5  million  and an area  of  1,240,190 km2, overall  population 
density  is  down to 9.3 inhab.h*. Approximately two thirds of the extensive  area is desert,  and 
the population is concentrated in the southern  fringe  of  the  country  where  climatic  conditions 
allow  a  certain  agricultural  production (EIU, 1998  p.  48). 
After  the first two decades  after  independence  characterised  by an economic  policy  oriented 
towards  the  Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe,  structural  adjustment  programmes  have  radically 
changed the Malian  economy  after  1981. S i c e  1988 when the influence of the IMF and  the 
World Bank on economic policy markedly increased and especially since the democratic 
government has shown  a  keen  interest in fulfilling the conditions set by international  financial 
institutions,  Mali has become  a  model  pupil  of IMF. International  economic  trends and climatic 
conditions,  however,  are as important as the economic  policy.  Both  were  unfavourable to the 
Malian  economy in the  1980s  when first a  severe drought and later declining  cotton  prices 
worsened an  already  difficult  situation.  After  the  devaluation  in  1994  that  considerably  improved 
exporh of main  products  such ascotton, livestock  and  gold,  the  economy has moved  into  a  period 
of  steady  expansion.  The  growth  rate  that was down to 2.5% in the period  1980-91,  averaged 
about  4-6%  per year in the period 1995-1997’’’ , and it now figures among the highest in the 
Like  the SYCOV movement at least  three of the  other  farmers’  oreanisations.  havine se n the light of day  after 
in the Segou  region,  the  vegeta  le  production  zone in the Koulkoro reglon,  and the groundnut  producmg  area 
1991,  are  found  in  relatively  pro  erous  agricultural  zones,  namely.thgrice  cyltivation rk in the Nig% R i v ~  iralley 
around Kita in the Kayes reaon (March&  Tropicaux  28  June  1996 p. 1349; Le Roy,  1992  p.  140;  Tag,  1994 p. 140- 
161). 
T 
Is’ It may be worth recalling the  assessment  by  Richard  Sandbrook  that  due to the lack of a  democratic  tradition  and 
the  pursuing of  an  economc policy that  disfavour  those organised urban  groups  that  form  the  core  of  the  democratic 
movement,  Mali ranks among the least  likely  ros  ects  for  durable  democracy m the world.  The  mere  fact  that 
multiparty  olitics  have  survived  thus  far  may, &regore, be  considered an achievement  in  itself  (Sandbrook,  1996 
p.  69,  p.817. 
annex. 
Is* For  a  discussion  of  the  reliability of statistical data, see ‘Fieldwork  methodology  and  literature  study’ in the 
Is’ While IMF figures indicate an average  growth  rate  of 4% in the years  1995-1997 (IMF, 1998 p. 96), EIU refers 
to a  growth  rate of 6% for each of the  years  1995,1996  and  1997 (EIU, 1998  p. 48). 
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f i c a n  region''o (IMF, 1994 p. 106; IMF, 1998  p.  96;  EIU,  1998  p.  48-49; f i c a n  Development 
Bank,  1998 p. 23). 
Structural  problems  remain,  though.  Although  80%  of  the  population  work in the rural sector,  the 
county is self-sufficient  infood  only  in  years of over-average  rainfall.  Until  the mid-l960s, Mali 
was  a  net  food  exporter, but drought  periods,  inadequate  agricultural  policies,  and  increasing 
consumption of imported  rice  and  wheat,  especially  by the urban  population,  have  made  the 
country  increasingly  dependent  on  food  imports.  Considerable  regional  diversities  add to the 
problem. While the southern Sikasso region  produces a substantial gain surplus, the northern 
regions Gao, Tombouctou  and Kidal have  a  permanent  deficit  (Staatz  et  al.  1989  p.  704; Diont, 
1995  p.  8; Marchts Tropicaux 28 July  1996 p. 1351). 
Cotton accounts for about  8%  of  GDP"l,  an  estimated  80%  of  agricultural  incomes  and  about 
50% of  exports'62.  Linkages  to  other  sectors in the economy  are  poor.  Hence,  more than 90%  of 
cotton  fibres are exported  without  any  local  processing.  The  importance  of  exports  makes  the 
Malian  cotton  production  heavily  dependent  on  international  factors  such as world  market  prices 
for  cotton  and  international  marketing  structures.  Although  Mali  since  1994  has  been  the  second 
largest  cotton  producer in Afiica  after  Egypt''3,  Malian  cotton  accounts  for  only 3% of  the annual 
global  trade.  It  therefore  relies on a distinct market identity and on a link to international 
marketing  structures  which an reduce  some  of its vulnerability.  While  its  market  identity  consists 
in a  steady  and  high  quality  cotton  supply, l i i g e  to  marketing  structures is provided  by  a  French 
company, COPACO, which has an exclusive buying arrangement with the Malian cotton 
parastatal, CMDT'64  (Coton et Dbveloppement  no.2,  1996  p.  38; Marchts Tropicaux  3  March 
1995 p. 460,  p.  472;  Bingen,  1998  p.  269-272;  EIU 4th quarter  1996 p. 32 EIU 1" quarter  1997 
p.  26;  EIU  2nd  quarter  1998  p.  22). 
Mali has the  largest  number  of  cattle in West Afiica,  and  production  and  export  of livestock have 
been  significantly  improved  &er  the  devaluation  of the CFA in January 1994l''. In recent  years 
the  share  of  livestock in GDP has been  around  13%'%,  while  the  share  of  livestock in exports  has 
Mali  6th gom the  top  with  a growth rate  well  above  the  regional  median  of  4.5%  (Afiican  Development Bank, 1998 
A corn arison  made  by the Afiican Development Bank of  real  GDP growth in 1997 in 50  African  countries  rank 
p.  23). 
Calculation  for  the  years  1994-1996  based on EIU  4th  quarter  1996  p.  32 
Calculation  for the years  1994-1996  based on EIU  1"  quarter  1997  p.  26  and  EIU  2nd  quarter  1998  p.  22. 
163 Mali  accounts  for  2.5% of the  international  cotton  trade  and  is the 8th  largest  exporter in the world  (Coton  et 
D6veloppement no. 2, 1996  p. 38). 
IM COPACO (la Compagnie  Cotonni&re) is the  marketing unit of the French  parastatal  CFDT that  holds  40%  of  the 
share in the Malian cotton  parastatal, CMDT. 
la Calculation  for  the years 1994-96  based on EIU 4' quarter  1996 p.  32. 
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been  about 15-20%'67 (March&  Tropicaux 28 June 1996 p. 1356-57; Ruben  et  al., 1994; EIU 4th 
quarter 1996 p. 32; EIU 1st quarter 1997 p. 26). 
Other important economic activities include goZd mining''* and migr~tion'~', while the 
munufatwing sector in Mali is negligib1el7'. Both  gold  exports  and  migrant  remittances  provide 
an important  capital input to the Malian  economy,  but l i e  cotton  these  activities also enforce the 
dependency of the country on international  economic trend^'^'. 
The fragility and international dependence of the Malian economy is reflected in large and 
permanent  trade  deficits.  From  the  mid-1970s to the  early 1990s exports have  covered only about 
50% of imports. In the 1990s and  especially after the  devaluation in 1994, import  coverage  has 
improved to around 70-75%. The  external debt is considerable,  and  debt  service  constitutes a 
major burden on the economy'n (EIU, 1997 p. 63-66, p. 80; EIU 2nd  quarter 1997 p. 37-38; 
World Bank, 1997b p. 348-349; IMF, 1998 p. 100). 
On this background it is hardly  surprising that Mali has become  one of the world's most  aid- 
dependent  economies. Net oficial development  assistance made  up 19.4% of GNP in 1996173. In
Calculation for the  vears  1994-96  based  on EIU 1st auarter 1997 D. 26 and  EIU 2" auarter  1998 D. 22.  It  should 
be noted  that  general  rkservations  cpnceming  the  validity of dak pkicularly concern figures on lijestock exports 
due to the  long  tradition of smugglmg  cattle  across  Mali's  borders (EIU 1" quarter  1998 p.  36). 
~ ~~. ~~ ~~~~ ~~.~ 
Gold minimg, constituting  the  basis of the  economic  prosperity of the ancient em ires,  has  in  recent  years 
u n d y  a remarkable  economic  revival.  From  a  ne li 'ble  production  in the early  199&  investments  hy  forei 
capi (mady Canadian and  South  African m the ref&%ation of existing  mines  and  the  opening of new  and g 
devaluation of the CFA  in 1994 has result J.' m a marked  production  increase,  and  gold  now  accounts for ahout  16% 
of  e orts (Calculation  for  1996  based on  EIU  2" quarter  1998  p.  22,  see also Jeune  Afrique  no.1917  1997  p.  104- 
l063IU, 97 p.  58-59; March& Tropicaux  28  June  1996  p.  1365. 
estimated  3.5  million  Malians,  corresponding to about  one  thiid  of  the  total  population,  live  outside  the  country, the 
'%e tradition for migration to the coastal areas, established  during  the  French  colonisation, is still  very vivid an 
maioriw of whom in C6te  d'Ivoire (1.5 million)  (Jeune A6iaue no.  1805-1806  1995 D. 49:  EIU. 1997 D. 47-48: 
M&& Tropicaux 29 June 1996 p. 1319; Woild Bank, 1497 p. 348; Mai et al: 1995 p. 4041).'Migrant 
remittances  constitute  around  20-25% of total  exports of goods  and  services galadation based  on  World  Bank 
figures for the period  1980-1995  (World  Bank,  1997b  p.346). 
GDP (Calcuhon for  the  years  1994-96  based  on  EIU  4th Ver 1996  p.  32).Years of protection  and  government 
Consistin mainly of ago-industrial and textile  industries, the manufacluing sector  accounts for only  6-7% of 
control have resulted in poor utilisation of capacity, hgh production costs and insufficient linkages among 
e n t e r n r i s e s  and between the manufachxk sector  and  other  sectors  of  the  economv.  Damages  in  relation to the riots 
in 1991,  liiberalisaton  olicies,~compe+itio~ fiom cheap  smuggled  Nigerian im rti and the-devaluation in 1994  have 
hit the sector hard (E$, 1997 p. 58;  March&  Tropicaux  28  June  1996 p. 1 3 g  Marchts  Tropicaux  3  March  1995 
p.  470). 
r ~~~ ~~ ~~~~ 
World  market r i m  for gold are resently falhng (EIU, 1998  p.  57).  The  economic risii m  Cote  d'Ivoire  during 
the  late  1970s an B 1980s  seriously Aected the Maltan economy,  while  its  recent  upsurge has had  a  positive  impact 
on  Mali. 
I n  According to the,World  Bank,  total outstanding debt  in  1995 was 3,066 billion USD.,(World  Bank,  199%  p.  349). 
Data on debt  servlce  ratio (m ercent of exports of goods  and semces) vary  conslderably fiom one  source to 
another.  Accordmg to recent lid figures, it has been about 3OYiO% in  the  years  1993-95,  whereas  the  World  Bank 
accounts for 42% of bilateral  debt,  and  debt  service paid  to  China  and  Russia  makes  up  about SO% of total  debt 
indicates  a  ratio of 15-20% in the  same years (IMF, 1998  p. 100; World  Bank,  19971, p. 349). The debt to Russia 
services  (Marches  Tropicaux 28 June  1996  p.  1325; EIU,  1998  p.  63). 
In Only  in  eight A 6 i ~  countries  the  share of official development  assistance  in GNP is  higher than in Mali.  These 
are Chad, Congo, Guea-Bissau, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique,  Rwanda  and  Sierra  Leone  (World  Bank, 1999 
p.  230-23 1). 
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recent  years  the  externally-financed  share  of  the  total  government  budget  has  been  about  60%174, 
while the externally-financed  share of capital  expenditures has been about 90%  (World Bank 
1999  p.230; EIU, 1998 p. 71; Marchis Tropicaux  28 June 1996 p. 1325).  Main  donors  in  order 
of  importance  are  France, the World Bank, Gemany,  the European  Development Fund and  the 
Netherlands  (OECD,  1997).  To the official  development  assistance is added  a  non-negligible 
amount  transferred  by  an  estimated  650  NGOs  (of which about  half are active)  working in the 
country  (Coulibaly & Poulton, 1997 p. III). 
5.3. Human  resource profile 
The  structural  problems ofthe economy  translate  into  a series of  social  indicators that give  Mali 
one ofthe lowest  rankings on the UNDP’s Human Development  Index: in 1997 it was placed 171 
out of 174  countries  with  only Burkina Faso,  Niger  and  Sierra  Leone faring worse  (UNDP,  1998 
p.  128-130). 
Health  conditions are alarming: in 1996  the  infant  mortality  rate w s 134,  the  under-five  mortality 
rate  was  220,  the  maternal  mortality  rate  was as high as 1,200, while  life  expectancy at birth  was 
47 years (World Bank, 1999 p. 192; UNDP, 1998 p. 130, p. 157). Poor overall figures hide 
a  substantial  bias in favour of the  capital  and  urban reas. Thus, Bamako region,  where  only 10% 
of the population  live, accounts for no less than 60% of recurrent  government  spending on health 
and  70% of investment spending’76  (World Bank, 1995 p.26).  After having declined  in  the  late 
1980s  and  early  1990s  both in relative  and  absolute terms, health  expenditures  have  increased 
since 1994 (World Bank 1995 p.  26). In 1990 public  expenditures on health made  up  2.8% of 
GDP.  Although  low, this share is higher than in many other countries in the Sub-Saharan  Aiiican 
region (UNDP, 1998 p.  158-159). 
Also educational  standards are very  poor  even  in  a  regional  perspective.  With  only  25%  of an
age  group  enrolled in primary  school in 1995,  Mali suffers from  one of  the lowest  net  primary 
school enrollment rates in the worldln.  The  adult illiteracy rate is 69%, and for women it is as 
high as 77%’’’ (UNDP, 1998 p. 147; World Bank, 1999 p. 193). Like health expenditures, 
educational  spending has increased in recent  years.  Measured  against  GNP,  however,  public 
expenditures on education are still lagging  behind the share in the majority of other  countries in 
The  external  share  of  the  total  government  budget  was  62%  in  1994,58%  in  1995  and 55% in  1996  (calculations 
based on EIU, 1998  p. 71 and  March&  Tropicaux 28 June  1996  p.  1325). 
rate per 1OO,OOO%ths. Only  in Sierra  Leone,  Niger,  Malawi  and  Angola  the  infant  mortality  rate is higher  than  in 
Infant  mortali rate per 1,000 live births, under-five  mortality rate per  1,000 live births, and  maternal  mortality 
Mah,  and  only in Sierra  Leone,  Niger  and  Guinea-Bissau  the  under-five  mortality  rate s high r than in  Mali (UIDP, 
While virtually  all  of the urban  population  have  access to safe  water  supplies, it is only  one  third  of  the  population 
1998  p.  156-157). 
in  rural  areas  (World  Bank,  1996  p.  216;  World  Bank,  1995 p. ii and p.26). 
In For irls the school  enrollment rate is d m  to 24%.  Only in Niger the p- school  enrollment  rate  is  lower 
than  in%ali W P ,  1998 p. 162-163). 
The adult  illiteracy  rate is higher  only  in Burkina Faso, Niger  and  Sierra  Leone (UNDP, 1998 p. 146-147). 
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the Sub-Saharan  African r e g i ~ n ” ~  (UNDP,  1998 p.  162-163; African  Development Bank, 1998 
p. 147; EIU, 1998 p.  52-53). 
Conclusion 
The  Malian  action  environment is far  from  favourable:  lack  of  a  democratic  tradition,  extremely 
fiagile  economic  structures,  and  a  human  resource  situation  among  the  poorest in the world  are 
all factors that can be expected to negatively influence the performance of government 
organisations. 
Despite  the  rather  bleak  portrait  given  above,  however,  present  positive  trends in bo h  the  political 
and  economic  development  make  it  fair  to  conclude  that  the  action  environment is n t  completely 
dysfunctional to development. 
The  difficulties of accommodating  the  many  different  interests  and  the  challenge  to  the  legitimacy 
of  the  government  constituted by the election  process  in  1997  should  be  seen  on the background 
of  more than 100  years  of  highly  centralised  rule  where  large  parts  of  the  population,  notably  the 
rural population,  have  been  cut  off  from  political  decision-making.  While the long  history of 
repressive regimes may  negatively  affect the image  of  the  state  held by the population, it also 
gives the present  government  a certain credit  even  for  small  improvements in the  access  by  the 
population to express  itself  and to influence  decision-making.  The  situation  has  been  relatively 
stable  since the dramatic  events in 1991,  and  none of the  social  conflicts  presently  characterising 
the situation seem  to  have the potential  of  resulting in a change  of  regime. 
Although economic  structures of the country  provide  a  poor  basis  for  the  government’s  ability 
to make its agencies work, the replacement in recent  years  of an extended  period  of  economic 
stagnation  by  quite  impressive growth rates  gives  reason to some  optimism. The country is highly 
dependent  on  international  trends,  but  given  that  these  have  been  favourable  for  some time and 
that  international  donors are pleased  with  the  development  and  willing  to  continue  assistance,  a 
country in Mali’s  structural  position  cannot  expect a much  more  favourable  economic  situation 
than the present. 
While the political  and  economic  situation is presently  undergoing  a  positive  development,  the 
low  level  of  human  resource  development  seems  to  constitute  the  most  serious  challenge  to  public 
sector performance  derived flom the action environment. It takes much longer to achieve 
significant  improvements in the fundamental  health  situation  and  in  educational  standards  than 
it takes to change  a stagnating economy  into an economy  of growth. 
If despite the recent positive  trends, the Malian  action  environment  appears to be poor,  a 
comparison to other countries in the region  reveals  that it could  have  been  considerably  worse. 
In neighbouring  Niger  a  series  of  coups  and  counter-coups  have  in  recent  years  resulted in an 
extremely  unstable  political  situation.  Development  assistance  has  been  cut  down,  and for years 
the state has been  unable to ensure a  regular  payment of salaries to government  staff. In Burkina 
’”In 1995  public  expenditwe on education made up 2.2% of GNP (as a@mt 3.7% in 1985). Among Sub-Saharan 
African countries for which data are available, only Zambia and Equatonal Guinea have lower shares (UNDP, 1998 
p. 162-163). See also Af~ican Development Bank, 1998 p. 147. 
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Faso the political situation  has so far been  stable,  but  the  legitimacy of the Blaise  Compaor6- 
government  has  been  repeatedly  challenged by the persecution of the  political opposition. While 
Mali  shares  with  these  countries  a N i l e  economic  structure  and  a  poor  human  resource  situation, 
it adds  to  the  legitimacy of the  Malian  government  that  the  political  situation  compares  favourably 
with that of neighbouring  countries. 
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CHAPTER 6. THE MALIAN STATE: THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF THE 
PUBLIC  SECTOR 
Introduction 
The  next  step  in the analysis  of  the  shared  environment by the  four  agencies  under  study is an 
assessment  of  ‘the  institutional  context  of  the  public  sector’. This includes an assessment of the 
budgetary  support  which  significantly  influences  public  sector  capacity through its impact  on 
s a l a r y  levels and  funding  for  recurrent  expenditures  and  capital  outlays.  Other  aspects  regard the 
institutional  set-up  of  the  public  sector,  its  management  practices  and  existing  structures  of  formal 
and  informal  influence. 
As  discussed  in  chapter 3, the institutional  context  of  the  public  sector  similar to the action 
environment  may  not  only  influence  the  performance of individual  government  organisations,  but 
it may be so poor that it  is  dysfunctional  to  development,  regardless  of the qualities of individual 
agencies. 
6.1. Size and  financing of the  state  apparatus 
Measured in economic  terms,  Mali  does  not  differ  from  the  general pattern in the  Sub-Saharan 
African  region  concerning  the  relationship  between the size of the public sector  and that of the 
economy.  Until  the mid-1990s central  government  expenditure  accounted  for  about 25% of GDP, 
while the share in recent  years has been  slightly  reduced,  mainly due to containment  of  wage 
expenditures’80 (IMF, 1998 p. 96; World Bank, 1995 p. 56). 
Measured as staff numbers in relation  to  the  number of inhabitants,  however, the Malian public 
sector is smaller than in most  other  countries in Sub-Saharan  Afiica.  Whereas  the  overall  ratio 
of  government staff to  inhabitants is a  mere 0.3% in  Mali,  the  average for Sub-Saharan  Africa is 
1% and for other  developing  regions it is 3% (Lienert, 1998 p. 45; World Bank, 1993 p. 5). 
Until 1990 the size of the  state  apparatus grew continuously.  During  the  first 15 years  after 
independence, staffnumbers tripled fiom 10,534 in 1961 to 31,783 in 1975 (Pierot, 1979 p. 57; 
Kone et al., 1994 p. 3). Although  growth in staffing  numbers  slowed  down  during the next 15 
years, it remained  very high, and in 1990 the public  sector reached a maximum of 42,300 
employees.  By 1993 retrenchments had reduced the number  to  about 36,000. The  significant 
downsizing  makes  Mali  member  of  a  small  group  of  African  countries  that  have  reduced th  
number of civil  servants by  more than 10% between 1986 and 1996 (World Bank, 1993 p. 5; 
Lienert, 1998 p. 44). 
Despite  the  fact  that  Malian  civil  service salaries have  historically been among  the  lowest in the 
CFA  zone,  personnel  spending  until  recently has made  up  a  larger  share  of  recurrent  expenditure 
than in many  comparable  countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The  attempts by the new  government 
Only for a l i t e d  number of countries data are available on central govermpent  expenditure in percent of GDP. 
Existing  data  suggest an average share of 20-30% for most sub-Saharan A f n m  countries (UNDP, 1998 p. 182- 
183). 
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to  reduce  the  number  of  employees  have  changed this picture,  and  the  share of personnel  spending 
in  recurrent  expenditure has gone  down  from 50% in the  late  1980s  to  31% in 1996  (World  Bank, 
1995 p.  7-8 andp. 57; EIU, 1998  p. 50; Kone et al.,1994  p. 45). It is worth  noting  that  no  less than 
1/3 ofthe public  sector  wage  bill is spent  on  military  salaries  (World  Bank,  1995  p. 8).This heavy 
burden on the government  budget  reflects the continued  existence  of  a  large  coercive  apparatus 
that  even in a  regional  comparison  appears  to  be  substantial"' (UNDP, 1998 p. 170-171). 
Low  government  salaries  have  a  number of very  unfortunate  consequences for the functioning 
of the public  sector.  A  major  challenge to the  democratic  government  has  been  to  combat 
corruption  and  mismanagement  of  funds  reaching  historically h gh dimensions  during the last part 
of the Traori regime.  The  freedom  of  the  press  to  report  incidences  of  mismanagement  and  the 
fact  that the government  on  several  occasions has acted  upon  reports  compromising  high-level 
offkials are believed to some  extent to have  reduced  the  dimensions  of this problem. It gives 
reason  to  serious  concern,  however,  that  mismanagement  of fundsin the early  1990s was believed 
to amount to several  times  the  total  budget  of the state'". Other  problems  derived  from  low 
salaries are  absenteeism  by  govemment staff from  their  offices  when  they  are  minding  private 
businesses  and  low  morale of government  staff  who  compare  their  situation t  those of NG0 or 
private  sector  employees's3  @one t al., 1994 p.  40-48). 
While the ratio  of  civil  service  employees to total  population is low  in  Mali,  a highly skewed 
distribution  of  staff  further  limits the direct  contact  between  government  agents  and  large  parts 
of  the  population.  The  distribution  of staff is skewed  both  across the various  sectors  and  across 
regions.  According  to  an  assessment  made  by  the  World  Bank, staff  numbers in the agricultural 
sector substantially  exceed  stafling  norms,  whereas  in  the  health  sector  there is a  considerable 
under-staffing.  The  regional  bias i reflected in a  concentration of staff in virtually all sectors in 
administrative  positions in Bamako  (World  Bank,  1995  p.  ii, p.9). The situation does not seem 
to  have  changed  much  since 1976 when 50% of total  government staffwas based in the  Bamako 
region (Pierot, 1979 p. 61-62). Thus, in 1994 60% of all professional health staff were 
concentrated  in the Bamako region'", while  Bamako  received  about six times the  average  per 
capita  education  expenditures  received  by  each  of the other  regions  (World  Bank,  1995 p. ii, p. 
21).  The l i i t e d  direct  contact  between  government staff and  large  parts  of  especially the rural 
population is firther illustrated  by  the fact that in 1990  only one third of the about  3,000 
''l In 1990-1991  military  expenditures  accounted  for  53% of combined  health  and  education  expenditures.  This 
ercentage is very  high for a  country  not  involv$ in major wars (in a 'e onai comparison  the  Tuareg  rebellion must 
!e considered  a  minor  conflict),  and  for  companson  the  share for negfbouring Burkina  Faso  and  Niger  was  30% 
and  11%,  respectively  (UNDP,  1998  p.  170-171). 
In  1993  the  rime  minister  had  to  acknowled  e  that  illegal  ap  ropriation of funds by the customs  service  alone 
amounted  to  180 billion CFA,  corresponding  to ! 40%  of  the  tota P amount  spent on salaries  to  all  government  staff 
(41  billion  CFA) (Kone et  al.,  1994  p.  48). 
out ordinary  duties of their service and those  seconded to projects  and  programmes  funded  by NGOs or bi-or 
A  1993  example kom the Mopti region illustrates  the  highly  different  conditions  for  govemment staff  who wry 
multilateral  donors:  while  there  were no daily aliowan~s for  govemment  staff on field tri S that  formed art of 
routine tasks, staffworking on  a  UNICEF-sponsored  project  were  given  motorbikes  and  a d aSy  allowance o P 1,500 
CFA.  Those  workin? on CqRESFonsored activities were given 2,500 CFNday and  transport or alternatively 5,000 
CFNda if  they cou d  rowde  thelr own !ramport. Staffw?r,h on a World  Bank-sponsored  extension  programme 
August  1993). 
(PNVA! were  given &,OOO CFA  per  months for 4-10  wslts  &erviews  with  government  staff m Mopti  cercle, 
60% of professional staff, 64%  of  midwives,  and  39% of state  registered  nurse  were  located in Bamako region 
(World Bank, 1995 p. iii. 
102 
employees in the Department of Agricult~re’~~ were operating at village Of these 50% 
were  employed by CMDT who  operates  only  in  the  southern  part  of  the  country (MDRE, 1991 
p. 15-16). 
As mentioned in chapter 5, about 60% of total government budget and 90% of capital 
expenditures are  funded fiom external  sources.  The  internal  financing  mainly  derives  from 
customs  accounting for 40-60% of total  government  revenue  excluding grauts, while  income 
taxes  provide  about 30% of  domestic  receipts’”.  During  the  first  three  years  after  the  change  of 
regime,  domestic  receipts  fell  dramatically as a result  of  widespread  tax  refusal  by  the  population 
who  claimed  that  president Konar6 had  promised  to  abolish  all  taxes  in  case  of his successful 
election”’. In recent  years,  however, a more  consistent  collection  of  taxes in rural areas,  more 
attention paid  to  large tax payers  and  reorganisation of the  customs  service  have  significantly 
improvedthe  revenue (IMF, 1998  p.  97;  March&  Tropicaux 28 June  1996 p. 1923-1925;  Jeune 
Afrique  no.  1735  1994  p.  47). 
Despite  increased  incomes  and  the  substantial  down-sizing  of  the  public  sector,  the  World  Bank 
in a  public  expenditure  review  in  the  middle  of  the  decade  concluded  that  funding  levels  remained 
inadequate  for  the  proper  functioning  of  public services and  for  undertaken  the  necessary  capital 
investments  (World Bank, 1995 p.  7). 
6.2. Institutional set-up 
After  independence, the new  government  replaced  the  17  ‘cercles’ from the  colonial  period by 
six new  regions,  each of them  headed  by a  governor.  The  cantons  were  dissoluted  and  new  cercles 
were  established  under the leadership  of  a  ‘commandant  de  cercle’.  Below  the  cercle  level  new 
‘arrondissements’  were  created  and  headed  by  ‘chefs  d’arrondissement’.  With  the  division  of  the 
Gao region in two (Gao and  Tombouctou) in 1977  and the establishment  of the Kidal region in 
1991, Mali today has a total of 8 regions, 50 cercles, 290 arrondissements and 19 urban 
communes.  When  a  large  administrative  reform  approved by the  Parliament  in  1993  is fully 
implemented,  the  present  arrondissements  will  be  replaced by 701  communes of which  664  are 
rural communes. While the process  of division was finalised in late  1996,  elections to new rural 
councils were  repeatedly  postponed  until  May  1999  when  they  eventually  took  place”’  (Sow, 
The  Department of Agriculture  under  the Ministry of Rural  Development  and  Environment. 
Village  level  here refers to those  based  either  in  a  village  or in a  group  of  6-1  1  villages  called  a  secteur (Sow, 
1992 p. 11). 
based on IMF-figures presented  in  March&  Tropicaux  28  June  1996 p.  1325-1325  and  Jeune Aliique  no.  1735  1994 
Is’ The  remainder of government  incomes are non-fiscal  incomes  such as incomes 60m privatisations.  Calculations 
collected further declined to only  3  1%  of  outstanding  taxes (Sall, 1993 p.  120):  Kon?rB  had  promised to abolish the 
In  1991 only 52% of the regional  and  local  development  tax (TDRL) was  collected,  and  in  1992  the  share 
national head  tax (‘minimum fiscal’),  but  people  understood  that  all  taxes  mcludmg  TDRL)would be abohshed 
(Kassibo,  1997  p.  12). 
p.  47. 
The  administrative  reform was appved by Parliament  in  1993  under the  title of ‘Loi  dBterminant les  conditions 
de la like administration des collechv1t6s tenitode$(Lai n0.93-008P-RM,  Sall,  1993  vol. I1 p.  329-332). During 
1995 and 1996 a large exercise was undertaken  to  mvolve  the  population  in  the  establishment of ew  communes 
p.  4-6; Mlssion de Dhntralisation, 1995a;  Mission de Dtcentralisation,  1995 , March& Tro icaux  5  May  1995 
each  comprising  between 4 and 25 villages  or  about  5,000-15,000  inhabitants p i o n  de Dtcentralisahon, 1994 
p.  922-924; Souma~B, 1995 p. 58-59; Le Dbocrate &bon Bciale July 1995; Kassiio, 1997; didogo,  1997; Coll, 
1997). The new rural communes  are  described in Joumal8fficiel de la  Rgpublique  du  Mali.  Loi  no.  96-059  du  4 
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1992 p.  9-12;  Sall,  1993  vol. II p. 329-332;  Le  Dkmocrate Edition  Spkciale  July  1995  p.  31; 
JORM,  1996;  Coll,  1997  p.  39). 
The institutional set-up of the Malian state is based upon the organisational configuration 
described in chapter  3 as the  mechanical  model. It is characterised  by a  high  level  of  formalisation 
and  centralisation.  Mamgement,  authority  and  communication  are  hierarchically  structured.  All 
information  going  both  up-wards  and dom-wards have  to  follow  the  hierarchy  of  administrative 
levels  which  often  lead  to  considerable  delays  in  decision-making  and  task  execution.  While the 
central  level has a  certain  technical  capability  and  retains  exclusive  authority  over  provision  of 
functions,  personnel and general  policy,  the  arrondissement  level in rural areas and the communal 
level  in  urban  areas re left  with little discretion.  Staff  at  these  levels  are th  ones who  meet the 
population  face-to-face  and  who  deliver  most  of  the  services,  but  they  have  to  do  with  very 
modest  material  and  human  resource  capabilities  (Sall,  1993  vol. I p. 70-73;  Traore, 1988 v01 I, 
p.  253-259,  p.  268-269;  Gellar et al.,  1990  p.  21-22, p. 50-51). 
Although  some  trace this organisation  back  to the ancient  ernpireslgo,  at  least the historical 
heritage  fiom the colonial  period is evident.  The  Malian  constitution,  thus, i  modelled  after the 
French  constitution of 5  October  1958, in some  of  its  articles  down  to  the  detail  where  only the 
names  of  administrative  units  in  France  have  been  replaced by  Malian  names.  French inspiration 
is furthermore  reflected in i.a. the division of power  among  central,  regional  and  local  authorities, 
the  role  of the president  and the electoral  system  (Sall,  1993  vol. I p.  75-92). 
In addition  to  the  historical  heritage  from the French, at least two other  factors  explain  the  present 
centralisation of power in the  state.  The  first is the  obvious  fact  that  after  independence  competent 
staff were  extremely  scarce’”, hence a  devolution of  authority to regional and local authorities 
was  difficult.  The  other  reason is political: l i e  in other  newly  independent  countries  the  elite  that 
came  into  power in 1960 had a  strong  wish to consolidate  its o m  power  base  by  supporting the 
national unity and combatting regional and ethnic disparities. This was best ensured by a 
centralisation of power  (Traore,  1988 v01 I, p.  145; Chazan et al., 1992  p.  46-47). 
The socialist  option  inspired by the Soviet  Union  and  China  further  enforced the tendency 
towards  centralisation of power in the  central  administration  and  especially in the hands of the 
president: 20 years  of  control  of the state  apparatus by the  only  legal  party’92  (1960-1968 and 
again 1979-1991)  and  11  years of its  control by a  military  committee  (1968-1991)  has  taken 
centralisation of power  and the role of the president far beyond  the  situation  set  for in the  French- 
inspired  constitution  (Sall,  1993  vol. I p.  70-73;  Traork,  1988  vol. I, p. 253-259,  p.  268-269; 
Gellar et al., 1990 p.  21-22,  p.  50-51). 
Novembre 1996 (JORM, 1996). 
It  is  a  much  debated  issue  among  historians  whether  the  ancien em ires were  characterised by a  strong  central 
power that intervened  in all aspects of the  social and economic  llfe  of Ng ordinate  states, or whether  they  were  rather 
characterised  b  a  large  extent  of  devolution ofpower from the central  level to local  authorities (Cams no. 184  13 
June  1997  p. 43: 
At  ind  endence on 22 September  1960,  Mali  had  a  total of 3  veterinary  doctors,  10  doctors  and  3  pharmacists 
for  a pop3ation of 4.3 million (Kcone et al. 1994,  p.  13). 
For  a  description of the  control of @e  administration by the party, see  Traore  1988  vol. I, p.  275-280;  Gellar  et 
al., 1990 p. 35-37. For a resentation of the opposlte new, namely that the party was controlled by the 
administration, see Ftlix, 1986  p.  148. 
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While  many  factors  have  contributed  to  centralisation  of  the  administration,  only  modest  attempts 
have  been  made  to  counter  it  before  the  change of r gime in 199 1.  After  having  paid  lip  service 
to decentralisation plans for more than a decade'93, the economic crisis in the late 1980s 
eventually  forced  the  Traore  regime  to  implement  a  limited  reform  in  1988. In order to  mobilise 
local  resources  the  reform  replaced  a  number  of taxes by a  regional  and  local  development  tax 
(TDRL)  meant  to  feed a local  development  budget (FDRL) at each of  the  administrative  levels'". 
The reform was presented as an  attempt to decentralise  government  administration  and  increase 
the  influence  of  its  lower  levels on  development  activities. In practice,  however,  additional 
funding obligations  were  transferred to the regional,  cercle  and  arrondissement  levels,  and 
although the TDRL. was supposed to be supplemented by subventions from the central 
administrative  level,  such  subventions  have  rarely  come.  Difficulties  of collecting taxes  and 
unequal  revenue  distribution  among the various  local  levels firther constrain  the  budget of 
arrondissements and often  imply  that  development  activities  carried out at village  level are 
negligible'95  (Sow,  1992  p.22-24;  Sall, 1993 v01.H  p. 246-260;  Diallo,  1995 p. 37; Gellar et al., 
1990  p.  45-48;  Kassibo,  1997  p.  1-4;  Ousmane  Traork,  personal  communication,  Oct.1994). 
The  institutional  set-up  of  the  Malian statestill  corresponds to the description  above,  but  changes 
are taking place.  During the 1990s  the issue of  decentralisation  has  been  high on the agenda19', 
and among the many reorganisation initiatives taken by the Konark government, the most 
important is an ongoing  administrative refom.  It is the  objective  of  the  reform  to  replace  existing 
arrondissements with rural communes and to replace the administratively appointed chef 
d'arrondissements  by rural councils  elected  by  the  local  populations  among  candidates  presented 
by the political parties. 
'93 An administrative  reform  approved in 1977  was  meant  to  deconcentrate  the  government  administration frm the 
central  level  to  regional,  cercle and arrondissement  levels  and to increase the involvement of elected  representatives 
of the  population m local  decision making. The  reform,  however, is believed to have  lead to a further concentration 
happened in practice, as no  legal  texts  existed to implement  decisions.  It also made  part of the reform to  establish 
of  power in the hands of  the  administrative staff. While  it  included the  decision to establish rural communes,  nothing 
develo  ment  committees  at  each  of the administrative  levels  (described in Ordonnance  no. 77-44 of 12 July  1977 
that  only  started  operating in 1981  and  are  still  functioning  consist of representatives from the various  ovemment 
and inbtcret no.  193  of  10  August  1981,  Sall,  1993  vol.11  p.  160-165,  p.  170-173).  The  development  committees 
technical agencies  and are formallv  resuonsible  for  the  schedulmp.  coordination  and  evaluation o f all  locally 
investments  in most areaS and  a c& control also over  NGO-funded uro 
The TDRL ('Taxe  de  Dtveloppement R6giod et Local') was  introduced by h i  no. 88-64/A%RM of  15  March 
1988.  The  FDRL  ('Fonds de Dtvelouuement Rigional et  Local'  was  established by Loi  no. 88-6YAN-M of 15 
March  1988 (Sal1,'1993 v01 II p.  253'-i58). 
- 
Ips With the assistance of chefs  de  village - and if  necessary the gendarmes - the tax is collected  at  arrondissement 
regional  level. In practice,,however, many Fndmemfi ts  only  dispose of a considerab!y smaller  share, and of the 
level.  In principle 60% of  the  revenue  remain at this  level,  whereas  25%  go to the  cercle  level  and 15% to the 
remaining  amount  most 1s used  for salanes to secunty guards, mdwves and  admirustratwe  clerks, repam and 
improvements of offices and staff houses  (notably the house of the  chef d'mondissemen!) and fuel for office cars 
(Ousmane Traod, personal  communicatiop,  Oct.1994;  mterviews wth chefs  d'arrondmements,  and studes of 
budgets  for  seven  arrondissements in the S h s o  re@on,  the  autumn  of  1994). 
and  there has been a  substantial pressFe on the K o m t  government to initiate  speclfic  reforms (Cams, various 
'%Already at  the national conference  held in  July  and  August  1991 the issue  of decenplisation was much  debated, 
issues). For analyses ofthe decentralisatmn  ocess  since  1991,  see  e.g.  Felix,  1996;  Coulibaly,  1994;  Soke,  1997; 
Le Ripublicain no. 198 26 June  1996; MarcEs Tropicaux  5  May  1995  p.  922-924;  Soumare,  1995;  Le Dimocrate 
tdition spCciale  July  1995. 
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The specific competence  of  rural  councils  and  their  financial st tus have  been  subject  to  heated 
debates. It was  the  initial  intention that the rural communes  would be responsible  for  local tax 
collection  and  for  managing  a  local  budget  covering  e.g.  the  running  costs  of  primary  schools  and 
primary health  care.  It  was  alsoexpected  that  the ruralcouncils  would  get  competence to hire and 
f i e  staff of  the  various  government  technical  services.  Both,  however,  were  increasingly seen as 
unrealistic  by  both  local  observers and the  government  body in charge of the implementati~n’~~. 
When the last fieldwork was carried out in early 1996, it seemed likely that the central 
administration  would  remain  responsible  for  the  financing  of  the  various  social  services as well 
as for  personnel  management  (Kassibo,  1997  p.  12-12; Le  Rkpublicain  no.  198  26 June  1996; 
Ousmane Sy  and  Noel  Diarra,  personal  communication,  November  1994;  Noel D i m ,  personal 
communication  Feb.  1996). 
.6.3. Structures for formal  and  informal  influence on government  administration 
Until  elections to the  new  rural  councils in May  1999,  formal  structures  for  influence of the 
population on the government administration (except for the population in the 19 urban 
communes)  have  been  completely  absent.  Until  1986-87  no  attempts  were  made  to  allow  the  rural 
population to become  involved in local-level  decision-making.  During  a  short  period  from  1987 
to 1992  advisory  bodies  to  the  local  administration  consisting  of  representatives of th   population 
existed  on paper’’’,  but these bodies,  generally  acknowledged to be  useless,  were  abolished  by 
the new  government  in  1992  (Sow,  1992  p.  41-43,48-50;  Bishop,  1988 p. 18-19;  Gellar et al., 
1990  p.  29-30;  Sall,  1993  vol.II p.  160-165,  p.235-244).  Since the  change ofregime, however, 
it  has  represented  a  considerable  change that the  freedom  of  expression  and  the  emergence of the 
many  new  parties  have  made  it  easier  for  the  population to protest  against  patronising  and 
arbitrary  behaviour  by  government staff. It is now  possible to lodge  a  complaint  against  the 
government  administration  for  improper  treatment,  and  according to interviews  with  government 
staff, this may  negatively  influence  the  career  of  those  involved  (interviews  with  a  number  of 
chefs  d’arrondissement in the Sikasso region,  the  autumn of 1994). 
Regarding informal structures  of  influence,  much has been  done to prevent  development  of  close 
ties between  the  government  administration  and  the  local  population.  After  independence  new 
administrative  divisions  were  crafted  with a view to break  the  power of canton  chiefs. Thus, new 
cercles  usually  grouped  together  several  cantons,  and  the  arrondissements  were  created in such 
a way as to break  up or regroup the territories  of  the  old  cantons.  Although many chefs de canton 
had often been selected  by  the  French  without  considering their  legitimacy in the eyes of the  local 
l’’ La  Mission  de  Dekentraliisation  established  in  1993 ?th the  mandate  to  prepare  and  organise  the  implementation 
of reforms  to redehe the  administrative  and  economlc  relatlonship  between  the  central  government  level  and 
subordinate  levels (Sall, 1993  vol. I1 p.  325;  Kassibo,  1997  p.  6-7). 
‘Conseil de cercle’ and ‘consell de rigion’, respectively. Although formally established already in 1977 @Y 
These  advisory  bodies were  established  at  each of the  administrative  levels  and named  ‘Conseil d’amndissement’, 
Ordonnance  no.  77-44  of 12 July  1977  concemin the temtonal and  administrative  reorganisation of the  Republic 
of Mali and  further  described  by  DCcret  no.  14iP8-RM  and  Loi  no.  82-49/AM-RM), the Conseqs  de diveloppement 
were  not  operational  until  1986-87.  theory  members  were su posed  to  represent  ‘civil  soclety’ (‘re resentants 
des Organlsmes ?I cara&e  iconomlque et social’,  membres &S par  les  Conseils  de  Villages  et  les zonseils de 
Fraction’, Ordonnance no. 7 7 4  article  1 , article 20 and  article  3 1). F practice, however,  members of the councils 
were . .  often retired  civil  servants wth close  relatlons to the admustration. Bemg  totally  dominated  by the 
adrmulstration, the  influence of the councils  were  limited to ‘rubber  stamp’ decisons that  had  already  been  taken. 
by the  development  committees  (E3lsho  1988  p.  18-19;  Sow,  1992  p.  48-50;  Gellar et al.,  1990  p.  29-30; Sal4 1993 
vol.11 p. 160-165, p235-244; Yaya Siiidk, personal  communication  Oct.  1994). 
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population, the dissolution of the cantons has been described  by  Bishop as a  final  break  of the 
‘genetic’ link between  local  people  and  the  state:  instead  of  being  representatives  of  the  local 
population, the new  administrators  were  selected from a  professional  corps  of  nationally  trained 
civil  servants,  and their authority  depended  exclusively  on  their  hierarchal  superiors  (Bishop, 
1988  p.  12-13). 
At  independence,  the  government,  furthermore,  adopted  a  policy  of  frequent  circulation  of  state 
administrators  among  posts  all  over the country.  One  reason for the  policy  was  the  wish  to  ensure 
cohesion ofthe new  state by letting  all ethnic groups  getting to know  each  other.  Another  reason 
was the wish to prevent administrators from becoming entrenched in a particular area. 
Administrators,  thus,  were  never  assigned  to  their  home  area  where  it  was  feared  that  family ties 
could  have  a compting influence.  Subsequent  governments  including  the  present  government 
have  pursued  the  same  policy,  and s a consequence  few  administrators  are  knowledgeable  about 
local  conditions in the area  they  govern.  Nor  do  they  have time to become familiar, as they  are 
usually  reassigned  within  3-5  years  and  sometimes  already  after  1-2  years  (Bishop,  1988  p.  12-13; 
Ousmane Traori, personal  communication,  Oct.1994). 
Despite  the  various  means  used to prevent  informal  ties  between  government staff and  the 
population,  it  seems  that in practice  such ties often  play  a  considerable  role.  While  a  large  part 
of the rural population tend to perceive of the state  as  something  distant  and  useless,  mainly 
manifesting itselfin the form of tax collectors  and  agents  involved  in  repression,  findings  from 
the village survey in the Sikasso region  suggest  that many other  types  of  contacts  between 
government  agents  and  the  population  exist  (for  a  discussion  of this, see  chapter  11). 
During  the  one-party  era,  the  position  of  the  village  chief in the party  appears to have  significantly 
affected  the  assistance  provided to a  village.  Villages  which  were  canton  headquarters  during  the 
colonial  period still seem to hold  a  certain  power  advantage as compared to villages  with  a  less 
impressive past history. Villages where inhabitants have relatives in high positions in the 
government  apparatus - not  necessarily in the same  geographical  region as the village - seem  to 
enjoy  the  advantage  of  being  able  to  short-circuit usual administrative  procedures.  The  physical 
nearness  of  a  village  to  administrative  headquarters  matters, and so does  the  general  wealth of a 
village:  a  village  with  many  large-scale  cash  crop  producers  seems to be more  able to influence 
decisions by the government  administration than poorer  villages.  The  latter  relates to the issue 
of corruption which, according to information gained through the village survey, is still a 
common  means  used  by  people  wanting  to  influence the government  administration  (interviews 
with fanners and resource persons in the S i s o  region, the autumn  of 1994 and  Feb.  1996). 
Conclusion 
Whereas in the preceding  chapter  it  was  concluded  that  the  action  environment  although  far  from 
favourable cannot be characterised as completely dysfunctional to development, a similar 
conclusion  regarding the institutional  context  of  the  public  sector  seems more problematic.  Based 
on the above  description,  it  appears to be suffering  from  many  and  serious  constraints. 
’The budgetary  support i s  very low and is likely  to  negatively  affect  the  general  performance  of 
government  agencies. In certain  cases it may even be detrimental to their  basic  functioning  due 
to lack of resources for investments  and  recurrent  expenditures. 
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Low  salaries  and  retrenchment  of staf f  that  result in poor  motivation  and  widespread  corruption 
are critical  parameters  that  individual  agencies  may  find  it  extremely  difficult  to  overcome. While 
the various  measures  related to  stn~ctural djustment  policies may have  strengthened  the  overall 
economic situation of the country,  it  seems liiely that this has  happened  at the expense  of  the 
institutional  capacity of the state. 
Mali  is  characterised by a  historical  heritage  in  the  form  of  a  generally  centralised  and  hierarchical 
institutional set-up  based  on  the  mechanical  model. This provides  a  poor  basis for responsiveness 
by  the  various  government  agencies  to  demands  raised  by  their  clients.  Limited  formal  access  by 
the population to influence  government  structures M e r  reduces  possibilities of government 
agencies to gradually  adjust to changing  conditions  and  improve  their  performance. 
In chapter 5 it was concluded that the legitimacy of the government is not fundamentally 
challenged  by  developments in the  formal  political  system.  Still, the fact  that  informal  access  to 
government  shuctures is highly uneven  and to a  certain  extent  determined by corruption is likely 
to  negatively  affect  the  legitimacy. This  is at least so in the case  of  agencies  most  susceptible to
these  practices, and may also  affect  the  legitimacy of the state as such. 
Dimensions  of  corruption  makes  it  appropriate  to  consider  if  after  all  the  organic  approach, 
criticised in chapter 1 for neglecting the influence  of  societal  forces  on  state  structures  and 
policies, has something to offer in an  analysis of a  state  such as the  Malian.  The  approach 
obviously  provides  an  excellent  entrance  point to the study  of  corruption  and  informal  relations 
within the state  apparatus,  and  given  that  these  phenomena are important  also  in the Malian 
context, the contribution by the approach  cannot  be  ignored. What  was  criticised in chapter 1, 
however, was the tendency  by  theories  applying the organic  approach to concentrate only on  these 
phenomena  and  thereby  leave little scope  for  changes in state  and  society  relations,  including 
changes in the scale and  broader  nature  of  corruption,  generated by new  demands by societal 
forces. 
The overall  conclusion to the analysis  of the institutional  context of the public  sector is that many 
explanations for poor  performance of government  agencies may be  lodged in the environment 
beyond their own control. Or in the words of Grindle and Hilderbrand poorly performing 
officials  and  organisations  may  only  be  symptoms  of  dysfunctions  rooted  more  deeply in political, 
social and economic  contexts.  The  extent  to  which this is the  case for the four  agencies  under 
study is examined in chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 7. THE SIKASSO REGION 
Introduction 
The  present  chapter  contains a general  description  of  the  agro-ecological  and  socioeconomic 
setting in the Sikasso region.  Together  with  chapter 8 dealing  with  ongoing  social  and  political 
changes in  the  region, it provides  the  background for  understanding  analyses  in  chapter 9,lO and 
1 1 of the interaction  between  extension  agencies  and  farmers. 
The  chapter  presents a relatively  prosperous  region  characterised  by  favourable  conditions for 
agricultural  production.  The  picture  of  the  generally  privileged  situation of the  region,  however, 
is  modified  by the  description  of  two main sets  of  division of the  population: one is geographical 
and  relates  to  the  marked  differences  between  the  northern  and  the  southern  part  of the region, 
and one is socioeconomic and  reflects a differentiation of households  across  the  region. 
Koutiala  cercle  in the north  and  Kadiolo  cercle in the  south  differ  in a number  of  respects:  they 
are  populated by two  different  ethnic  groups,  natural  resources  are  more  abundant  in  Kadiolo, 
while  population  pressure  is  higher  and  social  conflicts  more  pronounced i  Koutiala.  The  most 
important  difference  between  the two parts  of  the  region,  however,  seems to be that cotton 
cultivation  was  introduced  much  earlier  in  Koutiala  than  in  Kadiolo,  hence  the  present  level  of 
integration into the  cotton  economy is considerably  higher in the  north. 
A certain  socioeconomic  differentiation  of  the  population  has  always  existed,  but  since  the 
integration  into  the  cotton  economy this seems to a very  large  extent to have  become  conditioned 
on the  level of mechanisation  of  individual  households  and  thereby  on  their  possibilities to grow
a large  area  of  cotton. 
While the north-south  division is further  discussed in chapter 8 on  social  and  political  changes 
in  the  region,  emphasis  in this chapter  is  put on a presentation  and  discussion  of  socioeconomic 
differentiation  processes. 
7.1. The Sikasso region as an administrative unit 
The  Sikasso  region is located  in  the  southern  part  of  the  country  where it borders  Burkina  Faso 
to the East and  C6te  d'Ivoire to the  South. 
In the  region  the  symbolic  and  mythological  importance of the Khedougou kingdom is still 
significant. This initially  rather  small  kingdom  was  established  in  present-day  southern  Mali  in 
the 17th century. By the  mid-18th  century it became  an  organised  state  and  by  the  mid-19th 
century the kingdom under the  reign of the Traor6 family199 started a rapid  expansion into 
neighbouring  empires.  It  became a commercial  centre  for  trade  in  slaves, guns, horses  and  gold 
and prospered by  demanding  tributes  from  villages  in  the  area  and  by  raiding  for  pillage  and 
slaves.  After  relatively  friendly  relations  with the French  who  assisted  the kings in their  various 
wars, tensions  between  the  French  and  the  Kinekiougou  kingdom  increased  during  the  1890s. In 
'BDoulaTraore(rei g1845-1860),Daou&Traori(1860-1862),MoloKunafaT~ri(1862-1864),TiebaT~o~ 
(1866-1893) and &%%a Traori (1893-1898). 
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1  898  the  French  demanded  an mud tax from  the  king  and the installation  of  a  French  garrison 
in the capital of The king refused, and a French army attacked the town. After a siege 
of two weeks  and  a  major  battle,  the  French  took  the  capital  on  1st  May  1898.  Rather than being 
captured by the French, King Babemba committed suicide. This act and the fact that the 
Ken6dougou  kingdom  was the last of the Malian  kingdoms to surrender to the French is often 
referred to by  the  local  population  who  consider the kingdom  a  symbol  of  African  resistance 
against  the  colonial  powe?”  (Loosvelt  et  al.,  1995  p.45-55;  Imperato  1986  p.  173-174; Warms, 
1992  p.488-489,  p.  492). 
During  the  colonial  period  the  area  controlled by the  former  kingdom  was  made  an  administrative 
unit  called the cercle  of Sikasso2o2. It was  headed  by  a  French  colonial  official (le commandant) 
and  further  subdivided  into 12 cantons  each  headed  by  a  chef  de  canton. In several  cases  the  chef 
de canton  was  identical  to the local  leader of the Kinkdougou  kingdom,  ‘the 
dougoukounassigui’203,  but  in  other  cases  the  French just appointed  a  person  of their choice.  The 
canton consisted of  several  villages  each  headed by a village  chief (‘chef de village’). A 
traditional  chief (‘chef  coutumier’)  already  existed in the  villages,  but the French  introduced the 
parallel position  of  administrative  chief  and  thereby  provoked  a  division  of  power  at  village 
level2”. The abuse of power in t h i s  period by many chefs de canton seriously discredited 
traditional  authorities  and  constitutes  a  root  causes  of many  present  day  conflicts in the areaZoS 
(Rondeau,  1980  p.  451-452;  Coulibaly,  1994  p.  24;  N’Golo  Coulibaly,  personal  communication, 
August  1998). 
Considerable  centralisation  both  of  political  power  and  of  economic  resources  took  place in the 
period.  The  town  of Sikasso expanded  and  received  certain  infrastructural  investments,  while in
In 1876  king  Tieba Traort moved the capital  of  the  Ken6dougou  kingdom to Sikasso which  was  thereby 
transformed  from  a  small  village  into  a  larger  town. 
201 In May 1998 an event  of  commemoration of the  battle of Sikasso lead  to  a  heated  discussion  among  Malian 
particular  (various  contributions to  the Maliiet, July  1998).  The  fact  that  Modibo  Keita, the fust president  of 
intellectuals  about  interpretation of  the  French  colonialism  in  general  and  the  symbolic  value of the  battle  in 
mde  endent Mali worked as a  teacher  in Sikasso when he prepared fhe establishment of his party , l’Union 
SouLaise RDA, associated S i s o  with the  independence  movement. T~LS has further  contributed to the Few of 
(Loosvelt  et al., 1995  p.  61; Warms, 1992  p.  492). 
Sikasso as an  area  of  resistance. Also the  current  president  Alpha K 0 4  has  earlier  worked as a  teacher  in Skasso 
In addition to the area controlled  by  the  K6nkdougou  kingdom  the  cercle  of S i s o  included  some  neighbouring 
areas. 
203 Under the Ken6dougou  kingdom the dougoukounassigui ,was the  leader of one of  several  villages.  He  was 
pFovided  with  a  woman,  a  horse,  a oom and  food by the vlllage  populabon,  and his tasks were to defend  the 
wllages  and to keep  the  king  (‘fama’yiformed  about  developments in his area. 
m The osition  of  chef  coutumier s inherited within the liieage of  the k t  inhabitant  of  a  village.  He is responsible 
natural  resource  management  and religious matters. %e admimsptive chef  de  village  represents the vil!age in,its 
for  lanfmanagement (hence, in the Min- community  he is ~ e d  ‘chef  de  terre’), de f~ t ion  of rules concerning 
relations  to gov-ent authorities,  and  for this he re?;ves a certau~ salary from the  government.  The  adrrrrmsmbye 
chef de village 1s ap ointed  b the government admmstrabon based  on  a  proposal  made  by the vlllage. To avold 
personal  cornmumcation, August 1998). 
competition  among  v%agers, x e  chef  coutumier often suggests  somebody from his  own  lineage  (N’Golo  Coulibaly, 
205 Many  chefs de canton  ocketed  the  money  paid  by  the Fm?h w t r a t i o n  for crops  cultivated  by the villages, 
and  it was very  common P or them  to  force  eople to grow theu mate fields  wlthout  any  remuneratlon  (Rondeau, 
c o l o d  period  at this very  day IS reflected III conflicts about  the  vlllage  leadership.  The  present  village chi f is a 1980 p. 451-452).  The  case ofMolobala vie9 illustrates  how J e  b+aviour of the then  chef de canton d e  the 
descendant  of  a  former  king  and  son ofthe chef de c,anton. After  1991 his position has been  challenged  by  fellow 
villagers who  in  addition  to  other  charges  refer to the Improper  behaviour  by hs father in the  past (iiterviews canid 
out  in  the  village in February  and  March  1996). 
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rural  areas  very  few  investments in physical and social infktmcture were  made by the French 
(Loosvelt  et al., 1995  p.  55-56,  p.  60-61). 
After  independence in 1960 Sikasso was  made  a  region  and  subdivided  into  seven  cercles206  and 
46 arrondissements  including  a total of  1821  villages.  This  division is being  changed  with  the 
final implementation of the ongoing  administrative  reformzo7. 
7.2. Population 
With apopulation of  1,473,895 in 1992  and an area of  71,790 k m z ,  the  population  density in the 
region  (20.5  inhab/km2)  is  relatively  high in a Malian context.  There is a  marked  difference 
between  the  densely  populated  northem  part  of the region,  including  the  Koutiala  cercle,  and  the 
more  thinly  populated  southern areas, where the Kadiolo  cercle is found2’*. A total  of  83%  of  the 
inhabitants live in rural areas (DRPS, 1994).  Estimates of the population growth rate v e  
considerably  from 2% p.a.  to  4.2%  (Loosvelt et al., 1995  p.  13;  Bagayoko & Bengaly,  1995 p.3). 
The  dominating  ethnic  group in the northern  Koutiala  cercle is the hhyanka, while the Senoufo 
constitute the most important  ethnic  group in the southern  Kadiolo cercle209.  Until the first 
anthropological  study  of  the  h4inyanka  community  was  made  by  DanieUe  Jonckers in the 198Os, 
it  had  been  cormnon  to  consider t a  subsection of the Senoufo  community or at  least  not  to  make 
any  major  distinctions  between the two2lo (Jonckers,  1987).  It is now  acknowledged  that the two 
groups  differ in several  important  respects,  including  the  level  of  centralisation of  decision 
making. Thus, in the Senoufo  community it is stil1  common to find  hierarchically-organised 
extended  families  where  the  head  of  household has the  sole  authority.  The  Minyanka  community, 
on  the  other  hand, is characterised by a  non-centralised  organisation.  Very  large  families  are  less 
common,  and  subordinate  household  members  have more individual  space  (Loosvelt  et al., 1995 
p. 15; Wentholt et al., 1998 p. 4; Demb616 et al., 1997 p. 2). 
7.3. Agro-ecological  conditions 
Conditions  for  production  of  cotton,  cereals  and  vegetables  are  favourable in the Siasso region, 
whereas the climate is not  sufficiently  humid for production  of  coffee,  cacao,  pineapple  and 
bananas  (Rondeau,  1980 p. 466).  The  region has the most  abundant  rainfall  pattern in Mali: 
2M The  seven  cercles are Bougouni,  Kadiolo, Kolonditba, Koutiala, Sikasso, Yanfolila  and  Yorosso. 
The  administrative  reform has resulted in the  establishment  of  9 rural copnunes in the Kadiolo  cercle  and  35 
rural communes in the  Koutiala  cercle (JORM, 1996  annex 3).  For a discussion of risks and  advantages  related  to 
the  establishment of the  many  ‘micro-communes’ in the Koutiala  cercle, see Kont,  1997. 
The  population  pressure in the  Koutiala  cercle is the  hi@est in +e county with  a  total  number of inhabitants 
population  of  112,016 inhabitants and  a  surface  of  5,37 km*, the  population  density in the Kadiolo  cercle is only 
of 315,413  (1992)  and  a  surface of 8,740 kmz, the PO ulatlon  denslty IS as hlgh as 36.1  inhab./kmz.  With  a  total 
20.8 inhab/kmz (DRPS, 1994). 
2w In the  entire Sikasso region  princi al ethnic  groups are, in order of importance, the Bambara,  the  Senoufo,  the 
Bobo,  the  Mmyanka, the Fulanl  and i7l e  Samogo  (L.oosvelt et al.,  1995  p.  15;  Wentholt et al.,  1998  p. 4; Dembelt 
et al.,  1997  p. 2). 
Jonckers’  study La socittt minwnka du Mali is raised as the  first  and  very  successful  anthropological  study of 
the Min communi@ that combines a Mod, an anthropological and an economic anthropological a roach 
(Amselfi88 p.  135-136). For another  study  published  a  year fter the  one by Jonckers, see Colleyn, l&. 
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average  annual  precipitations  vary  from  about  700 mm in the  northern  part  of the region  to  about 
1200 mm in the southern  part of the region  (CMDT,  1995b;  Berth6 et al., 1991 p.  8). 
Soils are fertile, but many researchers are concerned about the level of degradation. The 
mainstream  view  of the situation  seems  to  be that an increased  population  pressure  exceeds the
carrying  capacity  of  the  land2I1.  The  main  problem  highlighted  by  researchers is a  decreasing  soil 
quality  due to acidification,  ‘soil  mining’  and  soil  erosion. This is explained  by  changing  farming 
systems  that  imply  a  suppression  of  fallows  and  a  rapid  extension  of  the  area  cultivated.  Under 
these  conditions the level of application  of  fertilizers and  manure  and  of  soil  conservation 
techniques such as conslmction  of  small  dikes  and tree planting  are  insufficient to maintain  soil 
fertility. In addition  to  these  problems,  excessive  pressure  from  cattle  and  deforestation  resulting 
from increased domestic firewood consumption are often mentioned as factors  further 
contributing to the  degradation  (Guindo &van Campen,  1994  p. 4748; Berth6  et  al.,  1991  p. 60; 
Bagayoko & Bengaly,  1995  p.  8-13;  Maiga  et  al.,  1995  p.  47;  Giraudy,  1996  p.  3;  Pol & Giraudy, 
1993;  Hesseling & Coulibaly,  1991  p.  22-26,  Hilhorst & Coulibaly,  1998a p. 3; Thea Hilhorst, 
personal  communication,  June  1998) 
Tor  Benjaminsen,  who has a more optimistic  assessment of the situation,  has  called  attention to 
the fact that only few attempts have been made to quantify the regeneration and use of 
resources2’*,  and that in particular  there is a  lack of studies  over time @enjaminsen,  1996  p.  5). 
Recently,  he has challenged the mainstream  view by  the  presentation  of  a  study  that  shows  that 
at  least  firewood-induced  deforestation  does  not  represent  an  urgent  and  immediate  problem  even 
in  the  most  densely  populated  areas in the northern part of  the  region  (Benjaminsen,  1997  p.  169; 
Benjaminsen,  1998). 
Regardless of the conclusions  reached  with  regard  to the existence of a  degradation  problem,  all 
researchers  agree  that he situation  varies  considerably  from  the  northern  to the southern  part  of 
the  region.  Even  the  most  pessimistic  researchers  do  not  deny  that in the  southern  Kadiolo  area 
there is still plenty  of  uncultivated  arable  land,  hence  the  present  use  of  resources  does  not 
represent  a  threat  to  the  canying  capacity  (Pol & Giraudy,  1993  p.  22;  Berth6 et al., 1991 p.  9-13, 
p.  28;  CMDT, 1993ap. 16-18). 
Conflicts over natural resources 
Regional  differences with regard to land availability  are  reflected in the concentration of land 
tenure  conflicts in the northern  part  of the region,  whereas in the  southern  part  tenure  conflicts 
are still few. 
21’ In some cases the situation is descriied as very  dramatic, e.g.  by Souleymane @attara who  refers to “me 
croissance  dkmogmphique  galopante”  and a resulting  “dbgradation  mbversible d l’enwonnement” (Ouattara, 1993 
p. 13-15). 
2’2 For an  attempt to quantify  pastoral  resources  (i.e.  pastures,  water  and  mineral  resources) in the Sikasso region, 
by participants in $e ‘&&on de  concertation  des  structures  gestion  des  terroirs  en  koisieme rkgion’  held on 30 see MDRE, 1994m 9 15 It  should  be  mentioned  that ssumptions and  calculations m the  paper  were  questioned 
November  1994  at ESP-GRN, Sikasso. 
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Compared to the situation in other  parts  of the country  (e.g. the Niger  river  delta)  tenure  conflicts 
in the Sikasso  region are very fed13. In the Koutiala  area,  however,  there is a  tendency  to 
increased involvement of the government administration in the solution of tenure cases214 
(Sanogo, 1994 p. 17; deuxikme  adjoint  au  chef  d'arrondissement de Koutiala  central,  personal 
communication  Nov.  1994).  Increasing  pressure  on  the  land  in the north  and in consequence 
hereof  increased  awareness by villagers  of the value  of  the  land are believed  to  be  major  reasons 
for the registration  of  more  tenure  conflicts215  (Hilhorst & Coulibaly,  1998a  p.  3-5). 
Other factors,  however,  may  have  contributed as well.  During the recent  decade, civil servants 
and traders in the Koutiala  area  have  become  owners  of  quite  considerable  cattle  herds.  When 
these  urban-based  cattle  owners  have  conflicts  with  local  farmers,  they  tend to go  straight to the 
administration  with  their  cases,  instead  of  leaving  it to village  authorities to mediate.  Conflicts, 
which  would  otherwise  have  been  solved  locally,  thereby  becomes  registered  by  the  government 
administration216 (Yaya Sidebk, personal communication, Oct. 1994; Souleymane Ouattara, 
personal  communication,  Nov.  1994). 
Finally,  the  more l i t e d  capacity  of  village-level  political  stmctures in this part  of the region to 
manage  village-internal  conflicts  seems  to be a  contributing  factor. A few  decades  ago  it  would 
have  been  considered  a  scandal  that  a  village  chief was unable to mediate  between  two  conflicting 
parties  without  involving  the  government  administration.  The  loss of authority in recent  years by 
many  village  chiefs in the Koutiala  area has made people jump the village-level  mediation  and 
instead  present  their  cases to the administration2"  (Yaya  Sidebk,  personal  communication,  Oct. 
1994;  Demba Samakk, personal  communication,  Oct.1994). 
'l3 An unpublished  study  carried  out  by  the  Direction  Nationale  de  I'Elevage  in  1993  concludes  that  tenure  conflicts 
involving cattle owners are v few in the Sikasso region as compared to the situation in other arts of Mali 
(MDRE, 1994d).  See  also Cou%aly et al.,  1991  p.  69-82;  Crowley,  1991b; Kmtz et al., 1992 p.  21-87. 
'l4 Procedures for managing  tenure  conflicts  are  not  very  clear.  Accordin to the law ('Le Code domanial et 
foncier'), all conflicts  that  cannot be solved  at  village  level  have  to  be trans&red directly  to the juridical system. 
In practice,  however,  a  tenure  case i  first  seen by tlie  chef  d'arrondissement,  then transfirred to %he commandant 
de cercle,  and  only  in  case of failure to  solve  the  contXct  at this level,  it is transferred  to  the  jurimcal  system (Traort 
& Fomba,  1991  p. 29; Yaya  SidebC, persoMl .wmmunication,  October  1994).  A,ccordmg to Tinougou  Sanogo,.an 
average of 5-7 cases are transferred to theJun&cal system  every  month  in  Kouhala  (Sanogo,  1994 p. 17). Dunng 
an interview in November  1994. the deuxikme  adioint  au  chef  d'arrondissement de Koutiala  centrale  estimated  that .~~ ~~~~~ ~~ ~~ ~ . 
during  the  five  month  of  a &yseason, appro&ately  20 cases were  received  and  assed  on  to  the  juridical  system. 
Cases  regard  both  conflicts  in  relation to borrowed  land,  conflicts  concerning  field t oundaries  and  conflicts  deriving 
fiom cr<p damages  caused  by  cattle. 
'ls A  certain  land  grabbing seems to take  place  in  some  villages. Thus, more land than needed  are  cleared  and  fallows 
government  encies to strengthen  their ~laims vis-i-9~ neighbouin villages. Nuf"~ous vlllage  wood lots are 
are suppressed. The increasing  awareness  of  the  value of land is also reflected  in  attempts, to use  the  various 
situated exac Y y  at the boundaries of a  vlllage,  and villagers have as a ed  research  mstltuhons to install  tests  on 
pastlrres in disputed zones (H~lhorst & Coulibaly,  1998a  p. 5; Thea  Hilhorst,  personal  communlcatlon,  June  1998). 
216 The strength  of the new  type of cattle owners is reflected  in  a  different  outcome  of  cases  transferred to the 
administration.  Whereas  prevlously  cattle owneTs were liiely to  lose  the  battle in a  conflict  with  farmers,  civil 
servants and  traders  benefit  from  their  connec'aons  and  financial  means,  and  they  are  often  able to influence 
authorities to their own advantage  (Yaya SidebC, personal  communication, Oct. 1994). 
"'.The legitimacy  crisis  of  village-level  political structures is discussed in further  details in the next  chapter. 
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The  situation is v e y  different in the Kadiolo area in the south. In this part  of  the  region  only  few 
conflicts reach the government  administration218.  Although  rarely  brought  to  the  knowledge of 
the  government  administration,  conflicts  between  sedentary farmers and  transhumant  pastoralists 
seem to be on the increase (Sanogo, 1994 p. 35). After the return in the early 1990s of a 
significant  number  of  Malian  pastoralists i?om C6te d 'I~oire~'~,  the  pressure  on  pastures  has  been 
growinp (MDRE, 1994m  p.3).  Usually  transhumant  pastoralists  like th sedentary  population 
prefer  to  leave the solution  of  conflicts to village-level  political  structures"', but,in some  cases 
violent conflicts have forced government authorities to intervenez2 (chef d'arrondissement 
Kadiolo  central,  personal  communication  Nov.  1994). 
The limited  number  of  tenure cases presented to the administration in this part  of  the  region is 
likely to be explained fist, by the more  abundant  pastures  and  second, by the  authority  still 
possessed  by  village  chiefs inthe southm  (Sanogo,  1994  p.  13-16;  Souleymane Ouattara, personal 
communication,  Nov.  1994). 
7.4. Economic profde 
Cotton constitutes the main  economic axis in  the  region,  but  the  production  structure is highly 
diversified  and  includes  both  cereals nd vegetable  production,  livestock  production  and  a  range 
of non-farm activities such as e.g.  migration,  trade and handicraft. 
Cotton 
With  a wish to  break the American  control  of  the  provision  of  cotton  to  the  French  textile 
industry, the French  colonial  power in the beginning  of the century  launched  an  extensive 
programme  to  promote  cotton  cultivation in West Africa. Despite the existence of a weli- 
In Kadiolo central only two cases were on  oing  when  the  chef  d'arrondissement  was  interviewed  in  November 
1994.  One of the  cases  dated  back to 1956 or three  decades the case had  been  presented  to  the  admimistration at
regular intervals without  ever &mg transferred to the legal  system.  Snmlar mfomation was  given by chefs 
d'arrondissement  in  Fourou  and  Loulouni  (Interviews  carried  out  in  October  and  November  1994). 
'l9 h the  early-1990s  violent c o n f l i c t s  between  Ivorian  farmers  and  Malian  transhumant  astoralists  resulted  in  the 
adoption by the Ivorian  government of a  range  of  laws  that  seriously  obstructed tl?e movements by Malian 
pastoralists in C6te  d'Ivoire,  e.g. a  demand  that  cattle  can  only  be transported across the  border  by  vehicles ( h t h  
du Drecteur Regional de 1'Elevage  in Sikasso, personal  communication,  September  1994). 
220 The majority of conflicts  are  around  watering  points.  More  cattle are coming into the re ion 60m outside,  and 
it  has furthermore contributed to increasing  confhcts  that  farmers a e now  estabhshmg  smalfgardens  of  vegetables 
or larger unfenced plots of rice  around  land  previously  treated s 'livestock-only  zones'  (Joshua  Ramisch,  personal 
communication, August 1998).  During  village  intervlews  taken  in  N'Golokasso, Chiime and  Nafegue,  all  situated 
in  the  Kadiolo  cercle  close t  the  border to C6te  d'Ivoire, the  issue  of  transhumant  pastoralists  were  brought up a g m  
and  again  (November-December  1994). 
Herders  do  not have much  choice  and are inevitably  classed as the villains, when villagelevel authorities  resolve 
a  conflict  (Joshua  Ramisch,  personal  communication,  August  1998). 
This was the case  when  in  1992 a Fulani  transhumant  pastoralist  killed  a  woman  from  N'Golokasso  village. In 
revenge  he  was  killed  himself  by  a  group  of  young  men 60m the village.  The  young  men  executing an order  by the 
village  chief  were  taken  to  prison  by the chef d'mndissement. After  the  $llage in 1995  had  paid 700,000 CFA (= 
7,000 FF) two of the men were  released,  while two others  remained in pnson when the  latest  interview  was  taken 
in  February  1996  (information  given  by the vlllage  population  and the village  chief  in  Dec.  1994  and  Feb.  1996). 
A third  factor  ssibly  contriiuting to the limited  number of conflicts  between  villagers i  the  existence  of  taboos 
concerning congcts over  land.  Peo le rather  leave  the  land to somebody  else than risk  to  cause the an er of 
ancestors  by  speaking  about  limits  of  &e  land.  Such taboosalso exist  in Koutiala, but there  they  are  gradually  fosing 
importance  (Souleymane Ouanara, personal  communication,  November  1994). 
114 
developed local cotton production and handicraft cotton textile industries, French efforts 
generally  failed.  The  measures  used  were  forced  cultivation  of  imported  varieties  (abolished  in 
1946),  establishment  of an extension  programme,  and  introduction  of tax payment  in  cash  rather 
than kind.  Prices,  however,  remained  low,  and  competition  from  local  handicraft  cotton  industries 
implied that exports  were  negligible.  By  the late 1920s  the  French  had  virtually  abandoned the 
cotton  programme  in  the Sikasso area As the  climate  prevented  a  large  scale  production  of  other 
cash  crops  such as e.g.  coffee  and  cacao,  the  French  considered the  region a labour  force  reserve 
for  plantation  activities in the  coastal  area  (Roberts,  1995  p.  223-236;  Fok,  1994a p. 330-331; 
Rondeau,  1980  p.  410-412,  p.  466;  Jonckers,  1987  p.  195-196)224. 
After  World War II the  French made a second  attempt. In 1949  the  parastatal  CFDT225 was 
established  to  promote  the  production  of  cotton  in  West  Africa in  order to generate an income 
from the  colonies  and  redress  the  French  trade  deficit.  Seeking  to  leam  from  past  failures,  CFDT 
made an effort to ensure  stable  and  acceptable  producer  prices.  Relatively soon production 
exceeded  local  demands,  and  with  the'assistance  of  the  colonial  administration226  the  company 
got a  monopoly ofpurchase, grinding  and  export  of  cotton  (Deveze,  1994  p.  6-7;  Fok,  1994a  p. 
331-332). 
At  independence,  the  importance of CFDT  for  the  generation  of  incomes  to  cotton  producers  and 
export  earnings to the  country  made  the  new  government  allow it to  continue its activities  without 
major  changes.  Unlike  similar  companies  in neighbouing countries,  CFDT  gradually  took  up 
more  and  more  development tasks. In addition to organisation  of all aspects  of  production  and 
marketing of cotton,  the  company  also  became  responsible  for  extension  activities  in  relation o 
cereals  production, it became  involved  in  provision  of rural inhstructure such as roads and water 
supply,  credit  provision,  organisation of f m e r s  at  village  level,  and  organisation  of  literacy  and 
account  courses (Fok, 1994a  p.  331-333;  Deveze,  1994  p.  7-8;  Marchan& 1991  p.  76-80). The 
partial  nationalisation in 1974  of  CFDT through the  establishment  of  CMDT  formalised the 
mixed  role  of  the  agency as both a  public  agent  and  a  private  sector  actor with economic  interests 
in cotton  production,  processing  and narkeetin$^. 
Since  independence  the  area  cultivated  by  cotton  has  expanded  rapidly:  since  1960  the  area  has 
six-doubled,  and  in  the  decade  1984-  1994  alone it has  almost  doubledu8. In the  northern  part  of 
the  region the expansion  started already in the 1960s,  whereas in the  southern  part of  the  region 
224 The  French  had  a  similar  negative  experience in  Upper  Volta  where  local copon  produ$ion  was also well- 
developed  before the introduction by the  colomal  power  of production for industnal processmg ( L a r s e n ,  1996 p. 
15-16). 
of th; shares, whili theie5 is controlled  by  privati.  interests (Fok, 1994  p.  331). 
226 The assistance not  least  consisted  in  the  collection of taxes that forced  farmem to continue  and  even  expand the 
production of cotton (Deveze,  1994  p.  7). 
When CFDT was nationalised  in  1974,  the  Malian  government was given 60% of the shares in  the  new  com  any 
CMDT  (Comp  e  Malienne  pour  le  Dtvelo  pement  des  Textiles),  while  40%  remained  in the hands of C h T .  
(Bulletin de l' *%que Noire no. 1697  Nov.  1894  p.6;  Bulletin  de  l'Afiique None no. 1743 10 Nov.  1995  p. 3) 
The cnlc&ih in hesed on addition of data  for the CMDT  regions  Koutiala  and Sikasso which  together 
cones ond to the  administrative Sikasso region.  The m cultivatd bfcotton in the Koutiala re ion was  13 S9 ha 
in  19& and  87,104 ha in  1994,  while  in  the Sikasso region it  was  6,710 ha in  1960  and 56,Ld ha  in  1994. 
_.._ - __.._ . ~~ 
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the  process has only  been  gaining  pace  in  the 1980sZz9 (CMDT,  1995b  p. 3;  Sanogo,  1989  p.  149). 
In the beginning,  the  production  was  characterised  also  by  a  marked  increase in yields,  but  since 
the  mid-1980s  yields  have  been  virtually ~tagnatin$~~ (Fok, 1994 p.  113; Ktbe et al., 1995b  p.2). 
Food production 
Contrary to the earlier  widespread  belief that an  expanding  cotton  production '- as cash  crop 
production in general - tends to  replace  food  cropsz',  it is the experience in the Sikasso  region 
as well as in other  parts of the  Sahel,  that  cotton  and  cereals  production are mutually  reinforcing. 
The positive impact  of cotton on  food  crops is explained  partly by the introduction into cotton 
production of modem  agricultural  practices  (such as mechanisation  and the use of  fertilizers) 
which  also  benefit he productivity  of  food  crops.  Partly  it is explained  by the fact that income 
from cotton  production  allows  more  flexibility in (and  often  reduction of) cereals  sale232 (Diont, 
1989;  Raymond & Fok,  1995  p.  225;  Coton et Diveloppement no.17 1996 p.11-12;  Giraudy, 
1996  p. 8). Thus, in Sikasso  cereals  (millec  sorghum  and  maize)  account for no less than 68% 
of the cultivated  area233,  while  cotton  represents  only  about  20%234.  The  remaining area is used 
for  pulse  crops  (10%)  and  vegetables (2%) (CMDT,  1995b  p.4;  Coton  et Dtveloppement no.17, 
1994  p.6). The Sikasso  region is self-sufficient in food,  and the cereals  production  per  capita is
considerably  higher  than  in  other  regions  of wiz ' '  (MATDB, 1987; K6bt & Brons,  1994  p.  10- 
11;  Coton et Dtveloppement  no. 17 1996  p.  11). 
At the household  level  the  positive  correlation  between  cotton  and  cereals  production is reflected 
in the fact  that  coarse  grain  production  per  capita,  net  grain  sales  per  farm,  and  per  capita  grain 
availability are markedly  higher  for  cotton  producers than for non-cotton  producers,  and  higher 
for large-scale  cotton  producers than for small-scale  producers  (Weber et al., 1988 p. 1047; 
22g~IntheKoutialaregion~thear.e;tcultiMtedincreasedbyafactor3.7intheperiod~960to1980(52,417ha~1980), 
while  in  the Sikasso regon the mcrease  in  the  same mod was  2.8  (18,867  ha m 1980).  After  1980 the mcrease, 
however,  has  been  more  rapid  in the Sikasso region  f200% from 1980 to 1994)  than in the  Koutiala  region  (66% 
from  1980 to 1994). 
In the  Koutiala area average  'elds  in  1960  were  about  200 kfha, in  1985/86  they  reached 1,300 kgha and  since 
then  they  have  varied  around ti% level. In the  southern art o the  reglon yelds are still increasing  but  at  a  lower 
level. In an esthnate of the development  until  year  2000, 8MDT  does  not  expect a yield  increase  above  1,300-1,400 
kgha (CMDT,  199%  p. 3; Giraudy,  1996 p. 6). 
231 This view  is  represented  in  e.g.  Campbell,  1984  who  refers  to  the  conclusion  of  several  studies  made  in  Cdte 
d'Ivoire  during  the  1970s. 
the  level  of &m technolo  and  3) the  level  of mst~btional supporting s e ~ c e s  (Staatz,et al., 1989  p.  713). y e r e a s  
232 Accordin  to Staatz et al., incomes  from  cereals, sales  depend  on 3 conditions: 1) rainfall  and soil conditions 2) 
conditions  number 1 a n g  mainly  explain  the  $ffe.rence  between the Sikasso ':@on and, other regons m the 
country,  condition  number  2  is  central to the  exphcafion  of  soclal  mfferences wthm the regon. 
Unliie cotton, yields  for  millet  and sorghum have  virtually  stagnated  since  independence  at  about  800-1,000 kgha
for  millet  and 400-600kgha for sorghum. Maize  yields  vary  around 1,500 kgha (K& et al., 1995 p. 2). 
234 There is an import@  difference  between  +e  northern  part  of  the  region,  the  Koutiala-area,  where  the share of 
cotton of  the area cult~vated by a  household  vanes  between  20%  and SO%, and  the  southern part, the Kadiolo-area, 
where the share is 10-30% @&e & Brons, 1994 .3). CMDT expects the share of cotton  to  mcrease to 25% of the 
cultivated  area in the  region  by  year  2000 ( C d T ,  199% p. 4; see also  Giraudy,  1996 p. 6). For cotton-  owing 
households  the share of  cotton is 26%  of  the  cultivated area, whereas  for  non-cotton-growing  households ti? e  share 
of  cereals is 82%  (Coton et DCveloppement no. 17  1996 p. 6). 
235 Cereals  production  per  capita  varies  around  380  kg  in  Koutiala  and 350 kg  in  Kadiolo  (235 kg for  the  entire 
Sikasso regon) as compared to a  national  average  of  about  164 kg (PNUD, 1987;  K&e & Brons, 1994 p. 11). 
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Sanogo,  1989  p.  148;  Dione,  1989;  Raymond & Fok,  1995;  Coton  et  Developpement  no. 17 1996 
p. 12). 
Livestock 
A  similar  positive  correlation exists between cotton production  and  livestock  raising.  Since  the 
introduction of animal traction in the 1960s, the number of draught oxen possessed by a 
household has been  decisive to the size  of the area cultivated  by  cotton, and there is a clear 
tendency  for  farmers to invest  the  surplus  &om  cotton  production  in  cattlez36  @&be &Brons,  1994 
p.  5;  KebC et al., 1995b p.  6-7;  CMDT,  1992  p. 21). The  simultaneous  increase in cattIe  raising 
by fanners and the southward  movement  of  transhumant  pastoralists  after the droughts in the 
1970s  and  early 1980s have made  Sikasso the leading  cattle-producing  region in the 
After the devaluation  of the CFA in 1994 and the recent  return of many  Malian  transhumant 
pastoralists  from CBte d’Ivoire, the importance  of  livestock  production in Sikasso  has  further 
increased  (Bengaly et al., 1993 p.  5-6; MDRE, 1994 p. 3; March&  Tropicaux  28  June  1996  p. 
1357). 
Non-agricultural activities 
In  the case of  cotton  production  and  non-agricultural  activities,  the  correlation  seems to be 
inverse: the involvement  by  a  household in out-migration,  trade  and  handicraft  increases  as the 
importance of cash crops  production  diminishes. In a  study tlom 1985 it was  found that only 
about  26%  of  households  surveyed in the  CMDT area were  involved in non-agricultural  activities, 
whereas in the  predominantly  food  crop  producing O H v - ~ o n e ~ ~ *  nearly  50% of the households 
were  involved in such activities @ion&, 1989 p. 294-296).  Due to extensive  migration,  the 
economy in the  Kadiolo  area  until a few  years ago has been  oriented  more  towards  CBte  d‘Ivoire 
than towards the rest of the country. With the expanding cotton production, however, the 
importance of migrant remittances seems to be d e ~ r e a s i n 2 ~ ~  (TorBenjaminsen, personal 
communication,  March  1997). 
Kkbk and Brow mention that an  estimated 2040% of net cotton  incomes are invested  in  cattle,  and  an  estimated 
15% are invested in small  ruminants  (Kebe & Brons,  1994 p. 8). 
”’ Figures  on  livestock  production are generally  not  very  reliable  because of wides  read  smuggling across the 
borders.  Furthermore,  a tax of 250 CFAhead of cattle,  100 CFNdonkey and  50 &Ahead of small  rumlnant 
discourages  correct  regishation (Le Faye, 1992 p.  35). Still, it appears from official  statistics  that  cattle  production 
in the  Mopti  region until 1985  exceeded  that  of  the Sikasso reaon, whereas m the late  1980s Sikasso took  over  the 
leading  position  engaly  et  al.,  1993 5). In  1992 Sikasso accounted  for  about  20% of the total  Malian  cattle 
production  (cal 2. &on  based on MD&, 1994  p. 3  and  March&  Tropicaux  3  March  1995  462).  Draught oxen 
make up an estimated 20% of the total  number  of  livestock  (cattle, small ruminants,  do&eys  and  porc) in the 
p. 1356). The  remaining 30% are owned  elther  by  transhumant  pastorafists or by  urban-based groups such as clvd 
southern  part of Mali, while  another  50% F e  owned  by  cotton-cultivatin fanners (Mach& Tropicaux  28  June  1996 
sewants or traders. Dunng the  1980s  the  importance of the latter has increased  significantly  (Yaya  Sldebk,  personal 
communication,  October  1994). 
?’*The OHV (Operation Haute Valle) is a government agency established in 1964 to romote agricultural 
development  in an area  around  Bamako  stretching %om Banamba  in the north to Ouelesse % ougou  in the south 
pione, 1989 p. 286-290). 
239 Whereas  reference to migration as an important aspect of livelihood  strategies  in the region is made in many 
reports (e.g. Ouattara,  1992; KebC & Brons,  1994;  Loosvelt  et  al.,  1995),  very  limited  data  on  its  proportion and 
specific  economic  importance  exist. 
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Farm  income 
Lack  of  reliable data on the  distribution of total farm  income on various  agricultural  and  non- 
agricultural activities prevents  a  calculation  of  the  real  importance of cotton  cultivation for 
individual  households240.  The  only dataavailable  indicate  the  share  of cotton in net  income  from 
farming  activities. If net income  from  farming  activities for an  average  household is calculated 
as the simple  difference  between  production  value and input  costs, the share,of cotton has 
increased  from  about  40% in the early  1990s  to  about  55%  after  the  devaluation in 199424' (K6bC 
& Brons,  1994 p. 8; K6bB  et  al., 1995ap. 5). If, however,  the monetary income is considered  (i.e. 
food  consumed  by  the  household  and  losses  are  subtracted),  cotton  accounted for more  than  two 
thirds of  net  farming  income  for  an  average  household in 1994  (Coton et Developpement  no.  17 
1996 p. 11). With the exception of public employment, no activities generate an income 
comparable  to the income  from  cotton  cultivation (CMDT, 1992  p.  22). 
Until  1985  net  incomes  from  cotton  production  slightly  increased,  but the s ppression in the mid- 
1980s  of  input  subventions  made  the purchasiig power of  cotton  farmers  fall  dramatically (Fok, 
1994 p. 333; Raymond & Fok, 1995  p.  222;  CMDT,  1992  p.  22).  Although  a  price  increase  in 
1991  and  particularly  the  increase  in  1994  have  raised the incomes  of  cotton  producers,  their  share 
of the surplus generated by the upsurge in international  cotton  prices and the 1994-devaluation 
remain  very r n o d e ~ e ~ ~  (Dion&,1995 p. 13). 
7.5. Social  indicators 
The  general  impression by observers  both  inside  and  outside of Mali is that  the  Sikasso  region, 
given the large  production  of  both  cotton,  cereals  and  livestock, is more  prosperous  than  other 
regions  in  the  country  (e.g. Staatz et al., 1989  p.  713; Maigaet al., 1995 p. 51;  Bingen  et al., 1995 
~ . 5 * ~ ~ ) .  Thus, wealth is displayed in the form of  consumer  goods  such as e.g.  clothing,  motorbikes 
and  radios  both in the larger  towns as Koutiala  and Sikasso and in surrounding  rural  areas 
(Sanogo,  1989  p.  238). 
2~ A  limited  study  including  only  30  households  m  five  villages  in  the Sikasso region has attempted  to  describe  the 
dis@iiution of  income on monetary  income,  non-monetary  income 60m production  and  non-monetary  income 6om 
other  sources  @ernMl& et al.,  1997  p.  19-22). As the presentation  of  data  reflects the primary  interest of the  study 
in  differences of income  sources  for  individual  household m e m e  (notably  dlfferences  between men and  women), 
findings 6om the  study are difficult to use  for  a calculation of the unportance  of  cotton m total  household  mcome. 
24' A  study  has  found  that the share  of  cotton in average  net  farming  income of a household  in  Koutiala  was  45% 
the  impact of the  devaluation  shows  that  in  both  cercles th  share  of  cotton  m  average net household  income om 
in the  period  1990-92,  whereas in Kadiolo  it  was  37%  in the  period  1988-92  (K&b& & Brons,  1994 p.8). A  stud on 
farming  activities  had  increased  to  58%  in  1994-95 (K&,& et al., 1995a p.5) 
l. 
w2 The nominal international  price  of  cotton fibre rose by  180% in 1994/95,  while the producer  rice  in  Mali  rose 
only  by  45%.  CMDT  reported  a  net  profit  in  1994 of more  than  10  billion  CFA,  while  the  leve P of  com  ensation 
for  family  labour invested  in  cotton  by  producers  increased on1 by  5% after the deraluatlon @ion&,  1985  p.  13). 
In 1995 the net profit of CMDT rose  to 20 billion  CFA, a d i n  1996 the expected  profit  was 30 blllion CFA 
(L'Ind6pendant  no. 54 22  February  1996  p.  6). 
According  to  Bmgen et al., the  estimated  household  income for Malian  cotton  farmers  prior  to  the  January  1994 
devaluation was 100,000 CFA or five  tvnes  the national av  e for all  farmers  (Bingen  et  al.,  1995 l: 5). A ret$ 
study  inch-  a l i i t ed  sam le of 30 hoyeholds suggests  at  average  household  incomes  in  the &asso reDon 
may be as h1gh as 230,000  FA  (Dembele  et aL.1997 p.  24-28). h e  to the lack of reliable data on income, 
reservations  must be made  for  all spec~fic figures gIven. 
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Somewhat  surprising,  however,  three  studies  of  poverty  in  Mali  undertaken in he early-1990s  by 
the  World Bank, the  national  statistical  office  and  a  team  of  international  consultants  all point to 
the  conclusion  that the Sikasso region  ranges as one  of  the  poorer  regions  in the con@ (World 
Bank, 1993a; MEFP, 1993; IDS, 1994). All ofthe reports  apply amultidimensional concept of 
poverty which  takes  into  account  both  consumption  levels,  access to health  and  education, 
knowledge  and  cultural  values.  However, in two of  the  studies  the  classification  of  the Sikasso 
region  immediately  after the poorest  region  in the country, the Mopti  region, and well below the 
northern  regions  Tombouctou  and Gao, results from definition  of  a  poverty line based solely on 
e x p e n d i t t ~ s ~ ~ ~  (World Bank, 1993  p.  9; MEFP, 1993  p. 16-17). In addition to general  problems 
such as limited  reliability of data2&, emphasis  put  on  expenditures  can  be  criticised for providing 
only a situational as opposed to a  more  historical  picture  of  poverty,  for  neglecting  the  structural 
dimensions of poverty,  and for not  approaching  the  overall  issue  of VulnerabiliT. 
Despite  these - important - shortcomings  of  the  studies, it must  be  acknowledged  that  also  social 
indicators  tend  to  assign Sikasso a  less  prominent  position i  the  regional  distribution  of  wealth 
than it could have been expected. Data are generally not very reliable, differ considerably 
according to sources, and  more  recent  data  are  not  available.  However,  even th  most  favourable 
assessments  of  the  situation i the Sikasso region  do  not  suggest  health  and  educational st ndards 
markedly above the national  average,  and  more  negative  assessments  place it in the bottom  of 
national  statistics. 
According to the  national  statistical  office,  thus, in 1980-85 a gross school  enrollment  rate  of nly 
12% in the Siasso region248  was the lowest in the country.  The  national  average  in the same 
The  three  studies are 1)  an  assessment of living  conditions  in  Mali  published  by  the  World  Bank  (World  Bank, 
1993a),  2)  a  of  the  overty  profile  in  the  country  undertaken by the  Mali  National Office of Statistics  and  Data 
Processing (MEFP, 1993)  and  3) a study cmied out by a  team  from the Institut  Universitaire  #Etudes  du 
various  African  countries (IDS, 1994). 
DCveloppement WED) in Geneva as part  of  a  larger  assessment  of  World  Bank  poverty  alleviation  activities in 
m The WB assessment bases the  overty lime on the maximum yearly per ca ita  expenditure of the  poorest 40% of 
the population  (World  Bank, 1983a p.  8-9). The  study  by  the  statistlcal ,Ace, on the other hand, focees on the 
household  consumption  basket  measured in calories  and  takes as a  reference  point  the  level of consumptlon  below 
which the o ulation cannot satisfy food  requirements.  This  is  then  converted  into  a  money equivaknt (MEFP, p. 
13). The &l% teamdoes  not  present  a  regional  profile of poverty,  but  the  report do!s not  question  those  presented 
by the  other  studies.  In  fact  the eam substantiates  the  characteristic of southern  Mall as relatwely  poor by  mcludmg 
in the study  a report on rural poverty  in  south-western  Mali (IDS, 1994 p.  65-77). 
The W B  assessment is based on results Of aMtiOM1  household  budget  survey  conducted in 1988/89 by the Mali 
National Statistical  Office, on an  urban  household  consumption  survey  carried  out  in  1985/86  in  the  regional 
capitals, on a  beneficiary  assess.ment  of  urban  ppverty carried out in Bamako UI late 1992, on a  rapid rural 
assessment  conducted in Kayes,Shso and M o p  m early  1993,  on the 1987-swey of  health  and Togra hy  in 
Mali  and on vanous studies w e d  out by NGOs and donors (world Bank,  1993  p. 8). The  study published g y the 
Statistical Office is also based  on  results  of the 1988/89  consumer  budget  survey (MEFP, 1993 p.  9-1 l), and the 
WED study  is  based on a  critical &g of the WB assessment, on a mxsion to Mali  by the team  and on a  special 
study on rural poverty in South-western  Mali by  Adrian Mgi (IDS, 1994 p. 7). 
247 These points  of  criticism  and  several  others  are  raised by the ,WD-team (IDS,  1994  p.  20-27)  and are also 
touched upon by the authors themselves when e . they e x p l v  the relatively low mcidence of poverty in 
Tombouctou  and Gao by the  relief  assistance provid4 to these regom by NGOs and  donors after years  of  drought 
and civil unrest (world Bank,  1993a p.  9). 
248 The report operates  with  a  regional  division  where :rural sud' is  more or less  identical to the administrative 
Sikasso region.  According to schoolteachers  mtemewed II? the  villages  under  stud  the  school  enrollment rate has 
even been decrming after 1991. Before the  change  of regme parents  often brib el? the head master, if they  wanted 
to  keep  their  chddren  away fromschool,  whereas  the  present  geneml  lack of respect  for  government  authorities  has 
made  them  abandon  that  ractice,  and  more  now  prefer  to  send  the  children fo work in the fields  rather  than 
allowingthem to go to sckool. In some  vllyages  (e.g.  Kolom)  confllcts  regarding  vlllage authority  are  said to have 
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period was  23%249,  and  for  comparison  it  can  be  mentioned  that  it  was  17% in the northern 
regions (MEFP, 1993  p.  34). A slightly  more  positive  picture is presented by two  other  sources: 
the World  Bank  poverty  study  points at Kayes  and  Mopti as the two  regions with  the lowest 
school  enrollment  rate  (World Bank,  1993a  p.20),  while  an  older report  from the Ministry of 
Territorial  Administration  compares  a  school  enrollment  rate of 17.8% in the Sikasso region to 
a  national  average  of all regions  except  Bamako  of  18.2% (MATJIB, 1987).  Regarding  the 
literacy rate, the various  sources  differ  even  more.  A  rough  estimate  of  20% in the Sikasso 
region2’’  (Le  Faye, 1992 p.4)  compares  favourably  to  a  national  average of 18%  (1980-85)  and 
in particular to an average  of rural areas of  only  8%  indicated by the  national  statistical ofice 
(MEFP,  1993 p.5). World  Bank  sources,  however,  present  a  higher  estimate of the  national 
average  (23% in the period  1980-85  according to World  Bank,  1996  p.  217251). 
According to the regional  statistical  office,  the  estimated  life  expectancy i  the  Sikasso  region is 
54 years  (Loosvelt  et al., 1995  p.  13).  Depending  on  the  sources, this is substantially  above or 
sightly under the national  average (48  years  according to World  Bank,  1993a p.14 and World 
Bank, 1996 p. 216,  but 57 years  according  to  MEFP,  1993  p.7). Also figures  on the number  of 
inhabitants  per  doctor  vary  around  the  national  average252.  The  most  striking  information  on the 
health  situation,  however,  is  the  substantial  share  of  malnourished  children  in this high-producing 
agricultural  region. A survey  by a  Norwegian-Malian  team has found  that 41% of children  under 
five  years in Koutiala  are  chronically  malnourished. This corresponds  to the hdings by  the  same 
team in the Gourma  region in the northern  part  of  the  country ( D i m  et al., 1992 p.  3;  Oshaug 
et al., 1992  p.  12-13). Also the  statistical  office  highlights  the  problem  of  widespread  malnutrition 
in the Sikasso region and adds that also uudemowishment  among the poorest  population is more 
prevalent than in other  parts of the  country  (MEFP,  1993  p.  26-28). 
7.6. Socioeconomic  differentiation 
The main reason  for the surprisingly  low  average  figures  on  indicators f wealth in the Sikasso 
region seems to be the existence of a  substantial  group  of  very  poor  households  and  a  smaller 
group of  extremely  poor  households.  Thus,  growing  general  prosperity in the  region  has  been 
accompanied by increasing  economic  inequalities  resulting in marked  differences  between 
farmers with  ox-traction  and  sufficient  equipment,  farmers  with  insufficient  equipment  and 
farmers  depending  on manual cultivation  (Jonckers,  1994 p.  121-122;  Sanogo, 1989 p.  238-244; 
contributed to the problem, as a  strong  village  chief  used  to be able to make the  villagers  obey  when  he  told  them 
to send  their  children  to  school. 
249 Also the World Bank indicates  that  the  national gross enrollment  rate  was  23%  in the period  1980-85  (World 
Bank, 1993a p. 15,  World Bank, 1994e). According to UNDP, the  most  recent  estimate is a  national  rate  of  32% in 
1995  (UNDP,  1998 p.  163). 
The  estimate is supported  by  a  survey  undertaken  b DRSPR in  1991  &t  found  literacy  rates  for  men  between 
(Coulibaly et al., 1993 p.  1  in the  annex). 
16%  and  41%  and  for  women  between  1%  and  11%  &&est  in  the  Koutlala  area  and  lowest  m the Kadiolo area) 
The most  recent  estimate  (1995) of the national  literacy  rate  is  3  1% (UNDP, 1998  p.  147). 
2s2 Le  Faye  and  Loosvelt  et al., both  basing  their,  information on data f?om the  regional  statistical office, differ 
considerably  with  res  ect o the  number  of  inhabltants er doctor:  according to Loosevelt it is 25,702  (Loosvelt, 
1995 p. 33,  while  Le F aye  mentions  19,500 (le  Faye, 19 8 2  14).  The  national  average  is  25,000  according  to  the 
statistical office (MEFP, 1993  p.  6)  but  only  19,450  accor&g  to  the  World,Bank  (World  Bank,  1996).  The  older 
report  by  the  Ministry of Territorial  Admiiistratlon  compares 61,657  inhabltants  per  doctor  in the Sikasso  region 
to a  national  average  of  45,634  (MATDB,  1987). 
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Colleyn, 1988 p.  62;  CMDT,  1992  p.  20-22).  The  situation is reflected in the conclusion by  the 
Norwegian-Malian  nutritional  study  that  differences in the nutritional  situation of the  various 
households are to be explained  mainly by differences in wealth (Diana et al., 1992  p.  11). 
No studies  on  socioeconomic  differences in the region  have  applied an approach that focuses  on 
vulnerability  and  coping  capacities.  The  few  existing  studies  all  focus  on  monetary  incomes, 
primarily  from  agricultural  and  livestock  production. 
For lack of more  comprehensive  data,  an  indication  of  socioeconomic  inequalities is g ven  by  data 
on the distribution  of  incomes  from  cotton  production253.  According to an estimate by  CMDT 
made in the  early  1990s,  the  wealthiest  20%  of the cotton-producing  population  accounted  for 
34% of  total net cotton  incomes,  whereas  the  poorest  11%  accounted for a  mere  5%  of  cotton 
incomes.  Furthermore,  a  very  substantial  lower-middle  group  comprising  about 40% of  the 
cotton-producing  population  received  only  27%  of  net cotton incomes  (calculations  based on 
CMDT,  1992 P . ~ O - ~ I ) ~ ~ ~ .  According to the same  source, only the 10%  best-earning  households 
had a  substantial  monetary  income  from  cotton  cultivation.  Even  for  these  households,  however, 
the  income  was  considerably  lower than that  of  civil  servants255  (CMDT,  1992  p.  22). 
Also data on  cereals  sales  show  a  highly  uneven  distribution.  A  study  carried out during  two  good 
cropping  campaigns in the  late 1980s found that only 53% of  dl households were net sellers, 
whereas 43% were  net  buyers  of  coarse grain. The  concentration of  cereals  sales  was  important: 
only  16%  of the households  accounted for no  less  than 75% of  total  net sales (Dione,  1989,  p. 
282; Staatz et al.,  1989 p.712). These  findings  are  supported  by  more  recent  estimates  that  point 
to high correlation  between the level  of  mechanisation  and  cereals  sales256  (Coton  et 
Developpement no. 17 1996  p.  12). 
Estimates on the  ownership  of  livestock  suggest  a  similar  difference:  according to data  from  the 
livestock  service,  80%  of the cattle  belonging  to  cotton-producing  farmers  are  owned  by  only 
As al studies on income  distribution  have  dealt  only  with  cotton-producing  households  and no reliable data exist 
on the  distribution  of total farm incomes on various  agricultural  and  non-agricultural  activities,  it cannot be 
documented that non-cotton  producing  households  are th poorest  households in the  area.  Hence,  the  only  indication 
of  socioeconomic  differences can be obtained  by  comparing  large-scale  cotton  producers to mall-scale  producers. 
An older  study  from the early  198Os, also made  by  CMDT, su ests an even  more  uneven  distribution  of  net 
cotton  incomes.  According to this study,  less  than  20%  of the house T olds  accounted  for  more  than  half of total net 
third  of the househol&  received  only  3%.  The  concentration was found to be particular  y  pmnounced  in  the  Koutiala 
incomes  from  cotton duction, whereas  another  48%  of  the  households  received on1 about  10%  and the poorest 
area. where 23% of  the  households  received  61% ofnet cotton  incomes  [referred  in  Sanogo  1989 U. 240-242). It 
Y 
~~~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~~ ~ ~ 
shodd be noted, however, that better-off  households  tend to be significaitly larger  than o'rer hocseholds wiiich 
means  that their  percentage  of  the  population s hi er than their  share  of  the  households (8MDT, 1992  p.  21).  Also 
studies  made in cotton-uroducing  areas  in  C6te P .  'Ivore (Camubell. 1984 u.163-168 ) and B u r b a  Faso  (Larsen, 
production  for  industrial  processing. 
1996  p.  90-92)  point 6 increashg social  differentiatio<as  a-geneial  co<sequence  of the introduction of cotton 
The report p-nts a  calculation of the monetary  income horn cotton  cultivatiodpersodday:  for  the  orest 20% 
of the  households I! was 23 1 CFA,  for the ne?  group  com rising  46% of the households  it  was 320 FA,  for  the 
next group comprismg  34%  of  the  households It was 380 C  A  and  for the upper  10% of the  households  it was 5 10 
CFA. Th~s is  com  ared to the average  income of 1,200  CFA  per  day for seasonal  labourers  employed  by  CMDT 
(CMDT, 1992  p.  $1-22). 
wealthiest  households. 150 kc for the uuuer-mlddle  households, 15 kg for the  lower-mlddle  households  and only 
An estimate of the net  cereals balandpersodyear in  cotton producing  households  indicates  170  kg  for  the 
f !? 
10 kg for  the rest hbusehords  who  deiiend on manual cultivation (&ta are based on the DRSPR-typology  to bi 
explained beE)(Coton et Ddveloppement no. 17  1996 p. 12). 
~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
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20%  of  the  households,  whereas  10%  of  households in the northern  part of the region  and 30% 
of  households in the  southern  part  of  the  region  do  not  possess  any  cattle  at  allzS7  (referred  in Kibi 
et al., 199513  p. 6). 
Typology  of households 
It is a common  conclusion by most  studies dealig with  socioeconomic  differences in the  region 
that, roughly  speaking,  it  boils  down  to the matter of mechanisation  level.  Thus, it has already 
been mentioned  that  cotton-producing  households are better  off than non-cotton  producing 
households.  Among  cotton  producing  households it has been found that the size of the area 
cultivated  matters  less  to  the  income  than  the  level  of  mechanisation  and the availability  of  labour 
(Sanogo,  1989  p.  242).  While the latter is considered  important,  most  authors  concentrate  on  the 
level  of  mechanisation as the  single  most  important  factor  determining  the  economic  situation  of 
a  householdz5*  (Jonckers,  1994;  Sanogo,  1989; CMDT, 1992; Kkbi et al.  1995b;  Staatz et al., 
1989). This is also the classification  criteria  used in a typology  of  cotton-producing  households 
developed  by  the  research  centre DRSPRzs9 in Sikasso in the  late  1980s.  The  typology  defines  five 
different  socioeconomic  groups as follows26o  (Fomba & Joldersma,  1991  p.  4-12;  Sanogo,  1989 
p. 215-218,243-244): 
Group-m  households are farmers  equipped  with tractorsz61. 
Group-a  households  possess at least two pairs of oxen, a plough,  a  multipurpose  cultivator,  a 
seed  drill,  a  donkey  or  ox  cart  and  a  minimum  of six animals in addition to the draught  oxen. 
These  households are usually  referred  to as ‘gros  producteurs’:  they  have  high  incomes  from 
cotton sales, and they  are  self-sufficient in food. Their main  problem is a threat of decliiing 
yields, as fallows  are  gradually  abandoned  when the area cultivated is extended. 
*” A calculation  based  on  data  provided  by  CMDT S ests  a sli tly  less  uneven  distribution:  76%  of  the  cattle 
are owned by  34% of the  households,  whereas  20% Y ?  o the  house  olds have no  cattle  at  all  (calculation  based on 
CMDT,  1992  p.  21). 
m Van  der  Pol & Giraudy,  looking  for  factors  determining the intensificafin of the production  rather  than  those 
explaining  social  differences,  point  to  availability  of  labour as the single  most  important  factor,  They  mention  tenure 
security  and the  presence  of  literate  members  of  the  household as other  factors  possibly  influencing  intensification 
(Van der Pol & Giraudy,  1993  p.10 and 15). In a  discussion  of  socioeconomic  mfferentiation  among  cotton- 
roducing  farmers  in  northern  and  centr a? part  of  C&  d‘Ivoire,  Campbell  also  concentrates  on  unequal  access  to 
kbour and  agricultural  equipments as the most  important  factors  (Campbell,  1984  p.  160-163). 
the  Institut d’Economie  Rurale  (IER)  under the Ministry of Rural Development  and Envronment. DRSPR  which 
DRSPR @&.padement de Recherche sur le Systhe de Production  Rural)  is the farming  system  research  unit of
receives  Dutch fundmg and has a  collaboration  with e Royal  Tropical  Institute  in  Amsterdam  changed  its  name 
in  1994  to ESP-GRV (E uipe  Systknes de Production  et  Gestion des Ressouys Naturelles).  With a view to  classify 
households  in  relatively %omogeneous goups based  on  the  level of mechamation and  the size of theirherds, the 
ology was developed  by  DRSPR as part of ongomg  attempts to unprove  extension  activities  Mmed  out by 
260 In ractice  the  typology  is  not as clear-cut as it may seem. Thus, it has been  reported  by  DRSPR  (Coulibaly  et 
al. 1983  p.11  and  was also  witnessed  during my survey that the interpretation  may vary from  one  CMDT  extension 
agent to anoder. Thus, exam  les  were  found  of  CMDT staffwho defmed  group-a  households  b  their  possession 
of  1-2  pairs  of  oxen,  while o J: ers  defined groupb households  by  their  possession  of  a minimum o?two pairs  of  oxen 
and  group-c  households by their possession of  a  minimum  of one p m  of oxen. 
261 In 1971 CMDT  launched  a  mechanisation  programme  targeted  towards  be.tter-off  farmers  with  a  large  labour 
force  and  len  of  land. In the mid-1970s  these  farmers  had an average  of  27 ha and  each of them  produced 21 T 
by  CMDT  (Coulibaly et af, 1993  p.  23-24).  It seems that  recently  tractors  have  become  more  popular  after  a  cattle 
ofcotton &on&s 1987  187  189)  By  1990  mechanised farmers  made up only  1% of the  households  supported 
disease in 1993-94 killedmany oxen (Thea Hilhorst,  personal  communication June 1998). 
%T. 
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Group-b  households  possess at least  one  pair of oxen  and  either  a  plough  or a multipurpose 
cultivator.  Insufficient  equipment  makes it difficult  for  the  household  to  respect the agricultural 
calender,  while  lack  of  cattle  prevents  the  application of  sufficient  amounts of  manure.  They  have 
modest  incomes  from  cotton  sales  and are only  self-sufficient  in  food in good  harvest  years.  These 
households are sometimes referred  to as ‘middle  households’. 
Group-c  households  have  either  no  draught animals or a  pair of oxen  but  insufficient  equipment. 
The households have  some  experience  with  animal  traction  either  from  renting or borrowing 
neighbours’  equipment or from past  ownership of oxen  now lost. They are usually short of  land 
and/or  labour,  have  poor  incomes  from  cotton sales and  are  not  self-sufficient  in  food.  Together 
with  group-d households they are referred  to as ‘poor  peasants’. 
Group-d  households  cultivate  manually  and  have  no  experience  with animal traction.  They  have 
very  tiny  incomes  and are not  self-sufficient in food. 
There is a considerable variation in data on  the  distribution  of  households  on  each of the five 
groups  defined  by the typology. Table 7.1  that  presents  the  most  recent  figures  available  should 
therefore be considered  only  a  rough  indication of main  proportions262. 
Table 7.1. Distribution of cotton-producing  households  in  the Sikasso region  according  to - 
the DRSPR typology (1993) 
- - - 
group-a total group-m  group-d group-c group-b 
Koutiala 
region*) 
100% n.a**) 5% 13% 42% 40% 
Sikasso 
region*) 
100% n.a. 19% 11% 3 8% 32% 
Source:  CMDT 1995b p. 4 
notes: *) CMDT operates  with  a  division  of the administratively  defined Sikasso region in a  northern  region, 
called the Koutiala  region,  and  a  southern  region,  called  the Sikasso region. 
**) According to DRSPR,  group-m  makes  up  an  estimated  1%  of the households  (Coulibaly  et al., 1993 
p.23). 
The  typology  may, even on its own purely  economic  criteria,  be  criticised  for  overlooking  the 
importance of incomes  from  trade,  migrant  remittances  and  remittances  from  relatives  who  are 
public  employees  and for underestimating  income  differences  between  owners  of small herds of 
6-10 animals and owners  of  large  herds of e.g. 50 animals. More important, however, the 
typology totally  neglects  political  dimensions  of  wealth  and  poverty.  It  says  little abou processes 
of  differentiation in which  political  power  is  an  important  element  but  provides  only  a  situational 
analysis  based on economic  indicators at a  given  moment  of  time. 
Even  data  produced  by  CMDT vary substantiall  compare e.g.  CMDT, 1992 2 where 20% of the households 
are  classified as m m - d  to the f ims  in the  table k e d  on CMDT,  199513 p.4. B’the  village  survey  undertaken i
relation to the gesei t  study,  &-position of each,of  the 312 rwpondents  Hccordpg to thi DRSPR typolo 
noted. Results of the survey show  that  the &stniubon between the four  groups vanes substantmlly among VI Y lages 
and  it  is  notable that in all ten  villages  under  study  except two, the  share  of  respondents in $e better-off  groups  (a 
and  b) are considerably  below the average for the area  given  by  CMDT  (see table  C  and  D m the  annex). 
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Causes of differentiation 
As  regards the causes of  differentiation, no  researcher  would  claim  that  processes of economic 
differentiation  are  recent  phenomena  and  that  the  society  before the introduction  of  the  cotton 
economy  was  characterised  by  equality  (Jonckers,  1994 p. 123).  However, there seems to be 
agreement about the  importance  of the cotton  economy  for the differentiation process that  has 
characterised the  region  during  recent  decades. Among  the  few  existing  studies the above- 
mentioned focus on the level  of  mechanisation  makes  most  authors  concentrate on access  to 
capital  input  from  outside  the  household,  and  more  specifically  access to credit, as the  single  most 
important  factor  determining  the  socioeconomic  situation  of  a  householdz63  (DionC,  1989 p. 308- 
309; IDS, 1994 p. 70; Jonckers,  1994  p.  128). 
Credit  for  agricultural  equipment  and  input  was  initially  managed  by  CMDT which gave  credit 
to individual fanners. With the establishment of AVs (Associations Villageoises - village 
associations264 - in the northern part  of  the  region i  the 1970s  and  further south in the 1980s), 
these  organisations  were  made  intermediaries  between  CMDT  and  the  farmers.  Although  the  AVs 
were  responsible  for the administration of  credit  provision,  CMDT  kept  an  upper  hand  in  the 
credit  system  by  maintaining the right to automatic  subtraction  of  outstanding  debt  from  payment 
to  farmers for the cotton  harvest.  When  in  1989 the credit  system  was  transferred  from  CMDT 
to  BNDAzs5, the cotton  harvest  guarantee  was  maintained,  and in 1994  it  was  reinforced by a 
group  guarantee  from  the AV. All  members  of an AV are  now  made  collectively  responsible for 
repayment  of  credit  allocated  to  individuals  unable to repay  their  debt  (De  Groote et al.,  1995a 
p. 9-14). 
The combination  of a core role of the AV management in the  allocation of credit and the 
automatic subtraction  of  loans  from  the  cotton  harvest is often  stressed as a  main  reason  for 
remarkably  high  repayment rates (Belloncle,  1990  p.  11).  It is obvious,  however, that the system 
may result in serious  problems at village  level.  Thus,  the  active  promotion  by  BNDA in recent 
years  of credits also for consumption  and  the  use  of the group  guarantee  to  ensure  repayment  of 
loans has  created  fraud  and  frustration i  many  villages.  A  study  carried  out in four  villages in 
the Koutiala area has found  that  despite  an  overall  repayment  rate  from the villages  of loo%, 
between  5%  and 17% of  the  households  were  unable  to  repay  their  debts.  Some  AVs try to  olve 
the  problem  by selliig goods  such as agricultural  equipment  belonging  to  delinquent  borrowers 
(De  Groote et al.,  1995b  p. 7, p.14; TheaHilhorst,  personal  communication,  June  1998).  Findings 
from the village survey  suggest  that  another  response by the AV  may be a  relentless  social 
263 Dion6 has found  a  correlation of 0.76 between  cotton  production  and access to  credit  and concludes that the  more 
farmers engage in cotton  production,  the  better  their eligibility for seasonal credit to purchase  mput,  which  agam 
determines  their  output  and  thereby  *eir  inFome (Dlon6, 1989 p. 308-309 . Also Campbell discusses the  credit 
policy as a  factor  reinforcing  existing mequal~t~es UI cotton growng areas m 2 &e  d’ivoire  (Campbell, 1984 p. 167- 
168). 
The establishment and role of AVs are  further  described  in  the  next  chapter. 
BNDA (Banque  Nationale de  D6velop  ement  Agricole),  established in 1981, is a  para.statal  that provides  credit 
and collect savins. Eleven of BNDA’s 2 8 branches  are  found  in the CMDT-zone  in Southem Mall @e Groote et 
al., 1995ap.10).’ 
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screening  of  applicants  for  credit  that  has  made  it  extremely  difficult  for  poorer  households  to  be 
considered266. 
The difficulties for poorer  households  are  further  aggravated by  limited  access to labour  to 
compensate  for  their low level of mechanisation. On average  poorer  households are significantly 
smaller than better-off  households267.  Previously,  labour  associations  (‘tons’),  which  could  be 
either  lineage  or  age-based,  used  to  ensure  a  certain  assistance  to the poorest  households.  While 
many  of  these  organisations  are still very  active  in the Kadiolo  area, there is a  tendency for them 
now to work  only against payment  which  obviously liits the possibilities of poorer  households 
to  make  use  of  themz6*. In the Koutiala  area  where the general  level  of  mechanisation is higher, 
labour associations  tend  to  disappear  altogether,  because  heads  of  household  deny  younger 
members  the  right  to  work for others  (Jonckers, 1987 p.  204;  Hilhorst & Djouara, 1996 p.  7-8, 
p.  29;  Thea  Hilhorst,  personal  communication  Oct.  1994  and  June  1998).Thus,  poor  households 
often  find  themselves in a  vicious circle where  lack  of  credit  forces  them to borrow  equipment 
fiom  better-off  households  against  repayment i  the form  of  manual  labour, This again  reduces 
their own work  force  and  thereby  their  income from cotton  cultivation.  Limited  agricultural 
income has to be  supplemented  by  migrant  remittances  which  further  reduces their work  force 
and  their  income.  While  agricultural  equipment is obtained  with  considerable  difficulties for these 
households,  it is easily  lost  when  cash  for taxpayment  and  purchase  of  food  can  only be provided 
by selling off the  existing  equipment  (Jonckers, 1994 p. 126;  Sanogo,  1989  p.  243-244). 
Better-off  households,  on the other  hand,  have  access  to  paid  day-labourers  in addition to their 
own labour  force  (Sanogo,  1989  p.  243;  Jonckers, 1994 p. 128-130). 
In addition  to  economic  differentiation  mechanisms  associated  with the integration into the  cotton 
economy,  political  changes in the same  period  have  enforced  social  differences,  notably in the 
Minyanka  community.  According to Jonckers, the replacement  of the lineage  group  by the AV 
management as the core social unit of a village has contributed to the differentiation by 
centralising decision-making and economic allocations. In her view, the introduction of a 
structure  organising all the population in a  village  breaks  radically  with the tradition in the past 
of  many  competing  and  sometimes  collaborating  lineage  groups  each  of  them with a  certain 
The difficulties  for  poor fanners are s u m m a r i s e d  in this statement  by  a  group-d  farmer  met  during the village 
a la CMDT. Puisque c’est l’A Vqui fait les born du commande des exploitant d la MDT, elle fait le  choir etprqere 
survey: “L ‘A V du village  n.’est pas sirieuse. I1 fmrt  que tu as bemoup d‘argent our qu ‘elle fmse fa commende 
fdigue  dam notre travail’ (Nafegue no. 17).  It  should be noted  that $is descrip~on is  questioned  by researchFs 
gidralement les chefs  d‘exFloitatiorn  qui  ont dtja assez  d’dquipements de travail. C’est cet itat de chose  qui nous 
working in the  region  who  stress  that  only  farmers  who  are  not  producmg  cotton (1.e. typically  farmers  belongmg 
to g m u p d )  do  not  have  access  to  credit  (N’Golo  Coulibaly,  personal  communication,  August,  1998;  Thea  Hilhorst, 
personal  communication,  June  1998). 
”’ According to data  preSented  by  CMDT, the average sue of a  household  without  e  uipment  was 9 persons in 
1992,  while the average slze of a fully equipped  household was 31 persons  (CMDT,  1892 p. 21). 
m h e  famllle Clargie pour l’en~xde entre les exploltations des membres assocles and “les associations de 
Zuidberg  and DjirC make  a  dis@ction  between “... les  associations de solidarite Teyissent des  membres  d’une 
p~stations de services contre  aiement  ne  d&pendent  pas de la parentt, mais  recrutent  leurs  membres  au.nweau d  
villa e ou du quartier” (Zui&er & Dire, 1992 18). It is quite costly to em lo a labour assoc1atlon, as the 
empkyer has to  feed  them weif in addition  to $e payment m cash,  salt or c P X  o es  (Thea  Hdhorst,  personal 
communication, June 1998). Chantal Rondeau concludes: “..ce sont surtout les familles les plus nches ou 
suffisamment nombFuses qui  en  profitent”  (Rondeau,  1994  187 . Similar  experience  with  the  replacement by 
wage  labour of-onal reciprocal  labour  arrangements  have%een  iound i  cotton  growing  areas in CBte  d’Ivoire 
(Campbell,  1984  p.  163). 
z 
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responsibility to care  for  their  less  affluent  membersz6'  (Jonckers,  1987  p.105-111;  Jonckers,  1994 
p.  122;  Colleyn 62 Jonckers,  1993 p. 43-45). 
In the  southern p m  of  the  region  dominated by the  Senoufo  community  lineage  structures  are  still 
very important, and the more l i i t e d  integration into the cotton economy implies that 
differentiation  processes  are  less  pronounced. 
Conclusion 
The  portrait  of  the Sikasso region has questioned  the  widely  held  picture  of it as  one  of  the  most 
prosperous  regions in the country  having  favourable  conditions  for  agriculture  and  income  levels 
above the national  average.  Although  statistical  data are highly  uncertain,  available  sources 
suggest that average  living  conditions are not  particularly  favourable  compared  to other parts of 
the  country.  Whereas the position as the leading  cotton  and  food  producing  region in  the country 
is undeniable, and very high incomes in certain households have been documented, social 
inequality  and  the  existence  of  a  group f oor  farmers are reflected in relatively  modest  social 
indicators. 
The chapter  has  described two main l i e s  of division  of the population:  a  geographical  division 
between  the  northern  Koutiala  area  and  the  southern Kadiolo area,  and  a  socioeconomic  division 
which  cuts  across  the  region  and  reflects  the hig ly different  situation  of  large-scale  mechanised 
cotton-producers and small-scale producers who cultivate manually. While the north-south 
division is further  discussed in the  next  chapter,  emphasis in the present  chapter  has  been  put on 
socioeconomic differentiation processes which to a large extent seem to be linked to the 
integration  into  the  cotton  economy. Thus, a  vicious  circle has been  described for small-scale 
producers who lack equipment and therefore have to borrow equipment from better-off 
households  against  repayment in the form of  manual  labour. This reduces  their  already  limited 
labour  resources and thereby  their  income  from  cotton  cultivation.  Large-scale  producers,  on  the 
other  hand,  usually  have  both  a high level of mechanisation  and  better  access to labour. 
Thus, far from a homogeneous area where standard extension packages can be used, the 
description  of  the  region  suggests  that  extension  agencies are working in a highly  heterogeneous 
context which is very taxing on their  capacity to adjust and  differentiate their approach. 
Variations in the integration  into  the  cotton  economy  account for major  parts of the differences 
observed. This again  points to a key role of  government  intervention  in  shaping  the  social  setting 
in the  region, but relations  are  more  complicated than that.  The  north-south  difference is very 
much  conditioned  by  factors  outside th traditional  sphere of government  influence,  such as e.g. 
the orientation of the Kadiolo  area towards C&  d'Ivoire  because of geographical  nearness, 
differences in population  pressure  and  pressure  on  natural  resources  and  the  different  social 
organisation of dominating  ethnic  groups. 
269 This description is questioned by Thea Hilhor$,who argues that competition amon members of the AV 
leadership counters the tendency to centralised declslon malang (Thea  Hilhorst,  personne 'icommunication,  June 
1998). 
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Similarly, the socioeconomic  differentiation is both related to the integration  into  the  cotton 
economy, as it has  been  promoted  by CMDT, and to social  processes  that  have to do with the 
organisation of authority at family,  lineage  and  village  level.  Changes in these  processes  are 
M e r  discussed in chapter 8. 
The  chapter  seems  to  confirm  the  theoretical  hypothesis  that  interaction  between  state  and  society 
influences the  character of societal  relations but is not  fully  explaining  these, as important 
‘society-internal’  dynamics  play  a  decisive  role aswell. 
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Introduction 
The  present  chapter M e r  describes  the  heterogeneity of the Sikasso region as it  adds  a  portrait 
of  rapidly  changing  social  and  political  relations  to  the  picture  given in chapter  7  of  highly 
varying  agro-ecological  and  socioeconomic  conditions. 
Together with chapter  7  it  provides the background  for  understanding the interaction  between 
government  agencies  and  farmers  analysed  in  chapter 9,lO and 1 1.  While  the  previous  chapter 
sketched  two  main  lines  of  division  of  the  population in the  region  and  dealt  most  thoroughly  with 
the  socioeconomic  differentiation, this chapter further details  the  differences  between  the  northern 
and the southern part  of the region as a  background  for  analysing  the  emergence  of  new  social 
identities in chapter 11. 
Thus, the chapter  shows that changes in family  structures,  lineage  structures  and in village-level 
relations are presently  very  rapid  in  the  northern  Koutiala are  where  authorities at all  levels  are 
being  questioned,  whereas in the  southern  Kadiolo  area  village  and  family  leaders  to  a  large 
extent  have  maintained  their  authority. 
8.1. Changes in traditional family structures 
Although  challenged  (e.g.  Becker,  199OZ70),  the  widespread  assumption about  a  link  between  the 
introduction  of  commodity  production  and  the  breaking up of  large  farming  households  seems 
to find  some  support in studies focussing  on  the Sikasso region. 
The  dissolution  of  extended  families s a well-established  historical  phenomenon  in  the  Minyanka 
and Senoufo communities,  but  before  independence  the  phenomenon  was  of  relatively  limited 
importance’”.  When  the  French  abolished the forced  labour  during  the  1950s, the control  by  the 
head of household of its subordinate members was significantly weakened’”. During the 
following  decades  increased  conflicts  between  generations,  especially  in the Minyanka 
community,  have  lead to a  growing  number  of  extended  families  being  broken  up  into  smaller 
units,  initially  comprising  only  a  nuclear  family of a man  and his wife  (wives)  and  children  and 
later including also adult sons with  their  families.  (Rondeau,  1994 p. 92;  Fok,  1994a  p.  334; 
Ouattara, 1992 p.  27;  Sanogo,  1989  p.  237,  Jonckers,  1994  p.  122; Dembile et al., 1997  p.  3). 
270 Based on a  study in a Bambara  village close to Bamako, Becker  argues  that  a  wide  range of different  responses 
to  the  introduction  of  commodity  production ca be found. Thus, certain  farmers  prefer to maintain  the  relation to 
the  extended  family farm as the large  household  labour  group may provide  an  economy of scale  for the food 
production and thereby  allow  them  more  time  to  grow  crops  for  sale  on  their  individual  plots  (Becker,  1990). 
In the  past as well as today the breaking  up  of  an  extended  family was often  related to rivalries  among  brothers 
(often of different mothers)  concerning  heritage of land  and  position  in  the  family. 
According to Chantal Rondeau, the  colonial  period  contributed to making  internal  differences  and  conflicts in 
a  household  more  transparent, as the  head  of  household  would  typically  res  ond  to the request by the French of 
providing  labour  h  sendin  those  members of a  household  that he perceive tl of as opponents to his power.  Until 
the last decade o?coloniafism  these  conflicts  could not be resolved as the  only  rotection  against the French 
consisted in the solidarity of  a  household. When the  extemal rasure on the househol& was reduced,  its  subordinate 
members  reacted  by  refusmg  to  obey the head of householc!(Rondeau, 1994  p.  91-92). 
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Both in the  Minyanka  and  the  Senoufo  community  the  extended  family  typically  consists  of  the 
head of the  family  and his younger  brothers  and/or  sons  and  their  wives  and  children  (Jonckers, 
1994  p.  123; Ouattara, 1992  p.  26). In addition  to  the  common  field,  of  the  household  mainly  used 
for  cultivation  of  stable  crops,  it is sometimes  possible for its members to obtain  a  personal  plot 
for  cultivation  of  vegetables,  cotton,  rice,  fonio, etc'". Also prior to the  introduction  of  cotton, 
individual  fields  could  be found but  at that  time  the  control of a  personal  income  from  private 
fields remained  the  privilege  of  elderly  people  (men  and  women).  Younger  women  were  expected 
to use their personal  fields  for  production  of  rice  and  vegetables  for  the  consumption  of  the 
ho~sehold)'~~. 
With the introduction  of  cotton  the  pressure  on  the  head of household to allow  personal  plots 
increased, and the  number  of  days  dedicated  to  work  outside  the  common  field  gradually  went 
up  from  one  to wo to  three  days  per  week Fondeaq 1994  p.  72-74  and  p.110-112;  Sanogo, 1989 
p.  236-237).  Access  to  a  monetary  income  from  individual  plots  has  made  the  unpaid  work  on 
the  common  field  considerably  less  attractive  and  has  lead to serious  conflicts  between  the  head 
of household  and  its  younger  members275. In the  Koutiala  area  most  heads  of  household  have 
responded by refusing  younger  men  the  right  to  individual  plots as this is considered  the first step 
towards their establishment of a new production To keep the young men on the farm, 
heads of households  are  increasingly  inclined  to  buy them consumer  goods such as motor bikes 
and tv sets (Thea  Hilhorst,  personal  communication,  June  1998). 
Also tax paying  has  become an issue  of  conflict.  Whereas  it  used  to  be  the  responsibility  of  the 
head of household  to  pay  taxes  for all adult members, some of them now want  their  younger 
brothers  or sons to use  incomes  from  cotton  production  to  pay  for  themselves  (Jonckers,  1987  p. 
197;  Jonckers,  1994 p. 126;  Fok,  1994a p. 334).  Finally,  forced  marketing of millet  from 1977 
to  1981 has contributed to this development.  While  increasing  the  work  load of the  household, 
it reduced  its  income  and  thereby  increased  the  discontent  among  subordinate  members  of the 
household  (Jonckers,  1987 p. 198). 
Conflicts  between  generations  are  believed  to  have  been  further  aggravated by the way extension 
staff from CMDT have  approached  a  household.  While lack of influence on decisions  concerning 
the  income from the  common  field  creates  discontent  among  the  younger  men, CMDT interferes 
in this conflict  by  prefemng to talk to  those  who  cultivate  the  land,  i.e.  the  younger  men,  rather 
than the  old  and  retired  head  of  household  (Jonckers,  1994  p.  126).  Furthermore,  literacy  courses 
and training activities  have mainly involved  younger  members of a household  who  are  more 
2n According to DemMlC et al., women  in  the Min community  only  have  very  small individual  plots,  whereas 
women  in the Senoufo  communi  spend  most o theu flme on their  individual  plots. In none of the communities 
women have tenure  rights  to  the and they  cultivate as mdividual  plots. The owner  (whether their husband 01 the 
head of a  neighbouring  household)  can reclam that land,  whenever he wants @embe16 et al., 1997 p. 4, p. 17). 
274 Jonckers makes the point  that in the Mmyanka  community  plots  outside the common field  were rare1  individual 
but rather cultivated  b  small  workmg  teams  such as e.g. a man and his brothexs or a  woman and $er children 
(Jonckers,  1994  p. 123y. 
27s In the southern  part of the  region  where  cotton  was  introduced  only  in the 1970s,  access to a  monetary  income 
produmon in  the north (Rondeau,  1994 p.  92-93). 
from m i p t  work  in C6te d'Ivoire seems to  have  played the  same  role as access to  mdividual  incomes &om cotton 
276 When a  household  breaks  up,  it does not happen  overnight,  but the process  usually  stretches  over  several  years 
where  younger  members ually mcrease then work  outslde the common  field of the household  (Rondeau,  1994 
p. 110-111;Sanogo,  198 P p.237) 
7 P.
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perceptible to educational activities (K6be & Brons, 1994 p. 14). This again has been a 
considerable  asset  for  the  younger  men  also at village  level  where.  they  are  often prefened for the 
positions as secretary  and  treasurer  to  the  village  association  (Jonckers,  1994 p. 126). 
Finally,  the  general  exposure to a  wide  range  of  new  consumer  goods  and  a  ‘modem’  way of life 
in  the  larger  towns  of  Koutiala  and Sikasso are  likely  to  have  further  contributed o the wish by 
the young  generation  to  become  independent  of  the  old. 
The  speed  of the process  of  breaking  up  larger  households  varies  considerably fiom the northern 
to the southern  part  of  the  region. In the  northem  Koutiala  area it  seems  to  be  relatively  fast, 
whereas  the  process is less  pronounced in the  southem  Kadiolo area where  cotton  production  was 
introduced much later. This is reflected  in  variation  of  average  farm  units  from 18 embers in 
the Koutiala area to  23  members in the  Kadiolo  area  (K6b6 et al., prefened p.  8;  Coulibaly  et  al., 
1993  p.  12;  Demba Samak6, personal  communication,  Oct.1994;  Souleymane Ouattarq personal 
communication,  Nov.1994). It should  be  noted,  however, that the  organisation at household  level 
features  an  extensive  variation  even within the same  village.  Thus,  management  skills of the  head 
of household  are  of  crucial  importance  to  willingness  of  its  members to stay  together  (Jonckers, 
1987  p.  155-159;  Thea  Hilhorst,  personal  communication,  June  1998). 
8.2. Changes in the  role of lineage  structures 
Parallelling the changed  organisation  at  household  level,  the  importance  of  lineage  structures as 
decision-making  units in the Minyanka  community  seems to be on the First, the 
emergence  of a multiplicity  of  social units (the many  new  households)  renders  decision-making 
within the lineage considerably  more  complicated  (Ouattara,  1992  p.  28).  Second,  organisation 
by lineage of mutual  assistance  has  gradually  become  weakened by the  monetisation  of  work 
relations  (Jonckers,  1994 p. 127;  Sanogo,  1989  p.  245-246;  Colleyn, 1988 p. 63-65).  And  third, 
the  individualism  superseding the ‘esprit  communautaire’  simply  does  not  encourage  solidarity 
associated with liieage groups or - as seen fiom the point  of  view  of  younger  family  members - 
the concentration of decision-making  power in what is looked  upon as non-transparent  bodies 
controlled  by the old. In the Senoufo  community,  on the other  hand,  lineage  structures  are  still 
very  important  (Ouattara,  1992 p. 28;  Jonckers,  1994 p. 127;  Sanogo,  1989  p.  244-246). 
8.3. Changes in the  political  organisation at village  level 
Village  leadership 
In both the Minyanka  and the Senoufo  communities  the  position  of  chief  of the land (‘chef de 
terre’) is inherited within the liieage of the  first  inhabitant  of  a  village.  With the introduction  by 
the French  of the position  of  administrative  head  of  the  village (‘chef de  village’),  village  power 
relations  were  seriously  complicated.  The  mere  introduction  of  a  power  division  challenged  the 
traditional  political  organisation,  and  furthennore  the  French  sometimes  interfered in th   selection 
of village chiefs by taking  a  candidate  of  their own choice  rather  than  the  one  suggested  by 
dominating  political  forces at village level. In the  Minyanka  community  changes  in  land  tenure 
*” Lineage  structures  are  defined  by  Jean-Paul  Colleyn as all  the  people who consider  themselves  descendants of 
the  same  ancestor  (even if this cannot  be  genealogically  documented)  (Colleyn, 1988 p. 63). 
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and  the  spread  of  Islam  into  the  region  since  the  beginning  of  the c e n t ~ r f ~ ~  have  weakened  the 
position  of  chef  de  terre. In the  Senoufo  community,  on  the  other and, the chefde terre  (or  ‘chef 
coutumier’ as he is called  here)  still  manages  the  majority  of  disputes  over  land  (Jonckers,  1987 
p.  106-108; Om- 1992p. 13-14;  Crowley, 1991bp. 43,p. 46;  Dembelt, 1997p. 4;  Coll,  1997 
p.  47-50;  Demba  Samake,  personal  communication,  Oct.  1994;  Thea  Hilhorst,  personal 
communication,  June  1998). 
In addition  to  the two main  political  characters  at  village  level,  a  whole  range  of  political  leaders 
at  lower levek have  existed  and  sometimes  still e x i ~ e ~ ~ .  These leaders  together 6 t h  the head of 
each  of  the  lineages  constituted  the  traditional  village  council  (‘Conseil  de  village’),  an  advisory 
board  to  the  village  chief.  Researchers  have  described  the  system as based on an equilibrium of 
power  among  the  various  leaders  and  have  stressed the decentralised  and  negotiated  character  of 
power  (Crowley,  1991b  p.  47). 
After  independence,  the  new  regime tuned the  village  council  into  a  formal  political  association 
of  which  seven  members  were  to  be  elected by  all  male inhabitants  of  the  village  and  approved 
by  the  administration,  and  13 other members,  who  were not heads  of liieages, were  to  be  selected 
by the  village  chief.  The  village  council  maintained its a visory  role  to the village  chief  (Jonckers, 
1987 p.  108-1  10).  While  the  intervention  by  the  government  administration  implied  a  (formal) 
weakening  of  lineage  structures,  hitherto  represented in the  council by all the heads  of  lineages, 
the  position  of  village  chief was further  strengthened  by  his  new  role as village  representative  of 
the Party. 
In addition  to  the  village  council,  the  association  of  young  farmers  (ton) has traditionally  had  an 
advisory  role to the  village  cheif. Also the  ton  became  subject  to  intervention  by  the  new  socialist 
regime  who  found  it  useful as a f o m  for  education  of  the  young rural population.  It  encouraged 
the  establishment of ‘Mali  ton’  in  all  parts  of  the  country  (Jonckers,  1987  p.  110-1  1  1 ; Coulibaly, 
1987 p.  69-70). 
The  purpose  of  these  interventions  was  to  increase  government  control  of  the  organisation  of  the 
rural population.  The  attempt  was  further  strengthened  after the military  coup in 1968  when  the 
new regime  made  membership of the party a  precondition  for  obtaining  agricultural  credit, 
established a national  youth  organisation  to  replace the village  based  tonszso, a national  women’s 
Until  the  mid-19th century there were  relatively few  Muslims in the Sikasso region. Through merchants’  trading 
networks  and  increased  contacts  to  other a eas, Islam expanded vay fast in the be ing of the century. During the 
three recent decades the  spread of Islam has been particularly fast in the  towns o f““ Koutiala  and Sikasso, and  today 
almost all of  the urban population  and  the  majori of the rural opulation  consider  themselves Muslims. (Warms, 
1992p. 487-494;  Jonckers,  1987  p.  202; TheaHi a: orst, person$  communication, June 1998). The spread  of  Islam 
has  made the religious  aspect of the work of chef de terre  controversial. 
During  colonial$m many vil es had a  chief  of  war  (‘chef de erre’) or a  chief of the  hunters (‘chef  de chass’). 
While the former I S  no longer to % e  found, the position  of  chef C.? e  chasse, a non-hereditary  position  dependmg on
skills, is still v a y  common.-Ward chiefs (‘Chefs.de  quartiers’) are heredim ositions withii -the lineage-of the fist 
occupant of the ward.  Age-grade  leader  and  heads  of  initiation  societies  ?chefs des sociktes  initiatiques’)  have 
important reli ’ous tasks and may be re laced  in  case of failure  such as e.g. hunger and  social unrest  (Jonckers,  1987 
p.  109-110.; gowley, 1991bp. 43-44! 
280 L’Union  Nationale des Jeunes du Mali (U.N.J.M.). 
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organisation  to  replace the traditional  women's  organisations2"  and  considerably  increased  the 
practice of intervening  in the selection of village  chiefs. 
Implications  of  various  government  interventions  village-level  political  structures  have  varied 
substantially  among  the  villages  and  not  least  between  the orthern and  the  southern part of the 
region. In many cases  villagers  have just integrated  the  new  structures into those already  there 
without  changing  existing  power  relations  (Coulibaly, 1994 p. 24; Soke,  1990 p. 9-10;  Gentil, 
1986 p. 70; Thea  Hilhorst,  personal  communication, June 1998). In other cases government 
interventions have created  conflicts that have been  smouldering  beneath the surface  for  years, 
until  the  political  changes in March  1991  made  them  erupt together with numerous other latent 
conflicts at all levels of the Malian  society. 
Whereas  overt  expressions of village-level  tensions  were  previously  kept  down by  government 
supervision  and  repression  and the lack of freedom  to  organise  outside  government-controlled 
structures,  the  years  after  1991  have  been  characterised by a  questioning of all authorities. In the 
Koutiala area  difficulties of village-level  authorities  are  particularly  pronounced.  Some  chiefs 
chosen  by  the  previous  government  administration  have  been  forced  to r sign, and  in  many  other 
cases  village chiefs face an undisguised  contempt by their fellow 
Previous government intervention, however, is only one among several factors that have 
contributed  to  tensions  between the village  leadership  and other groups.  Other tensions exist in 
many  villages  between  descendants  of  the first occupant of a village and latecomers.  Access by 
latecomers to important incomes from cotton production or migrant remittances has often 
challenged  the  internal  power  balance. In the Koutiala  area examples can be found of villages 
where it is accepted  that  economic  power is directly  convertible  into  political  power,  implying 
that a  village  chief has to step down if somebody  else  becomes  considerably more wealthy  than 
himselfs3. Despite this acceptance of shifting the village  leadership  among the lineages, the 
decision of course  is  not  taken  without  a  period of serious  power  struggles.  These  struggles  seem 
to  have  been  enforced  by  the  social  turbulence  after  1991284. In other cases  the  political elite has 
"' L'Union  Nationale  des  Femmes  du  Mali (U.N.F.M.) 
Loulouni village  illustrates  the  problem.  A  village  chief  supported  by the ma'ority of the village PO ulation  was 
the  same su port, anfin 1991  he was forced to step down  and  leave  the  office to the  former  village  chief.  However, 
forced  by the former  overnment  administration  to  resign. His successor  selected by the  administration i d  not enjoy 
the  one seicted by the  administration  in  the  meantime  had  built up a  certain  power  base in the  village,  and, 
therefore,  the  village is now divided into two conflicting fractions (interviews carried out in October  1994). 
Molobala  and  Sincina  are  other  examples  of  the  roblem In Sincina  the  former  government  administration  tried to 
divide the village  in  two, as it  was considereltoo big.  Although  they  never  managed to divide the village,  the 
conflict  between  those, who  wanted the division  (a  large  ward  in  the  village),  and  those  who  were  against  (the 
supporters  of  the  village  chief), is very  much  felt  in  the  village  (Interviews camed out in December  1994). 
Whereas the  position  of  chef de village  (administrative)  can  be  shifted  according to the  economic  power  of  the 
lineages, the same  does  not re d the position of  chef  de terre (chef  coutumier)  that IS always  held  by  a  descendant 
of  the frst occupant of the  vi T lage (N Golo  Coulibaly, p e r ~ 0 ~ 1  communication,  August  1998). 
Although  situated in the  southern part of the  region,  Woroni  exemplifies  a  village  with  a  certain  tradition  for 
shifting the Village leadership  accordmg  to the economic  ower of the  lineages. At the  time  of the fieldwork  the 
authority of the  vlllages  chief  was  challenged by two men W % o owe  their  wealth  and  influence  to sons in important 
positions  in  the  government  administration  (interviews  undertaken m October  and  November  1994). 
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managed to avoid  sharing  their  power  with  better-off  latecomers,  but  also in this situation  social 
changes  after  1991  have  intensified  power  struggles2g5. 
A wide range of disputes  concerning  women,  land  issues and  religious  issues are adding  to the 
problems  in the villages.  Especially  ‘le problhe des femmes’  is frequently mentioned as a  major 
reason  for  internal  village  conflicts,  whereas  land  conflicts  and  religious  matters  seem  to  be  less 
common  problems2%. Also these  disputes  of  course  have  existed  long  before  1991,  but the 
difference  seems  to be that in the Koutiala area the village  leadership  often  no  longer  has the 
authority  to  solve  them  when  they  emerge. In Kadiolo all such  conflicts  are still managed by the 
village  chief  without the involvement  of  government  authorities. 
Finally,  the  role  of  political  parties  should  be  mentioned. In the villages  introduction  of  multiparty 
politics has often  been  referred  to as the  major  reason for internal  conflicts. This was  denied  by 
virtually  all  resource  persons  interviewed  during  the  fieldwork,  who  insisted  that  the  only  role  of 
political  parties  have  been  to  enforce the conflicts  already  there.  Opposing  fractions  now  typically 
organise in each  their  party to get  outside  support  for  their  position  in  internal f ights287.  In support 
of this interpretation  speaks the fact  that it is only in the  Koutiala  area  that  several  parties are 
represented in the same  village. In Kadiolo,  where  village  chiefs  have  maintained  their  authority, 
there is usually  only one party  represented in a  village,  namely the one  supported by the  village 
chiefgg. Party-related  problems  also  existed  in  Koutiala  before  1991, as elections of  candidates 
proposed by the party  were  not  based on secret  ballots  in  the  villages.  At  that  time,  however, 
conflicts  were  suppressed  by  the  one-party  system,  whereas  the  various  political  parties  now  add 
fuel to the flameszg9 (personal  communication  by  Demba Sama!&,  Oct.94; Thea  Hilhorst,  Sept. 
1994; N’Golo Coulibaly, Sept. 1994; Souleymane Ouattara, Nov.1994; Cheibane Coulibaly, 
Oct.1994;  Yaya  Sidebe,  Oct.1994;  interviews in the  villages in the autumn  of  1994  and in Feb. 
1996;  interviews with representatives from various  political  parties,  Feb.  1996). 
Associations  Villageoises 
A particularly  important  aspect  of  village-level  political  changes is constituted  by the power 
struggles in and around  the  village  associations. 
A l t h o v  the  AV  remained  undivided  in  February  1996,  Dossorola  exemplified thi situation  (interviews  taken 
in Decem er 1994  and  February  1996). 
Rumours about  ‘women  roblems’ are many.  One  chef d’mndissement interviewed  in the  Koutiala rea claimed 
Kltla where three different  political  parties are represented is an example of this. 
During a po interview  taken NGolokasso, villagers  refused  that  olitical  parties had any  importance  to  their 
everyday life  an T to the future  situation  of the village.  They  regretted $e abolishment  of  the  one;Rarty  system  but 
seemed to see a more or less duect link between UDPM and ADEMA, now supported by e entue vlllage 
(interview  carried  out  in  February  1996). 
The pr aration during  1995  and  1996  of  the  new rural communes  and the  legislatives  and  presidential  elections 
held  in 19% has  significantly  enforced  the  presence  of  political  parties  in th  villages.  After the elections in 1992 
most arties  lost the interest III rural areas, and for  a few  years ther resence  in  the v d l a p  were  not yery, much  felt. 
In orger to gain  support  in the 1997  elections,  political  parties a k r  1994  renewed e r  interest m dlagelevel 
campaigning  and  became  involved  in  a  wide  range of issues re ardmg  both  village-internal  matters  and  conflicts 
between the village and  external  parties  mtervlews  in the vi f lages,  with the various  political  parties  and  with 
resource  persons  carried out in  February  1596). 
to be presented  with c o m p k t s  from deserted  husbands  at  least  once  every  week. 
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The first village  associations  (associations  villageoises  -AV)  were  established  in  the area covered 
by  CMDT  in  1974.  The  background for the  emergence  of  these  new  associations  was  a crisis in 
the  relationship  between  CMDT  and  farmers,  upset  about  the  dishonest  practices of CMDT  agents 
responsible for the weighting  and  grading of cotton.  Researchers  have  interpreted the character 
of  AVs  differently:  while  some  seem to see  a  direct  connection  between  AVs  and the traditional 
organisation at village  level, in particular the ton of young  farmers  (e.g.  Rondeau, 1994 p. 187), 
others  see them as an attempt by farmers to organise  independently of the CMDT  (e.g.  Bingen, 
1994 p.  59), and  still  others  stress their character as ‘a  social  construct’ by  CMDT  (Fok, 1994 p. 
81-84;  Jonckers,  1994  p.  128).  The truth is probably, as suggested  by  Gentil  and  Mercoiret,  that 
it was both: it was the result of a  compromise  of  interests  between  farmers  and  the  CMDT  (Gentil 
& Mercoiret,  1991 p.  880).  Farmers did demand  more  influence  on  the  weighting  and  grading of 
cotton,  but  CMDT  was  quick to see  the  AVs as a  means  to  improve  relations  between  extension 
staff and farmers  and at the same time a  means  to  reduce  expenditures,  when  unpaid  villagers 
took over some of the tasks of paid  extension  agents29o. 
An AV  organises all cotton-producing  male  inhabitants  in  a  village29’. A special  technical  team, 
mainly  consisting of young  farmers, is trained by  CMDT to  undertake  a  range  of tasks in relation 
to production and marketing of cotton and  cereals. In the  beginning,  the  new  AVs  were  mainly 
responsible for weighting  and  grading  of  cotton.  Soon ew tasks  were  added,  and during the 
1970s  and 1980s AVs  became  involved  in  distribution  of  inputs,  distribution  and  repayment of 
credits, marketing of cereals,  organisation of adult  literacy  courses,  accountancy  courses  and 
training courses for young  farmers,  investments in village-level  infrastructure such as village 
pharmacies, class rooms,  store  rooms,  millet  mills  and  wells,  organisation of women’s  activities 
and the running of an environment  programme (Le Roy  et  al.,  1991b  p.  36-40;  Guindo & van 
Campen, 1994 p.  49-53;  CissC, 1986 p.  126-136).  Especially  the  literacy  courses  have  attracted 
the attention of the outside 
Already  in the late 1970s it became  clear that many  AVs  were  facing  serious  problems  with 
regard to  bookkeeping  and  proper  reporting on credits &d village  investments  (Cisse, 1984 p. 
The fact  that  a  similar  transfer of responsibilities eom govemment  agencies  to  village  associations  have  taken 
place  in neighbouhg coun!ries supprts this  interpretation. In B u r h a  Faso the  involvement  since 1979 of  village 
associations  in  marketing  of  cotton IS believed to have  resulted in a  cost  reduction  of 40% compared to the previous 
parastatal  (Larsen, 1996 p. 24, p. 29). 
situation  where  marketing of cotton was the sole responsibility  of  the  government  extension  agency a d the  cotton 
291 Before 1993 women  did  not  participate in AV meetin , except  in  a  few  cases  where  CMDT  had  made  it  a 
condition  for  support that a  few  women  were  included  (Zuid F erg & wid, 1992 p. 35; Sissoko, 1994 p.24). In recent 
years women have  become  resented  in  many AVs in the  Koutiala  area,  while  in the Kadiolo  area it is  rare  to  see 
a  woman  at AV meetinps.%e  real  influence  of  women.  even  when  thev  are  remesented.  however. is still very 
limited. Thus, Jonckers iiiticises the  attempts by  CMDT to integrate worn&  in  the’ AVs for  neglecting  the s t rend 
of women’s association  and instead forcing women  into  a  subordinate  position  in  male-dominated AVs (Jonckers, 
1 9 9 4 ~ .  130-131). 
292 Many  researchers  have  pointed  to the literacy  training as the main achievement of CMDT, e.g. Le Roy: 
“L’alphab&tisation en  Bambara  est ii mes yew la riussite absolue  de  la  CMDT dams sa zone  d’intervention” (Le Roy, 
fondements  e  la pnse de  conscience  des  points  de  revendication  et surtout de  l’audace  de  leur  forme  d’expression” 
1993 p. 155 and ChGibane Coulibaly: ‘“ais les paysans concernes voient dans cette alphab6tisation un des 
(Coulibaly, 1994 p. 54). 
d .  
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158-161).  A small group  of ex-fighter~’~~ and  a  few  school  leavers  were  selected as secretaries 
to the AVs,  but  being the only  villagers  speaking  and  writing  French,  they  tended  to  exclude 
others from  the  management  and  frequently  misused  common  funds (CissC, 1986 p.  132-136). 
In 1978 CMDT, therefore, launched an extensive programme for functional literacy and 
accounting in Bambara.  It  was  improved  several  times  and  resulted in a  programme  combining 
intensive  literacy  training,  accounting  courses  and  systematic  training for specific  tasks  targeted 
towards  villagers  responsible for management of AVs  (Cissk,  1986  p.139-216;  Belloncle,  1990 
p. 10-1 1). By 1989  an  estimated  20-40%  of  all  heads  of  households  had  participated  in  literacy 
training  courses2” (Le  Roy,  1993  p.  155). 
The various training  activities,  however,  could  not  prevent the existence of serious  internal 
tensions in the  AVs.  First of all, the  AV is hardly an institution  combining the best  of the 
traditional community organisation and of modem democratic organisation as sometimes 
indicated  (see, e.g.  Guindo & van  Campen, 1994 p.  49). In the beginning the AV  management 
was  dominated by  young  literate  farmerszg5  who  had the privilege of  occupying the important 
positions as secretary  and  treasurer  to  the  AV. As the politically  dominating  groups  (the  lineage 
of the first occupants of the  village,  the  larger  families,  the  better-off  farmers)  have  gradually 
realised the importance of AVs,  they  have  significantly  increased  their  involvement in the 
management  (Sanogo,  1989  p.243;  N’Golo  Coulibaly,  personal  communication,  August  1998). 
In addition to tensions  between,  on  the  one  hand,  politically  powerful  groups and, on the other 
hand, the young,  who  benefit  from  their  direct  contact  to  CMDT,  tensions  between  management 
and ordinary members often exist. Quite substantial amounts are controlled by the AV 
management,  and  temptation to abuse  resources is obvious  (Le  Roy  et al., 1991b p. 44). That 
abuses  and  mismanagement of funds  have in fact been  widespread is well  documented. In an 
evaluation  report  that  shocked  CMDT  and  the  donors,  Guy  Belloncle  in  1990  characterised he 
activities in the cotton  zones as a  general  failure296.  After  having  studied  files  belonging to a 
number of AVs,  he  found  that in most  cases  lack  of  competence  of the secretaries,  lack of 
democratic  procedures for presenting  accounts to the  general  assembly  of the AV,  and  lack of 
support  (and  external  control) from CMDT  had  resulted  in  complete  financial  chaosz9’  (Belloncle, 
1990  p.  16-24).  Many  other  sources  mention  mismanagement of AV funds as a serious  threat to 
village-level  social  relations  (e.g.  Jonckers,  1994  p.  129;  CMDT,  1994d p. 13-14;  Bingen et al., 
1995  p.  8;  Le  Roy et al.,  1991b  p. 45; Fok,  1994b p.  174-176). 
293 ‘Anciens  combattants’  are  men  who  (often  involuntarily)  have  participated  on he French side in World  War I 
and 11, the Vietnam  war  and  the war in A1 eria  in the 1950s. An estimated  41,000  men  from  French  Soudan  were 
incorporated  into the French  army  during l8 orld  War I, while  more than 200,000 men  from  French  colonies  in Afica 
were  recruited  during  World  War II (de Benoist,  1989  p.  95;  Warms,  1992  p.  490).  Being  French  spealdng,  ‘anciens 
combattants  enjoy certain privileges  among  their  fellow  villagers. 
Women  made UD a  negligible  share of those  uarticiuaiing  in  literacv  courses.  Of the 1.278 village  associations 
trained  by  1989, ody 122-in&1ded  women inthLtmi&g,  an2 in these  6nly 28% of course articip&t  successfully 
trained  were  women  (calculations  based  on  Zuidberg & DjirC, 1994 p. 58 and  Le  Roy,  1983  p.  155). 
‘Neo-alphsb&es’  is the local  label  for  those  who  have  successfully  passed the literacy  training  in  Bambara. 
296 ‘Mali-sud J.L des  rCsultats  globalement  nCgatifs’  (Belloncle,  1990  p.  14-15). 
Accordin to Souleymane Ouatlara, the lack  of  transparency  of the AV m a  ement  was still a serious problem 
in the mid-lg9Os. There were  usually  no procedures for  presentation  accounts to t8 e AV general  assembly,  and  abuse 
by the treasurer of his position  was  only  revealed  if  the  village  was  visited  by  the CMDT internal  audit  (personal 
communication,  November  1994). 
135 
Already  before  1991,  tensions  concerning the AV management  lead to the  breaking  up  of many 
AVs  in  the  Koutiala area, and  after  the  change  of  regime this phenomenon  has  become  extremely 
widespreadz9*.  Opponents  to  those  hitherto  in  power  (often  people  who  enjoy a certain status due 
to their economic  power) are forming  new  associations,  and in some  cases  up to nine  different 
village  associations  can  be  found in one  village299. 
Sometimes  conflicts in the AV relate  to  tensions  regarding  the  village  leadership,  but in the 
majority  of  cases  mismanagement  of  AV  funds  play  a  major  role in the conflicts3''. In certain 
cases management  problems  brought to light also  seem to have  triggered  the  eruption  of  much 
more  fundamental  conflicts,  e.g.  among  different  lineages  and  wards3".  When  tensions  arise in 
a  village  regarding e.g.  the  geographical  location  of  village inhstmcture such as wells  and  health 
clinics paid for by  the  AV,  the  real  problem  usually  relates to power  relations  among the various 
wards  which  again  may  reflect  competition  among  different  lineages302. 
The  phenomenon  of  breaking  up  AVs has so far  mainly  been  confined  to  the  northern  part  of  the 
region,  whereas in the southern  part  only  few  examples  were  found  of  villages  with  more  than 
one AV. A major  reason for this seems  to  be  that  cotton  has  been  introduced  much later in the 
southern  area  where  production  is  still  signiscantly  lower than in  the  north,  hence  much  smaller 
amounts are controlled  by  the  AVs. Inthe  north  the AV  management deals with quite  substantial 
amounts,  and  the  political  interest in controlling  the  AVs is therefore ~onsiderable~'~. In addition 
to this (and as argued  above,  probably also related to the  degree of integration  into the cotton 
economy), the maintenance  of  authority  by  traditional  political  leaders in the  south is an  important 
factor. As long as the village chief is respected and obeyed, nobody dares to suggest the 
establishment  of a new  AV in addition  to the one  supported by  him. 
The literature on this henomenon is still liited. For two of a  few  examples, see Bourgoing,  1994  p.  10  and 
Barrot, 1 9 9 4 ~ .  19-20. d e  description  in  the  following,  therefore, is mainly  based  on my own village  study  and 
interviews w~th resource  ersons  in  the  area of whom I am particularly in debt to Thea  Hilhorst,  Souleymane 
Ouattara, N'Golo  Coulibafy,  Yaya  Sidebd  and  Demba  Samake. 
When  interviews  were  made  in  the  area  in  November  1994,  Sogoumba  village  with  4,000  inhabitants,  situated 
AVs. 
in the eatem part  of  the  Koutiala  area  close  to the border of Burkina  Faso, was reported to have  no less than  nine 
and  stresses  that  the  village  chief s very 
October  1994). 
Amon8  the  vi!lages  under  study,  mismanagement is part  of the  problem in  at least S i o l o ,  Koloni  and  Molobala. 
In Koloni  there IS an apparent  underlying  conflict  among  lmeages. 
Sincina is an example of this. The  observation is suppofied  by  Souleymane  Ouattara  (personal  communication, 
November  1994). 
'03 As an  exam le can be  mentioned  the  case of a village in the Sikasso cercle  where  the  single  largest  producer  alone 
was  able to sei80 T cotton  &er the harvest,  while the total  number of 1  18  households  in the vlllage  together  sold 
2,000 T. This can be  compared to the  case of N'golopene  village in the  Kadiolo  cercle  where  the  total sale of cotton 
the  same year did  not  exceed 19 T (example  given  by  N'Golo  Coulibaly,  personal  communication,  August  1998). 
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Consequences of village-level changes 
In Koutiala  conflicts in some  cases  have  costed lives either in violent  clashes  between  opposing 
parties or as a  result of poisoning of some  of  the  parties involved3@’. Usually,  however,  the  major 
consequence is that it is no  longer  possible to unite  the  entire  village  for joint meetings or 
common village activities. Thus, in many  villages  activities  such as construction  work  and  tree 
planting  have  come  to a virtual  stand  still.  Government  extension  workers  complain  that  it is no 
longer  possible  to  undertake  group  extension  sessions, as they  now  have  to  approach  each  of  the 
conflicting  parties  separatel$os.  In  some  villages  conflicts  are  even  said  to  have  had  implications 
for the school  enrollment of children  and for the access by certain  groups  to the various  social 
hhstructure in the  village;“.  Finally,  internal  social  conflicts  have  had  consequences for power 
relations  between  the  village  and the outside  world, as it  has  become  difficult to make  common 
decisions, e.g. concerning  relations to neighbouring  villages, the attitude  towards  interventions 
by the  government  administration,  the  approach  towards  wood  cutters  from  towns,  and  relations 
to transhumant pastoralists. All this has resulted in a  general  feeling  of  uncertainty,  and  many 
people in  conflict-stricken  villages  express  a deep frustration  about  the  chaos  prevailing  after 
1991;”. 
In the Kadiolo area the political  changes  described  above  have  been  much  less  pronounced. Thus, 
in  a  comparison  of the northern and the southern part of  the  region, the development  during  the 
1990s can  be  said to have  added  a  very  important  political  dimension to existing  differences 
between the two  areas  regarding  agro-ecological  conditions,  integration  into  the  cotton  economy 
and  socio-cultural  organisation. 
8.4. Changes in inter-village organisations 
Before  the  colonial  period  a  wide  range  of  inter-village  organisations  existed.  Initiation  societies 
and  hunters’ associations usually  included  the  inhabitants  from  several  neighbouring  villages. 
Mutual ties  were  enforced  through  intermarriages  among  the  villages  and  joint  religious  and  other 
parties.  Villages  having  suffered  a  war  or  a  period  of  famine  and  managed  due to their  mutual 
assistance had particularly  strong ties (Jonckers, 1987 p. 11 1-1 12). 
In March 1994 two people  died  in  internal  village  conflicts  in Klda (N’Golo  Coulibaly,  personal  communication, 
an are said to explaii the death of a  village chef m one of the other  villages  under stuiy (interviews camed out 
Se  tember 1994 and  interviews  carried  out  in Feb- and  March 1996). Rumours about  o1soning  are  widespread 
October-December 1994). 
meeting  were  found.  When I initially  joined  the  government  extension  services  in  their  village wits  in  the 2outiala 
g the study  carried  out  in  the  autumn of 1994, many  examples of the  difficulties  of Gting a vi11 e for  a 
area,  it  was obvious  that only a l i i ted h c t i o n  of  the  village  population turned up for  +e  meetings. In one  village 
where  the  authority  of  the  vlllage  chief was senously  challen ed, he was nmning  around m vau~ attempting to make 
his  fellow  villagers  come,  but  they just continued  their worf in  the  fields. 
The  school  enrollment is said to have  been affected e.g. m Sincina,,  where  some  parents  have  denied  their  children 
access to a  school  constructed  by  those S porting  the  village  chlef,  and  in  Koloni,  where  the  general  lack  of 
authority  at  village  level is said  to  have a e  parents  send ther children to the fields mst@  o:exro+g them in 
school. Also in Smciua  villagelevel qfrashuc@re such as e.g. a health cliic where the staf€ls pad by  vlllage funds 
have  become  subject  to fights (mtervlews camed out October-December 1994). 
”’ See chapter 11 for a  further  discussion of this. 
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Despite  the  attempts by the  French  to  destroy  all  relations  uniting two or more  villages,  some  of 
these structures survived during the colonial period. The discrediting of the role of some 
traditional  authorities  resulting  from  interventions by the French,  however,  also  had  a  negative 
impact on inter-village structures. The weakening of inter-village relations continued after 
independence  and  was  further  aggravated after 1968  when  the  party  increased its attempts  to 
control all local-level  organisations  (Coulibaly,  1994 p.  24;  Jonckers,  1994  p.  127-128). 
When in the  late  1980s  farmers’  discontent  with  CMDT  was  growing,  a  number  of AVs started 
to have joint meetings  on  a  weekly  basis  to  discuss  possibilities  for  putting  pressure on CMDT 
to  adjust  producer  prices  (Coulibaly,  1994 p.  17-18).  Despite  the  fragility of many AVs, discussed 
above,  and  their  apparent  dependence  on  CMDT, the structures  turned  out  to  be  sufficiently 
cohesive to constitute the basis  of  enhanced  inter-village  cooperation  and  later  the  basis of  the 
farmers’  movement.  While  the  emergence  of  the  farmers  movement is discussed in further detail 
in the chapter  1 , a brief  mentioning  should  be  made  of  some  of  the  other  organisations  that  have 
emerged or have  been  revived  after  199  1. 
With the freedom  of  association,  approved  by the national  conference  held in July  and  August 
1991,  interest  groups of various  kind have formed  legally  acknowledged  associations  all  over 
Mali.  Although  the  majority  are  both  urban-based  and  urban-oriented,  quite  a  few are repr senting 
rural  interests  (Josserand & Bingen,  1995). In the  Sikasso  region  the  emergence of a  wide  range 
of  producer  associations3o8, small NG0209 and  saving  and  credit  associations  represent  such  small 
organisations  that are limited  and  local in scope  but  fairly  autonomous of both  the  state  and  donor 
organisations.  Among  the  saving  and  credit  associations, Kafo Jiginew  deserves  a  particular 
mentioning.  With  initial  financial  support f om a  French NG0 and  advisory  support  from CMDT 
independent  local  saving  and  credit  associations  were  established in the Sikasso region in 1988. 
Soon after the  establishment the financial  support &om donors  was l i i t ed  to the funding of 
educational activities for local treasurers, and by the mid-1990s farmers were responsible 
themselves  for the management  of  their  local  association  and  the  payment  of (Lasina 
Djabate,  personal  communication,  February  1996;  De  Groote  et al., 1995a p.  58-59). 
In addition to the many new organisations, some of the so-called traditional associations 
experienced  a  revival  when  the  state  gave  up  its  strict  control.  The  hunters’  association  operating 
on inter-village  level is a  prominent  example of this. Although  the  importance  of  hunting has 
decreased  significantly,  hunters’  associations  have  managed  to  survive  both the colonial  period 
Producer organisatons are e.g  ‘L‘association des producteurs des legumes’,  ‘L’association  des  producteurs  des 
pommes de terres’ and ‘L’association des manses’ (interview with the regional director of la Chambre 
d’Agriculture, Sikasso, February  1996). 
3w NGOs are still  relatively  few in the Sikasso region,  and local NGOs  that  are,not  branches of int,emational  NGOs 
are very  few,  indeed.  Howeyer  associations of young  unemplo ed people wth a  certam  educabonal  background puns, dipl6mb) are b m  to em e  and  now carry out task such as e.g. garbage  collection in urban  centres 
310 Initial financial  support  was  received f?om Credit  Cooperative de France  which  was  later  replaced  by  four 
European NGOs.  There are no  financ@.relabons  between  Kafo  Jlgmew  and  CMDT, and the only  connection 
conslsts in the  em lo ent by the association of two  former  CMDT  agents. In addlbon  to  these  advisors,  only  the 
treasurers of the g3 associations (as of  February  1996)  reqeive  a  payment  and in thia case  the  salary  depend 
on the surplus of the associabon.  All  members  (a  prox 30,000 m FebruaSy  1996)  have a  share of 5,000  CFA and 
the purchase of agricultural e upment. The repayment rate IS close to 100% (Lasina Djabate, personal 
are  allowed  to btain three  types of credit 1) cred!t d&g the  huneer  penod, 2) short-term  credit  and 3) a e h t  for 
communication,  February  1996; 4, e  Groote et al., 1995a p.  58-59). 
mtervlews  undertaken m the  autumn Y o 1994  and in February  1996). 
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and the two first regimes  after  independence  (Jonckers,  1994 p.  127-128). In 1993 a national 
federation  of the various  local  Organisations  was  established,  and  the  structure  now i cludes five 
administrative levels (the village, the arrondissement,  the  cercle, the regional  and the national 
level) (Ft5dt5ration Nationale  des  Chasseurs  du Mali, 1993 p.  1-8).  Whereas  the organisation  does 
not seem to be very  forceful  in  the  Koutiala  area,  it has obtained  a  status  almost similar to that 
of a police force in the Kadiolo area. Thus, in Kadiolo armed local units of the hunters' 
association  are  patrolling  the  villages  at  night,  and  according to their own statements, they shoot 
before  they  ask  if  they  catch a t iep".  The  strength  of  the  organisation in the  southern part of  the 
region is reflected  by the fact  that  the  incident of crime  seems to be  very  modest in this area.  The 
Koutiala area, on the other hand, has suffered from a crime wave after 1991 as neither 
government nor village authorities  have  had the power  necessary  to  control the situation (Thea 
Hilhorst,  personal  communication  October  1994,  interviews  carried out in the villages in the 
autumn  of  1994  and  February  1996). 
Conclusion 
The chapter has further elaborated  on  the  north-south  differences in the region by describing 
marked  contrasts  in  village-level  social  and  political  relations  between  the  northern  Koutiala  area 
and in the southern  Kadiolo area. 
First, in the Koutiala area the  process  of  dissolving  extended  families  into  smaller  family unts 
seems to be rather fast, while  the  speed  of the process is less  rapid in Kadiolo.  Second,  the 
importance of l i e  structures  seems  to be on  the  decline in Koutiala,  whereas in Kadiolo  lineage 
structures are still very  important. F d l y ,  and  probably  most  important,  village  authorities n the 
north  to a large extent are  losing  the  power to make  their  fellow  villagers  comply with their 
decisions.  At  the  same  time  village  associations are breaking  up,  and the previous  concentration 
of  decision-making in one AV is being  replaced  by the coexistence  of  several  different AVs in 
a  village. In the south the village  chief  has  usually  maintained  authority,  and it is still very  rare 
to fmd  more than one AV in a  village. 
These  processes  have  been  ongoing for many  years,  but  the  change  of  regime  in  1991 has made 
many  conflicts  erupt-  Conflicts  within  AVs  and the undermining  of  the  authority  of  village  chiefs 
in the  Koutiala  area  have  gradually  increased,  but  during  the  former  regime  problems  existed  only 
beneath the surface due to the lack  of  freedom to form  new  organisations.  The reduction of 
government  control of local  organisations  has  been  accompanied  by  a  decline in the general 
surveillance  of  the  population  that s further  contributed to the differences  between north and 
south. Thus, in the  southern  part  of  the  region  maintenance of law  and  order has been taken over 
by village  and  inter-village  organisations,  whereas  in  the  northern area local  organisations do not 
have this power,  and  consequently  the  security  situation  has  deteriorated. 
The  chapter has shown  that the tradition for far-reaching  interventions by the state  into  village- 
level affairs dates  back to colonialism  and has been  gradually  enforced  ever  since. While the 
French  colonial  administration  interfered  in  local  political  structures  by  selecting  chefs de anton 
311 As expressed by a member of the hunters associations in Nafegue: 'Ye fais partie de l'dquipe  des  chasseurs du 
personne  qui ne saitpas parrer sdnoufou, i1 aura des sirimpro&mes  mec nous*' (Nafegue no. 4). 
villagea m assurom la  sdcuriti du village. Nom organisons des atrouilles  nocturnes. Si now rencontrom une 
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and  village  chiefs  of  their own choice,  the Keita and  Traork  regimes  continued  and  enforced  the 
intervention  by  imposing  party  structures  upon  existing  organisations. Also the  support by  CMDT 
to the establishment  of  village  associations  can  be  considered  a  continuation  of the tradition. In 
addition to this comes the wide range of more indirect but probably even more important 
interventions in the form of tax collections,  forced  cultivation,  integration into  the market 
economy, etc. 
Like in the preceding  chapter,  however,  it must be  stressed that  local  social  and  political  relations 
are  not  a  mere  product  of  the  interaction  with  the  state.  Marked  differences  between th  northern 
and the souther  part of  the  region is a  clear  illustration  of  the  importance of ‘intra-societal 
dynamics’ in the shaping  of  the  social  forces  with  which  government  structures  interact. 
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CHAPTER 9.  EXTENSION  AGENCIES  IN  THE  SIKASSO  REGION 
Introduction 
The  purpose of the  present  chapter is to analyse a series  of  organisational-specific  factors that 
condition the performance of the four agencies under study. As defined in chapter 3, 
organisational  performance is understood as the  ability of an organisation  to safisfi the  demands 
by its clients. In case of extension  agencies  it  was  proposed to approach  the  issue of clients’ 
satisfaction by considering  factors  such as frequency  and  reliability  of  services,  usefulness  of 
services  and  the  context in which  interaction  between  extension  agents  and  farmers take place. 
Answers  from  farmers to these  questions are reported  in  chapter 10, while in the  present  chapter 
they just serve as points of reference to discussions  about  conditioning  factors. 
In chapter 5 and 6 the  shared  environment  of the agencies in the form  of  the  action  environment 
and  the  institutional  context  of the public  sector was analysed. It was concluded  that the Malian 
action  environment,  although  not  favourable,  cannot  be  described as completely  dysfunctional 
to development. In the case of the institutional  context  of the public  sector, the analysis  pointed 
to  a  less  promising  conclusion:  it was  suggested  that  institutional  constraints  are so many  and so 
serious  that  it  may  not  only  negatively  influence the performance  of  government  agencies  but in 
some  cases be detrimental to their basic functioning. The extent to which this is  the case is 
assessed in the following. 
For  each  of  the  agencies  organisation-specific  factors  conditioning  their  performance  are  analysed 
according to the guidelines  provided by the framework  established  in  chapter 3. By combining 
contributions to the revised  agency  theory with more  recent  contributions  inspired by theories 
about  workers’  motivation  and  the  importance  of  demand  pressure,  the  chapter  suggested  that an 
analysis  should  consider six issues,  namely authority, rewar& organisational  identijkation, peer 
pressure,  worksatisfaction by staffand demandpressure. It was  argued  that  demand  pressure is 
particularly  important,  because it is through the  response  from  clients  and  the  general  public  that 
an organisation maintains the legitimacy  necessary to exist or,  alternatively,  becomes  aware  that 
it  lacks  legitimacy  and  therefore has to  adjust.  The  particularity of government  organisations  was 
found to be  that  they  depend  not  only on their own legitimacy  but  on the legitimacy  of the state 
as such. 
All  the  four  agencies are involved  in  different  aspects  of natural resources  management,  and  they 
all refer to the Ministry of Rural Development and Environment  @IDRE).  The  chapter,  therefore, 
opens  by  a  brief portrait of the ministry  and of what  Grindle  and  Hilderbrand  describe as their 
‘task  network’, i.e. relations  of  collaboration and coordination  among the agencies. 
While three of the agencies  (viz. the forestry  service,  the  livestock  service  and  the  cooperative 
service) are clearly  defined as government  agencies  (i.e.  departments) in MDRE,  CMDT has a 
particular status as both  a  public  agent of the minishy and a private  sector  actor  with  economic 
interests  in  cotton  production,  processing  and  marketing.  It is a government  agency  in the sense 
that the  Malian  govemment  holds 60% of  the shares in the  agencyiI2,  it  represents  the  Department 
3’2 As described in cha ter 7, the Malie government holds 60% of the  shares in CMDT,  whiIe,4O%,are  owned b 
the  French  parastatal c! FDT (Compagme Franyse pour le D6veloppement des Fibres  Textiles) m whlch  the  Frenc B 
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of  Agriculture in the Sikasso  region,  and it has  the  same  status as other  government  agencies  in 
regional and local development planning and coordination. Furthermore, it is considered a 
government  agency in the eyes  of the population  and  thereby,  similar to the  other  agencies, 
depends  on the overall legitimacy of the state3I3.  It is not a government  agency  in  the  sense  that 
it  does  not  share the dependency  by the other  agencies on  the institutional  context  of  the  public 
sector, but has its own more plentiful resources and its own recruitment and employment 
procedures. The mixed status of CMDT is an illustration of the problem of empirically 
distinguishing  between  state  and  society, as discussion  in  chapter  2. In analyses  and  conclusions 
in the following, its particular  status  will  be  taken  into  account. 
In addition to available  written  sources,  analysis in this chapter  mainly  draws on a  total  of  64 
interviews  with staff of the four  agencies  made in late  1994.  Emphasis  was  put  on  interviews  with 
front-lie staff, but  also  cercle  level staff, regional  and  national  directors (or deputy  directors) 
have  been  interviewed.  The  information is supported  by  interviews  with  a  total  of  40  other 
government  st&  (chefs  d’arrondissement,  chefs  de  cercles,  the  governor of Sikasso  and  other 
staff in  the  regional  administration,  other MDRE staff at national  level,  and  members  of  various 
government  planning  units)  and  40  researchers,  donor  representatives,  and  other  resource  persons. 
Fmally,  the  chapter  draws  on  some  of  the  many  personal  comments by the 312 respondents in the 
village  survey  reported  in  chapter  10  and  chapter  11. For a further  description  of  the  methodology 
applied,  see the section  on  ‘field  work  methodology  and  literature  study’ in the  annex. 
9.1. Ministry of Rural Development and Environment @Dm): the  task  network 
In the mid-1990s the MDRE had  about 7,000 staff corresponding  to  close to one fifth of  the  total 
number of government  employees.  Both  before  the  change  of  regime in 1991  and  during  the 
1990s,  the ministry has  been  subject to constant  reorganisations.  Numerous  times the various 
departments  have  been  split up  between  different  ministries  before  they a few  years  later - and 
sometimes  only a few  months  later - have  been  rejoined  again3I4.  Coordination  units at the 
national  level have been  established  and  abolished,  and  often  several  competing  coordination 
units  have existed at the same  time3I5  (Diallo,  1995). 
state holds 64% of the shares. 
313 As expressed by the president  of the farmers’  movemenc  SYCOV,  Antoine Berthe ‘>our nous, Igtat et la 
CMDT ne sqntpas dissociables. Ils se confordent.  Parlez de la CMDT ci n’im orte quelproductew, il YO? dira 
ue c’est [’Etat” (Coumier de la Planae, 1994). The statement  was c o n f m d b y  intermews  with  farmers m the 
&asso region  in the autumn of 1994  and  February  1996. 
314 At  the  time of the chan  e of regime  the  agencies  were  divided  between two ministries,  viz.  MinistL.e de 
I’Agriculture  and  Minist&e f e  I’Enviromement  et de 1’Elevage. In March  1991  they  were  joined  in the Ministke 
du DCveloppement Rural et de 1’Environnement that a few months later changed Its name to Ministere de 
I’Agriculture, de 1’Elevage et de I’EnviroFement. In April  1993  they  were  split U again,  when the  Ministere du 
Dkveloppement  was  separated  fiom Mmt+e de 1’Envuonnement. In. February P 994  they  were  rejoined  in  the 
the  fieldwork was done,  but,in  late  1998  the  forestry m c e  was se arated  fiom  the rest, when a  new &histere de 
Ministke du Dkeloppement Rural et  de  I’EnwonnemenY,  and the agencm remained united  during the  eriod  when 
I’Environnement  was  estabhshed (MD=, 1992d  p.  2;  Dudeck, 1984 p. 5; interviews  with  members of the MDRE 
CabmK the  autumn of 1994  and  Feb.  1996;  Thea  Hilhorst,  personal  communicatlon,  May  1999). 
’ls A  coordination  unit named CPSPPNLCD  (later CSWPNLCD) was established  in  1989 with a view to coordinate 
all  activities  within the field  of m,tural resoyce management.  When  in  March  1991  the,M@istry of Environment 
that  it  belonged to was  merged wth the  Mmlstry of Rural Development,  another  coordmahon m t ,  la  Cellule de 
Planification  et  de  la  Statistique,  took  over this task.  ?e first unit, however, was not  aboliihed  and for years  the two 
units competed  and  countered  each  others  efforts.  Addmg to the confuslon was the  estabhshment m 1991 of a new 
c o o r a o n  unit by the World  Bank  with the  task of coordinating  efforts  related  to  the  Projet  National  de  Gestion 
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For  each ofthe departments,  referred  to  here as agencies,  the  various  organisational  changes  have 
had  limited  implications  for  their  actual  activities.  Since  their  establishment,  they  have  existed 
as top-down  parallel  lines  of  command  from  the  national  to  the  arrondissement  level,  and  mutual 
collaboration has been virtually nonexistent.  Below  the  national  level  where  the  cabinet  and  the 
various  competing  units  are  supposed  to  coordinate  activities - but  are  unable to do so - no  formal 
structures  of  coordination  exist.  Regional  and  local  development  committees at regional,  cercle 
and  arrondissement  level3I6  rarely  meet  and  when  they do,  any  questioning  by  others  of  the 
activities  of  a  particular  agency is considered  unwarrantable interferen~e~~' (MORE, 1992d  p.  3-4: 
W E ,  1991  p.  13-21). 
In many  parts  of  the counm the  existence  of  the  so-called ODRs3'*, parastatals  with  the  objective 
of promoting  a  particular  crop  or  the  development  of  a  particular  geographical  area,  and  the 
multitude  of  projects  and  programmes  funded by  bi-  and  multilateral  donors  and NGOs are 
adding to coordination  problems319. In Sikasso this is less  of  a  problem  because  the  role of CMDT 
in the  region  implies  that  actors  other han government  agencies are few.  However,  when  cross- 
sectoral collaboration is sometimes described as farthest advanced in the Sikasso region 
(Brinkerhoff & Gage,  1993  p.  17), it  tells  more  about  the  complete  lack  of  collaboration in other 
regions than about  the  situation in Sikasso.  Indeed,  activities in the region  are  characterised by 
overlaps  and serious gaps in the  coverage  of  the  services  provided,  while  farmers  are cofionted 
with a wide  range  of  agents  each  of  whom  deals  with a particular  aspect  of natural resource 
management.  Initiatives to improve  coordination  and  collaboration  have  been  given  up  because 
of the general  fear  by all agencies  to  become  involved in joint activities  headed  by  another 
agencfZ0 (MD=, 19928 p. 10-28; interviews  with  the  four  regional  directors  of  the  agencies 
under  study  and  other  regional  government staff, the  autumn  of  1994). 
In late 1994,  when  the  interview study  with staff &om  the  four  agencies was made,  the  only 
regular  contact  among  the  four  agencies  under  study was related to their  involvement in a donor- 
funded  natural  resource  management  project,  the  'Test  Zones  programme'.  Although  meant to 
support  the  preparation  of  land  management  plans  ('schema  d'amenagement  de  terroir'),  the 
de Ressources  Naturelles  and the establishment  in  1996  by  a grou of donors of a  coordination  unit  for the Plan 
National  d'Action  Envimnnementale (F'NAE)(I.nteWiews w~th mem ers of MDRE Cabiiet,  the autumn  of  1994  and 
February  1996). 
'l6 The  regional  and  local  development  committees ar  explained in chapter 6.2. 
'" In a  speech  held  in  March  1992  the  then  Ministerof Agriculw, Livestock  and  Environment,  Ma-mouna  Ba  Sy, 
expressed the problem of the ministry  very  precnely: "Chaque Direction rate crisp& sur s a  prdrogatives 
anciennes? dipense de g r a d  inergie et des trisors &imagination a dkfendre son territoire 'abmaine de 
compdtence',  ses  at@ibutwm telia yue ddtailldes dam des textes  alors que la exigences de l'actwn etparfois les 
mots em-rn2me-s n 'ontpas de senr ' @4J3RE, 1992d p. 3). 
'I8 ODR stands for Ophtions de Divelop anent Rural. They include, e.g. Oftice du Niger (ON), Opkration Riz- 
Segou (ORs) and  &ation P&che-Moph PO€"). About the objective  and structure of ODRs, see  Plerot,  1979 
4448. In the  early T 1 90s an  estimated  15 OD& were  attached to what was then  the  Mmist&e de YAgriculture, 
1'Elevage  et de 1'Envuonnement (MAEE, 1991  p. 20). 
'l9 The issue'of donor  coordination (or lack  of  it) is another  story  that  will  not  be  dealt  with  here  apart  from 
mentioning  that  the  problem  seems to be  particularly  ve  in  the  field of natural  resource  management  where 
relations among main donors  such .asthe World Bank an Y , the  French  Development CFperation (la  Caisse  Franwise 
de Divelo pement) are best descnbed as hostile  (Intervlews  wlth  donor  representahves and resource  persons,  the 
autumn  oP1994). 
32D At regional level, a 'Comitk  Technique  de  Coordination' was established in 1993  in Sikasso, but when the  last 
fieldwork  was  done in February  1996, It still remamed  dormant. 
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major  impact of the  project  was  its  provision  of  some  much  needed  funding to the  agencies 
because  it  made  it  possible  for  them to fund  activities  part  of  their  regular  programme by funds 
for  the  ‘Test  Zones  programme’  (a  brief  presentation  of  the  project is found in the annex). 
The  above  description  of  the  institutional  problems  in  the ministry was  valid  when  the  fieldwork 
was  carried out and  has  been so until  recently,  but  an  ongoing  reform,  meant to integrate its 
compartmentalised  activities, is changing  the  picture. The reform,  referred to as ‘the  action  plan 
for MDRE’, aims at dismantling  existing  departments as juxtaposed  government  agencies and 
will replace  them by three  new  departments  for  a unitary extension  service,  for  natural  resource 
management  and  for  law  enforcement,  respectively.  Integration  of sta f from  existing  agencies 
into a unitary extension  service is meant  to  imply  that  in  future  farmers  will  meet  only  one 
multipurpose  agent  who is supported  by  subject-matter  specialists  at  cercle  and  regional  level3’’ 
(Diallo,  1995; CAMOPA, 1994; Le  Rkpublicain  no. 1 15 23 November  1994; MDRE, 1994i; 
MDRE, 19941; MDR, 1993c;  MDR,  1993e; MDR, 19930. 
As the  specific  outcome  of  the reform  was  still  not known when  the last fieldwork  was  carried 
out in  February  1996,  descriptions  and  analyses of the  four  agencies in the  following  all  refer to 
the  situation  prevailing  before  the r e f ~ r n ~ ~ ~ .  
9.2.CMDT 
Introduction 
As explained  above,  CMDT  (Compagnie  Malienne  de  Dkveloppement  de  Textiles)  differs  from 
the  other  agencies by  having a  mixed  role as both  a  public  agent  of  the Ministry of  Rural 
Development  and  Environment  and  a  private  sector  actor  with  economic  interests in cotton 
production,  processing and marketing. Its legal status is that  of a parastatal  commercial  and 
industrial  enterprise  (Bingen,  1998 p. 272). 
’*’ The history of the reform  dates back to the  national  conference inJuly  and A u p t  !991  when the rural population 
protested  a  ainst the oor conditions of the rural sector. In December  1991  an msfiwonal study of the  then MAEE 
wascarrie f out @&&E, 199lkand a  national  conferences on the  rural  sector  was  held.  With  la  Calsse Fran*se 
as the lead agency, donors ded a thorough analysis of the rural sector ( l e   s c h h a  drecteur du secteur 
developpement rural’, MAEE, 1992e  vol. 1-11) that  provided  the  basjs  for  a  national seminar on institutional 
problems in MD= (‘the Selingue seminar’) and  the  subsequent  establlshment of CAMOPA,  a  unit  with  the  task 
to repare  and  implement an institutional reform of the ministry. m g  the  process the World Bank took  over the 
rol! as the lead  donor  to CAMOPA  and  demanded  that @so the S . h s o  re on should  be  included in the process. 
While la  Caisse  Franpaise  had  wanted to apply the expenence  of  mtegrate frural development  by  CMDT  to  other 
regions in the  country,  it  was  never  its  intention,.that the Sikasso regon should be part of the reform,  and CMDT 
thereby  should adjust to a  new  structure  of  a unity semce. In late  1998 im licatlons  of  the  reform  was seriously 
diminished,  when the  transfer of the  forestry  service  to  a  new Miniibe de fEnvjronnement  excluded this a  ency 
from being art of the  reform  (Interviews  with  CAMOPA staff,  staff from La Misslon de  Decentraliiation, stafffiom 
communication,  May  1999). 
la Caisse Prangaise and resource persons, the autumn of 1994 and February 1996; Thea Hdhorst, personal 
The  reform was initiated in  mid-1996,  but  available  sources  do  not  indicate if  the status of the Sikasso region  has 
been  finally  established.  When  the  last  fieldwork  was  carried  out m February  1996,  it  was  still the perc 
CMDTthat  the Sikasso region was  excluded fiom the  reform. Staff+ CAMOPA,  howeveqsuggested that%:%: 
of exception  was  not  yet  clarified  and  stressed  that  they  were a 9 m  at  a  reform  compnsing  the  entire  country 
(Interviews  with the  regonal  drector of CMDT in Sikasso and  vvlth 8 AMOPA staff, February  1996). 
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In an  area  covering  about  10%  of  the  total  surface  of  Mali - c a l l e d  ‘Mali-s~d~’~ - the  company  has 
the double objective of promoting cotton production and undertaking an integrated rural 
development  programme. In addition to cotton  production,  processing  and  marketing,  CMDT is 
responsible  for all extension  activities  oriented  towards  food  production,  and for two  decades  it 
has  been  involved in construction  of rural roads, rural health  centres,  village  boreholes,  promotion 
of  animal  traction,  environmental  protection  activities,  organisation  of the rural population, 
provision of credit facilities and literacy, booMceeping and accounting courses for cotton 
producers. Part of the funding for its  various  activities  comes  from  donors,  including the French 
Development  Cooperation,  the  Dutch  Development  Cooperation  and the World Bank which  are 
channelling a considerable  amount  of  development  assistance  through t e company  (CMDT, 
1994b  p. 3-5; Bingen  et al., 1995 p. 7-8; Marchant,  1991  p. 76-80; Guindo & van  Campen,  1994 
p.  48-50;  Zuidberg 62 DjE,  1992 p.  22). 
Since  the  nationalisation  of the company in 1974,  CMDT  has  acted as the  representative  of  the 
National  Department  of  Agriculture  (DNA) in Mali-~ud~’~. The  mandate  of  CMDT is negotiated 
in a  contract  between the agency  and  the  government  (and  since  1994 also representatives  of  the 
farmers’  movement)  that lists the activities to  be  undertaken by  CMDT on the  behalf  of  the 
government  and  specifies  the  financial  relations  between  the two pa~ties”~. CMDT  refers  to  DNA 
which is informed  about  all  activities,  but  given the close  links  of  the  former  to  donors  and 
especially to the French  Development  Cooperation326,  DNA often finds it difficult to control  and 
influence CMDT”’. During  interviews with high-ranking  DNA staff this was  regretted,  and  a 
critical  assessment was made  of  CMDT’s  approach,  including  the  mixing  of  commercial  and 
public service activities’28 (Interview with MDRE cabinet staff, Nov. 1994; CMDT, 1994b; 
MDRE, 19928  annex 3). As an  example  of  CMDT’s  semi-autonomous  status it can  be  mentioned 
that the agency has managed to negotiate that the third region  (the Sikasso region) is excepted 
from a  large  extension  programme  initiated in the mid-1990s  and  expected to cover  the  rest  of 
the ~0untry3~~. 
Mali-sud  includes the entire Sikasso region  (the  3rd  region  and  the  cercles of San, Tominian,  Baraoueli,  Bla  and 
Dioila in the  2nd  and  the 4th regions  (CMDT,  19941,  p.5). 0 2 about  4,200  villages  in  the  ‘Mali-sud  region’  only  329 
were  not  yet  covered  by  CMDT activiaes m 1995. In recent  years  the  programme has expanded  significantly,  and 
many  new  villages  have  been  included  (CFDT,  1995; Graudy, 1996 p.  6). 
The  few staff members  delegated fiom DNA to the Sikasso region  refers to the  regional  directors of CMDT 
(MDRE, 19928  annex 3). 
The k t  contract  (the  so-called  ‘Contrat-Plan’)  between the overnment  and  CMDT  was  signed  in  1989,  while 
the  second  contract  was  signed  in  1994  by the government 8 MDT  and  SYCOV  (CFDT,  1992b  p. 7; CMDT, 
1994b). 
326 Given the majority shares of  the  French  state  in CFDT,  the  French  Development  Cooperation  (la  Caisse Franpise 
de Developpement) has indirect  economic  interests in the  company,  and  CMDT  receives  a  considerable f m c i a l  
support fiom la  Caisse Frangise (EIU 1996-97  p. 61; Jeme Ahque 10-23  Aug. 95 p.  53; Cauris 19-25  April,  1995). 
321 A s~ ~lar  point is made by Campbell  regardmg  CIDT in C8te  d’lvoire  (Campbell,  1984 p. 149). 
Other points  of  criticism  mentioned byDNA staff included the top-down  extension  approach  a  plied by  CMDT 
and the  lack of interesf  by  CMDT in the romoaon  of  vegetables.  Considenng the general  top- i? own character of 
all  government  extenslon  activities, the &t-rnentioned  pomt seems somewhat  surpnsmg. 
CMDT  has  managed to ne otiate an exception of the Sikasso region from a  national  T&V-based  World  Bank- 
funded extension rogramme  &NVA) (Intyv~ew with  the  national  coordinator ofPNVA, Nov. 1994;  interview  with 
staff at  the  Frenc R Development Cooperation, Dec.  1994). 
The  picture of a  powerful  agency that it is difficult for the ministry to influence,  however, is far 
ftom unequivocal.  There  are  several  examples of situations  where the ministry has  demonstrated 
a strong will  to make CMDT  comply  with its policies.  One  example is the intervention by the 
Minister of Rural  Development  during  a  farmers’  strike  in  the Sikasso region in May  1991.  While 
CMDT  initially r e h e d  to  discuss  farmers’  demand,  the  minister  forced  CMDT  to ad pt a  more 
accommodating position towards the farmers’  movement.  Other  examples  include the transfer 
in  1993  of  livestock  activities  in  Mali-sud  fiom  CMDT  to  the  National  Department of Liv stock 
against the wishes of CMDT.  And  finally, the  contract  between  CMDT, the government  and 
farmers  signed in 1994 forced  CMDT to accept  to  concentrate on cotton  production in the future 
and  gradually  give up its general rural development  activities33o  (CMDT,  1994b; interviews with 
CMDT staff at national and regional  level;  interviews  with MDRE Cabinet staff, the autumn of 
1994). 
Formal  structures  and  decisions,  however,  are  probably  not the best  reflexion  of the relationship. 
Informally,  there  are  very  close  links  between  CMDT  and  the  top  executive  layer of MDRE,  and 
many  issues  are  handled through informal  discussions. Thus, there has been a certain  tradition  for 
Directors of CMDT to become  Minister  of  Rural  Development  and  Environment,  and  many  other 
ministers  and  heads of dep-ents are  former  CMDT  employees33’  (Jeune  Afiique  no. 1917 1997 
p. 101; Jeune Afiique no.  1805-1806,  1995 p. 53; interviews  with MDRE Cabinet  staff,  the 
autumn of 1994).  The  close  relations  reflect  the  national  economic  importance of CMDT.  With 
cotton accounting for half of export  incomes,  and an annual contribution by CMDT to the 
government  budget of USD 37  mio,  CMDT  obviously  represents  a  core  interest of the MDRE3‘* 
(L’hdipendant no. 54 22 February  1996). 
As regards the relationship  between  CMDT  and  CFDT in France, it seems to be mainly  financial 
and  technical. As long as CMDT is able  to  present  a  stable  high-quality  production of cotton,  the 
agency in  France does not  interfere  in its policy.  Issues such as personnel  policy,  transfer  of 
extension task to farmers  and  the  policy  vis-&vis the farmers’  movement are handled  solely by 
The  changed mandate of CMDT  illustrates  that the  Malian  government  has  many  other  interests  to  consider than 
those  of  CMDT.  Thus, it is believed to result  partly 60m pressure eon the World Bank who is working for a 
mivatisation of cotton  uroduction  and  marketing  and.  therefore.  has  ouuosed  the m m e  of Dublic and unvate ~~~ ~~~ ~ ~~~~~ ~~ ~~ 
mterests  in CFDT-&lied parastatais. In Benin  &dC@eroon  have lrkady  been hitiated 
(Afrique  Agriculture  no.  194June 1992 p.26- 9; inkmews the  autumn of 1994). 
Former CMDT  employees in the state  apparatus are often referred to as the ‘CMDT clan’. The  CMDT &&or 
mwml until 1992. Ousmane Sv.  lei? to become  the  minister  of Rural Develomnent  and  Environment  and the uresent D - - ~ - _, . -,,
director,DrissaKeita,hasearlierbeenRime~and~e~ofFinan~(JeuneAfri ueno 19171997p. 101; 
Jeune Afriaue no. 1805-1806,  1995 p. 53; mtemews wth vanous resource  persons). ? h ‘  e  French  Development 
Cooperatioh actively participates ii the informal exchanges. Close personal relations among the CMDT 
managm.mt, top-level  government  officials  and staff from the Bamako r resentation of the French  Development 
Coop&on  have often facilitate  the co!laboration  among the three parties%ttenriews  with staff6om la  Cooperation 
Franqaise  and  other  resource  persons m the autumn of 1994). 
332 The  tumover in 1996  of CMDT of USD 357  mio.  corresponded to about  60%  of  the  entire state budget 
(Calculation  based on data from Jeune  Afrique no. 1917,1997, Le Malien 19 October  1998  and  EIU,  1996 p. 75). 
The  same year the S lus ofthe agency  amounted  to  more than USD 30 mio. (Jeune Apque no. 1917,1997). For 
a  further  analysis of”;R e  mutual  interests of CMDT and the Malian  government, see Bmgen,  1998 p. 272-274). 
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the  CMDT managerner~f~~ (Interview  with  the  regional  director  of  CMDT in Sikasso, Feb.  1996; 
interview  with M. Bkroud,  CFDT Paris, July 1996). 
Organisational  structure 
The  basic  organisational  structure  of  CMDT is based  on  the  mechanical  model.  Management, 
authority  and  communication  are  structured  according to a  hierarchy  ranging fiom the  ‘secteur 
de base’, comprising 4-7 villages, to headquarters in Bamako.  Roles  and  responsibilities  are 
clearly  defined,  and  each staff member  refers to his immediate  superior in the  hierarchy. All major 
decisions  are  taken  at  headquarters  level  and  communicated  downwards  through  the  hierarchy. 
Figure 5. Simple  organisation  chart of CMDT in the Sikasso region. 
Headquarters 
Bamako 
l 
I 
Koutiala 
Region a) 
I 
1 
ZAER c) ZER d) 
Notes: 
a)  CMDT  does  not  follow the administrative  divisions in Mali  but  has  regional offices in Sikasso, Koutiala, 
Bougouni,  San,  Fana  and  Kita. 
b) In a  total  of 25 ‘secteurs’ the staff include i.a. heads  of  ‘secteurs’,  secretaries,  store  keepers,  educational  staff, 
livestock  agents  and  environmental  specialists. 
c) A ‘Zone  $Animation  et  #Expansion  Rurale’  (ZAER)  includes 8-12 villages  able to maintain a  considerable  part 
of  extension tasks themselves. Thus, a  sole  ‘Chef de ZAER’ together  with  a  village tchnical team cany out all tasks 
related to extension,  educational,  input  distribution,  storing  and  collection of the  harvest  (Sanogo,  1989  p.  99). 
d) In a  ‘Zone  #Expansion  Rurale’  (ZER)  a  ‘Chef ZER’ is responsible  for  support to about 4 ‘secteurs de base’. 
e) In a ‘secteur de base’ an extension  agent (‘Chef SB’) is  responsible  for 4-7 villages (on average 500 households), 
depending on the  level of qualifications  of  farmers.  He  receives  assistance from his  superior, the ‘chef  ZER’ and 
various  educational staff from the ‘secteur’ . Source: Sanogo, 1989  p.  99. 
’’’ Accordin to M. B&o& responsible  for  relations toCMDT$ CFDT P@, @e  management  capacity of CMDT 
this, M. B&oud was not  informed  in  any  details  about  the  relationship  between  CMDT  and  e  fanners’  movement 
is high and i e r e  is no need  for  CFDT to have  a close touch wth the sltuahon III the  coun As an  illus!mtion  of 
after  1991  (Interview  with M. Bdroud, CFDT  Paris,  July  1996). 
9x. 
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Ofthe approximately 2,500 permanently  employees,  about  1,000  are  working at village-level,  i.e. 
either at the level of ‘secteur  de  base’, ZER,  ZAER or  ‘secteur’.  Of  these  about  750  live  in  a 
village. In addition to the permanent staff, CMDT  employs  about  2,500  seasonal  labourers 
(CFDT,  1995  p. 10; le Monde  Diplomatique  27  Jan.  1994;  Wentholt et al., 1998 p.  2). 
The  extension  approach  applied  by  CMDT is inspired  by  the  T&V  system. It basically aims at the 
distribution of a  standard  technological  package  to  increase  the  production  of  high  quality  cotton. 
Multipurpose  field  agents are supported  by  a  large  team  of  subject-matter  specialists at ‘secteur’ 
and  regional  level.  All  village-level  agents  follow a relatively  tight six monthly  work  schedule 
that  specifies  the  number  of  extension  sessions  to  be  held  in  each  village, the number of days  to 
be used  for  participation i  staff training  activities  and  visits  by  superiors,  and  the  number of days 
to be used for internal  CMDT  meetings  and  report  writing.  Reports to superiors  have  to be 
provided within rather  short  intervals,  such as e.g.  every 10  days for reports from a  ‘chef  secteur 
de  base’  to his ‘chef ZER’. Although  some  time is set a side  to  supervise  farmers in the field  and 
see if they follow the instructions  given,  possibilities  for  village-based  agents  to  improvise  are 
limited  (CFDT,  1995 p. 12; interviews  with  CMDT staff, the  autumn of 1994). 
The extension approach,  however, is far from  a  ‘pure’ T&V approach.  It has more in common 
with the ‘modified  T & V  system’  applied  by  the  majority of  African  countries  where  several  of 
the  principles in the  original  version  have  been  found  inappropriate to local  conditions  (Hulme, 
1992 p. 439, see also chapter 3). Firs4 the  agency  does  not  concentrate on the communication  of 
one  simple  and  clear  extension  message  only  but  rather  executes  what  may  be  called  an  integrated 
rural  development  programme.  Second,  extension  agents  do  not  concentrate  entirely on  pilot 
farmers.  Although it operates with the notion  of  ‘paysans  cibles’,  they are but one of  several 
groups  of fanners covered  and  are not expected  to  pass  on the messages to other  farmers. Thus, 
farmers  are  divided into four  groups  according to their  level  of  mechanisation,  and  separate 
extension  sessions  are  held  with  each  of  the g o ~ p s ~ ~ .  And M y l y ,  as it  will  be  explained  below, 
the  agency is in a process  of  moving  beyond the mechanical  stage  and  incorporating fanners in 
the  organisation  of its activities. 
Authority 
CMDT  resembles other government  agencies  by its adherence to a  traditional  authority  system 
where  superiors  decide and subordinate s t a f i e x e c ~ t e ~ ~ ~ .  
Field staff generally  need  to  be  very  sure that their superiors  have  approved of their  activities 
before  they  dare  to  go  ahead.  During  interviews  with staff from the four  agencies,  CMDT  staff 
were  generally  more  worried  than  other M a b o u t  the risk of answering my questions. Thus, the 
only case encountered  where  a  letter  of  introduction  from  headquarters was not  enough  to 
convince  the staff to  participate  was  found  with  CMDT. A ‘chef  secteur  de  base’  did  not  want  to 
The S tern of diving  farmers  into  four groups ( group  a-d  according  to  ‘the DRSPR typology’) has  been 
describe&  chapter 7). 
During a ioint seminar for CMDT staff and  reoresentatives  of  the  farmers’ ormisation SYCOV,  held  in Seou 
in March-1993, the mtraliied and  hierarchical  siructure  of  decision-making by CMDT was highlighted as a m$or 
problem  for  CMDT’ S extension  activities  (CMDT,  1993b p. 2-3). 
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answer  any  questions  before  it  was  documented  that  not  only Bamako but also his immediate 
superior, the ‘chef ZER’ had  given his consent. 
The  management  system,  however,  cannot be described as a  purely  low-trust  system.  Field  agents 
seem more ready to speak up in the presence  of  their  superiors than subordinate staff e.g.  from 
the forestry service.  The  feedback  from  extension  workers  during the regular training activities 
and intemal meetings also implies  that the dialogue is not  entirely  one-way. 
It  is  worth  noting,  however,  that the management of  the  agency  had  not  been  able to perceive the 
growing disaffection by farmers in the late 1980s when the ground for the later farmers’ 
movement  was  laid.  Field  agents  must  have known of farmers’  discontent,  but  when  the  strike 
broke out in May  1991,  management  was  taken  by  surprise  (Interviews  with  CMDT  staff,  the 
autumn of 1994). 
Rewards 
External funding and the surplus from cotton production allow CMDT to pay wages and 
allowances to its staff considerably  above  the  general  level in government  agencies.  Staff rom 
other  agencies are particularly  envious  of  the  provision  of  each  CMDT  field  agent with a  moped 
and  a large budget for fuel  (Interviews  with  CMDT staff and staff from  other  agencies, the 
autumn of 1994). 
When in the late  1980s  world  market  cotton  prices decried, CMDT  managed  to  restrain  wage 
increases for some  years.  After the change of regime in March  1991  when all government staff 
was generously  rewarded for the  role  played  by  public trade  unions in the  toppling of the Traork 
regime, also CMDT staff got  substantial  wage  increases336  (CFDT,  1992b p. 13). 
While the linking  of  wage  payment  to  performance is only  indirect in the sense  that  wages are 
frozen in years  with  poor  profits,  promotions  are  directly  tied to performance. Unliie other 
government  agencies,  CMDT  undertakes  career  planning  for  individual staff members  based  on 
current evaluations  of their performance,  including  assessments  of  their  contact with farmers. 
High performance  and  good  relations to farmers  are  rewarded  by  promotions,  whereas  poor 
performance  may  result in transfer to less  prestigious  positions  (Interview  with staff from CMDT 
Division  Administrative et Sociale, Sikasso Dec.94). 
Organisational  identification 
CMDT  cultivates an image as the most  popular  and  useful  organisation  of all government 
agencies. Its staff are constantly  assured  that  they  are  something  special  and  very  different  from 
the  majority  of  government  agents  who are sitting  idle in their  offices  and  only  work  when  forced 
to do so or motivated by allowances  or  bribes. Staffin CMDT offices  arrive  no later than 7.30 
a.m.  and often work  long  hours.  Staff  interviewed  declared to have  accepted  that  wages  were 
frozen in the late 1980s in order to ‘save the agency’. 
In two years from 1989/90 to 1991/92  the  total wage budget of CMDT went up by 50% (CFDT, 1992b p. 13). 
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It is part of the CMDT  organisation  culture  to  emphasize  the  outstanding  qualifications  of its 
staff. The  extensive  internal  training  programme is highlighted as a  factor  that  significantly 
contributes to the good performance of the agency. During interviews, field agents often 
compared their qualifications  to  staff  from  other  agencies  and  concluded  that  they know more 
about livestock  raising  than  livestock staff, more  about  environmental  protection than forestry 
staff  and  considerably  more  about  organisation  of  the  population  than the cooperative  service. 
While  other  govemment  agents  are  believed  to  have  much  to  learn  from  CMDT,  the  agency  itself 
is considered  ‘simply the best’  and  therefore  unable  to  gain  much  from  closer  cooperation  with 
others. 
Also in an international  comparison,  staff  express  confidence in the  favourable  position  of 
CMDT.  They  refer to the  difficulties  of  cotton  agencies  in  neighbouring  countries  and  are 
obviously  aware  of  the  high  esteem by CFDT  of  their  agency. 
It is important to note,  however,  that  the  strong  organisation  culture has been  somehow  shaken 
in areas  where  farmers’  anger in the  early  1990s was turned  against the staff. In parts  of  the 
Koutiala  area it was  necessary  during  a  shorter  period  to  evacuate  field  agents for security 
reasons.  That  experience  gave  many  agents  a  shock,  and in villages  where  farmers  are  still  very 
critical  towards  the  staff,  serious  tensions  sometimes  occur. 
Implications  for  the  organisation  culture  have  been  that a contradiction is emerging  between,  on 
the one  hand,  staff  who  blame  the  trouble  on  what  they  consider  ungrateful  and  irresponsible 
farmers  and, on the  other hand, staffwho sympathise  with  the  fanners’  movement.  The  latter  are 
critical  towards  their own role as extension  agents  and  stress  the  need for a  much  more  direct 
involvement of  farmm in all  decisions  regarding  the  choice  of  extension  themes  and  activities 
(Interviews  with  CMDT  staff,  the  autumn  of  1994). 
Peer  pressure 
CMDT field  agents  fulfill  several  of  the  conditions  for  the  exerting  of a strong  peer  pressure, 
mentioned  by  Leonard  and  Wade  (Leonard,  1977;  Wade,  1995,  ref.  chapter  3): within each 
‘secteur’  they  constitute  a  small  and  cohesive  group  who  share  common  living  and  working 
conditions.  Transfer  of staff is not  very  frequent (staff usually stay 3-5 years in each  position),  and 
close  relations to clients  are  encouraged. 
Furthermore,  many  agents  also  share  the  same  geographical  and  ethnic  background, as there is 
an overweight  of staff originating from the Sikasso region.  Although in principle  headquarters 
in Bamako is recruiting  the  agents  from  all  over  the  country, in practice  there is a bias  towards 
recruitments  from  the Sikasso region. This may  be  explained  partly  by  the  fact  that  language 
capabilities  are  part  of  the  criteria  for  recruitment.  While it is possible  for  a  field  agent to 
communicate to most  farmers in Bambara, it is considered  an  asset  to  master  either  Minyanka  or 
Senoufo because it improves  relations  of trust to fanners (Interview  with staff from  CMDT 
Division  Administrative et Sociale, Sikasso Dec.94). 
Whereas  the  physical  spread  of  agents may be a  bindrance to the  mutual  monitoring  of  tasks, 
frequent  training  sessions  and  internal  meetings  where  individual  results  are  discussed  provide 
the  theoretical  condition  for  a  group  to  control its output  (ref.  chapter  3).  When this does  not  seem 
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to result in a common definition of a (limited) ‘fair day’s work‘ but rather in a mutual 
encouragement  to  raise  productivity,  the  general  work  satisfaction  of  employees  appears  to  be  the 
reason. 
Work satisfaction 
CMDT staff generally  express  a  considerable  work  satisfaction.  They  appreciate  their  relatively 
high  wages  and  benefits,  but  satisfaction is mainly  derived  from  the  positive  feedback  they  get 
from  farmers. 
The general orientation towards cotton in the region constantly confirms their importance. 
Wherever  they  go,  the  main  topics of talks among  people  are  cotton  prices,  cotton  yields,  cotton 
inputs  and  cotton  harvest,  and  the s aff know  that  they  play  key  role  in  providing the  results.  The 
fact that the economically  most  powerful  people in the  region  have  derived  their  wealth  from 
cotton  production  further  contributes to the  self-esteem  of CMDT staff. Proudly staff tell  that 
farmers  sometimes  refer  to  them as ‘the  saviours’  (‘les ~aveurs’)~~’, and  a  young staffmember 
expressed his view of their  role as follows:  “We  want  to do our best.  It is our country  and if 
changes  are to be  made,  we  have to make  them!” 
In addition  to  client  relations,  several  other  factors  contribute to work  satisfaction.  Despite  tight 
work  schedules  and  close  monitoring  of  their  performance,  village-based  agents  have  a  certain 
discretion  because  staff  living  far  from  their  superiors  cannot  be  controlled 24 hours  per day. 
Work  objectives  are  clearly  spelled out, and  close  contact  to  superiors  helps  clarify all matters  of 
doubt. Staff do  not feel  overqualified  for  their  jobs,  and  neither  do  they  feel  incapable  of  meeting 
the  challenges. 
Frustration  resulting  from  the  farmers’  movement  seems to prevail  mainly in the  Koutiala  area. 
Some  field  agents in the area  where SYCOV emerged  clearly  stated  that it has  become  more 
difficult  and  less  satisfactory  to w0rk3~’. As one of them said “earlier  we  were  given a chicken 
when  we  visited  a  village,  now  we  are  asked  what  presents  we bring!”
Other reasons for  dissatisfaction  mentioned - also  by sta€f in the  Kadiolo  area - regarded  the  tight 
work  schedule  and  what are considered l i t e d  possibilities to improvise.  Some frustration was 
expressed  over  decisions  about  additional t sks coming  ‘from  above’ that made  it  difficult to find 
time to supervise  farmers in the  field.  Finally,  not allagents  seem  to  unconditionally  praise  village 
life.  For staff who  have grown up in towns, it can be difficult to adjust,  and the health  risk  for  the 
337 Statements  by fanners during  the  village survey confirmed the particular status of CMDT Wous vivons dufruit 
du  coton.  C ‘est g rke  b la CMDT  que nous gagnom de l’ar ent (Nafegue  no. 4). Tu CMDT est rwtre  soutien 
total. Elle aformd nos jeunes alphabitisis quisont capable beaucoup de choses” (N’golokasso  no. 17). 
338 The  critical  anitude  towards CMDT  by  many f?nners in the Koutiala  area was reflected in the  following 
statements about the agency recorded during the d lage  survey:  “Ele nous a a ris les nouvelles techniques, 
maintenant  que nous savom beaucou elle ne veut as cider nom laisser  travai Pp er de rwus m&ne” (Kolom  no. 
2). ?Le SYCOVpeut  bien rwus donner & comeik  teckiques. Now pouvons  travailler  sans la CMDTqui d’aiIleurs 
n ‘est as I u s  utile.  S’il y avait un m e  achetew de coton j e  me rqoignais de cela car c  ’est l’achat seulement  qui 
mus fii &a  CMDT. elle ne sert 2 rien b m? de cela Tu as besoin de 10 sacs d’engrais,  elle ne te  donne  que S sacs 
et elle vend  le  reste am commercants  Koutiala q u i  revendant t r i s  cher ampaysans. Cela n’estpas sc+riem” 
(Sincina  no. 24 ?Le village b havers SYCOVest.capable defournir des conseils  techniques  sur  le  travail. Nous 
n’avons pas tel ). ement besoin  de  la CMDT” (Sincma  no. 10) 
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family  was  mentioned  by  some as a  serious  inconvenience339  (Interviews ith CMDT  field  staff, 
the  autumn  of  1994). 
Demand pressure 
Due  to  the  economic  importance  of  cotton  production,  demand  pressure on CMDT is substantial. 
To  a  very  large  extent  the  pressure  comes from government,  donors  and  CFDT  who  monitor 
performance  and  constantly  request the agency to do  better.  Investments  by  donors in research 
and  development are important  driving  forces for achieving  a  high  performance. 
Equally  important is the  pressure  from  its  direct  clients  and  ‘the  general  public’  in  the  area  where 
it  works. The  crucial  role  of  cotton  in  local  incomes  ensures  CMDT  a clientele that  is  extremely 
interested in all the assistance  it  can  provide  them to increase  the  production  of  cotton.  Thus, 
farmers  have  gradually  become  more  explicit  in their demands to the  agency. 
The  development  of  trust  between  field  agents  and  farmers is a significant  aspect  of  relations. 
Because the agents  live in the villages and share  conditions  with the population,  farmers  easier 
establish  a  face-to-face  relations  to  them than they do to the majority of other government staff 
who visit the villagers as ‘strangers from the 
The  agency  strongly  encourages  the  enhancement  of  trust  relations. In addition to the  policy  of 
basing  field  agents in the  villages, the priority  given  to  communication skills in local  languages 
is an expression of this. As mentioned above, recruitment procedures consider language 
capabilities, and the agency also runs staff training  courses  in  local  languages.  Moreover,  the 
policy  of  avoiding kquent stafftransfers form part of these efforts. It is attempted to let people 
stay  a minimum of 3-5 years in each  position,  and  superior staffwho get  along  well  with  the  local 
population can stay  up to 5-8 years in the  same  position.  Furthermore,  relatively  high  wages  for 
CMDT  agents  and  their  access to transport  and fuel from the agency have tended  to  make  them 
less  inclined  to  ask  farmers fo  contributions to travel  expenditures,  small  equipment,  etc.  Finally, 
the attention paid to the importance of trust is reflected in the fact that environmental  specialists 
are  preferably  recruited  fIom the local area in which  they are going to work.  Due to the serious 
tensions between the population and forestry staff (to be discussed in the next section), 
environmental  management is considered  a  particularly  touchy  issue, and it is believed  that  an 
agent  with  ‘local  roots’  will  better  be  able to xplain  himself to the population  (Interviews  with 
staff from CMDT  Division  Administrative et Sociale  and  other CMDT staf, the autumn  of  1994). 
Among  advantages  of  having  close  relations  to the farmers,  field  agents  mention  that  they  often 
discover  problems  which  farmers  would not necessarily  have  reported,  had  they  been  only  at  a 
brief  visit to the  village.  They  can  monitor  the  work  of fanners more  closely than other  agencies 
and  thereby  discover  problems  that would otherwise not have  been  raised,  because  farmers 
themselves are not aware that e.g.  they apply  equipment  and  pesticides  wrongly. 
339 D e  g the time  when  interviews  were  conducted, a CMDT agent  lost  a  child kom malaria  in  a  village  cut off 
from the roads due to heavy rains. While this.is not an u!xmnmon tragedy for.dlage opulations,  goyemment staff 
living  in towns are usually  spared the expenence of bemg  unable to bring  slck chll & en to the hospltal. 
As expressed  by  a fanner in the village  survey; ‘@:est la CMDT qui nous  ai& et qu’on voit sous les y m  
fiiquemmentpar rapport a m  autres  services ‘’ (WOrON no. 20). 
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The particular status of  CMDT  agents  in  the  villages is reflected by their  ffequent  role as 
mediators  between fanners and  other  agencies.  It is common, thus,  that  livestock  owners  address 
the  CMDT  agent  first  when  they  want  assistance  from  the  livestock  service,  because  a  letter  from 
the  CMDT  agent will make it easier  for  them  to  convince  the  livestock  agents  to  come.  Also  the 
establishment  of  contact  to the forestry  service by  farmers  interested in tree  planting  sometimes 
goes through the  local  CMDT  agent  (Interviews  with  CMDT  field staff and  farmers,  the  autumn 
of 1994). 
As regards the responsiveness by the  agency to a  more  organised  demand  pressure that goes 
beyond the  wishes by  individual  farmers  for  assistance,  CMDT  seems to have  become  gradually 
more  sensitive. As described in chapter  8,  it  responded  already  in  1974  to  farmers’  demand  for 
more  influence by initiating a policy  of  gradually  transferring  tasks ffom extension  agents  to 
village associations.  The  agency  realised  its own interest  in  satisfying  farmers’  demands  while 
at  the same  time  offloading  some  of its tasks on unpaid  villagers.  Over  the  years this policy  has 
implied  a  substantial  decrease in the  number  of  field  agents  and  a gradual building  up  local 
capacities,  but it did  not  fundamentally  change  the  relationship  between  an  agency  which  set  the 
agenda  and  farmers  who  responded ac~ordingl$~’ (Bingen,  1994  p.  59-60;  Bingen  et  al,  1995  p. 
7-8;  Guindo & van  Campen,  1994). 
When in the late 1980s  farmers  discontent was growing  again  and  they now wanted  more 
involvement also in the  overall  management  of  the  agency,  CMDT  was  considerably  slower to 
respond.  For  several  reasons,  relations  between  extension  agents  and local farmers  were  gradually 
deteriorating.  First  of all, farmers  were  angry  because  declining  world  market  prices  for  cotton 
resulted in stagnating  producer  prices.  Second,  the  wage  freeze  for  CMDT staff resulted in a 
hitherto unknown pressure put on farmers to pay  them  bribes.  And third,  farmers felt that the 
process of disengagement should be speeded up as they now possessed the qualifications 
necessary  for a complete  replacement  of  CMDT staff (CFDT,  19921,  p. 7;  Bingen,  1996  p.  2-3). 
Nothing signiscant happened  until  May  1991  when  farmers  threatened to go on strike just as the 
planting was to begin.  They  reckoned that  a  lost  cotton hawest would be more M to CMDT 
than to themselves, as a  diversified  production  structure  would  allow  them to switch to other 
activities,  while CMDT (and the government)  depended  on  the  cotton  production.  Although this 
was  obviously  the  case,  the  regional  CMDT  management in Koutiala  initially  refused to talk to 
farmers’  representatives,  pleading  that SYCOV was not a representative  body  for all cotton 
producers. Then the minister of rural development  intervened,  and  remarkably soon the company 
adjusted  to  the  new  circumstances:  the  regional  manager  in  Koutiala was replaced by somebody 
more willing to negotiate with the farmers, and SYCOV was recognised as the formal 
representative of cotton  producers  (Bingen,  1994  p.  61-62;  Marchant,  1991 p.  82-85;  SYCOV, 
1994  p.  1-2;  Coulibaly,  1994  p.  51-53). 
Since  then  CMDT has accommodated a range  of  demands  by  fanners  conceming  price  issues  and 
conditions  for  collaboration,  including  improved  accountability. This responsiveness to farmers’ 
demands  illustrates a considerably  increased  sensitivity to their  wishes as compared to the 
341 AS -plc ofthe reduction  of e f f  it can be  mentioned that de  ‘secteur  de  Kadiolo’  reduced the number of 
nuber  of villa es covered  by  each  ‘chef  secteur  de  base’  went up from 4-5 to around 7 vilf&S  (hterVieW  with 
‘chefs  secteur  de  base’  by almost 50% m the ten year  period,  1984-1994 from 38 to 20. Durin the  same  period  the 
the CMDT Chef Secteur,  Kadiolo Dec. 1994; see also FOk, 1994 p. 140). 
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situation  when  its  agents  were  busily  distributing  a  fixed  ‘extension  package’.  Still,  there is a  risk 
that the  agency  gradually  co-opts  the  movement and thereby  limits the de  facto  influence  of 
farmers. This issue is further  discussed in chapter 11.  
Conclusion 
CMDT  exemplifies  a  mechanical  model  which has moved beyond the mechanical  stage  of 
systematically  delivering  extension  messages and has  incorporated  a  degree  of  learning  from 
farmers  and  from the experience of its  agents. As Gustafson  has  observed,  such  an  agency  may 
be able to induce  real  improvements in farmers’  situation  (Gustafson, 1990 p. 201; Gustafson, 
1994 p. 131-133, ref.  chapter 3). 
It  also  illustrates  the  observation  made  by  many  researchers  that  seemingly  unresponsive  agencies 
have  sometimes  unintendedly  increased  the  capacity  of  local  farmers to put  demands  on  the 
organisation. 
The  interaction  between  CMDT  and  farmers  shows  how fruitfid it  can  be  for  an  agency to work 
in close  collaboration  with its clients.  The  initial  demand  by  farmers to become  more  involved 
in extension tasks was  utilised by the  agency  to  introduce  a  more  cost-efficient  organisation  of 
the work.  When  the  gradual  building  up  of  farmers’  organisational  capacities  resulted in their 
more  far-reaching  demands  for  influence  also  on  management  issues, th  agency  responded by 
establishing a formal  structure  of  collaboration  allowing  farmers  an  increased  influence  without 
threatening  the  objective of a stable  and  high-quality  production  of  cotton. 
That such a  development has been  possible,  while  other  government  agencies  working in the 
same  region  have  settled  into  a  mechanical  rut  and  have  been  unable  to  adjust  to  new  challenges, 
is likely  to be explained  mainly  by  the  particular  character  of  the  external  pressure  on  CMDT.  The 
fact that the agency has an  economic  imperative  to  produce  cotton at low costs  and  provides  a 
service  requested by farmers  has  forced  it to be  more  creative than agencies.  These  have  been 
ensured  a  certain  allocation of funds,  regardless  of  their  performance,  and  few  other  agencies 
provide a service  considered  economically  useful by  farmers. As consultations  on  management 
issues between  CMDT  and  CFDT  in  France  seem  to  have  been l i i t ed ,  responsiveness  to 
farmers’  demands  should  probably  rather  be  explained by the  economic  interests in services 
provided  by  the  agency  (both by the  government,  CFDT  and  farmers) than by its status as 
parastatal  partially  controlled by foreign  capital. 
The mixed character  of  CMDT is Wer reflected  in  the  fact  that  the  agency is less  dependent on 
the  institutional  context  of  the  public  sector than the  three  others,  but has access  to  resources  that 
allow it a better staffiig, higher  wages  and  more  mobility  (transport). 
Having  stressed  the  advantages  of  the  ‘CMDT model’,  however, it is important  to  note  that  it has 
not been without serious problems also. The agency has not always been able to respond 
adequately to client  wishes,  and its hierarchical  and  centralised  organisation has sometimes been 
fatal  for  management  needs to be  informed  about  the  situation  in  the  field.  When  in the  late 1980s 
relations of trust  between  CMDT  field  agents  and  farmers  were  deteriorating,  the  agency  was 
unable  to  perceive  of  the  growing  disaffection by  farmers. Its initial  rejection of the  legitimacy 
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of  farmers’  movement  was a fatal  misjudgement of the  situation,  which  could  have  had  severe 
consequences,  had  there  not  been  a  political  intervention. 
The  mechanically-oriented  structures  also  constitute  a  hindrance to the  flexibility  of  the  agency 
in day-to-day activities in the  villages.  The  tight  and  inflexible  schedules  of  field-level  agents 
make  it  difficult  for  them  to  respond  to  farmers’  wishes  and  thereby  counter the development  of 
relations  of  trust. 
The  fact  that  these  constraints  have  not  been  more  detrimental to the  performance  of  the  agency 
must  be  explained  by  its  strong  organisation  culture,  a  strong  peer  pressure, the  system  of  rewards 
related  to  performance,  a high work  satisfaction  of staff and  not  least  the  fact  that  field  agents  are 
village-based  and  thereby in a  favourable  position  to  develop  relations  of  trust  with  farmers. 
Although  very  far  from  the  ‘platform  approach’  (Christoplos, 1996 p. 200, p. 208; Christoplos 
&Nitsch, 1996 p. 35-36, p. 41-42, see  also  chapter 3), the  ‘CMDT  model’  may  be  developing in 
that direction,  depending  on  the  strength  of  the  farmers’  movement.  A  development  towards  a 
more equal basis for interactions between extension agents and farmers first and foremost 
depends  on  the  ability and  willingness  of  farmers to move  beyond  their  economic  orientation 
towards price issues and put more emphasis on demands related to extension issues, too. 
Secondly,  such  a  development  depends on fanners’ ability to avoid  that  CMDT  co-opts  their 
organisation. 
While  the  future  political  relationship  between  the  agency  and  farmers is open to many  types  of 
development,  the  economic  consequences  for  the  population of a  mechanical  extension  model 
seem  less  open  to  changes.  Many  years  of  delivering  extension  messages in the  form  of  standard 
packages  have  illustrated  the  difficulties  of  the  agency in responding to differences in agro- 
ecological  conditions  and  especially  to  socioeconomic  differences.  As  described in chapter 7, 
socioeconomic  differences in the  region  are  marked  and  seem  closely  related to the  integration 
into the cotton economy. As it will be shown in chapter 10, there is a very pronounced 
socioeconomic  bias in CMDTs  extension  orientation  favouring  better-off fanners at  the  expense 
of the  poor. 
93. The Forestry service 
Introduction 
It is a  common  phenomenon i many countries that forestry  services  have  developed  a  militarised 
tradition  and  emphasise  repression  rather  than  extension  activities.  Mali is believed to be the 
country in Francophone  West Africa that has had the most  militarised  tradition  of government-m 
~ t u r a l  resource  managemen6  and  repression  appears  to  have  been  particularly  widespread in the 
Sikasso region  (Freerk  Wiemum,  personal  communication,  Oct. 1996; interviews  with PADREF 
staff and  local  resource  persons,  the  autumn of 1994). 
The  history  of  the  forestry  service3”, at the time of the  field  study  a  department  under  MDRE, 
dates  back to 1935, when  it  was  created by the French  and  initially  staffed  with  former  military 
The official name of the foresby service was until 1995 Direction Nationale des Faux et Fore% (DNEF) and after 
1995 Direction Nationale des Forestibes, Fauniques et Halieutiques (DNFFH). 
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personnel  rather than foresters.  Until the mid-1980s  it  had  purely  police  fimctions,  and  its 
objectives  were  described as protection  of  all  unregistered land protection  of  forest  areas  against 
destruction  by  tire  and  protection  of  forest resou~ces against  overexploitation. The vast  majority 
of  its taff have  undergone  a  paramilitary  education  of six months as part  of  their  education  which 
was  only  abolished in 1990M3.  From 1986 an  extension  objective  was  added to its mandate,  but 
its  major  activities  remained  related to  its broad  but  ill-defined  police  powers  (Thomson,  1995 
p. 1; Brinkerhoff,  1995  p.  205-206;  Brinkerhoff &Gage, 1993 p. 4-9; Lai &Khan; 1989 p.  5-12; 
McLain,  1992  p.  11-12). 
Unlike  many  other  countries  where  donors  have  tended to shun  the  unpopular  forestry  service, 
the Malian  agency since the mid-1980s has enjoyed  substantial  support from donorsw. In the 
Sikasso region  the  Swiss  Development  Cooperation, through PADREF,  since 1984 has provided 
the  forestry  service  with  vehicles,  allowances  and  fuel or tree  planting a~tivities;~’. According 
to  local  sources,  the  encouragement in the  past  by  the  Swiss  project  to  change  repressive  practices 
has been rather  modest,  and the projects has often  been  accused of facilitating the repression 
rather  than  fighting  against if346 (Interviews with PADREF staff and  local  resource  persons, the 
autumn  of  1994;  see  also  Ribot,  1995a  p.  32). 
The change  of  regime in March  1991  exposed the agency to a  fundamental  shock.  Farmers’ 
reckoning  with  the  forestry  services  was  very  violent.  The  immediate  reaction  was  physical 
attacks  on  the  most  hated staff members,  including  in  some  cases  the  application of  ‘ ecklaces’ 
of  burning tyres’47.  When the physical  persecution  was  beginning  to  ebb,  forestry  agents  were 
forced to remain in thek offices for  fear  of  provoking  new  reactions.  At the national  conference 
held in July  and  August  1991  one  of  the  major  demands  by  participants  was the closing  down  of 
the  forestry  service.  The  agency  survived,  but for several  years it was completely  paralysed,  while 
a  reform  of  its  structure  and  a  revision of f restry  laws  were  prepared. In 1995 a new  forestry  law 
was  approved  by  Parliament,  and the agency  gradually  resumed  its  operations  now  with  more 
focus on extension  activities.  During the first  years  after the change  of  regime  a  wide  range  of 
donor-sponsored  studies  were  made  to  prepare  a  reform  of the agency’. An emergency  reform 
was made in 1995349,  and the forestry  service  was  meant to be  part of the reorganisation  of 
Educational  reforms  started in 1989-90  but due to structural adjustment-related  staff-freezin  policies,  many 
young  foresters  with  a  more  a  propriate  education  are  unemployed  (Intermew  with  ‘Equlpe cfiagnostic sur la 
formation  forestiere’, Sikasso, 8ept. 1994). 
In order to show  foreign  donors  that Mali was serious about  environmental rotectio3 the  Traore  regime in 1986 
considerably  raised  fines  for  offences  against  foreshy  laws. In t h ~  late  1980s a onor assistance to the forestry  sector 
amounted to 10  times  the  contribution from national  sources  (&bot,  1996  p.  42;  Trouv6,1995  p.  18). 
34s PADREF stands for F’rojet  d‘Appui a  la  Direction  Regionale d s Eau et  For& 
346 Brinkerhoff  and  Gage  have  a differFt assessment of PADREF  which  they  describe as instrumental  in  helping 
the  regional office to operationaliie son+ forestry  practices (Brukyhoff & Gage,  1993 p. 16). This assessment  has 
not  been  supported  by mformation obtamed dunng the  fieldwork  m the region. 
” The  opular  euphemism for this w e  ‘article  320’  which  refers to the cost  of  petrol  (300  CFA)  and  matches  (20 
CFA)  &ay,  1995  p. 24;  interviews wth forestry staff, the autumn of 1994). 
348 The  various studies include i.a ME, 1993; MDRE, 1994b; B e e r h o f f  & Ga  e, 1993; McLain,, 1992; Crow!ey, 
1991;  Hesselmg & Coulibaly,  1991;  Coulibaly  et al, 1991; Coulibaly & Hessefmg,  1992;  Hesselmg,  1992; Kmtz 
et al., 1992. 
349 The initial reform  of  the fo service was  started  at  the  initiative of the  forestry  service  itself to allow its  agents 
to  resume  activities  after  they 3h been  forced  by  the o ulation to abandon  them in ,l 99 1. It  implied i.a. a formal 
separation  of  extension  and  enforcement  actwities (M%&, 1994k;  Loi  portant creakon de  la Drection Natlonale 
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MDRE. In late 1998, however,  the  forestry  service  was  separated  from  the  other  agencies  when 
a new  Ministkre  de  1’Environnement  was established,  hence it seems  that  agency has now  been 
excepted  from  the  planned unity extension  services  (Hilhorst & Coulibaly, 1998 p. 6; interviews 
with  forestry staff, CAMOPA staff and  farmers,  the  autumn  of 1994 and  Feb. 1996, Thea 
Hilhorst,  personal  communication, May 1999). 
In the mid-1990s when  the  interviews  were  conducted,  activities of the  forestry  service in the 
Sikasso region  had  been  cut  down to a  relatively  limited  Swiss-funded  extension  programme  in 
about  half of all  villages  plus  the  participation  of  forestry staff in ‘Test  Zones’  activities  in  a  total 
of 15 villages.  Outside  these  villages  the  only  activities of the  forestry  service  were  occasional 
visits to supervise  and  approve  clearing of new  land  and  an  annual  extension  session  held  in  each 
village  to  promote  improved  stoves  and i form about  cutting  permits.  Fanners  rarely  approached 
the forestry service themselves350 (Coulibaly et al., 1993 p. 11; N’Djim et al., 1993 p. 29, 
interviews  with  forestry staff and fanners,  the  autumn  of 1994) 
Hence,  interviews  were  conducted  at a time  when  the  agency  found  itself in an impasse  between 
a  long  and  well-established  tradition  for  repression  and  requests  for  fundamental  changes  of its 
structures  and  activities.  Individual  forestry  agents  were  largely  left  to  interpret  the  new  situation 
themselves,  and  even  at  cercle  and  regional  level, the policy to a very large  extent  seemed to 
depend on personal  assessments by the  people  in  charge.  While  expressions  of  self-criticism  and 
willingness to change  relations  with  the  population  were  relatively  sparse  in  some  parts of the 
organisation,  others  seemed to be  ready to take up the  challenge  of  radically  changing  past 
practices3”. 
Organisational structure 
The  structure  of  the  forestry  service until the  initiation of  reforms was an  example  of a fairly  pure 
version  of  the  mechanical  model.  It  illustrates  Mintzberg’s  point  about  a  control  agency  that  has 
adopted a structure that enforces its orientation towards both internal and external control 
(Mintzberg, 1989 p. 137-138, ref. chapter 3). As the  old  structure was still  in  force,  when  the  field 
study  was  made in late 1994, the  description of the  organisation  below  refers to that. 
All  important  decisions  are  taken  by  the  management  in Bamako. Even  the  transfer  of  individual 
forestry  agents is decided  personally by the  National  Director of forestry,  based on reports 
received  from  the  regional  level.  Relations  among  the  various  levels  of  the  hierarchy  have  much 
in common  with  relations in an  army:  orders  are  sent  downwards  and  reports  are  sent  upwards 
the system,  while  information to subordinate staff are limited to the  extent  possible. This even 
des Forets, de la  Chasse  et  de  la  Peche, draf~ S tember  1994;  interview  with  national  director of fore 
1994; interview with CAMOPA s a  Feb. %6). In practice, however, this separation proved 
im lement, as most  arrondissement offices were  only staffed with  a  few  agents  (Interviews  with  researchers, fanners an$ representatives of political  parties  in the Sikasso regioq  Feb. 1996). 
The  aralysis of the agency is reflected  in d e c l i i g  number of officially  registered  offences against for- laws 
registered in 1992 @WS, 1994  p.  156). 
in the &asso region:  while  it  was  about  1,200  per  year  during the period  1988-1990,  only  32  offences  were 
351 A seminar held  b  the  regional 
injustices committediin the ast ( P Z F ,  1992).  During  the  field  study  undertaken  in  the  autumn of 1994 and in ement  in Sikasso in  1992  represented a forthright  attempt to con6ont the 
February  1996  examples 08~0th fierce  resistance  and  genuine  interest  in  changing the role of the  agen  was  found. 
For an example of the importance of attitudes  held  by  individual  forestry  agents, see Hilhorst & Co$baly, 1996. 
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goes for relations  within  the ofices at the  lowest  levels  of  the  hierarchy  where  deputy  chefs  de 
poste complained that they do not receive any information from the chef de (Interview 
with the National  Director  of  Forestry and other  forestry  staff, the autumn  of  1994). 
Figure 6. The four hierarchical  levels of the  forestry  agency. 
(headed  by  a  national  director) 
j (National  level) , ' Regional  (headed  Department  by  a  regional  of  director) Forestry 
i (Regional level) 
(headed  by a chef  de  cantonnement) 
Cantonnement 
(Cercle  level) 
i ' ---- (headed  by a chef de  poste) ~ Poste Forestikre 1 (Arondissement  level) 1 
The organisational structure can best be described as completely insulated from external 
influence.  There  have  been  no  means  for  the  population to discuss  or  appeal  the  decisions  taken 
by forestry  agents,  and at least  until  1991  the  agency  fitted  the  portrait  of  a  closed  mechanical 
system  given  by  Mintzberg  (Mintzberg,  1989  p.  138-148). 
The  undertaking  by  the  same  agents  of  enforcement  and  extension  activities,  however, has made 
the  model  differ  somewhat  from the mechanical  ideal  of  having  clearly  defined  tasks. This has 
been  further  aggravated  by  a serious ambiguity  of  the  legal  framework  which in practice has left 
it to field staff to interpret the clmacter of an  offence and thereby has provided  them  with 
substantial  unintended  discretion. As regards  the  limited  extension  activities, tasks have  been 
considerably  clearer as each staff member  until  1991 was simply  given  a  well-defined area to be 
planted  (Brinkerhoff & Gage,  1993  p.  7-8;  Mclain,  1992  p.  16; MDRE, 1994b;  interviews  with 
forestry staff, the autumn  of  1994). 
In the  mid-1990s  there  were  about 800 agents  of  the  agency  of  whom  approx.  120  were  working 
in the  Sikasso  region (MDRE, 1994fp. 11-12; MDRE, 1994np. 11-12). 
In Kadiolo  the only general information about  activities of the  forestry  service  received  by  arrondissement  staff 
the same  difficulties. The chef de  cantonnement m Koutiala  calls a monthly  meeting  for all chefs  de  postes,  but 
is  the annual report from the  cercle. Thus, they do not h o w  if  staff in neighbouring  arrondissements  struggle with 
reports are  not  passed on to deputy  chefs  de  poste. 
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Authority 
The  paramilitary  character  of  the  foreshy  service has reinforced  the  general  tradition  for  low  trust 
management in government  agencies.  Authority is based  on  position  and  operates through control 
and  application  of  sanctions.  Like n an m y ,  absolute  loyalty is demanded  by all staffmembers. 
Any deviations  from  decisions  taken by  superiors are sanctioned  by  transfer to positions in remote 
areas  of  the  northern  part  of  the ~0untry3~~. 
There  are  marked  differences  between  the  top  and  the  bottom of the  system.  Differences  relate 
both to the  educational  background,  access  to  training  courses  and  general  privileges  enjoyed 
(MDRE 1994n  p.  92-105).  The  poorly  educated  field staffat arrondissement  level  are  disregarded 
by their  better  educated  superiors  who  consider  them  unable  to  reflect  much  about  their tasks and 
hardly  able  to  produce  a  written  report.  In  my  presence  field staff were often treated by outright 
disdain by superiors  who  did  not  fmd  it  worth  addressing  them  during joint meetings  but  were 
talking  only  to staff at their own level  from  other  agencies354.  Arrondissement staff on  their  side 
expressed  a  widespread  fear  for  superiors  and  did  not  dare  to  speak at all in joint meetings  with 
cercle s t a f f s 5  (Interviews  with  forestry staff, the  autumn  of  1994). 
The fear by  arrondissement staff is aggravated  by  the lack of  clarity  of  their  tasks.  Ambiguity  of 
the  legal  framework  and  the  general  lack of information  about  what is in fact  wanted by them 
often  make  sanctions by superiors  appear  to be arbitrary  and  unfair. 
Control by superiors,  however, is generally  not  very  effective.  They  rarely  visit  he 
arrondissement  level,  let  alone  the  villages,  and  do  not  receive  any  reports fr m the  population. 
Assessments  of  performance,  therefore,  have to be based  on  reports  written by staff members 
themselves.  Given  the  distance  between  management  and  field staff and the  low  risk of detection, 
forestry staff has little  encouragement  to  perform  more  than  minimum  tasks.  Before  1991 this 
meant  that in practice  they  spent most of their  time  chasing  personal  incomes  (Wiersum & 
Deprez,  1995  p. 238; interviews  with  forestry staff, the autumn of  1994). 
Rewards 
Salaries are low in  the  forestry  service,  and  there is no  linking  of  salaries  and  promotions to 
performance. Whereas ‘disobedient’ behaviour is sanctioned (when detected), there are no 
”’At the  time  when  the  interviews  were  undertaken  (September-  December  1994),  positions in the North were  not 
that the family of the  agent  could  not joln bnn but  had to stay  behmd.  Due to the  Tuareg  rebellion,  it  was  +rectly 
only  considered  humiliating  and  very inconveent by foreshy staff,, because  they  were  isolated  and  usually  +plied 
the army. 
life  threatening for forestry  agents to go  there as in the eyes  of the rebels  they  were  associated  with  the  police  and 
h the  presence of arrondissement  level staff, a  chef de cantonnement  made  it  clear  that e did  not  expect.  them 
to  be  able to write  a  satisfying report on the  progress  made by the ‘Test Zones programme’  (a  brief descnptlon of 
this project is found m them-ex> ‘‘chesepe~ple~we good talkers butpoor wrirkrs? as he said.  While  waiting  for 
joint meetings to begh, it was several tMes observed  that  cercle  level staff would  rather  read  a  news  paper than 
spend the time  talking to their  subordinate  colleagues  at  arrondissement  level. 
During a two hour  meeting,  the  only  comments from arrondissement staff were conked to affirm that  they  had 
understood the orders  given (“c’est compris”, “c’est ca“, ‘pas deproblGmes”). 
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rewards  for  doing a special  extension  effort.  Promotions  in  some  cases  seem  to  have  less  to  do 
with  performance  than  with  personal  links to ~uperiors”~. 
Until  1991  the  wage  system  strongly  encouraged  repressive  efforts as the  low  basic  salaries  were 
supplemented by access  for  individual staff members  to  a  share  of  revenues from permits  and 
fines.  The  system  not  only  encouraged  issuance  of  legal and illegal  fines  and  permits  but also a 
widespread  corruption, as the  population  often  tried  to  avoid  payment  of  exorbitant  fines by 
bribing  the  forestry  agent  responsible  for its collection357.  Despite he low  salaries,  the  system 
implied  that  forestry M until  1991 had considerably  higher  real  incomes than other  government 
M. M e r  1991  when  agents  were  no  longer  able  to  issue  fines  and  permits,  incomes  have  fallen 
dramatically  (Brinkerhoff & Gage,  1993  p.  7-8;  Mclain,  1992  p.25-26;  Ribot, 1995a p.  32-33; 
DRPS,  1994  p.  154;  Bishop,  1988  p.  7-1 ; interviews  with  forestry  staff,  the  autumn  of  1994). 
Organisational identification 
Until  1991 a  strong  team  spirit in the  agency  helped  divert  possible  individual  doubts  about  the 
legitimacy of its practices.  Thus,  the  self-image  cultivated by the staff emphasized  its  role as 
protector  of  the  environment  against  the  misbehaviour  of  ignorant  and  irresponsible  farmers  and 
herders who  would  immediately  destroy  everything  if  not  kept  under  close  supervision.  The 
forestry  service was well connected to top political  leaders in the  Traor6  regime,  and  staff 
members  considered  themselves  core  pillars of the regime  (McLain,  1992  p.  21-22;  Thomson, 
1995  p.  3;  interviews  with  foreslry staff, the  autumn  of  1994). 
Forestry staffwere socialised  to  the  particular  organisation  culture  already  during  their  education 
where  especially  the  paramilitary  training  influenced  their  perception  of  the  agency s a  police 
force. Although there has been a gradual development since the late 1980s towards more 
emphasis  put  on  forestry  and  extension-related  topics,  the  paramilitary  orientation has not  been 
countered  by  these  modest  attempts.  Thus,  the  education  in  extension  issues is gen rally  described 
as highly  insufficient,  while  also  access  to  in-service  training is limited,  especially  for  field staff 
(MDRE 199411; interview  with  ‘Equipe  diagnostic SUI la  formation  foresti&e’, Sikasso, Sept. 
1994). 
After  1991 this strong  organisational  culture has disintegrated.  Internal  cleavages,  which  probably 
existed  long  before  the  change of regime,  have  erupted,  and  the  previous  feeling of unity has been 
replaced  by  divisions  and  -tion.  One  such  division  relates to the  divide  between  superior  and 
lower-level staff. During  the  interviews  arrondissement  staff  were sqrisingly outspoken  about 
their  feeling  of  having  been  let  down  by superiors. They  had  received  no  information  or  training 
in  how to tackle  the  difficult  relationship  to  populations  after  1991  and  expressed h t a t ion  over 
the  suspicion that superiors  were just looking  after  themselves  by  complying  with  donor  demands 
The  opposite  situation  was  encounter@ d e  the  field  study when a  chef de cantonnement,  who  had  done a 
particular  effort to promote  the  collaborabon WI tfl other  agencies  in  relation to the ‘Test  Zones  pro 
transferred  to  an  unanractive  position  in  the nort . It is said to be common that  a  new regiopl director nngs a  group 
of  loyal  people  to  become  chefs d  cantonnement in h ~ s  area when  he takes  up the posltlon. 
T’, Was
As exam l e s  can  be  mentioned  that  fmes  for  illegally  clearing  land  for  agricultural  urposes  and  de-branching 
trees in the lahe1 zone  amounted to 500 to  1,500 FF and/or 1 month to 5  years  in jail. ?or failure to obtain  cutting 
and trans orting  permits  the h e  amounted to 600-2,000 FF and/or 1 month to five  years  in jail (Brinkerhoff & 
Gage, 1983 p. 32). 
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for  reforms.  Attempts  by  the  management  to  dissociate  itself  from  the  practices  of  the  past  were 
interpreted by some as a surrender to anarchic  forces in power. 
Another  cleavage  regards  the  difference  between  young staff and  the  old  guard.  Many  young staff 
members  have  never  participated  or  only  been  little  involved in the  repression  before  1991. As 
donors  believed  them to be  more  susceptible to new  methods,  they  used  to  be  preferred  by  the 
various donor-funded projects and therefore have received more training than older staff 
members.  The  ‘old guard’, on  the  other  hand,  know  of  no  other way to be a  forestry  agent han 
fining  and  issuing  permits.  Hence,  they  are  very  reluctant to take up  new  extension  activities3’* 
(Brinkerhoff & Gage,  1993  p.  19,  p. 27, interviews  with  forestry staff, PADREF staff and  local 
resource  persons,  the  autumn  of  1994). 
The  internal  cleavages  are  symbolically  reflected in a  highly  diverse  dress  code.  Some  (mainly 
older)  agents are still  wearing  the  traditional green military uniform, salute  superiors  the  military 
way  and  answer  orders  by  “yes, sir!” Others  wear  casual  dress  and  relate to superiors by civilian 
greetings  (Observations  made  during  the  field  study,  the  autumn  of  1994). 
Peer pressure 
Until  1991 the peer  pressure  played  an  important  role  for  the  performance  of  the  agency. Through 
the  education  and  especially through the  paramilitary  training  forestry  agents  were  socialised to 
perceive of themselves as a  closely  knit  group. 
Performance  monitoring  by  superiors was poor, but  peer  monitoring was rather  well-developed. 
As forestry  agents  were  rarely  placed  alone  in an office  (there  was  always at least  one  deputy  chef 
de poste at arrondissement level), the behaviour by the individual agent would always be 
observed  by  colleagues.  The  paramilitary  ‘esprit de corps’  meant  that  individual  reflections  and 
deviations  from  unwritten  ‘codes of conduct’  were  very  badly  viewed.  It  was  difficult,  therefore, 
to  go  against he tide  and  concentrate  on  extension,  while  all  colleagues  did  nothing  but  collect 
taxes and fines (Brinkerhoff & Gage,  1993 p. 7; interviews  with  forestry staff, the  autumn  of 
1994). 
After 1991 the peer  pressure has almost  disappeared.  Immediately  after  the  change  of  regime, 
management in Bamako decided to transfer  all staff back to their home area, pleading  that  ‘you 
do  not  abuse  your  relatives’359. This policy  was  soon  abandoned,  however,  and  instead  the 
frequency  of stafftransfers was  significantly  increased. In late  1994  when  most  interviews  were 
taken,  the  majority  of  field  agents  spent  only  about  a  year in each  position.  Limited  horizontal 
contacts  among  field  staff,  frequent  transfers  and  lack of guidelies about  how to deal  with  the 
new situation, have  more  or less left  each  forestry  agents  to  interpret  the  situation  themselves. 
While  some  seem to have  resumed  the  practice  of  fining  and  taxing  after  the  new  forestry  law in 
According to resource  persons in the Sikasso region,  the  ‘organisational  schizophrenia’  (Brinkerhoff,  1995 p. 
206) was reinforced by the  fact that older staffmembers profited  more h m  the  system  before l99 1 ,.as they  tended 
to  have  higher  positions  than  younger staff members (Souleymane Ouattara, personal communlcahon Nov.1994). 
359 Critical voices argued that the reason for this move was rather that ‘you  do  not kill your  relatives’, i.e. the 
transfers were made mainly to protect  the forestry staff agaulst angry populations (Interviews wah resource  persons, 
the  autumn of 1994). 
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1995,  others  are  doing an effort  to  shift the focus to extension  activities (F‘ADREF, 1992 p.  6; 
interviews  with  forestry staff and  farmers,  the  autumn of 1994  and  Feb.  1996). 
Work satisfaction 
Previously,  forestry staff have  enjoyed  a  certain  work  satisfaction by being  powerful,  having  a 
certain  discretion,  earning  well,  being  part  of an organisation  with  a  strong  organisation  culture, 
and  being  appreciated by the  government  for  maintaining  law  and  order.  For  some  field-level 
agents  satisfaction may  have  been  negatively  affected  by the  extremely  poor  relationship  to  clients 
and  the  overt  disdain by superiors,  but in retrospect  the  majority of the staff interviewed  referred 
to  ‘the  good  old  days’  before  1991  when  they  were  pleased  to  work. 
After 1991 the  prevailing  feeling  is h tration. The  situation  of  forestry  field-staff is a very  clear 
illustration  of  Christoplos’  description  of  extension  agents  squeezed  from two sides  (Christoplos, 
1997a):  they  feel  let  down by their  management  who has not  given  them any assistance  in 
acquiring  new  skills  and  in  interpreting  the  new  situation,  while at th  same  time  they  are  hard 
pressed  by the  population.  Subordinate staff are  still  treated  in  a  top-down  way  by  their  superiors, 
and  nobody has cared to listen to their frustration and fear  after  the  radical  change  of  conditions 
in  1991.  At  the  same  time  they  are  constantly  reprimanded for  their  activities  in  the  past  and  their 
lack  of  adjustment  to  the  new  situation. 
Not  surprisingly,  many  farmers till harbour  a  grudge  against them3@‘. They  are  also  disliked by 
other  government staff who  are  reluctant to collaborate  with  them  for  fear of being  negatively 
affected by the bad  reputation  of  forestry staf. The  agency has become  the  very  symbol  of  all  past 
injustice, and  the  ovenvhelmingy  negative  assessments  of the agency  obviously affect the work 
satisfaction by the sM. 
To this should  be  added  that  for  several  years  there has not  been  much  work  to be  satisfied with. 
In the years  1991-1995 a strategy of disappearance was prevailing  all  over  the  country:  for  fear 
of  angry  populations  forestry  agents  were  forced to hide  in  their  offices  without  being  able  to 
carry out neither  extension  activities  nor  enforcement  activities.  Needless to say,  the  population 
did  not  approach  them  in  the  offices  either,  and  except  for  staff  members  involved  in joint 
projects  with  other  agencies,  the  work  carried  out  has  been  very  limited. 
It  is  highly  unsatisfying to do  nothing,  and  forestry  agents  who  believe that they  in  fact did a 
valuable  effort  to  protect  the  environment in the  past  have  found it difficult to watch while 
sometimes  farmers  have  illegally  burnt  the  forests36’. 
As ressed by farmers during the  village survey: Ye nepempas avoir confiance  en e m  car j ‘ai i t i  beaucoup 
v i c t imzns  le temps parsd” (Sink010 110.13). Je n’aipas de confiance ma Ema et For<& cependantj’ai besoin 
d’empowfaire uneplantation. J’ai unpeupeur d’eux” (Woroni no. 4). 
As a foreshy agent  laconically  remarked uring a  field  trip  when  we  passed  a  burned  down  area: “Voila c ’est la 
dimocratie!” 
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While  the  majority  of  agents  have  reacted by not  even  doing  the  little  they  could d 362, some  have 
perceived of an increased interest by farmers in planting h i t  trees and eucalyptus as an 
interesting  challenge363. In an area where  farmers  fiequently  address  the  forestry  service to 
demand  education in the establishment  of  tree  nurseries,  a  forestry  agent  expressed an entirely 
new  meaningfulness in his  work  (Interviews with forestry staff, the  autumn  of 1994). 
Demand pressure 
Before 1991 the only  demand  pressure  on  the  agency  derived fiom the  demand  by  the  government 
and donors that something was done  to  protect  the  environment.  Mali  has  signed  a  number  of 
international  conventions  and has accepted  the  implementation  of  a  range  of  (overlapping)  donor- 
sponsored  national  environmental  plans  and  programmes3M. Part of  the  donor  funds  have  been 
allocated  to  projects  and  programmes  undertaken  by the forestry  service,  but  genuine  interest  in 
the  actual  outcome of the work  seems to have  been l i t e d .  This  may  be  partly  explained  by  the 
intense competition  among  donors  which as sometimes  led  them to concentrate  more  on  the 
preparation  of  new  programmes than on evaluation  of  already  existing  activities.  Another  reason 
may be that  donors  have often preferred to work  through  projects  and  programmes with dedicated 
staff which implies that the general  forestry staff have  been  little  involved365  (Interviews  with 
Bamako-based  representatives of the World Bank, la Caisse Franpise de Diveloppement, 
USAID, GTZ, UNSO and with resource  persons, the autumn of 1994). 
As regards  farmers’  demands,  the  concentration  by  the  agency  on  repression has made it difficult 
for people to see that they might possibly have any interest in the ‘services’ offered. The 
behaviour  by  forestry  agents has resulted in extremely  negative  connotations  of  ‘environmental 
activities’ in the ears of  many  people. In the Sikasso region  where the pressure  on  natural 
resources is still  not  very  apparent  to the majority  of the population, the interest in the agency is 
further limited. 
362 Lack  of  meaningfulness  combined  with  lack  of  supervision  by  superiors and  l wsalaries  in  many  cases  lead to 
market  day  to ap roac the  arrondissement offices of the mious extension agencies.  Many  offices,  however,  were 
absenteeism  and  negli  ce.  During  the  field  study it was  observed  that  people  often  use  the  occasion of the weekly 
& empty on such ys as the agents  were on the market  themselves. 
363After the rivatisation of nursery activities in the  early  1990s,  the  private  production of nursery  p@s  has  beep 
&S has led to a  substantial  demand  by  farmers  for  educabon  in  the establishment of nursenes for h t  
k Z t e u c a l y p t u s  production. 
f? 
The national environmental lans and programmes include le Plan #Action Forestikre Tropicale (PAFT) 
sup  orted by  FAO,  le hgrammehtional de Lutk Contre  laD6sertifiCation (€‘NL.CD) launced  in 1987  with UNSO 
as tK e lead agency, le Projet Nationale de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles launced in 1993 with the 
World Bank as the  lead  agency,  and the National  Action Program (CCDNEPA)  launced  in  1996  with  GTZ as the 
(MRNE, 1985; MRNE, 1987, MEE, 1989; MAEE, 1991;  FAO,  1990,  World Bank, 1992a;  World Bank, 1992b; 
lead  agency. In addition to this Mali has signed  the  International  Convention  to  Combat  Desertification n 1994 
Club du Sahel  Newsletter no. 15  1996;  interviews  with  donor  representatives  and  resource  persons, the autumn of 
1994 and Feb.  1996). 
365 The establishment  0f.a  unified  donor  approach as been  made  difficult  by a  geographical  division of labour 
among  the  major  donors  mvolved m mtml resource management  activities  (the  World Bank, France, Switzerlan4 
Germany  and the United States). Various, attempts to estabhb a donor coprdination has fail+ dueto lack  of interest, 
the Swiss Development Coo eration and  some mdlndual French  experts  but exclucfmg  major donors  such as la 
and in late  1994  when donor represenmves were m.%lewed, only an  mformal grou ex=te$,  mcludmg USAID, 
Caisse Frangaise, the World % @ and GTZ). Releons among.representatives  of the World B@ and  la  Caisse 
Frangaise  are  described, as e c d a r l y  poor,  which IS reflected F a  range  of  overlappmg actwbes, notably  in  the 
field of land  tenure stuhes & Khan, 1989  p.  13, interviews \nth donor  representatves,  Cheibane  Coulibaly  and 
other  resource  persons, the autumn  of  1994). 
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While  demand  pressure  from  direct  clients,  thus,  has  been  virtually  nil,  and the pressure  from 
other external agents has been  very  limited,  relations  of trust have  not  existed  at  all.  It is a 
widespread  belief  that the population in the Sikasso region  due to the  wealth  generated  by  cotton 
production  have  been  subject  to  a  more  severe  repression by  forestry staff than people  in  other 
regions.  Many  villages  have  been  visited  every  single  day  of  the  year  by  agents  with a license to 
send the inhabitants to  prison for up to five  years or issue  a  fine  corresponding to their annual 
income  even  for  relatively  modest offences'". An intense feeliig of hatred  towards the staff has 
been the result. 
Farmers  have  done verythng possible to avoid  contact  with  the  disgusted  agents,  and in some 
cases mafia-lie systems  were  developed  by  entire  villages  who  preferred to pay protection fees 
for being left alone rather than living  with  the  constant  risks  of  arbitrary  taxation.  The  dubious 
impact on the environment of these  relations  can be  illustrated  by  a  special  variant of the 
protection fee system  which  consisted in the  plantation of a  certain  number  of  trees  by  the  village 
against the right to cut as much  green  and  dead  wood as they  wanted. This allowed the forestry 
agent  to  report  the  fulfilment  of  objectives to his superiors,  while  villagers  were  pleased  to  be  left 
alone  (McLain, 1993 p. 17-19; Brinkerhoff & Gage, 1993 p. 7-8; Lai & Khan, 1989 p. 7-8; 
interviews  with  forestry staff and  farmers,  the  autumn  of 1994). 
The  only  reason  that the agency  has  been  able  to  continue  its  activities for so many  years  despite 
the hostile  relations to clients is the  almost  total  insulation  of  the  forestry  service from public 
reactions.  Individual staff members  of  course  knew  the  feelings  of  village  populations  but  they 
never  depended on farmers'  assessment of their  performance  neither  for  their  professional  career 
nor  for  their  social  relations.  Farmers  had  no  means to complain  about  or  influence  the  practices 
of the agency, and  among its own staffnobody had an interest in initiating  reforms  (Brinkerhoff 
& Gage, 1993 p. 7-8; interviews  with  forestry  staff  and  farmers,  the  autumn of 1994). 
After 1991 the unequivocal  demand to the agency  from  government,  donors  and  farmers  have 
been  to  stop  repression. In the Sikasso region  the  Swiss  donor  eventually  seems  to  have  become 
worried  about  the  bad  reputation  of  the  agency  and  instead  of  increasing  its  support to the  difficult 
transition to extension-oriented activities, it has  decided to reduce the funding and channel the 
money  through  an N O  instead.  The  external  interest  in  an  agency  considered  too  controversial 
and inflexible to  deal with, thus, has been  further  limited  (Interviews  with PADREF staff, the 
autumn  of 1994). 
As regards demands from direct  clients, the prevailing  strategy  of  farmers is still to avoid  any 
contact with the agency.  It is generally  recognised  that  the  agency  has  changed,  but  with  the 
exception of farmers  interested in h i t  tree prod~ction'~~, the majority  of the population  doubt 
As orted  by  a her during  the  village  survey: "Les Ema et For& ontpilli ce  village a h  le tempspassi. 
C Ztai% tares de 200.000 CFA d 400.000 CFA p m  accusatiorz Et le villages 'aEsociaitpourpayer  ca" (Nafegue 
no. 91  1). 
Especially.during  the  interviews taken in  late  1994  several  farmers  interested  in  tree  planting  spoke  positively 
For& ont changi, ils ne sontplus comme avant Now leur demandom des ppinikres de plants pour des  pmceI1es 
about the assstance provided  by  the  forestry service. Statements by farmers include  the following: 'Zes E m  et 
de reboisement, ils nous donnent despipinih-s " @Idla no. 29). 'C Wait avant  'on  n'avait as c o n f i e  om Eaux 
et For&  mais  maintenant les Eaux et For& sont des  bons  conseillers mp%ntations. Pfts de moitii du village 
aime la  plantatwn" (Word no.16). Ye suis bemcoq intiressi maintenantpm les Enla et,ForZts.  Je les vois trks 
utile pour nous  les villageois -ils mus donnent des conseils de plantations d'mbres, la necessiti de  lutter  contre 
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the  sincerity  of  the  change368.  Relations do not  change  overnight:  forestry  agents  have  not  been 
forgiven,  and  relations  of  trust  are  unlikely  to  develop in a short  and  medium  term  perspective. 
It  has  been  contributing  to  the  hesitation  by  the  population to establish a new  type of relations  to 
the  forestry  service  that  agents  themselves  appear to be reluctant to take up a new  role as advisors. 
Thus, farmers  complain that assistance h m  the  forestry  service  is  difficult  to  obtain. This regards 
both  assistance  to  establishment of nurseries369  and  assistance to protect  village  land  against 
woodcutters  from  outside  the  village,  in  particular  commercial  woodcutters  from An 
attempt to involve the forestry service in Koutiala in the establishment of local firewood 
conventions has experienced  serious  difficulties  and  delays  due to reluctance  by  the  agency  to 
formally  delegate  authority  with  regard to the  management  of  tree  resources to (inter)  village 
a~thorities~~' (Joldersma  et al., 1994;  Hilhorst & Coulibaly,  1998;  interviews  with  farmers,  the 
autumn  of  1994  and  Feb.  1996).). 
The  development of closer  relations is also  countered by  many small  and  major  signs  that a 
substantial  number  of  forestry  agents  have  not  regretted  and  are just waiting  to  strike  back. In the 
Sikasso  region a feeling of  backlash was spreading  in  the  villages  around  1996  when  the  latest 
field  study  was  made. After the  approval of anew forestry  code,  some  agents had resumed  patrols 
in  the  villages,  and  examples  were  reported  of  backsliding to old  practices such as requests  for 
exorbitant  fees3n. In several  cases this had resulted  in codiontations between  the  forestry  service 
and  farmers  who  were no longer  willing  to  tolerate  such  behaviour  but  had  contacted  the  new 
la  disparition ah for&. J'en  aiprofti.  J'ai en  verger  qui me  rapporte  de  l'argent  aujourd'hui" (Woroni  no.  29). " 
J'ai confiance a m  Ema et For& J'ai uneplantation  d'eucalyptus quej'exploite" (Koloni  no.16). 
368 When asked to list  the three most  important  changes after 1991, no  less than 35% of  the  3  12  respondents  included 
however,  only 1% of  respondents  dec  ared to have  more  confidence  in the forestry  service than in  other  agencies 
in  the  village  survey  mentioned  the sus ion of repression  by the forestry  service  (chapter 1 1). At  the  same  time, 
(chapter  10). 
'" Complaints that the forestry service is not williig to assist with tree planting include the following 
statement: 'Rous avons besoin  desplantes  enpdpinikres  &eucalyptus  que now mons demand6 ala Eala et For&. 
For& se mifent de nous, ne  veulent  plus  travailler  avec nous,  car il y  a plus des tares  donc pas d'int6rZt  avec 
C'est pour fare  uneplantationprivde. J'ai lapromesse bient6t 2 ans,  mais  rien n'est r6gli encore.  Les Eala et 
nous" (Molobala  no.  32) 
"' Many  complaints  that  the for- service is not willing to collaborate with  villages  suffering  from  problems  with 
Moussa Traori est que les Ema et For&  ne conir6lentplus  l'exploitatwn ah arbres  sur  le tewoir. Les itrangires 
commercial  woodcutters h m  Sikasso and  Koutiala  were  recorded  during  the  village  survey: '!L 'incominient apris 
viennent  de  Sikasso  et un peuportout dans l'alentour du village  et ex loitent  librement  sans permis ni  aucun  autre 
pa ier" (Molobala no. 13). Xvant les Ema et For& venaient Lns le village constamment. Ils taraient les 
de  contrc5le de coupe de  bois.  Mgme le boit vert  est coupd et  vendu" (Molobala  no.  16). 'Rous avons regretti la 
inq!actions. Maintenant les E m  et  Forits ne viennentplus ...La Ema et Forits ne nous assistent  plus. I1 n 'y a plus 
disparitwn des agents Emu et Forits a h  notre  village. Les villageois n 'ont plus pew. Ils sont sans contrc5le car 
il n 'y a plus des  tares. Les personnes viennent de partout pour exploiter  notre  tewoir. Si les agents  des Ema et 
Forits pouvaient reprendre le conirdle  sur le peu de ressources que nous disposons prisentement il serait  bien " 
(Kl6la  n0.7). 
In an area close  to  Koutiala  town.  'the  Siwaa are'.the aeencv  since  1992 has been  involved in the  ureoaration 
p" 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ 
of  a local iirewood  convention.  1995  when the con<entio<w&ready tp be si ed, the agency, howekr;refused 
to  sign it,  and a  final  approval  was onl obtained  in  May  1997.  Accordmg to f h o r s t  and  Couhbaly, the forestry 
service started to back  away  in  the + d e  of the  process  because  key  ersons in the  agenc had their  doubts  about 
transferring  management responsibhty to villagers  (Hilhorst & Cou P Ibaly,  1998  p.  16-17: 
'72 Already during  the  village surv in late  1994 a ses  of  excessive  fining  were  reported: Ye n'aipas de confance 
m Eata et For&. Mime au caszemeur de lapart de nos egants en e m  a2 browse,  ils  viennent tawf i r t  mime 
maintenant" ( S i o l o  no. 12) Y'aipav d'itendre mastafae cultivab f .  e, S I  les Eator et  For& me voient  couper un 
arbre j e  serais taxi fort. Ils ne sontpas tout a fait cr6dibles 6 nos yem 6 prisent. Ils viennent de temps  en  temps" 
(Nafegue  no.  22). 
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political  parties  for  assistance373  (Interviews  with  farmers  and  representatives of political  parties, 
Feb. 1996). 
At  the  policy  level,  strong  forces  within  the  agency  seem  to  work  for  a  rewinding of the  s tuation 
to the time  before  the  change  of  regime.  The  process  of  preparing  the  new  forestry  code  was 
characterised  by  many  attempts  to  avoid  a  radical  change  of  existing  laws.  According  to its  critics, 
the draft code  at  every  revision  became  more  and  more  similar to the existing  forestry  code  from 
1986,  and  the  final  version  approved  by  Parliament  in  1995  ended  up  with  a  number  of  provisions 
that go even further than the existing lad74. (Interview with Cheibane Coulibaly and 
representatives  of  political  parties,  Feb.  1996). 
Finally,  the  reaction  by  the  agency  to  the  reorganisation  of MDRE can  be  mentioned.  During  the 
time of the  field  study  when  the  plans  were  still  under  preparation,  forestry staff at all  levels 
expressed  a  strong  opposition  to  the  idea of integrating  the  forestry  service  into  a  unity  extension 
service. Although the management was forced to approve of the action plan in late 1995, 
statements  given  during  informal  interviews  in  late  1994  suggested  that  many  were  willing  to 
combat  the  implementation  by allmeans.  With  the  transfer  in  late  1998 of the forestry  service  to 
a  separate  ministry,  these  forces  seem to have  achieved  their  objective  (Interviews  with  forestry 
staff and  resource  persons,  the  autumn  of  1994). 
Conclusion 
The  forestry  service  exemplifies  an  agency  where  the  lack  of  demand  pressure  over  many  years 
has  resulted in extremely  poor  performance.  The  development of the  agency  illustrates  how 
otherwise  positive  features  such as a  strong  organisation  culture,  a  strong  peer  pressure  and  a 
relatively  high  level of work  satisfaction  can  be  detrimental  to  the  performance of an  organisation 
when  they  do  not  coexist with sensitivity to external  demands. 
Relations  between  the  forestry  service  and  farmers  illustrate  Lipsky‘s  point  that  public  service 
workers  who  do  not  have  relations  of trust with clients  are  likely to relapse  into  the  issuing  of 
sanctions  and  the  provision  of minimum services  only  (Lipsky,  1980  p.  60-65,  p.  90-94,  p.  102- 
104,  ref.  chapter 3). The  agency  managed  to  survive  the  complete  lack  of  legitimacy  only so l g 
as the govemment  sanctioned  its  use  of  coercion.  When this support  disappeared,  the  agency 
collapsed. 
The  forestry  service is an  extreme  example  of  a  mechanical  model that has  developed  into  a 
closed  system  (ref.  chapter 3). The  complete  insensitivity to extemal  demands  and  notably  to 
demands by clients has made it unable  to  adjust to changing  circumstances.  It  missed  the 
possibility of gradually  taking  up  new  challenges  such as farmers’  growing  anger in the  late 
The exam le  of  Dossorola  illustrates this: in late 1995 villa ers eom Dossorola were  requested by forestry  agents 
to  pay  125,080  CFA  for  an  offence  they  claimed that  they  ha f not committed.  Instead of paying  they  contacted  the 
local  representatives  of UDD who  managed  to  ensure  that  they  did  not  have to pay  (Interviews camied  out in Feb. 
1996). 
374 In the new  law  on  forestry  resources  (Loi No. 95-004) the rice of  permits  and maximum fhes are higher  than 
in the law eom 1986 (Loi No.86-42/AN-,y Inaddition to &e  forestry  law  the  new  legal  framework  for  natural 
resource  management  includes  the f o l l o w  ws,  wdd llfe  resources  (Loi No. 95-03 1); tree resources  (Loi No. 95- 
003) and  fishery  resources (Loi No. 95-032). Also  a  tenure  reform is being  prepared. 
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1980s,  farmers’  increased  capacity  to  leam  new  techniques  (due to the education by  CMDT),  and 
donors’  increased  interests  in  environmental  activities.  Instead,  it  settled  into a rut, until  outside 
changes  were so fundamental  that  it  could  no  longer  protect  itself  from  their  influence. 
At the  time of the  field  study,  when  the  initial  shock  of  being  physically  attacked  had  gradually 
passed off, the  agency  still  seemed  unable to perceive  of  and  adjust  to  the  new  demands. Its major 
endeavours  seemed to be to reestablish  the  past  situation to the  extent  possible  without  risking 
to provoke a renewed anger by government, donors and populations. There had been no 
fundamental  changes in the way the agency  operated,  and it seemed  unlikely that such  changes 
would occur  unless  external  pressures  made  it  possible to initiate  internal  changing  processes. 
In the  mid-1990s  the  lack  of  reconciliation  activities  made it impossible  for  the  population  to 
believe  in a sudden  switch of roles of its agents from policemen  to  flexible  and  responsive 
extension  agents.  Furthermore, the lack of extensive  training  activities  for  forestry  staff  made 
them unable to take up the new role even if the population accepted it. The hierarchical 
organisation  and  the  patronizing  treatment  of field level staff gave  them  limited  discretion to 
respond  to  farmers’  possible  demand  for  extension  services.  And  finally,  the  organisation  still  did 
not  consider  relations of trust an issue  of  importance  to its performance.  On the  contrary,  the 
policy of keeping a distance  to  the  population  had  been  further  enforced by the  increased 
frequency  of staff transfer^^'^. It  is still too  early to assess  whether  the  reorganisation f MDRE 
initiated in 1996  will  be  able  to  initiate  major  changes to this picture. 
The  experience  of  the  forestry  service  shows  that a government  agency  will  never  be  fully 
independent  of  other  government  agencies  and  of  the  overall  legitimacy of the  state as such  (ref. 
discussions in chapter 3). Even  the  forestry  service  which  for  many  years  managed to remain 
isolated  from  external  pressures  was  eventually  overtaken by a development  partly  initiated by 
reactions to other parts of  the  state. Thus, protests by public  trade  unions  and  the  student 
movement  against  the  lack of democratic  rights  and  the  Tuareg  rebellion  in  the  north  triggered 
a deeply felt dissatisfaction with the state. by the  majority  of  the  population.  When  the  Traor6 
regime fell, the forestry  service fell with it. The  attitude  of the population  in  the Sikasso region 
no longer  to  accept  any  encroachment on their  civil  rights  (the  renewed  imposition of excessive 
fines)  partly  derive  from  their  experience of being  able to force  CMDT  to  make  concessions. 
The  forestry  service in other  words  clearly  illustrates  that  performance  of a government  agency 
results from pressures W i g  exerted  upon it both  by its status as being  part  of  the  state, by a set 
of  organisation-specific  factors  and by the social  forces  with  which  it  interacts. 
375 Brinkerhoff compares the Malian  forestry  service to an  ocean h e r  which  once  headed  in  one  direction has a 
limited ability to shift  its  course  quickly:  “internally, the mass of the agency’s structure, standard  operating 
procedures, and staffin patterns, set m motion  by the original  policy  mandate,  makes  turning  difficult.  Externally, 
the agency’s  clientele dg evelops  a  backlog of experience  and expectations of  dealin  with  the  agency  in  a  particular 
way, which also contributes to the  forces  of  inertia to keep gomg as before”(B&erhoff, 1995 p.  221). 
167 
9.4. The livestock  service 
Introduction 
Since  Independence  the  ministerial  affiliation  of  the  National  Department  of  Livestock  has 
changed  no  less than 12  times.  It has been  part ofjoint ministries  with  the  Department  of  Forestry, 
with the Department of Agriculture and with both  departments  at  the  same  time:  Since  1994  it 
has  been  placed  under  the Ministry of  Rural  Development  and  Environment (MDRE Cabinet 
staff,  personal  communication,  May  1996)376. 
It is the  mandate  of  the  agency to support  and  control  livestock  production  and  marketing  by 
activities  focussing  on animal health,  animal  production,  pastures  and  water  supply  facilities. In 
practice there has been a clear tendency for livestock agents to concentrate on the more 
remunerative  activities  related to animal  health,  i.e.  vaccinations  and  treatment of sick  animals 
W E ,  1991  p.  15; MDRE, 19928 annex  4;  interviews  with  livestock stafi, the  autumn  of  1994). 
During the 1990s  a shift of  emphasis  towards  animal  production  and  water  supply  has  been 
encouraged by the management.  These  attempts had limited  success  until  more firm measures 
were  applied.  Thus, in 1994  privatisation  of  vaccinations  was  initiated in the SCgou and  Sikasso 
regions as an  experiment  preceding  a  planned  total  privatisation  of  animal  health  activities. 
Although this has forced  the  livestock  agents to concentrate on other  activities,  their  generally 
poor  educational  background  constitutes  a  serious  constrainf7’.  A  considerable  number  of staff
members  do  not  have  the r quired knowledge to advise  livestock  owners  on  cultivation  of  fodder 
crops,  compost  with  manure, milk production,  etc.  Given  the influx of  a  large  number  of  cattle 
to  the  Sikasso  region from C6te d’Ivoire,  a  particular  challenge  consists  in  mediating  between 
transhumant pastoralists and sedentarised livestock owners claiming the right to the same 
pastures3’*.  It has been  made a task of  the  livestock  service to set  up  and  assist  ‘reception 
committees’  in  the  villages  concerned,  but  many  livestock  agents are uncertain  about  their  new 
role as mediators379 (MDRE, 19928  annex  4;  interview  with  the  deputy  national  director  of 
livestock  and  other  livestock staff, the  autumn  of  1994). 
In the  Sikasso  region,  CMDT was in charge  of all livestock  activities until 1992. In 1990  a 
livestock  project  partly  funded  by  the  French  Development  Cooperation (F‘AAP3*”)  was  initiated, 
The  organisation  of ‘La Direction  Nationale de 1’Elevage’ at  the  time  of  the  field  study was defined by 
ordonnance  No 81-38PMR dated 8 November  1981 (MDRE, 1992g annex 4). 
In Compared to other  agencies  in h4DRE there is an  overweight  of  technicians  in  the  livestock ervice and  relatively 
these  usually  older staffmembers, as It does nor have the necessary means to pay their  retirement ( W E ,  1991; 
few  agents  with  a  more  advanced  eduFational  background.  So far it  has  been  difficult  for the agency to get rid of 
interviews  with the deputy  national  director  of  lrvestock,  the  autumn  of  1994). 
’7~ About the return  of  Malian  pastoralists kom C6te  d’Ivoire, see chapter 7. 
A‘Cornitd  d’accueil’  in  villages with a  large  influx of heras kom C6te d’Ivo& consists  of  the  village  chief,  an 
advisor to the  village  chief,  a  member of th!hunt?’ assoa&on and  two  sedentansed hestock owner.  Their  tasks 
include  counting  the  total  number  of  cattle III th   vlllage,  allocation  of  pastures,  encouragement  of  herders to show 
consideration  for the a ‘cultural calendar, and  mediation  in  case of conflicts amon livestock owners or between 
livestock owners and k e r s  (Interviews  with  arrondtssement-based  lrvestock  stafE  the  autumn  of  1994). 
With the objective  of  enabling  livestock  owners  to  let he herds  stay in W i  instead  of  moving to C6te  d’Ivoire, 
PAAP (projet Amhagement A 0-Pastoral de la 36,Rd~on) supports FvestmFnts III water supply y d  other 
infiastructural  facilities  in  initial Fy 21 villages  m  the S h s o  region  (3-4  vlllages m each  cercle).  The  project  was 
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and  when the agreement  with  CMDT  expired  in  the  end  of  1992, the livestock  service  decided 
to  take over all  livestock  activities,  including  the  French-funded projecP (Interview  with the 
regional  director  of  livestock,  Dec.1994). 
The  transfer  of  activities  to  the  livestock  service has r sulted in a  rather  complex  institutional  set- 
up in the region.  Some  CMDT staff were. transferred  to  the  livestock  service,  and  new  offices 
were  established at regional,  cercle  and  arrondissement  level.  Part of the staff, however,  were 
maintained  by  CMDT as so-called  ‘zoo-technicians’  with  a  particular  responsibility  for  draught 
oxen  purchased  on  credits  from  CMDT.  Despite liitations of  their  formal  mandate,  the 1 17 zoo- 
technicians in the  Mali-sud  area  often  intervene i  other  domains, in particular  treatment  of  sick 
animals  (CFDT,  1995  p.  10;  interviews  with  livestock staff and  farmers,  the  autumn  of  1994). 
With the  privatisation  of  vaccinations  the  situation has been  further  complicated.  By the end  of 
1994  20  private  veterinarians  had  established  pharmacies,  and  of  these  15  were  also  involved in 
vaccinations. W e  in 1994  private  veterinarians  covered  2/3  of  all  vaccinations  in  the  region  (the 
remaining being covered by the livestock service), vaccinations were expected to be fully 
privatised by  1995  (Interviews  with  the  regional  director f livestock  and  other  livestock staff, 
the autumn of 1994). 
In addition  to  livestock staff, CMDT zoo-technicians, and private veterinarians, a growing 
number of village-based  ‘barefoot  veterinarians’  (‘secouxistes’)  are  operating in the  field of 
animal  health.  Whereas  private  veterinarians  usually  hold  a  university  degree  and  have  received 
postgraduate  training  by staff fiom the  livestock  service,  barefoot  veterinarians  are  farmers,  who 
have  received two months  of  training by CMDT in vaccination of poultry,  castration  and 
treatment of the  most  common  animal  diseases. 
Since  1992  resources  for  transport,  office  equipment  and  investment in infrastructure  such as 
cattle dips and  wells  have  been  down  to  a  minimum. The  PAAP  project in the Sikasso region 
initially  concentrated  its  activities in only  21  villages,  usually  situated  close  to  the  arrondissement 
offices,  whereas  activities  in  other  villages  were  negligible.  At  the  time  of  the  field  study in la e 
1994, activities were few even in villages  covered by PAAP. Several  years  had  been  used for 
preparations,  and  when  physical  activities  (such as the  construction of wells)  were  about to take 
off, the project ran into serious funding problems (Interview with the regional director of 
livestock,  Dec.  1994). 
In addition to the very limited  PAAP-funded  activities,  the  livestock  service is involved in the 
‘Test Zones  programme’ in about  10  villages in the region  (N’Djim et al.,  1993  p.  29). 
formally  initiated  in 
funding condition 
(about  the TDRL, see 
eneral refusal to pay Lds, it is the  intention to 
of  livestock, Dec. 1994). 
”’ According to CMDT staff, the  transfer &om CMDT to  the  livestock  service  took  place  due  to  jealousy of the 
livestock  service  aroused  by  the  access by CMDT  to  donor funds. Livestock staff, on the  other  hand, stress that 
dissatisfacton with  CMDT 
the  reason  (Interviews  with F MDT  and  livestock staff, the autumn o 1994) ’ concentration on treatment of t oxen at the expense of other animals was T .  
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During the interviews many livestock  agents  bitterly  complained  that  resources  had  been  more 
readily  available  during  the  time  when CMDT was  running  the  service.  However,  others  stressed 
that  while  resources  at  that  time  were  plenty,  they  were  all  concentrated  on  animal  health  and 
particularly  on  treatment  of  draught  oxen. 
Organisational  structure 
Like  other  government  agencies  the  organisational  structure  of  the  livestock  service  follows  the 
mechanical  model.  It  shares  with  other  agencies  a  clear-cut  hierarchy  where  all  major  decisions 
are  taken by headquarters  in Bamako and  communicated  downwards  through  the  hierarchy  to 
field SM. Authority  is  based on position,  and  like  the  forestry  service  hierarchical  roles  are 
maintained  even at the  arrondissement  level,  where  deputy  chefs  de  poste  receive  only  limited 
information  from the chef  de  poste  and  are  not  allowed  to  challenge his  decision^'^^. 
Virtually  all  activities by the  agency  are  project  funded.  The  centralisation  of  the  organisation 
implies  that  headquarters  has  to assess all  suggestions  for  activities in the  field  and  approve of 
the  funding. This often  makes  funding  procedures  extremely  cumbersome  and  slo\rsg3. 
Figure 7. The  four  hierarchical  levels  of  the  livestock  service. 
National  Department  of  Livestock 
headed  by a national  director) 
(National  level) 
Regional  Department of Livestock 
(headed  by  a  regional  director) 
(Regional  level) 
Secteur 
(Cercle  level) 
! Poste  Veterinaire 
(headed by a chef  de poste) 
(Arondissement  level) j 
As expressed  by a deputy  chef de poste who was sharing a small office with the  chef  de  poste  and  another  deputy: 
“$I want anything changed, I have to wait for my boss to take the initiative” (Interview  carried out the autumn  of 
1994). 
383 Exam les  were  given of budgets  forwarded to headquarters in December  and  receiving  funding  only  the  next  year 
in June  &erviews  with  livestock  staff,  the  autumn of 1994). 
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In the  mid-1990s  the total number  of staffin the livestock  service  was  about 1,000 of  which  212 
agents  were  working in the Sikasso region.  It is a  widespread  belief  among  field staff in Sikasso 
that  the  total  number of livestock  agents  available to assist  livestock  owners  has  been  cut  down 
after  the  transfer  from  CMDT. his, however, is contradicted  by the regional  management  who 
argues  that the sum  of  livestock staff, CMDT zoo technicians,  private  veterinarians,  and  barefoot 
veterinarians  by  far  exceeds  earlier staffnumbers (MAEE, 1991;  Coulibaly et al.,  1993  p.  annex 
1 p.  9-10; interviews with the regional  director and other  livestock staff). 
After the transfer of agents from CMDT, former village-based staff were concentrated in 
arrondissement  offices  that are usually  staffed with three  agents.  While  Kadiolo  cercle  follows 
the  general  picture,  Koutiala  cercle  makes  an  exception as all  village-based  positions  have  been 
maintained  after  the  transfer. 
Authority 
Despite the adherence  by the livestock  service to a  low-trust  and  authoritarian  management 
system,  the  discipline in the  agency is far less  strict  than  in  the  forestry  service.  Subordinate  staff 
seem  more williig than both CMDT  and  forestry staff to  speak  up in the presence  of  their 
superiors,  and  during  interviews  agents  did  nothing  to  conceal  their  dissatisfaction  without 
worrying  about he possible  disapproval by superiors of  their  outspokenness. 
In Koutiala  cercle  field  agents in the  bottom  of the hierarchical  system  have  a  very Kited say in 
the preparation and execution of work programmes. In Kadiolo cercle, on the other hand, 
arrondissement staffprepare their  own  programmes  which are approved by the  cercle  level  with 
some  additions.  While the involvement  of  field staff in the  preparation  of  programmes  means  a 
lot to their work  satisfaction, it is a  common  experience  by  all staffthat rigid  work  schedules 
seriously limit their  ability to respond to livestock  owners’  demands.  As  exemplified  by  an 
arrondissement-based  livestock  agent in Koutiala  cercle,  it  may take much  longer than expected 
to  explain  farmers  how to grow  fodder  crops. If somebody has not  understood  during the 
extension  session  scheduled in the programme, he has to  wait for the next visit by  the  livestock 
agent after a  month, and at  that  time it may  be too late  to  sow.  It  should  be  stressed,  though,  that 
working schedules are not at all as tight as those of CMDT staff: of 10 PAAP-funded  days for 
field visits per  month,  only 2-3 days are allocated to particular  activities,  whereas 7-8 days are 
open for requests  from  livestock  owners  (Interviews  with  livestock  staff, the autumn  of  1994). 
In addition to the  limited  influence on preparation  of  work  programmes,  it is a source of 
considerable  frustration for arrondissement staff that  they  receive  very little information fkom 
their  superiors at cercle  level,  who  constantly  make  changes in the work  programme. In Koutiala 
staff complained  that  meetings are often  called with only  a  few  hours  notice,  evaluation  missions 
suddenly  show  up  and  take  up  their  time,  new tasks are  added to their programme  without  prior 
consultation,  etc3@. In Kadiolo the problem  seems to be  less  pronounced  and  here  arrondissement 
staff receive  copies  of  the  monthly  reports  prepared  by  their  colleagues  in  other  arrondissements. 
As expressed by an arrondissement-based  agent in the  Koutiala  cercle: “we are sick andtired of being  told by 
the cercle  level to cany out this and that in village a,b,c,d without  being  involved  in  deciswns. We  never h o w  what 
comesfrom above!”. 
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Relations  between  field staff and c e d e  staff are  often  rather  tense,  because  arrondissement  staff 
for  lack of contact to the  regional  and  national  level  blame  their  difficulties  on  their  direct 
superiors.  Cercle  level staff, themselves  being  hard  pressed by the  regional  and  national  level, 
complain  that  field  agents are unwilling to do an  effort.  During  the  field  study,  tensions  were 
sometimes  openly  expressed  when in joint meetings  field  agents  bitterly  complained  that  working 
conditions  were  unacceptable.  When  interviewed  individually,  all staff williigly and  without 
reservations  explained  their  perception  of  the  situation. 
The  lack  of  fear  of  superiors may partly be explained by the  non-application  of  sanctions  for 
offences  against  internal  rules  and  regulations. Stafftransfers do  not  seem to be  used  neither  as 
promotions  nor as sanctions,  and  inefficient  work  monitoring by superiors  makes  it  difficult  to 
detect  offences  (Interviews  with  livestock staff, the  autumn of 1994). 
Rewards 
Salaries are  low in the  livestock  service,  and  there is no  linking  of  salaries  and  promotions to 
performance. 
The  majority  of  livestock staffin the  Sikasso  region  have  experienced  a  decline  both in salaries 
and  in  fiinge  benefits  after  the  transfer  of  activities from CMDT.  During  interviews,  all  questions 
about  working  conditions,  therefore,  were  answered  by  comparing  the  situation  before  and  after 
the  transfer.  First,  CMDT  used  to  pay  a  quite  substantial  monthly  hardship  allowance  for  field- 
based  agents,  but  after  1992  there  have  been  no  allowances  for  field  visits385.  Second,  access  to 
stafftraining  has  been  substantially  reduced386. Third, CMDT  gave  credits  to  the  purchase  of  new 
mopeds, and although credits are also available from the livestock service, staff members 
complain  that  the  mopeds  provided  are  old  worn-out  vehicles  which  the agency  gets  rid off by 
selling them to the staff. Fourth, all repair costs now have to be paid by staff members 
themselves,  whereas  earlier  CMDT  paid  for  repairs.  And fifth, a  limited  budget  for  fuel  covering 
a  total of 10 days of field  visits  per  month  does  not  compare  favourably with the  previous 
CMDT's  budget  which  allowed  field  visits  every  day in the month. 
Although  the  reduced  incomes  and  fiinge  benefits  are  not  tied to individual  performances,  many 
staff members  expressed  a feeliig of having  been  degraded  and  not  being  appreciated s much 
as they  previously  were  (Interviews  with  livestock staff, the  autumn  of  1994). 
Organisational identification 
In the Sikasso region  the  livestock  service hasexperienced two major  recent  transitions first from 
being  integrated into CMDT to be  a  proper  agency,  and  second  from  being  oriented  towards 
animal  health  to the challenges  of  becoming  involved in a  wide  range  of  new  and  demanding 
activities. 
385 The  hardship  allowance  paid  by  CMDT  amounted to 20,000 CFA  per  month  (it  should  be  noticed  that  this  was 
before the devaluation)  (Interviews  with  livestock staff, the autumn of 1994). 
Although training activities  have  been  reduced as compared to the  situation  when agents were  attached  to  CMDT, 
livestock staff in  the Sikasso region  receive  considerably  more t ainin than forestry staff and  CAC staff. Thus,  most 
livestock staff re orted to have  participated in ap rox 2 3 courses %ring the two years  preceding  the  interviews 
(Interviews  with?ivestock staff, forestry staff  ancfCAC staff, the autumn of 1994). 
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Among the many  internal  cleavages  resulting  from  the  far-reaching  changes is a  very  apparent 
difference  between the approach  of  younger  and  older SW. Whereas  older staff members  lack 
the technical competence to take up the new tasks and  feel  nostalgia  for the time  when as 
employees  of  CMDT  they  could  concentrate  on animal health,  many  younger staff members  find 
it interesting and challenging to advise on animal production and water supply. Another 
difference  regards the contrast  between  village-based  and  arrondissement-based SW. Whereas 
village-based staff have  maintained  a  close  contact  to  livestock  owners,  town-based taff have 
strongly felt the  change  in  the  form  of  a  much  more  distant  relationship to livestock  owners 
(Interviews  with  livestock staff, the  autumn  of  1994). 
A unifying  organisation  culture  has  not ye   emerged  to  bridge these various  cleavages.  Little is 
done  by the  agency  itself  to  encourage  organisational  identification s even  higher  levels  of  the 
organisation  blame all difficulties  encountered  on  lack of funds.  Contributing to the problems  of 
finding a ‘mission-focussed mystique’ (ref. the discussion in chapter 3) is the perceived 
competition h m  the many  agents  outside  the  agency.  Whereas  livestock  agents  previously  found 
an identity in their role as the only knowledgeable people on issues relating to the much 
appreciated draught oxen, the many zoo-technicians, barefoot veterinarians, and private 
veterinarians  are  now  challenging this position.  Especially  the  latter  are  perceived as a  threat by 
many  livestock  agents,  who  feel  overshadowed by the  better  educated  and  better  paid  private 
veterinarians sometimes preferred by farmers3”. Finally, agents’ self-confidence has been 
negatively  affected  by  the  spread  during  several  years of a  severe  animal  disease  which  the  agency 
apparently has been unable to prevent and (Interviews with livestock staff, the autumn 
of  1994). 
Whereas  forestry  agents  until  1991  and  CMDT  agents  still  are  socialised  to a particular  team 
spirit, village-based  livestock  agents  without  much  contact  to the agency  seem to be  ‘lonely 
wolfs’  whose tasks  are defined  more  by  clients’  demands than by the policy  of  the  agency.  Office- 
based staff lack  both a close  contact  to  clients  and an organisation  culture  which  could  give  their 
activities  a  direction. In other words each  livestock  agent  similar to forestry  agents  after  1991 is
very  much  left to interpret  the  situation  himself. Whereas the  forestry  service has been  subject  to 
changes  imposed on the agency  from  outside,  the  disintegration  of  livestock  service  results  fiom 
internal  restructuring  (the  transfer rom CMDT to the  Department  of  Livestock). 
Peer  pressure 
In order to encourage trust between  livestock  owners  and  extension  agents,  the  agency is tr ing 
to limit stafftransfers as much as possible. No agents  have  been  transferred  since  their  shift  of 
organisational aftiliation in 1993,  and  most  livestock  agents know each  other  rather  well. 
Another  factor  potentially  contributing  to  the fe liig by livestock  agents  of  being  a  group  with 
common  interests is their  sharing  of  a  background as former  employees  of  CMDT  and i  many 
That also higher levels of the  agency  consider  rivate  veterinarians  a h e a t  is illustrated  by the attempts  by  the 
privatisations in Koutiala  did  not  reach  very far during  1994,  whereas  the transfer in Kadiolo  took  place  according 
cercle level in Koutiala to boycott the transfa o!vaccination activities to private veterinarians. In consequence, 
to schedule  (Interviews  with  the  regional  director  and  other  livestock staff, the autumn of 1994). 
388 h epidemic of hyanosomiasis broke  out in the  region in 1993,  and  by  1996  it  was still not  under  control 
(L‘Ind6pendant 7 March  1996). 
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cases  also  their  origin i the Sikasso region.  The  latter is probably  explained  by  the  fact  that  they 
were  originally  recruited by  CMDT  which  considers  language capabilities in recruitments. 
Despite all this, the  general  uncertainty  about  the  work  seems  to  have  lessened  peer  pressure 
considerably.  Differences  between  young  and  old  and  village-based  and  office-based s t a f f  have 
made  it  difficult o reach  a  common  understanding  of  the  situation,  and in practice  the  various 
agents interpret  their  tasks  rather  differently.  While  some  are  ready to pay for fuel  for  their 
mopeds  by  private  means  to  visit  livestock owners, others  during  up  to five  months  use  the  excuse 
of  a  broken-down  moped to avoid  going  on  field  visits  (Interviews  with  livestock  staff,  the 
autumn  of  1994). 
Work satisfaction 
Despite  considerable  discretion  in  their  work,  many  livestock  agents  express  deep  frustration 
about  working  conditions  and  describe  their  work  satisfaction as much  reduced as compared  to 
the  situation  a  few  years  ago  (Interviews  with  livestock  staff,  the  autumn  of  1994). 
First  of  all,  they  often  feel  insufficient  when  they  have  to turn down requests  for  assistance  from 
livestock  owners. In addition  to  lack  of  resources  for  travel,  the  situation  should  probably e 
explained by an inadequate organisation of the work rather than lack of staff. Thus, the 
concentration  of  livestock  agents in arrondissement  offices  (in  Kadiolo)  have  increased  the 
distance to livestock  owners and  thereby  made travels more  expensive.  Negative  reactions by 
farmers  who  prefer  to  contact  private  veterinarians,  zoo-technicians,  and  ‘barefoot  veterinarians’ 
undermine  work  satisfaction  of  livestock  agents. 
The  changed  orientation  of the  agency  constitutes  a  second  important  source  of  frustration. 
Inability  especially  by  older staff members  to  carry  out  the  many  new tasks due  to  lack  of  training 
creates a feeling  of  not  being worth  one’s salt.  Contrary  to  the  point  made by Leonard,  Grindle 
and  Hilderbrand  that  over-qualifications  may  be a serious  hindrance to job satisfaction,  the 
problem in the livestock  service has more  to  do  with  lack  of  qualifications  (Leonard,  1977  p.  102- 
128; Grindle & Hilderbrand, 1995 p. 459-460). Hence, livestock staff exemplify Lipsky‘s 
description of staffwho are facing too many  conflicting  objectives  and  react  by  concentrating  on 
clients who are easy to  reach,  i.e.  clients  who  request  assistance  themselves,  while  they  blame  the 
lack of contact to others on clients themselves (Tipsky, 1980 p. 143, p. 151-153, see also 
discussions in chapter 3). 
Conflicting  relations  between  management  and  field  agents  have  become  more  pronounced  with 
the reduction of resources. It seems likely that the influence by field staff on their work 
programme  was  even  more  limited,  when  they  were  integrated  into  CMDT,  but  tight  budgets  now 
make  agents  react  against what was previously  accepted,  when  the  work  was  considered  more 
rewarding. 
And  finally,  general  uncertainty  with  regard to the  future  limits  the  work  satisfaction  of  many 
agents.  They  fear that their tasks will  gradually  be  passed  on to private  veterinarians,  and  that 
remaining  activities  will depend on funding by local  communities  which  they  seriously  doubt. 
Some  also  express  concern  about  the  situation  of  livestock  owners,  if  privatisations  are  taken  too 
far. Thus, they question  the  social  responsibility of private  veterinarians  to  ensure that all  cattle 
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even  in  remote  and inaccessible  villages  will  be  vaccinated  (Interviews  with  livestock staff, the 
autumn  of  1994). 
To this general  portrait  of  frustration a d lack  of  work  satisfaction  it  should  be  noted,  that  the 
picture  mainly fits the  experience  of  office-based  agents.  It  is  mainly staff based in 
arrondissement  offices,  who  tend to give  up  and  adopt a mental exit option in the form  of 
absenteeism,  slowdowns,  etc.  They  do  not  seem  to  care to do  even  the  little  they  could  do, do  not 
request  assistance  from  superiors  when  faced  with  problems  they  cannot  solve  themselves,  and 
concentrate on financial  requests for fuel,  repairs  of  mopeds,  etc. 
Many  village-based staff, on the  other  hand,  receive a constant  feedback  from  farmers  who  are 
pleased  with  their  services.  They seem to  experience a basic  work  satisfaction  and to struggle  to 
do a decent job even  though  also  they  work  under  the  constraints  of a tight  budget.  While office- 
based staff seem to use  the  lack  of  close  supervision  and  the  considerable  discretion  they  have  to 
do as little as possible, village-based staff sometimes use it to do an additional ~3ffor t3~~ 
(Interviews  with  livestock  staff,  the  autumn of 1994). 
Demand pressure 
After  the  transfer  of  livestock  activities  from CMDT to  the  livestock  service,  external  demands 
from  others than direct  clients  have  been  reduced.  When  the  livestock  service was an integrated 
part  of CMDT, government,  donors  and CFDT considered  the  work  of  the  agents  part  of  general 
efforts  to  ensure a large  production  of  cotton.  The  detachment of he  livestock  service  from  the 
specific  responsibility  for  draught  oxen  has  lowered  the  attention  paid to its activities and  also 
lowered  its  resources. 
Also the  privatisation  of animal health  activities  has  reduced  the  external  interest  in  the  agency. 
Althoughthe  livestock  service is still responsible for coordinating  efforts  of  private  veterinarians, 
it  no  longer  has an unequivocal  responsibility  for  preventing  and  controlling  epidemics  but  can 
blame their  outbreak on negligence by private  veterinarians. 
The  main  interest  by  the  government  in  the  activities  of  the  agency  in  the  Sikasso  region  now 
seems to be that of controlling  potential  conflicts  among  livestock  owners  and  between  livestock 
owners  and  farmers.  The  various  activities within the  field of  animal  production  and  water  supply 
and the  establishment  of  ‘reception  committees’  are  meant  to  increase  the  capacity  of  the  region 
to  receive a substantidly increased number of cattle. This political  objective may well be 
considered  important  by  the  government,  but it is  unlikely to result  in  the  allocation  of  the  same 
amount  of funds as the  previous  economic  objective  of  ensuring  the  raising  of  draught  oxen  for 
cotton  production. 
As regards  demands  by its  direct  clients,  these  also  have  been  reduced  by  the  emergence  of a 
range of alternatives  to  cover  the  most  pressing  needs  related to animal  health.  It  has  become 
more cumbersome and expensive for livestock owners to contact the livestock service for 
389 As expressed by a young  villagerbased  livestock a r t :  yoborfv can blame  me for not having hied. Despite the 
conditions I do what I can”. b g  skap in the vi1 ges It was sometunes  ?messed how llvestock  agents were 
called out late  at  night to attend  sick anunals. Also statements  recorded  dunng the vlllage survey  confm this, 
e.g. 5 ‘agent de l’ilevage  estprst ri rdpondre  n‘importe quand (Koloni no.18). 
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treatment  of  sick  animals  and  therefore  they  often  prefer  to  go  to  the  private  veterinarians  instead. 
Thus, CMDT used  to  distribute  vaccines  free of charge,  whereas  the  livestock  service  now  ask 
owners to pay.  Livestock  owners  also  have  to  pay  for  the  agent’s  transport,  whereas  CMDT 
agents  had  mopeds  and  large  budgets for fuel.  While  CMDT staff used  to  bring  the  drugs, 
livestock staff have  nothing to bring, hence owners  have to make  (and  pay  for)  several  travels, 
first to collect  the  livestock agent  and then  to buy drugs  from  pharmacies  in  town.  Private 
veterinarians  often  give  credit,  and  either  they just issue  a  prescription  based on the  description 
of symptoms by the  livestock owner or they bring with  them  drugs  from  their  private  pharmacies. 
While  the  general  frequency  of  contact to livestock  ownem has been  much  reduced,  office-based 
staff  have  almost  entirely  lost  contact to others  than  livestock  owners  in  project  villages39o 
(Interviews  with  livestock staff and farmers, the autumn  of  1994). 
Contributing to increasingly difficult relations to clients is a serious loss of trust between 
livestock  agents and owners, othemise strongly  encouraged  by the agency. While the low 
fiequency  of stafftransfers  still  constitutes a supporting  factor,  other  factors  have  recently  worked 
against  the  development  of trust. The most  detrimental  change  has  been  the  withdrawal  of  many 
agents  from  village-based  positions to arrondissement  offices.  The  increased  physical  distance 
seems to have been accompanied by an increased psychological distance. Reduced travel 
resources,  declining  incomes  for  livestock staff, and their  reduced  work  satisfaction  are  other 
factors.  Thus,  it has become  common for agents  not  only to ask  livestock  owners to pay  travel 
expenditures  but  also to request  a  ‘field  allowance’ for visits to sick  animals”’. This ‘privately 
contracted extension’ (Christoplos & Nitsch, 1996 p. 8-10) coexists with other individual 
solutions  by  livestock  owners  to  get  the  assistance  needed.  The  so-called ‘squark factor’ (Leonard, 
1977  p.  188-190)  is  obviously  also  at  work  and  ensures  the  most  powerful  livestock  owners  a 
certain  assistance,  while less influential  and  poorer  owners  lose  out  (see  discussions  in  chapter 
3 and findings  from  the  village  survey  presented  in  chapter  10). 
Finally,  the  general  political  development i  the  region  (and  in  the  country as such) has affected 
the  relationship  between  livestock  agents  and  their  clients.  The  livestock  service has not  escaped 
the  general loss of  authority by government  organisations,  and  some staff now  complain  that 
livestock  owners  have  become  more  demanding  in  recent years. Clients  no  longer  accept  that  the 
agency  imposes a  programme  on  them,  and  often  they  present  their  own  wishes to the  content of 
extension  sessions. While this may  be seen as an  expression of interest in  the services  provided, 
it conresponds  badly  to the  maintenance  of  traditional  hierarchical  structures  of  the  agency  where 
all  decisions  concerning  extension  messages  are  made  at  headquarters  level. 
Some livestock  agents  seem  to be  aware that  the  agency may seriously  undermine it in  the 
competition with private veterinarians, if relations of trust with livestock owners are not 
maintained. During the  interviews  it was often stressed that trust is decisive to the work of 
390 A chef  de  poste m an  arrondissement office in Kadiolo cercle  mentioned that he received about 1-2 uests from 
livestock ownen per  month,  whereas  the  year  before  peo  le  came  every  day. An office-based  chef  e  poste in 
Koutaiala cercle  reported that several  months  could pass wi out  receiving  any  requests  from  clients  (Interviews  with 
livestock staff, the  autumn of 1994). 
The  ‘privately  contracted  extension’  by  the  livestock  service  provoked th  followin  critical  statements  during 
the  village survey: 5 e  service de I’Plevage  ne cherche  que de l’ar ent Si tu les appe 8 es et acceptes les fiais de 
diplacement, en gdndral ils viennent sans tar&” (Nafe e no. 4). #’agent  vdtdrinaire  ne respectepas ses rend=- 
vous. Son diplacement est aussi cher” (Dossorola no. & 
2 7
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livestock  agents,  and  that  loss  of  trust  will  make  people  go  elsewhere.  People  prefer  agents  they 
how,  until  they  are  disappointed  by  their  lack  of  willingness  and  ability to a s s i ~ t i ~ ~  (Interviews 
with  livestock staff, the autumn  of 1994). 
Conclusion 
The  livestock  service  shares  with  the  forestry  service  the  experience  of a prof und  organisational 
change  which has fundamentally  shaken  the  agency.  Whereas  in  the  case  of  the  forestry  service 
pressures  have  come  from  outside  the  agency,  the  livestock  service  has  experienced an internal 
reorganisation in the  form  of its transfer  from CMDT  to the  Department  of  Livestock.  The 
reorganisation has significantly  changed  working  conditions and  has  coincided  with a changed 
d e f ~ t i o n  of the  agency’s  mandate. 
The  livestock  service  differs  from  the  other  agencies by a rather  substantial  discretion  held  by  its 
field  agents.  The  lack of strict  internal  discipline and a  limited  working  load  compared  to  the 
number of staff  make it possible for field staff to  improvise and respond to livestock  owners’ 
wishes to a  larger  extent than field staff from  other  agencies. 
The  agency,  on  the  other  hand, also illustrates  that  discretion  is  not  enough  to  ensure high 
performance if not  combined with a  certain  external  pressure  and  work  satisfaction  of  the SW.
For  office-based staff, who  do  not  have  close  contacts  to  clients,  the  discretion  tends to be  used 
to do as little as possible. For village-based staff, the satisfaction of working in close 
collaboration  with  clients  makes  agents  perform much  better  but  only  with  regard  to animal health 
which  they are supposed to gradually  abandon in order to concentrate on new  tasks. 
Having  been  subject to only  one  type  of  pressure  for  very  many  years,  namely  the  pressure  to 
vaccinate  and  care  for  sick animals, the agency has been  allowed  to  take  root  in  a  fairly  confined 
role.  Thus,  absence  of an organised  pressure from livestock  owners  similar to the  pressure  from 
fanners  faced by  CMDT, has made it possible  for  livestock  agents o respond  only to individual 
demands  for  treatment  and  vaccination of animals.  The  coincidence of livestock  owners’  and 
government’s  economic  interests  in  assistance to raising  draught  oxen  for  cotton  production  has 
relieved  the  agency  of  pressures to adjust to other  types  of  challenges. 
Now  when these other  challenges are presenting  themselves in the  form  of  a  considerably 
increased  number  of  animals  having to share the  same  natural  resources,  the  agency  lacks  the 
flexibility  to  adjust. Its staff do  not  possess the  qualifications  needed  and the  experience  of  taking 
up new tasks, and  the  management  does  not  understand  that  new  ways  of  organising the work 
may  be  necessary. 
The  perplexity of the agency  and its inability to respond to new situations  are  clearly  illustrated 
by its  lack of capacity to handle  even  a  new  challenge  within its traditional  field  of  intervention. 
Unliie the  example  reported by Tendler  from  Brazil  where  a  threatening  crop  disease  made  a 
mediocre  extension  organisation  raise  its  performance  to  excellence  (Tendler, 1993% see  also 
In one  arrondissement office other staff members williigly admitted that the agent.most  requested  by  livestock 
owners was the  one  who had been in the  same  position for 10  years (Intmews wth livestock staff, the autumn of 
1994). 
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chapter  3), the spread  of a serious  cattle  disease in the  Sikasso  region  only  seems to have 
increased  the  uncertainty  of the livestock  agency. 
9.5. The cooperative  service  (CAC). 
Introduction 
The  National  Department  of the Cooperative  Service was established  in  August  1967  with  the 
double  objective  of  providing  technical  and  legal  support to the cooperative  movement  and 
ensuring  its  control  by  the  state3”.  Since  the  establishment the agency has changed its ministerial 
affiliation nine times of  which  four  changes  have  taken  place  after  the  toppling  of  the  Traore 
regime  in  1991394.  Since  1994  it has been  a  department  of  the Ministry of Rural Development  and 
Environment  (Pierot,  1979 p. 53; MDRE Cabinet  staff,  personal  communication, May  1996). 
The  cooperative  movement dates back to the early  years  of  colonialism  when in 1910 the French 
created  ‘indigenous  associations’  for  marketing of a ricultural  produce  and  purchase  of  consumer 
goods. After independence the attempts by the new government to introduce a ‘socialist’ 
organisation of the rural  population  led to reorganisation of the cooperatives  under the name  of 
COOPAC”’. These  organisations  were  established  at  village  level  with  the  main  objective of 
ensuring state monopoly  on  purchase  and sale of  cereals  (Diallo,  1995 p. 37; Diallo, 1990 p. 22- 
25). 
M e r  the  failure of  the  socialist experhen?%, the establishment in 1967  of  the  Department  of  the 
Cooperative  Service  was  an  attempt to revitalise the cooperative  movement.  The  idea  was  to 
improve  the  technical  and  organisational  support  by  the  government,  while at the same time  allow 
farmers  more  influence  on  village-level  activities. In practice,  however,  existing  structures  were 
further centralised as village-based  COOPAC  units  were  forced to join larger  arrondissement- 
based  organisations. COOPAC was just renamed  CAC3”,  and  government-employed  CAC  agents 
based  at  arrondissement  level  maintained  an  upper  hand in all decision-making  and a monopoly 
on the hancial management (Diallo, 1990 p. 22-25). 
The  establishment after 1972  of  a  wide  range  of  integrated  development  agencies 
implied  a sipificant increase in the  number of government  agencies  intervening in the fields of 
production,  marketing  and  transport.  The  overlap  of  activities  was  further  aggravated  when  in 
The  D  artment  of  the  Cooperative  Service -’La Duection Nationale de l’Action  Coo  erative’  (DNA-COOP) - 
was estaL%hed by  government  decree 126PC dated 23 August  1967  (Pierot  1979  p. 535. 
’s4 Most  of  the  time  the  Department  of  the  Cooperative  Service has belonged to the  various m i n i s h i e s  of  agriculture, 
livestock  productim, rural develo  ent  and rural economy,  but it has also been  laced in the  Ministry  of  Territorial 
Administration, the Ministry of .P mployment  and  under the Prime  Minister’s 6 ffice. 
395 Coopcktive Agricole  et  Commerciale  (COOPAC). 
396 In relation to the cooperative  movement the failure  consisted in the  purchase  by  COOPAC of grain  from  local 
producers  at  very  low nces decided by the  state  and the resale of large  quantities  of  the  grain  to,civil  servants  and 
priv& traders. Thus, Bespite  official  intentions, grain was unavailable  for  resale to producers  @shop,  1988 p. 13- 
16). 
397 Centres  d’Assistance et de Contr6le  pour le Dt5velop  ement du  Mouvement  Coop&ative  (CAC In 1989  the 
name was changed to Centre  d’Action Coophtive, whl P e  the  abbreviation  was  maintained  (Tag, ,294 p. 55-56). 
19’ For  a  description  of  these  agencies,  see  section  9.1 
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1989 the mandate of the  cooperative  service  was  extended  to  include  also  promotion  of  village 
associations and  ‘village  tons’.  CAC  agents  were  now  made  responsible  for  training  of  village 
leaders,  credit  management in collaboration  with  the  various  financial  institutions,  organisation 
of  literacy  courses  and  provision  of  agricultural  equipment.  All  these  tasks  were  core  elements 
of the  mandate  of  OD&  (Bishop,  1988  p.  13-16;  Gentil,  1986  p.  61-73;  Tag,  1994 p. 55-57; 
Diallo,  1990  p.  22-25;  Diallo,  1995  p.  37). 
The  problem  of  overlap  with  other  agencies  is  particularly  pronounced in the Sikasso region 
where  CMDT for more than two decades has undertaken  exactly  the  tasks  included in the 
mandate  of  the  cooperative  service.  Until  the late 1980s CAC had  a  certain  financial  basis  for 
taking  up  the  competition  with  CMDT,  but  after  a  financial  restructuring of the  agency in 1988, 
the  support  by  CAC to the  organisation  of  the  population has been  virtually  nonexistent.  Unlike 
other agencies, the majority of the s t a f f  are contractual workers. Before 1988 cooperative 
members  paid  salaries  for  contractual  workers  and  all  running costs such as transport  and  office 
equipment, but after the restructuring, these expenditures are supposed to be paid by the 
population through the  local  development ax”’. In some  regions NGOs and  bi-  and  multilateral 
donors  working through CAC  structures  have  ensured  the  agency  a  certain  level  of  funding,  but 
in the Sikasso  region all donors  channel  their  funds through CMDpoo (MAEE, 1991  p.  58; 
Diallo,  1995  p.  37;  interview  with  the  deputy  regional  director, Sikasso Dec.  1994). 
With the general  refusal to pay  taxes  after  1991,  activities  in  the Sikasso region  have  come to a 
virtual stand stillm1. Many staff members  have  not  been  paid  for  months  and  even  for yearsmz, and 
the  only CAC activities at village  level  are  funded by a tiny support  from  the  ‘Test  Zones 
programme’  used  for  off-season  gardening  and  sheep-fattening  activities  for  women in a  mere 
eight  villages in the region403.  Apart fiom  the  role  of  the  cooperative  service as th  body for legal 
approvements  of all new  associations,  the  agency in the Sikasso region  can  best be described as 
an  empty  shellw  (Interviews with CAC staff, the  autumn  of  1994). 
More than half  of all CAC  employees are contractual workers,  the  so-called  ‘conventionnaires’  who  work as field 
agents at arrondissement  level  and  at  higher  levels as ecretaries,  accountants,  drivers,  watchmen,  etc. (MAEE, 1991 
p.  15; Pierot  1979 p.  56-57). 
In the MO ’ regon CAC  activities  are  funded  by BENSO and  GTZ,  and  in the Se ou region  CAC  activities  are 
funded  by F E ’  A and BENSO (Interview with the  deputy  regional  director,  Sikasso%ec.  1994). 
40’ In the years 1991-1994 tax payment in the Sikasso region was down to 3040% of government claims 
(consultation of budgets  for  various  arrondissements  and the two cercles  of  Koutiala  and  Kadlolo). 
40’ In late  1994  when  interviews  were carried out, only three staff members  in  Kadiolo  cercle (le director, his deputy 
and one more  staff  member)  received  salaries,  while  five  contractual  workers had not been  paid  for 3 months. In 
Bougouni and  Yanfolila arrears for  contractual  workers  were  said to be more than two years  (Interview  with  the 
deputy  director  of  CAC,  Kadiolo Dec.1994). 
403 Of the15 villages  included in the ‘Test  Zones  programme’  in  Koutiala  and  Kadiolo,  only 8 has  CAC  executed 
gardening  activihes (N’Djim et al., 1993 p.  29). 
404 After freedom of association  was  established  by  the  new  constitution,  it has become  a  condition  for obtainiig 
nurserymen’s  associations that they  are  a  roved  by  the  coo  erative  service.  Organisations  which fall outside  the 
legal status for the various  new associai~ons uch as e.g. pastoral  associations,  rabbit  breeders’  associations  and 
mandate of CAC  are Dolitid oartie. G& (Grouuements a’Int&&s  Economioues  which fall under  Chambre  de 
Commerce),  @de uniins anddG0s. in d o n  tobTe  taslcf,,the coo erative sirvice in  a  short  period  from  1990 
to the establishment of the Mission de DQentrallsaon III 199f was made formally responsible for the 
~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~~ ~~~~ ~ 
implementation ofnational decentralisation  olicies  (Tag,  1994  p.  56;  Sall,  1993;  interview  wit6  the  president  of 
Chambre RGgionale d’Agriculture, S i s o  {ec.  1994). 
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Organisational  structure 
Like the other government agencies under study, the mechanical model provides the core 
structure  of  CAC.  Limited  resources  and  dependency  on  local  development  budgets  and  donors, 
however,  make  the  agency  a  very  ‘loose’  structure  which  functions  highly  differently  in  different 
regions. 
Figure 8. The  four  hierarchical  levels  of  the  cooperative  service. 
National  Department of the  Cooperative  Service I 
(headed by a  n tional  director) ~ 
(Nntional level) l 
Regional  Department of the  Cooperative  Service 1 
(headed by a  regional  director) l 
(Regional level) 
~~ ~ 
(headed by a  directeur  CAC) 
(Cercle  level) 
(headed by an agent  CAC) 
Bureau d’Arrondissement 
fArondissement level) I 
In the early  1990s the total  number of staff was  about 1,000 of  which  only  about 400 were 
permanent staffpaid by  the  general  state  budget  (‘fonctionnaires’). The  remaining 600 including 
the majority of field  agents  were  contractual  workers  paid by  local  development  budgets or 
donors (MAEE, 1991  p. 16). 
In 1994  only 25 of  the  total staff of 108 the Sikasso region  were  permanent,  while the rest  were 
contractual  workers.  According  to  the  law,  there  should  be  at  least  one  CAC  agent  per 15 villages, 
but in practice  there is usually  only  one  agent  per  arrondissement. In some  arrondissements the 
position is even vacant  (Interview  with  the  deputy  regional  director,  Dec.  1994). 
Authority 
Like all government  agencies  the intmal organisation  of the cooperative  service is formally 
characterised  by  a  strongly  centralised  hierarchy  with  vertical  lines  of  command fro  the central 
administration  over  the  region  and  cercle to the  arrondissement  level.  Lines of authority,  however, 
are  less  clear-cut han in other  agencies  because  resources are so few that in practice  field-level 
staff are  left  to  make the most  of  their  means.  Working  progmmmes  leave plenty  of  discretion to
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field-level staff but  rarely  do  they  have  the  resources  necessary  to  undertake  the  activities  they 
would  like to carry  out. 
CAC  field staff share  with  other  government staff in the  bottom  of  the  hierarchy  a  general  lack 
of information  about  policy  decisions and  strategies  by their agency. In the  cases  of  CAC, the 
level  of  information  for  arrondissement-based  agents is virtually  nil:  they  write  monthly  reports 
to  the  cercle  but  do  never  receive  anything in return,  nor  do  they  meet  with  cercle staffvery  often. 
Apart  from  the  monthly  reports,  there is no  monitoring  of the work  of  arrondissement  staff,  and 
the  agency is in a  bad  position to sanction staff who  may  have  worked  without  payment  for 
months  or  who  receive  their  salaries t highly  irregular  intervals  (Interviews  with  CAC  staff,  the 
autumn  of  1994). 
Rewards 
Whereas  CAC staffpreviously had both  stable  salaries  and  access  to  illegal  incomes  from  abuse 
of  cooperative  funds,  the  agency  now  exemplifies  the  situation,  mentioned  by  Grindle  and 
Hilderbrand,  where  salaries  are so low and so irregularly  paid  that  employees are not  ensured 
enough  money  to  live  on  (Grindle & Hilderbrand,  1995  p.  452-453, ref. chapter 3). This situation 
would  be  a  serious  constraint  to  the  performance  of  the staff, ven if compensatory  factors in the 
form  of  a  high  work  satisfaction  and a close  contact  to  clients  had  existed.  As  neither  factors  are 
present in the Sikasso region,  the  performance  of  the  agency is the  lowest  imaginable. 
In a  career  perspective  it is a  dead  end to be  a  CAC  contractual  worker.  At the time  when 
interviews  were  taken,  quite  a  few staff members  were  only in their mid30s, as they had been 
employed  by  the  agency in the  years  immediately  before  1988.The  only  reason  why  young  field 
agents  cling to their  positions is the  lack  of  alternative  occupations  which  make  even  the  remotest 
hope for  a future donor  funding  more  attractive than the  decision  to  resign  from  the  agency 
(Interviews  with  CAC staff, the autumn  of  1994). 
Organisational identification 
One  would  not  expect  to  find  very  many  signs of organisational  identification by field  agents 
placed alone in poor  office  premises  made at their  disposal by the  arrondissement 
administrationm5,  deprived  of viaualy all means of work,  irregularly  paid  or  not  paid  at  all - nd 
last  but  not  least - surrounded by  CMDT  agents  with a similar  mandate  and  plenty of funds  to 
carry  out  activities. 
Surprisingly,  several of the  agents  interviewed  expressed  a  certain  pride in th ir agency.  Referring 
to  what was described as the  glorious  past  of  the  cooperative  service,  they  seemed to perceive  of 
the  agency as a  potentially  powerful  organisation  with  a lot to offer  the  population. Thus, some 
CAC staff expressed  a  view of their  role as protectors of the  farmers  against the exploitation by 
CMDT.  According to them,  CMDT  only  supports  farmers’  organisations with a  view to increase 
cotton production, whereas CAC assists the d population in order to strengthen their 
Offices of CAC agents  working  at  arrondissement  level  were  the  poorest f all off~ces visited rarely furniture 
exceeded an unstable  table,  a  chair  and a set of ramshackle  shelves  leaned  against  the  unpainted  walls. 
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management  capacity  and  thereby  their  autonomy.  While  CMDT is privileging  better-off  farmers, 
CAC is addressing  all  farmers  regardless  of  their  level  of  mechanisation.  Following this line  of 
reasoning,  some staff members  concluded  that the sometimes  tense  relations  between  the two 
agencies  are  mainly  explained  by  fear  of  CMDT of the  revolutionary  potential  of  the  work  carried 
out by the  cooperative  servicea6  (Interviews  with  CAC staff, the  autumn  of  1994). 
While this may  seem  to  be  a  considerable  exaggeration  of  the  present  potential  of the agency  and 
very  much  beside  the  role  played  by  the  agency in its great  period in the  1970s  and  1980s,  it is 
interesting to note that a previous strong organisation culture can survive several years of 
uninterrupted  economic  decline. 
Peer  pressure 
A  peer  pressure  does  not  exist a all. All field  agents work in splendid  isolation  and  have only 
(limited)  contact  to  colleagues  from  other  agencies. 
Work satisfaction 
The  work  satisfaction  of  CAC  staff is generally  extremely  low.  Being  forced to stay in  their 
uninspiring  offices  for  lack of resources to carry  out  any  activities,  CAC staff expressed  a  deep 
frustration  about  not  being  employed  according to their  skills. 
Dependency  on  local  budgets  implies that all proposals  for  activities  made by the staff are  turned 
down.  Furthermore,  it  constantly  brings  the  field  agents  in  the  humiliating  situation  of  having  to 
beg the  local  administrator  for  even  the  most  basic  working  tools  such as paper  and  pencils. 
More than anything  the total lack  of  contact  to  clients is discouraging  the  agents.  While  they  used 
to be  actively  involved  in  economically  important  transactions  related to purchase  and  sale  of 
cereals  and  organisation of cooperatives,  the  population  now  hardly  know  who  they  are. 
The  experience  of  belonging  to  a  previously  powerful  and  financially  privileged  agency  that  has 
been  degraded to a  poor  and  generally  ignored  structure has created  anger  among staff members 
who  often turn it  against  other  agencies. In the Sikasso region,  thus,  there is a widespread 
agreement  among  CAC staffthat CMDT is the  main  culprit  of  the  situation  given its usurpation 
of  tasks  rightfully  belonging to CAC. 
The  few  examples  found  of  a  certain  work  satisfaction by staff members  were  all  related to the 
participation in the  ‘Test  Zones  programme’.  Field  agents who had  taken  part in a  close  work 
collaboration with staff from  other  agencies  expressed  enthusiasm  about  the  new  experience of 
having colleagues  and  a  sincere joy about  going to the  field,  rarely  found  among staff from  other 
agencies  (Interviews  with  CAC staff, the  autumn of 1994). 
406 In an interview  given to a  government-controlled  magazine,  the  national  director f DNA-COOP  expresses a 
the  history of the cooperative  service has proven its role as the leading  agency for support  to  the rural population 
similar view of the agency.  According to him O m s  such as CMDT have  produced  nothing  but  failures,  whereas 
(Diallo, 1995 p. 37). 
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Demand pressure 
There is no  demand  pressure  whatsoever  on  the  cooperative  service.  At the national level the 
political  uncertainty  about  the  role  of  the  agency is reflected  in  its  constantly  changed  ministerial 
affiliation  and in the alternating  enlargement  and  reduction  of its mandate. 
Apart fiom donors who  in  other  regions than Sikasso  find  it  appropriate  to  implement  their 
projects through the structures of the agency,  no  external  parties  have  any i terest in the  services 
provided  by the cooperative  service. 
The  major  reaction by the population  towards  the  agency is indifference.  CAC  agents  are  rarely 
seen in the  villages,  and  if  they  come  they  have  usually  nothing to ffer4''. Whereas  people  until 
the  political  changes in 1991  may  have put up  with  meetings  without  an  apparent  purpose,  they 
no  longer accept this. In some  villages, thus, CAC stafihave been  asked to stay  away as farmers 
do not want to waste  their time on meetings  where  a  (material)  outcome  cannot  be  ensured 
(Interviews with CAC staff and  farmers,  the  autumn  of  1994). 
Needless to say in such  a situation trust  does  not  exist.  As  expressed by  the  deputy  regional 
director: '%ut depends  on the usefulness  of  the  service,  and if you  have  nothing to offer, you 
cannot  expect people to trust  you"(Interview,  Dec.  1994). 
To the extent that people  are  familiar  with  the  agency,  its  past history is not  always  considered 
as glorious as reported  by  the staff. Some  people  remember that the  agency  used to be  responsible 
for  organisation  of  village  cooperatives  and tr ining of  cooperative  leaders  and  refer  to the many 
cases of mismanagement  and  abuse of  cooperative  funds. 
The  only positive assessments  of the agency  were  given  either  by  women  involved  in the 'Test 
Zones'-funded  gardening  activities4o8 or by people who  appreciated the fact  that CAC agents 
usually  stay longer in each  position  than  other  government staff. Given  the low frequency  of 
transfers, it is not uncommon to find  CAC  agents  who  have  been  in  the  same  position for up  to 
ten  years.  Some field staff have  obtained  an  understanding  of  village-level  living  conditions 
which  in  some  cases  have  made  them  defend  the  interests  of  a  village  vis-a-vis the go ernment 
administration  (Interviews  with CAC staff and  farmers,  the  autumn  of  1994). 
Conclusion 
The  cooperative  service xemplies a  situation  where  the  public  sector  institutional  context is so 
constraining for its performance that it would be extremely difficult to increase it by 
40' The majority of res ondents  in  the village  surve  did not bother to comment on CAC. Among  the few who did, 
donnait  des  in  ormationr sur la  commercialisation  de nos produits, maintenant 'e ne sais pas ce  qu'ils font 
assessments  were  hi&ly  critical: Ye n 'aipas coi&mce au  CAC.  Je  ne  vois pas encore  leur uti&;. Avant le CAC 
(WoroN no.19{"Avante le CAC nous abnnait des graines de semences (ma&  aracdides, soja etc.). Maintenant, il 
ne faitplus d'actions" (Klda 110.26). 
Statements  by  the few women  included  in  the  village survey were generally highly  positive: 'Grdce au CAC nous 
les femmes du village nom produisonr  des  piments,  salades,  oignons,  du  gombo, du chou  que nous voudrons " 
(Nafegue no. 2 1). Nohe msociation  tient le  toute grdce m soutien du CAC i nous a don& l a   p r e m i k s  semences 
de haricot  et d'arachide " (Sincina no. 26)."Gr&e m CAC j e  me  rpjouis g l a  cueillette dufnrit du jardin qui fait 
une rdcolte" (Woroni no.7). 
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improvements  made at any  other  level.  Discouraged  and  irregularly  paid  staff  deprived  of  even 
the smallest budget,  without  contacts  to  clients  and  without  any  prospects for future 
improvements of their  situation  make  the worst possible  point  of  departure for attempts  to 
improve the service  rendered by the  agency. 
Despite overwhelming  constraints,  however,  it is worth  noticing the survival  of the previously 
strong organisational  identification  by  the staff. It is interesting  to  compare the reaction by CAC 
and forestry staff to  fundamental  changes in their  mandate  and in the  general  position  of  their 
agency.  While  forestry staff have  been  virtually  paralysed,  and  the  organisation  culture  has 
quickly  disintegrated,  many CAC staff have  maintained  a  faith  in  the  (potential)  usefulness of 
their agency.  One  important  reason  may  be  that in the case  of CAC it  has not been the cause  of 
the  agency  itself  that has come  under  attack.  Its  mandate  has  been  taken  over  by other agencies 
and  funding  sources  have  dried  up,  but staff members  have  not  been through a  period of severe 
criticism and even  traumatic  physical  attacks as those  experienced by their  colleagues in the 
forestry  service. In case of the  forestry  service  it  was its core  idea of repression as a  means  to 
protect the environment  which  came  under  attack. 
It is interesting also to note  how this dormant  trust  in the organisation  can  be  converted  into 
renewed  work  satisfaction  the  moment  modest  funding makes it possible for field staff to 
reestablish  some  relations  to  clients.  It may  seem a  rather  limited  achievement to assist women 
to grow vegetables  and  feed  sheep in a  mere  eight  villages  in  the  regionm,  but for CAC staff 
involved in the activities  together  with  colleagues in other  agencies,  it  was  enough to give  them 
back their work  satisfaction. 
Despite this example of (limited)  reactivation of the agency,  its  potential  must  be  described  as 
extremely  low. It is notable,  thus,  that  the  farmers’  movement at no  stage  has  benefited from 
support from this agency  supposed to support  rural  organisation. 
Finally,  it  must  be  mentioned  that  the  continued  existence of a CACstructure,  complete  with  field 
agents,  cercle  level  and  regional st f,even in a  region  where  another  government  agency is doing 
exactly what CAC is supposed  to  do,  sadly  illustrates the waste  of  resources  deriving  from the 
compartmental structure of government  organisations  and  the  consequent  competition  among 
agencies. 
4w The  achievement seems especially limited  when  considering that in  many cases CMDT are running  gardening 
activities  in  exactly  the  same  wllages. 
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Forestry service Livestock service :MDT 
dechanical  model 
which has become 
ess  mechanical  by 
ncorporating 
earning  from 
inners and  front- 
ine  staff. 
,ow-trust  system. 
:lose supervision. 
4 certain discretion 
)f front-lie staff. 
Structured  flow of 
nformation  to 
kont-line staff. 
Structured  feed- 
lack  from front-lie 
mff. 
High salaries. 
homes have 
hcreased. 
Performance 
xiented rewards 
md sanctions. 
Very high.  Staff 
consider the agency 
superior  to  all  other 
agencies. 
High. 
Very  high  because 
of  positive  feed- 
back  from  farmers. 
However,  recently 
challenged. 
Very  high  demand 
by  government. 
Very  high  demand 
by  farmers. 
Trust-based 
relations  between 
agents  and  farmers. 
Cooperative 
service 
Mechanical  model 
which has become 
less  mechanical 
(even  fragmented) 
due to lack  of 
resources. 
brganisational 
tructure 
Extreme example of 
mechanical model 
which has  not 
ieveloped  during 
m y  years. 
Mechanical  model 
which has become 
to  lack of resources. 
less  mechanical  due 
~~~ 
Luthority Low-trust  system. 
Poor supervision. 
A certain  discretion 
af front-line staff. 
No information to 
front-lie staff. 
No feed-back  from 
front-lme staff. 
Low-trust  system. 
Poor  supervision. 
Large  discretion  of 
front-line staff. 
No  information to 
front-line  staff. 
No  feed-back  from 
front-lme  staff. 
Low-trust  system. 
No supervision. 
Large  discretion to 
front-line  staff. 
No information  to 
front-lie staff. 
No feed-back  from 
front-line  staff 
lewards Low salaries. 
Incomes  have 
declined. 
No performance- 
oriented  rewards. 
Arbitrary  sanctions. 
Low  salaries. 
Incomes  have 
No pe r fomce-  
declined. 
oriented  rewards. 
commonlv  used. 
Sanctions  not 
Low salaries  and 
No  performance- 
irregular  payment. 
oriented  rewards. 
Sanctions  not 
commonly  used. 
kganisation 
dentification 
Until  1991  very 
high,  but  now it has 
disintegrated. 
Low. Modest  (kept  up 
because  of  past roll 
of the  agency). 
Until  1991  high, bu1 
now  it has 
disarmared. 
Low. Non-existent. ?eer pressure 
Work 
iatisfaction 
Demand 
pressure 
Until  1991 high, bu 
now extremely  low. 
Low for  office- 
based  staff. 
High  for  village- 
based  staff. 
Extremely  low. 
Non-existent. 
No trust-based 
relations  between 
agents  and  farmers 
Low  demand  by 
government. 
Reduced  demand 
by farmers. 
Trust-based 
relations  between 
village-based  staff 
and  fanners. 
Non-existent  until 
1991.Now  slightly 
increasing  demand 
by  government  and 
farmers.  No  trust- 
based  relations 
between  agents  and 
farmers. 
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Conclusion 
Findings  from  the  analysis of organisation-specific  characteristics of each  of  the  agencies  are 
summarised in table 9.1. 
The  analysis of the  four  agencies dram a picture of the  Malian  state as resource-poor,  weakened 
by an institutional  set-up  based  on  the  mechanical  model  and  characterised by a  very  poor  task 
network  reflected in the virtual absence  of  collaboration  among  the  agencies,  gaps  and  overlaps 
in  services  provided. 
The  i@tutional  context  of  the  public  sector is seriously  constraining  the  performance oftwo of 
the agencies, the forestry service and the livestock service, while it must be described as 
detrimental  to  the  performance  of the cooperative  service.  The  latter  illustrates  a case where  a 
government  agency is so crippled  by  lack  of  resources  and staffthat it is unable  to  perform at all. 
Given  its  mixed  status,  CMDT is less dependent than the  other  agencies  on  the  institutional 
context  of  the  public  sector,  and its access  to  more  plentiful  resources  and  possibility to define 
its own performance-enhancing employment conditions are important reasons for its  better 
performance. 
CMDT,  however,  shares  with  the  other  agencies  the  dependency  on  the  overall  legitimacy ofthe
state.  To avarying  extent all agencies  have  been  affected  by the  change  of  regime  in  1991  and  the 
subsequent  challenge  of  state  authority.  The  forestry  service  obviously  represents  the  most 
outstanding  case, as it virtually  collapsed  when  the  regime  which  protected it was  toppled.  The 
general  upsurge in popular  manifestations  and  the  countrywide  prosecution  of  forestry staff 
contributed to inspire confrontations between farmers and CMDT a few months after ‘les 
kvenements’  in  March 1991. Less spectacular  expressions  of  the  dependency  of  agencies  on  the 
overall  legitimacy  of  the  state  are  the  complaints  by  all  agencies  that it has become  more  difficult 
to  make  farmers  attend  extension  sessions  and  comply  with  their  advice. 
Also  positive  examples  were  found of the  mutual  influence  of  agencies’  legitimacy in the  eyes 
of the  population.  When  farmers in Sikasso are  interested in getting  assistance from the  livestock 
service to grow  fodder  crops  and  from  the  forestry  service  to  plant  fruit  trees,  it  relates to their 
experience  of  having  received a much  appreciated  assistance  from  CMDT. Whereas in other  parts 
of  the country, farmers have  learned  not  to  expect  anything  useful  from  government  agencies,  the 
experience  in  the Sikasso region is that their  assistance may,  indeed,  be  useful. 
While  these  findings  relate o the  characteristics  of  government  agencies as part  of the abstract 
state  that  depends  on  a  certain  amount  of  legitimacy n the eyes  of  societal  groups,  the  analysis 
also  confirms  the  understanding  of the state as a  complex structure composed  of  many  different 
parts all pulling in different  directions.  It  illustrates  how  different  strategies  are  pursued by 
different  parts  of the  state  not just with  regard to their  day-to-day  activities  but  with  regard  also 
to  their  more  fundamental  relation to societal  forces.  While  CMDT is pursuing  an  engagement 
strategy  aiming to influence  virtually  every  possible  aspect of rural life,  the  strategy  of  the 
cooperative  service  exemplifies  a  form  of  state  withdrawal.  Even within the  same  agency  different 
strategies may be  pursued.  Livestock  agents  based in villages  actively address the  population  and 
are  available  for  requests any time,  day  or  night.  Office-based  agents, on the other  hand,  have 
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given up and  have to be  given  ‘incentives’ to work.  According to Bratton,  the  latter  must be 
described as a disengagement  strategy  because  acceptance  of  bribes  reduces  state  authority  rather 
than  extending it (Bratton, 1994% see also  chapter 2). 
A  comparison  of  the four agencies  shows that a core  organisational  structure  based on the 
mechanical  model  may  develop  in  many  different  directions,  depending  on  available  resources 
and  the  demand  pressure  faced.  CMDT  illustrates  a  mechanical  model  that has gr dually  become 
less  mechanical by incorporating  some  learning  from  farmers  and  experience of field agents. 
While the gradual  change of CMDT’s structure  to  accommodate  clients’  wishes has been  a 
controlled  and  deliberate  process,  the  livestock  service and  CAC  represent  organisations  that  have 
become less mechanical mainly by default.  Field  agents  in  these  agencies  have  relatively  large 
discretion  because  the  management  level  does  not  have  the  resources  necessary  to  maintain 
authority. The experience  of  these  agencies,  however,  makes  it  evident that discretion  without 
demand  pressure  does  not  necessarily  result  in  increased  performance. 
The  forestry  service  represents an extreme  example of a  mechanical  organisation  that  has  not 
developed  at all during  very many years. The  total  absence  of  external  pressure  has  allowed  it  to 
settle into  a  mechanical rut and  left it completely  unprepared  for  any  demands  to  adjust.  After 
years of isolation  the  forestry  service  has  been  unable  to  find  a  new  modus  operandi  after 1991. 
Thereby,  the  recent  experience of the  forestry  service  bears  witness to the  difficulties  govemment 
agencies with a limited capacity may face when requested to make sudden changes. The 
experience attests that if other  conditions  for  good  performance  are  absent,  a  sudden  demand 
pressure will result  in little more than perplexity. 
When trying to  understand  why  CMDT has been so much  more  influenced  than  the  other  agencies 
by demand  pressures,  the  reason  again  seems  to  be its particular  status as a parastatal  partially 
driven by private  and  public  commercial  interests. As management  issues  are  handled  solely  by 
CMDT, the existence of French  interests as such  does  not  explain its sensitivity to farmers’ 
demands.  It is rather  the  economic  imperative  to  produce  cotton  at  low  costs  and  the  request  &om 
farmers  for  assistance that have  forced  CMDT  to  become  more  creative  and  experimenting tha  
the other agencies until recently ensured a certain allocation of funds regardless of their 
performance. It is possible, thus, that also the forestry service could have experienced a 
development  similar to  that of  CMDT, if it had been  under  a  similar  pressure to support e.g. 
commercial  tree  production  in  which  the  govemment a d  farmers  had  considerable  economic 
interests. In such  a situation it  seems  highly unlikely that  the  agency  would  have  been  able to 
disregard the demands  by  farmers  supposed to produce  the  trees.  Whereas  part  of  the  CMDT 
success  story  is  explained  by its access to resources  which  the  other  agencies  do  not  have  due to
their  dependency  on  a  poor  state,  the  other  part  of  the  story  relates to the  particular  character  of 
demand  pressures on the agency. 
The analysis  of  the  ‘CMDT  model’,  however,  reveals  that it has not  been  unconditionally 
appropriate in all situations. Its mechanically  oriented structures have  sometimes  constituted  a 
hindrance to its ability to respond  both to individual  clients’ demand  and to organised  demands 
by  farmers.  When,  nevertheless,  constraints  related to its structure  have  not  been  more  detrimental 
to its performance,  the  reason  seems to be  the  existence  of  a  range  of  performance-enhancing 
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conditions,  such as a  strong  organisational  culture,  a  strong  peer  pressure,  a  performance-oriented 
reward  system, high work  satisfaction by staff and  close  relations  between staff and  clients. 
Some  of  these  performance-enhancing  conditions  are  also  found in the  other  agencies  and  explain 
that these are  sometimes  able to perform  well  against  otherwise  hard  odds.  The  most  notable 
example is the  cooperative  service  where a previously  strong  organisational  identification by staff 
has survived  the  comedown  of  the  organisation  and h s the  potential  of  being  converted  into  new 
work  satisfaction for the stafionce they  ontain  financial  means  to  reestablish  relations t  clients. 
Also work  satisfaction  of  livestock  agents  based  in  villages  demonstrates this, Despite  the  absence 
of a  performance-related  reward  system,  organisational  identification  and  peer  pressure,  village- 
based  livestock  agents  often  find  a  basic  work  satisfaction  in  having  close  relations  to  clients,  and 
apparently  they  are able to accommodate  farmers’  demands. 
The  argument by Tendler that agencies  are  rarely  performing  consistently  well  or  consistently  bad 
finds  limited  support  in  the  above  conclusions  (Tendler,  1993a;  Tendler,  1993b,  see  also  chapter 
3).  Contrary  to  her  findings,  there  seems  in  fact  to  be  a  close  relationship  between  organisational 
structure  and  performance  of  agencies.  Radical  changes  in  performance, thus,  appear to be  more 
related to structural  changes  than to sudden  external  shocks  and  challenges.  The  much  reduced 
performance  of the  livestock  service  and  the  cooperative  service  following  institutional  changes 
are  but  two  examples,  while also the  inability  of  the  livestock  service  to  raise  performance  when 
faced  by  a  threatening  animal  disease  counters  the  hypothesis. 
The analysis, thus, confirms the appropriateness of analysing performance of government 
agencies as a  result of pressures  exerted  upon  them  both  by  their status as being  part  of  an  abstract 
symbolic totality, by a range of organisation-specific factors and by societal forces. Their 
dependency  on the overall  legitimacy of the  state and  on the  institutional  context  of  the  public 
sector confirms that it is little appropriate to treat government agencies only as individual 
organisations.  Organisation  theory  takes  the  analysis  a  good  part  of  the way but has to be 
supplemented  by  theories  about  overall  relations  between state and  society  in  order  to  understand 
the  particularities of government  agencies. The marked  differences  among  organisations  sharing 
the same environment, on the other hand, illustrate the usefulness of considering also 
organisation-internal  factors  and  the  particular  demand  pressure  from  clients,  hence  the  need  for 
moving  beyond general  theories  about  state  and  society. 
As regards  pressures  exerted  upon  the  agencies by the  particular  character of the  social  forces 
with  which  they  interact,  the  analysis ha so far  dealt  only  with  a  general  ‘demand  pressure  from 
clients’. The difference between the experience of CMDT and the forestry service clearly 
illustrates that  existence of a  demand  pressure  is  decisive  to  the  performance.  Based on the 
analysis  in this chapter,  however,  all  that  can  be  said  is  whether  the  demand  is  there or not, 
whereas  the  particular  character  of  social  forces  in  the  region has not  been  dealt with. This 
analysis is attempted  in  chapter  1 1. 
Finally,  the  understanding  of  performance  guiding  the  analysis  in  the  present  chapter  has  been  a 
very broad  understanding  of  the  notion as a  measure  of  the  ability by agencies  to  satisfy  general 
client  demands.  There has been  no  differentiation  of  the  ability  to  satisfy  demands  by  particular 
groups.  The  issue of inequality in relations  between  agencies  and  their  clients  is  taken  up  in 
chapter 10. 
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CHAPTER 10. INTERACTION  BETWEEN FARMERS AND EXTENSION  AGENCIES 
IN THE SIKASSO REGION 
Introduction 
It is  the  purpose of the  present  chapter  to  present  a  picture  of  the  interaction  between  farmers  and 
extension agencies in Sikasso, i.e. a picture of what is happening when farmers me& 
representatives  of  the  state. The  perspective  is  that  of  farmers’ as it  was  reflected  in a village 
survey  undertaken  in  the  region i  late 1994  and  early  1996. 
h the first chapters  of  the  theoretical  section  (chapter  1-2)  the  notion  of  ‘interaction’  was  used 
to designate any  exchange  between the abstract  categories of  ‘state’  and  ‘society’. In chapter 3 
the  perspective  was  narrowed  down  to  concentrate  on the specific  interplay  between  government 
agencies  and  their  clients,  and  the  notion  of  performance by  the agencies,  defined as their  ability 
to  accommodate  clients’  demands, was introduced as an entrance  point to study  the  interaction. 
In chapter 5,  6 and 9 conditioning factors for the performance of the agencies have been 
discussed.  Chapter 5 dealt  with  the  Malian  action  environment,  chapter  6  with  the  institutional 
context of the public  sector, and in chapter  9  a  thorough  assessment  was  made of organisation- 
specific  factors  conditioning  the  performance of each of the  four  agencies  under  study. 
In this chapter farmers ’ assessment of the  services provided by the agencies is presented. As 
performance  is  defined as the  ability  to  accommodate  farmers’  demands,  the  assessment by 
farmers  can  be  considered  a  ‘test’ of conclusions  reached in chapter  9  concerning  the  expected 
performance  of  each  of  the  agencies 
The village  survey  which  constitutes  the  basis  for  the  chapter s addressed  both  quantitative  and 
qualitative dimensions of the services provided. As discussed in chapter 3, the degree of 
satisfaction by clients  can  be  difficult  to  measure  because  needs  tend to be  indefinite  and  therefore 
never  properly  satisfied.  The  issue  of  demand  satisfaction,  therefore,  has  been  approached by 
asking a series  of  more  specific  questions  concerning the3equency of  contact  between  agencies 
and  their  clients,  the  reZiabiIity  of the  services,  i.e.  whether  the  services are available  when  they 
are  needed,  the perceived usejidness  of  the  assistance,  and  the character  ofpersonal relations 
between  extension  agents  and  farmers. 
It  should  be  noted  that  questions  asked in the  survey  concern  three  more  government  agencies  in 
addition to the  four  under  study,  namely  the  health  service, the educational  system,  and  the 
government  administration  represented  by  ‘chefs  #arrondissement’  and ‘commandants de  cercle’. 
This was  decided  partly  because  information  on  interaction  with  these  agencies  are  useful  for 
comparative  reasons,  and  partly  because  these  agencies through their  activities  in the region 
influence the overall  perception  held  by  the  population of the  state. 
The  survey  includes a total of  312  respondents  in ten villages  in the Koutiala,  Kadiolo  and 
Sikasso cercles in the Sikasso region. For a presentation and discussion of the fieldwork 
methodology  applied, see the section  ‘Fieldwork  methodology  and  literature  study’  and for 
additional  information  on  villages  and  respondents,  see  the sections on  ‘Characteristics of the  ten 
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villages  under  study’  and  ‘Characteristics of respondents  in  the  village  survey’  in  the  annex.  Maps 
indicating  the  location  of  villages  are  found in the  beginning  of  the  dissertation. 
It must be stressed that all figures presented in the following should be considered rough 
indications  of  tendencies  rather  than  exact  measures  of  ‘real’  phenomena. 
10.1. Frequency  and  distribution of contacts 
The  first  issue  investigated  during  the  survey was how  much  in  fact  farmers  and  extension  agents 
see of each other. In a context such as the Malian where letters to farmers and television 
broadcasting of extension messages are not among the options, physical contact between 
extension  workers  and  farmers is a  first  precondition  for  being  able to describe  their  relation  as 
interaction. This may  be in  the  form  of  participation by farmers in extension  sessions, visits by 
farmers  to  government  offices,  or  visits by extension  agents  to  individual  farmers. It is relevant 
to  know  also  who  among  the  two  parties  typically initiates  the  interaction: if extension  agencies 
primarily  address  farmers, or  if it  is mainly  farmers  who  solicit  the  assistance of the  agencies. 
Although this cannot  be  directly  translated into the theoretical notions of engagement and 
disengagement  discussed  in  chapter 2, it  contributes to an  overall  picture.  of  whether  government 
agencies  are  actively  trying  to  relate  to  the  population  or  whether  they  are  rather  in  the  process 
of  retracting.  Similarly,  the  frequency of contacts  on  farmers’  initiative gives an  indication of 
whether  the  population  tend to shun  representatives of the  state  or  they  are  instead  trying  to 
address  them. 
The  survey  contirms  that  the  four  agencies  under  study  account  for  a  considerable  share of tot l 
contacts  between  government  agencies and population in the region (table 10.1). Measured as a 
simple  average  of  frequency  of  contacts  reported  by  all  respondents,  only the health  service has 
a higher  frequency of contacts  to  inhabitants than CMDT  and  the  livestock  service.  Even  the 
forestry service has more frequent face-to-face contact to the (adult) population than the 
educational  system. 
The overall frequency  of  contacts  reflected  in table 10.1 must Le described as relatively  high. 
Respondents  included in the  survey  have an average  of  about 33 annual contacts to government 
agencies,  corresponding  to  close  to three contacts  every  month.  Contacts to agencies  involved in 
natural  resource  management  (i.e.  the  four  agencies  under  study)  amount  to  about 18 annual 
contacts  which  is  substantially  above  the  level  of  contacts  reported  in stu ies&om other parts of 
Africa4’’. 
Considering CMDT’s extensive  programme  in the region, it is not surprising  that his agency  is 
placed on  top of the  scale of contacts.  Less  predictable is the  information in table 10.1 that the 
4’0 In his  thorough  study of .e extensjon  agency in Kenya, Leonardfound an average of 2.91 visits  per  year  to 
progressive  farmers, 0.44 vlslts to  mlddle  farmers  and.only 0.07 vlslts to so-called  ‘non-innovative  farmers’. 
Although his study seems to  count  only  visits  by  extension  agents to individual  farmers,  the  level  of  contact s a  
appears  to be considerably  below  the  level  found inSikasso (Leonard, 1977 p. 173-177). Also my own &cussions 
wth agricultural  extension  workers  from six African  countries (Tanzania, Uganda,  Kenya, Eritrea, Malawi  and 
Mozambique)  and  subsequent  visits o Uganda,  Malawi  and  Mozambi ue have  confirmed  that  the  frequency of 
contact  between  extension  agencies  and  farmers  in the Sikasso region  is far above the frequency in other countries 
lnformation  obtained through my participation as a  trainer  in  an  ‘Agricultural  Extension  Coordination  Course’ L ded by  Danida, 1999). 
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livestock  service has about  the  same  number of contacts.  While  general  activities  of  the  latter 
were extremely l i t e d  at  the  time  when  interviews  were  undertaken,  the  many  contacts  reflected 
in  table  10.1  are  believed  to  be  explained  mainly by the  inclusion  in  the  survey  of a number  of 
villages  benefiting  from  specific  project  activities  (see  section  10.1.2  below).  The  low  frequency 
of contacts  to  the  forestry  service  and  the  very  limited  contact  between  farmers  and CAC fit the 
general  picture of two  agencies  seriously  constrained  in  their  ability  to  carry  out  any  activities. 
Table  10.1.  Average  annual  number  of  contacts for all resDondents  to  each of  the  agencies - - 
during  a year (n=312) 
- 
I 
CMDT CAC  EDUCATION FORESTRY mm.  LIVESTOCK I 
9.7 I 1.4 I 7.3 I 4.0 1 1.4 2.1 
Note: contacts  include  both  individual  and  group  contacts  (participation by respondents in extension  activities  that 
address a  larger  group or the entire  village).  Respondents  have  staied  the  number of contacts  during  the  rainy  season 
May to  November is the cultivation  period  where  assistance from extension  agencies  is  most  needed 
and the dry season, respectively,  and these have  been  added to arrive  at  an annual average.The rainy season from 
Table  10.2  reflects the mode  of  operation by the  various  agencies  (emphasis  put  on  outreach 
activities  vs.  reception of clients in offices) as well as their  perceived  usefulness to farmers.  Thus, 
the health service that runs only a limited outreach service is very much solicited by the 
population4".  That  the  livestock  service  appears to be the  one  agency  among  the  four  under  study 
which  receives  most  requests  fiom  farmers  is  probably  explained  by  the  fact  that  livestock  agents 
use the occasion of project-funded extension sessions to respond to individual requests. 
Assistance  fiom  the  forestry  service  and  the  cooperative  service  is  not  much  in  demand,  and staff 
fiom these agencies,  therefore,  are less solicited  when  they  come  in  relation to project-funded 
activities.  The  rather  substantial  extension  activities by  the  livestock  service  in  the  ten  villages 
can  be seen  from table 10.3. 
~. . .  
Table  10.2.  Average  number  of  contacts on the  initiative  of  farmers for all respondents 
during a year (n=312) 
HEALTH CAC FORESTRY EDUCATION mm. CMDT LIVESTOCK 
6.9 0 0.2 1.3 1.9 2.2 3.3 
Evidently,  outreach  activities by  CMDT are more  extensive than activities by  any other  agency 
in the  region  (table 10.3). The  relatively  few  contacts to CMDT  on  farmers' initiative  should be 
seen in  relation  to  the  policy  of  gradually  replacing  extension  agents by village  technical  teams. 
In many of the  villages  included  in  the  survey,  the  village  technical  team h s the  capacity  to  assist 
farmers  without  involving  CMDT  agents. 
Regarding  the two other  agencies  included in the survey, the administration  only  addresses  the  population  once 
tax problems,  etc.  The school system rarely  approaches the (adult)  population,  but  parents  contact  the  nearby  school 
a year when  taxes are collected, while farmers contact  the  admini&ation  concerning birth cerhfides, Identity cards, 
to enroll their children. 
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Table 10.3. Average number of contacts on the  initiative of agencies for all respondents 
during a year (n=312) 
CMDT EDUCA. CAC ADMIN. FORESTRY HEALTH LIVESTOCK 
5.2 0.1 1 1.1  1.9 2.8 4.0 
Directly  comparable  studies  from  the  same  region  are  not  available. A survey  undeitaken  in  1993 
by researchers  from  DRSPR  on  frequency  of  contacts  and  quality  of  extension  messages by 
CMDT, the  forestry  service  and  livestock  service  took  up  some of  th  same issues  but  applied a 
different  methodology412  (Coulibaly  et  al,  1993).  Despite  slightly  different  specific  results,  the  two 
surveys  indicate a fairly  similar pattern  of  interaction  between  fanners  and  extension  agencies4I3. 
So far only  average  figures for all  farmers  have  been  dealt  with.  It is necessary,  however,  to 
‘disaggregate’  the  group of farmers  in  order to find  out  if  all  farmers  have  the  same  frequency  of 
contact, and if this is not the  case, to assess  factors  decisive to the  frequency. In accordance  with 
the  description  in  chapter 7 and 8 of  two main lines  of  division  of  the  population,  the  survey  has 
concentrated  on  assessing the importance of socioeconomic and geographical  factors,  i.e.  the 
possible  difference  in  contacts  according to the  position  of  farmers in the  classification a- d (see 
definition in  chapter 7) and  the  possible  difference  in  contacts to farmers  living  in  different 
villages. 
10.1.1. Concentration of services on better-off  farmers 
Average  figures  conceal a heavy  concentration  of  all  services  on a limited  number  of  farmers. In 
the  rainy  season  about  half o all contacts to CMDT  on  farmers’  initiative  are  taken  by  only 6% 
of  respondents,  whereas 62% of  respondents  declare  never to contact  the  agency  during this 
period.  For  the  livestock  service,  it  appears that 40% of  contacts on fanners’  initiative  are  taken 
by  only 10% of respondents.  About half of  those  interviewed  never  contact  the  livestock  service. 
For the  forestry  service  the  concentration is even  more  pronounced 5% of  respondents,  namely 
those  interested in nursery  activities, account for  all annual contacts  to  the  forestry  service,  while 
the  remaining 95% never  contact  the  agency. 
For all agencies  without  exception  there  is a tendency  to  concentrate  extension  efforts  on  better- 
off farmers in group-a  and  group-b  at  the  expense  of  poorer  fanners  in  group-c  and  group-d.  It 
appears  from table 10.4 that an average  group-a  household  has  substantially  more  contacts  to 
The survey comprised  a  total of55 men  and 44 women in seven  villages in the Sikasso region. As jt  turned out 
that the team was  unable to obtam answers fiom women  concerning  contacts  to  government  agencles, the total 
sample of SS respondents was considerably  smaller  than that qf the present survey. The  villages  were  selected 
accordin  to  criteria  emphasizing  their  osition in the classlficahon by CMDT  (i.e.SB, ER, ZAER, non-AV). In 
each of $e villages a  stratified  sample o f households  was  selected  by  use  of  the  DRSPR-typology  (i.e.  by  grouping 
households in the  categories ad). Like in the  resent survey, questions  distinguished  between the rainy  and  the dry 
season, but instead of stating the specific num \ er of  contacts, re ondents  were  asked  to  indicate  whether  contacts 
take  piace  ‘rarely’,  ‘constantly’,  m-between’ or ‘never’ (Coul$aly et al., 1993). 
4’3 The  DRSPR-survey  found  that  CMDT has an  average of about 11 annual contacts  to  each  farmer,,the  livestock 
service  sees  each  farmer 4 times per year, while  the  forestry  service  is in touch  with farmers about 6 tunes per year 
(the number of  contacts  has been calculated  based on  data  presented in Coulibaly et al., 1993 p. 33 table 2.5.) Data 
on the  foreshy service are  questionable, as only 9 respondents  account  for 90% of reported  contacts  to  this  agency. 
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government  agencies  than  group-b  and  group-c  households  and  50%  more  contacts than group-d 
household. 
Considering the ‘modified T&V’ approach applied by CMDT, the skewed distributions of 
contacts  to this agency  may  seem  rather  surprising.  It is the official  policy  of  CMDT not to 
concentrate  on pilot farmers,  but  to  undertake  separate  extension  activities for each  of the four 
groups  based  on  identification  of  the  particular  constraints  they are facing  (Fomba & Joldersma, 
199 1 p.  2).  Nevertheless,  information  in  table  10.4 is confinned by the DRSPR- survey  mentioned 
above.  Based on interviews  with  CMDT  agents, his survey  found  that  mechanised  farmers,  who 
make  up  only 1% of all households  in  the  region,  were  subject to 5-50% of  all  contacts o farmers 
taken by CMDT staff. Several staff members explained the concentration of attention on 
mechanised and group-a farmers by a deliberate strategy to optimise results of extension 
activities4I4  (Coulibaly et al,  1993 p.  23-24). 
Table 10.4. Average number of contacts to each agency during a year, according to 
socioeconomic  background (n=312) 
CMDT TOTAL EDUCA. HEALTH ADMIN CAC FORESTRY LIVESTOCK 
group-a 41.2 1 .S 11.9 5.1  1.3 3.1 8.8 9.2 
group-c 29  1.6  8.7  3.7 0.8 1.9 5.8 6.5 
group-d 27.3  0.3  8  3.5  0.8 1.5 7.0 6.2 
Note: the average of 7 contacts  between group4 farmers and the livestock  service reflects the answer of only 3 
people who  had about 16 annual contacts  each. 
While  a  personal  interpretation  by  field  agents  of  official  CMDT  policies  may  partly expl in the 
bias, the close  monitoring  of  their  work  and  the  many stafftraining courses  make it unlikely  that 
their  discretion is wide  enough  to  provide the full  explanation.  It  seems  more  plausible that the 
so-called  ‘squark  factor’  and the power  advantage  of  better-off  farmers are among the main 
reasons (ref.  chapter  3).  Poorer  farmers  who  cannot  obtain  credit to buy  equipment  and raught 
oxen often hesitate to contact  extension  agents for assistance  to  manual  cultivation,  whereas 
large-scale  producers (‘gos productem’) feel  that  they  have  a  clear  right to demand  immediate 
attention4’’. Interestingly,  the  more l i i t ed  tradition for CMDT  agents to accept  bribes  may 
further aggravate the problem of poorer  farmers.  As  discussed in chapter  3,  the  possibility for 
poorer farmers of  paying  for  services  otherwise  concentrated on better-off  farmers  may  mitigate 
the unequal  distribution of extension  benefits. 
This hypothesis is supported by the fact that although  unequal, the distribution of contacts to the 
livestock service is less skewed  than  what  may  have  been  expected. As per  definition,  group-c 
‘l4 Information  on  contacts  to  mechanised  farmers  were  obtained  only a s h g  extension agents to assess the 
frequency of contact Unfortunately  the DRSPR-survey do  not ap ly  the a 2 .  typology to the presentation of data on 
frequency of contacts,  and it is therefore  not  possible to know  tRe ditribuhon of contach on all  soclal oups It 
a ears fiom the surve that a very  large grou of respondents  have  no  contact . o the  three  agencies  at 8: dunhg 
g r a i n y  season 37% i, ave  no  contact to C A T ,  48%  have  no  contact to the hvestock  service  and 53% have no 
contact to the  forestry  service  (Coulibaly et al., 1993 p. 33). 
4’s For  a  further  discussion of thii phenomena,  see  section  10.4,  below. 
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and group-d  households  have  less  draught  oxen  and  cattle  than  group-a  and  -b  farmers4I6,  and, 
therefore,  need  the  assistance  of the livestock service less often. Nevertheless, when these 
households  report  a  relatively high number  of  contacts  to  the  agency,  it  may  be  explained  by the
widespread  application of so-called  ‘privately  contracted  extension’  by the livestock  service4”. 
In case  of the forestry  service,  the most obvious  explanation for the socioeconomic  bias is that 
only  better-off  farmers have means to invest in nursery  activities. 
Finally, the gardening and sheep  fattening  activities run by CAC in  ‘Test-Zones  villages’  are 
likely to appeal mainly to women from better-off households who can afford the time to 
participate“*. 
10.1.2. Concentration of services on certain villages 
Also the distribution of contacts on villages is highly  uneven. As can  be  seen from table 10.5, 
inhabitants in Woroni on average  have  more than 2.5 times  as  many  contacts to government 
agencies as inhabitants in Molobala 
It is of interest to note  that  all  agencies  tend to favour  and  disfavour  the  same  villages:  few 
villages have  close contact to one agency but limited contact to others. While six villages 
(Molobala, Klila, Chikmi, Ngolokasso, Dossorola,  and  Sincina)  have  relatively  few  contacts, 
two villages  (Koloni and Nafegue)  have  fairly  many  contacts,  and two villages  (Sinkolo  and 
Woroni)  have  exceptionally  frequent  contacts to virtually all extension  agencies. 
Geographical and factors related to extension strategies420 may contribute to explain the 
similarities of the  extension  pattern  by  the  various  agencies,  but  the  single  most  important  factor 
seems to be the existence of project-funded  activities  in  some  of  the  villages.  Thus, the four 
villages  with most contacts  (Woroni, Sinkolo, Nafegue  and  Koloni)  are  all  included  in  the  ‘Test 
416 According to the definitions  presented m chapter 7, group-d  households  have  no  experience  with  manual traction, 
while  group-c  households  possess  a m xmum of  one pa r  of  oxen. 
417 Also  in  relation  to  the  health  service  and the administraton, payment of  extralegal fees pla S a considerable  role. 
The  higher frequency of contacts of oupa and -b  households  to  these  agencies  ma be e x p k e d  by the  generally 
larger size of the  households,  hence  &ir  more  fre  ent  need  for  health  services,  b  certificates, etc. For the  school syse the l i i ted contact  to  poorer fanners is l i e  y  to  be  explained  mainly  by the importance  of  children as a  work 
force  m these households. 
9” U 2
For a  brief  presentation of the ‘Test  Zones  programme’,  see  the  annex. 
Geographical factors may contribute to lain  the  attern of contacts in some  of  villa es but not in  other.  While 
the geographical  isolation of Dossorola 3 N’golo&o  may  be  part  of the  reason for their  low  frequency  of 
arrondissement  head  uarters. Easy access to an  all-weather  road may explain  the  frequent  contact  to  Woronl  and 
conlac\ distance to govemment  agencies  cannot  explam  limfied contacts in  Molobala  and KMa that are both 
inhabitants m Sincina  and Klela have  relatwely  few  contacts. Smcm 1s situated as a  suburb  to  Koutlala,  and KlCla Sinkolo both s i t ua4  near to the m m  ‘pad from C6te  d’Ivoire,to  Koutiala.  It  does  not  explain,  however,  why 
bas  about  the  same  distance as Sinkolo to the main road and  a  larger  town (see also the  maps  in the beginning  of  the 
dissertation  and the section on ‘Characteristics of the  ten  villages  under  study’  in  the ann x). 
420 h case of CMDT, the different intensity  of  support,  depending on the M acity  of  the  village,  may  e  lain part 
of the pattern  but  not  all of it. CMDT IS represented  by  a  ‘chef  secteur de L! ase’  in  Sinkolo,  Woroni an? Chierne 
which  un  lies  a  relatively  close direct contact  to  fanners. In Klela, Koloni Molobala,  N’golokasso  and  Sincina, on 
the  other khd, CMDT is r esented  by a  ‘Chef ZAER who mainly  work through the  village  association  and  has 
limited direct contact to Km. Chlkne is supported by a ‘chef secteur de base’ based in the village, but 
respondents  have  limited  contact  to  the  agent, wh- respondents III Koloni  asslsted by a  ‘Chef ZAER’ have  very 
frequent  contact  to  CMDT staff (see also table B m the annex). 
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Zones  programme’  which  implies  that  agents from the  livestock  service,  the  forestry  service, 
CMDT  and  CAC  receive  transport  and  allowances  for visits  to  the  villages.  Additional  funds  by 
the  project  may  mean  little  to  the  possibilities  of CMDT agents  to  visit  the  villages,  but  it  makes 
a  big  difference  for  the  three  other  poorly-funded  agencies. 
Table 10.5. Average  number  of  contacts  during a year,  according  to village background 
~ 3 1 2 )  
CMDT TOTAL EDUCA. HEALTH ADMIN CAC FOREST LIVESTOCK 
Moloba. 
22.7  1.7  7.8 3.3 0 1.1 3.9  4.9 Kl&la 
22 1 .S 7.9 2.9 0 0.4  4.6 4.4 
N’golo. 
27.1 0.7  9.8  5.9 0 0.5  4.6  5.6Dossoro. 
26.7 1.6 8.7  3.6 0 0.3 5.8  6.7 
Koloni 33.5  1.8  5.6  3.6 1.7  3.6  9.1 8.1 
Nafegue I 6.8 39.1 0.2  13.2  6.3 1 4.6 7 
Woroni 58.2  1.7  13.5  5.7 2.7  4.4 13.4  16.8 
A ‘village  power  advantage’  similar  to  the  power  advantage  of certain better-off  households  may 
also influence the distribution of extension  contacts. Unoffkial criteria  for  selection of villages 
to be included in the  ‘Test  Zones  programme’  seem to have  emphasized  the  existence  of  good 
relations  between  the  administration  and  the  village42’. To the  extent  such  good  relations  still 
exist,  which  seems to be  the  case  for at least Sink010 and Woroni, this may further  reinforce the 
tendency to concentrate  assistance  on  these  villages422  (Interviews  made in relation to review of 
the Test Zones  programme,  Aug. 1993, and  interviews  with  resource  persons,  the  autumn of 
1994). 
10.2 Reliability of services 
Table 10.6 shows answers  given  by  respondents  when  they  were  asked  to  assess th   reliability of 
the  services  provided by indicating  for  each  of  the  agencies if it ‘always’, ‘sometimes’  or  ‘never’ 
satisfies  their  needs,  when  requested to assist  them 
It  appears from the  table  that  the  livestock  service  is  the  agency  which  the  largest  share of 
respondents  consider  able to provide  a  satisfactory  service,  when  it is needed.  CMDT is ranked 
rather low, the forestry  service  is  considered  reliable  only by a minority of  respondents,  and SO 
See also the  brief  description  of  the project in the  annex. 
See also the section on ‘Characteristics  of  the  ten  villages  under  study’ in the annex. 
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few  respondents  have  bothered  commenting  on  the  reliability  of CAC that it has not  been  possible 
to  include it in the  table. 
Table 10.6.  Share  of  all  respondents  who  declare  ‘always’ to be  satisfied  with the service 
provided  by  each  of  the  agencies  (n=305) 
LIVESTOCK FORESTRY mm. EDUCAT. CMDT HEALTH 
58% 16% 31% 39% 42%  52% 
note:  the  table  does  not  include CAC as only  a  negligible  part  of  respondents ha commented  on  its  reliability. 
A possible  explanation  for  the  assessment  of  the  livestock  service  and  the health service as more 
reliable than CMDT may be that  CMDT  provides  a  more  well-defined  service  than the other 
agencies,  hence  it is easier for farmers  to  know  what  to  expect  and to identify  situations  where 
demands  have  not  been  satisfied. 
A reflection of the generally low reliability of agencies is given in table 10.7 showing 
respondents’  answers  when  asked to list main reasons  for  unsatisfactory  services.  It is notable  that 
nearly  half  of  all  respondents  find that lack  of  commitment  by  government  agents is a  factor 
contributing to explain insufficient assistance, and that about one fifth mention lack of 
understanding by agents  of  the  peasant  way  of life among the reasons.  St&  shortage  figuring 
prominently  in  explanations  given  by  government  agents  themselves is only  mentioned  by 17%, 
whereas 44% of  respondents  agree  with  government staffthat lack  of  resources i a  core  problem. 
Table 10.7. Reasons  given  for  insufficient  assistance by government  agencies - share  of  all 
respondents ( ~ ~ 3 0 9 )  - 
LACK OF 
RESOURCES  COMMlTMENT 
LACK OF LACK OF JACK OF 
LINDER- 
LACK OF LACK OF STAFF 
TRANSPORT 
STANDING*) 
QUALIFICA- 
TIONS 
47% 7%  17% 23% 27% 44% 
note:  the  question was phrased as a  closed  question  where  a  range  of  possible  answers  were  mentioned.  Respondents 
decided  themselves  how many - if any - of the reasons  they  found  valid. 
*) the proposed  answer  was  phrased  ‘lack of understanding of the  peasant  way of life’ 
10.3.  Qualitative  dimensions  of  demand  satisfaction 
During  the  survey it was  attempted to get  an  impression also of qualitative  dimensions  of  demand 
satisfaction by  obtaining  an  assessment  by  respondents  of  the usefihess of the services  provided. 
This issue  was  approached  by  asking  about  respondents’  trust  in the various agencies 
(respondents  were  asked to mention  the  agency they trust  least  and  most)  and  by  encouraging 
respondents to qualify  answers by personal  comments. 
It  turned out that  many  respondents  commented  both  on  the use&Zness of the services and on the 
character ofpersonal relations between  extension  agents  and  farmers. The latter  suggests  that 
factors  such as extension  agents’  regard  for  the  dignity  of  clients, a friendly  attitude  by  extension 
staff, and  familiarity  with  village  conditions  play a considerable  role  for the assessment  of the 
services. 
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It  is  hardly  surprising  that  CMDT  appears  to  be  the  agency  which  the  majority  of  respondents 
trust  most  (table  10.8). Also the  health  service,  the  livestock  service  and  the  educational  system 
seem  to  enjoy  a  certain trust, while  only  a  tiny  minority  of  respondents  consider  the  cooperative 
service  and  the  forestry  service  most  trustworthy.  The  fact  that  administration  has  not  been 
mentioned by  any  respondents at all reflects  the  prevailing  view  that  it  is an extractor  of  taxes 
providing few services  in  return. 
Table  10.8.  Agency  most  trusted  by  respondents  (share of all respondents)(n=311) 
CMDT 
all  agencies  and 4% who  trust  most in BNDA. 
note *) o h =  9% of respondents  who  declare  not t  rust any of the  government  agencies, 3% who  declare to trust: 
100%=3  1  1  16% 0% 1% 3% 11%  11% 18% 40% 
TOTAL OTHER*) ADMlN FORESTRY CAC EDUCA. LIVEST. HEALTH 
A comparison  of  table  10.8  to  table 10.6 suggests  a  distinction by respondents  between  usefulness 
and  reliability  of  services.  Whereas  CMDT  receives  only  an  average  score  when  people  are  asked 
to assess the reliability  of its services  (table  10.6), it is  mentioned by no less than 40% of 
respondents as  the agency  which  they  trust  most.  It  seems,  thus, that services  provided by the 
health  service  and the livestock  service are considered  less  crucial  but  more  reliable  than  the 
assistance by CMDT. 
Regarding  personal  relations  between  extension  agents  and  farmers,  the  core  issue  seems  to  be 
whether  the  meeting  takes  place on quaE terms. Condescending  behaviour by government  agents 
and requests  for  bribes are fiequently  mentioned as factors  detrimental  to  a  positive  assessment 
of the  services.  The  fact  that  extension  workers live and  work in  the  villages, on the  other  hand, 
is  stressed as a factor  considerably  strengthening  personal  relations  and  increasing  the  usefulness 
of  services. 
- 
As Lipsky has discussed  in  relation to American  social  workers,  condescending  behaviour  is  often 
found in  situations  where  trust  between  government staffand clients  does  not  exist  (Lipsky,  1980, 
ref.  chapter  3).  Village  populations  in Sikasso often  experience to be  talked  down  to  by  better 
educated  government staff who  consider  themselves  superior to ignorant  farmers.  Clients are 
being  requested to wait  for  hours  outside offices, government  agents  do  not  respect  appointments 
made,  and  they  often address clients in a language  that  these  do  not under~tand~~.  
The  phenomenon  of  'privately  contracted  extension'  may  ensure  a  certain  assistance to farmers 
who  would  otherwise  not  be  served,  but  comments  by  respondents  suggest  that  the  other  side  of 
the  picture is a serious  undermining  of  the  legitimacy  of  agencies424.  When  farmers  are  forced to 
423 "Tous les services sont  Ies  memes. C'est e m  qui  connaissent  tout,  ils  ont did ri l'dcole  et pensent que nous 
connaissions rien" (Chikme no. 8). 'Tow les agents  sont les mhes .  Ils sont lespatrons, car  ils  sont  instruits ... 
no.20). 71 f m t  que le  villageois  soit  accom a-' &un jeune alphabitis6 pour que  I'aoininistration  rkgle les 
besoins" (Nafegue no. S), '2es agents de I'arron fissement nous  prennent hop de notre  temps.  Pour  une  mission  il 
faut 3 ci 4 jours de diplacement" (Sincina no.15). "Ils ne font que mus embeter ri Koutiala" (Sincina no. 14). 
@'atpar & M i  et mauvaise  volontd  que les services  n'arrivencpas ci nous assister. 11s ont tous les  moyens 
mais ils veulent  que  le  villageois  donne  toujours  de  I'argent" (Smcma no. 25). Quand nous mom besoim des 
services twus Ies rejoi ons Si  non,  ils  ne viennentpas ri mus comme ca. S'ils viennent  directement ri nous, cela 
veuf  dire  qu'ils  ont unyesoin ci notre niveau. Nous sommes  oblige5 de les  satisfaire &ns la mesure possible, cela 
nouspripare notre  besoin&  en m" @Ida no. 31). V est rare de voir lepaysan aller  vers  I'agent  sans  argent 
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extralegal  payment  for  services  supposed  to  be  free  of  charge,  relations  between  extension  agents 
and  farmers  become  pure  business  relations  with  the  sole  purpose  for  farmers  of  obtaining  certain 
services  and  the  sole  purpose  for  extension  agents of making  a  private  profit.  The  result  is  that 
farmers turn their back  to the  agencies  the  moment  they  can  do  without  their  service42s. As 
defined in c?mpter 3, trust is an expression  of  relations  where the parties are collaborating  because 
of  normative  obligations  rather  than  for  purely  utilitarian  reasons. 
Similar to the  findings of  other  studies  (Wade,  1995;  Tendler & Freedheim,  1994,  see also chapter 
3), the  survey has found  that  relations  of trust are  positively  influenced by extension  agents  being 
village-based.  According to table 10.9,  no less than 71%  of all  respondents  prefer  village-based 
agents. In personal  comments  respondents  mention  among  advantages  of  village-based  agents  that 
they  understand  the  village  way  of lie, that  agents  and  farmers  become  friends,  and  that  they  are 
more  easily  accessible  than  agents  based in a  distant  arrondissement 
Table 10.9. Government  staff  preferred by respondents - share of  all  respondents (n= 311) 
I 
II VILLAGE-BASED *) l LONGER PERIOD I I ***) II HAVE STAYED FOR A SPEAK A LOCAL LANGUAGE 
71% 
~~ ~~ ~~ 
3 1% 14%  17% 
notes: *) Respondents  were  asked to indicate  whether  they  prefer  village-based,  arrondissement-based or cercle- 
based  agents or whether  the  base of agents  is  considered  unimportant. 
to see if  differences  between  young  and  old  staff in the  forestry  service  and  the  livestock  senrices  were  reflected in 
**) 13% of respondents  prefer  older  agents  and 70% consider  the  age  of  agents  unimportant.  The question was asked 
assessments  by  farmers. 
***) a  local  language is understood as a  language  different from Bambara  (i.e.  Senoufo or Minyada) 
Also the  duration  of  the stay in  the  same  position by  government  agents is important  to  the 
development  of  trust: 3 1% of  respondents  prefer staff who  have  remained in their  position  for  a 
relatively  longer  period  and  explain  it,  similarly  to  the  explanations  given  for  preference of 
village-based  agents, by the  development  of  closer  relations427. 
Individual  characteristics  of  the  agents,  e.g.  their  age  and  language  capabilities,  appear to matt r 
less to farmers428. 
enpoche" (Woroni no. 9). %S service ne veulentpas faire de ddplacementgratuit ni de geste  gratuit" (Nafegue 
no.10). 
The view of relations to government agencies as business relations only is reflected in the following 
statements: 5 a  confance n'estpas  facile. Nous travaillons  avec tous les services, mais la confance c'est autre 
chose. J'ai plut6t confance 6 mes ca  acitis, mes matiriels de  travail" (Kl61a no. 4). Ye n 'ai confance 6 aucw 
services ...is ai confanceplut6t 6 ma A ba" Pincina no.1). 
pow Ies avoirpar rapport 6 c m  basis a  Koutiala" (Smcma  no. 1 l), Wotre jeune agent basi au village peut etre 
"Les agents basis au village sont comme nos parents! ils mus comprennent  bien, on fait moins de  deplacement 
riveilld ci n'importe quandpow travailler" (Sink010  no.1). 'Celor qui sont basis au village  sont MS amis. Tow les 
agents bash au  village ont une portion de terre danr nahe laine rizicole. Ils sont bien " (KlCla  no. 5). Respondents 
in villages  served from arrondlssernent  offices, on the o tR er  hand,  regret he lack of vlllage-based  agents: '@'est 
rnalheurelor  que nous n'avons pas d'agents basis &m nohe village. Un agent basi  dam nohe village nous 
comprendrait bien" (Dosssorola  no.15) 
427 5 e s  agents qui ont durd chez nous ici... sont presque devenus nos parents, nos fils, ils now cornprennent" 
(Molobala  no.  14). 
The onl exc  tions to this  picture  were  found in Nafegue  and  Molobala  where 73% and 35% of  respondents, 
respective&,  pr%  Senonfo-speaking  and  Mmyanka-speakmg  agents. As habitants in these  villages  are  less 
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10.4.  Level  of  demand  satisfaction  conditioned  by  socioeconomic  background 
Generally  speaking, the better-off  a  household  is,  the  more  assistance  it  receives,  and  the  more 
it is satisfied  with the assistance  received  from  government  agencies. 
As it appears from table 10.10, no less than 55% of respondents  belonging  to  the  poor  manually- 
cultivating  group-d  households  declare to have  no trust  in any  of the  government  agencies, 
whereas  only 4% of  the  privileged  group-a  respondents  give this answer.  Group-c  respondents 
are  less  critical  towards  the  agencies than respondents  belonging to group-d  but  more  critical  than 
group-b  respondents. 
Table  10.10.  Share of respondents  from  each  socioeconomic  group  who  declare  to  have no 
trust in any  of  the  agencies  (when  asked to mention  the  agency in which  they  trust  the  least) 
(n= 301). 
group-a Total g0Up-d group-c  gr0Up-b 
4% 17% 55%  25% 10% 
As  seen from table 10.1 1, the  difference  of  assessments i  particularly  pronounced  in  the  case of 
CMDT where  more than half  of  group-a  respondents  but  only  one  fourth  of  group-d  respondents 
declare  ‘always’ to be  satisfied  with  the  assistance  provided by the  agency.  The  tendency is clear 
also in the  case of the  livestock  service,  the  forestry  service  and  the  educational  system,  but  less 
clear  for  answers  regarding  the  health  service  and  the  administration. 
Table  10.11.  Share  of  respondents  from  each  socioeconomic  group  who  declare  ‘always’  to 
be  satisfied with the service  provided  by  each  of  the  agencies  (n=305) 
CMDT TOTAL  EDUCAT. ADMIN. HEALTH  LIVESTOCK  FOREST. 
group-a 100%=69  43%  42% 62%  26%  71%  55% 
gr0up-b 100%=112  22%  41% 53% 13% 63%  45% 
~ 
group-d 
~~ ~~ 
25%  40% 100%=20 40% 10% 60%  10% 
~ ~~ 
note: the table  does  not  include CAC as only a liited group of respondents m in touch  with this agency,  hence the 
majority of respondents are unable to assess  its  assistance. 
Personal  comments  by  respondents  confirm  that  differential  treatment by agencies of farmers 
according to their  socioeconomic  position is a main reason  for  highly  different  assessments. Both 
group-c  and  group-d  respondents  feel  discriminated  by  government  agencies  whom  they  accuse 
of  being  interested in assisting  only  better-off  farmers.  As  the  main  key  to  economic pr speriv 
is a large  production of cotton,  poor  farmers  naturally tum their  anger  against  CMDT  which  is 
familiar with Bambara,  some  have  basic,  language difficulties in co-unicating  with  agents  who do not  speak  either 
would probably  have been quite  &fferent, as many women are unable to communmte in Bambara. 
Senoufo or Minyanka. Had it been  possible to include  more  women m the survey, ii@~gs on language  preferences 
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believed  to  obstruct  their  possibilities  of  becoming  rich  by  application of a  str ct  credit  policy  and 
due  to lack of  attention by  extension  agents  to  manually-producing household^"^. 
The  importance  of  the  so-called  'squark  factor'  for  access to assistance  by  government  agencies 
is illustrated by the view of  many  poorer  farmers  that  they  do  not have the right to request 
anything  and  therefore  receive  very  little430.  Better-off  farmers  and  notably  persons with a high 
social status,  e.g.  religious  leaders  and  village  chiefs,  on the other  hand,  experience that their 
words  carry  weight  when they approach  government  agencies43'.  Many  farmers b lieve that civil 
servants  have a much  easier  access to government  agencies  than  they  have  themselves432. 
The practice by many agencies of demanding extralegal payment for assistance may also 
contribute  to the negative  assessment  by  poorer  fanners. As already  mentioned, this practice may 
actually improve the access  by  poor  farmers to assistance by mitigating the inequality  in  the 
distribution of benefits  deriving  from the squark  factor, but it is perceived of as unfair and 
discriminating  against  those  who  find  it  difficult  to  pay433.  Better-off  farmers,  on the other  hand, 
do not  face  the  same  problems  of  finding  money  to  pay - and  maybe even pay  less  often434 - and 
seem to accept the phenomenon  of  'privately  contracted  extension'  without  major  reservations435. 
4 2 9 Y ,  CMDT  ne  donne as de cridit a m  paysans  pauvres. Si non j 'ai besoin d'un cridit de ba S de  trait  pour 
itemire ma  superficie  c$ivie. ..Je n'ai  confiance 6 aucun  service. Les services  ne donnentpas ca Y eau aupaysan. 
Nous n'avom pm de fmilitis ci gagner  de  ['argent.  ..Dam  la  vie s  tu n'as rien, tu n 'as pas de  arents ui Ont  des 
moyens, tu travaille  avec  peine. Somentje n 'ai mt?me pas de matiriels d rkter pour travaidr mes  c%amps. La 
CMDT ne donne pas de  credit a u x p q s m  diminuis" ( groupd respondent, G olobala no. 1 8). 'Maintenant on trouve 
plus le cridit avec la CMDT,  surtout mus les  pauvres.  Ca me fait 2 am que j e  cherche W cridit de  charrue 6 la 
CMDT Je n'arrivepas d I'avoir. Je ne  comprendspas. Pornant ily en a  qui I'ont acilement" (group-c  respondent, 
Chihe  no.9)."Je n az as de confiance a m  services  techniques. J'aiplutdt con lance m voisins  exploitants  qui 
ont  plus d'une paire ' B  e bceufi  qui parvent me prt?terp?ur  que j  puisse  travail fer et  me faire quelques chose ... Je 
nous les cultivateurs  manuels SW l ha ou 1/2 ha de terra. Cet itat de chose  ne  me metpas a  I'aise ... 1991 
constate  que les agents de services  d'enca&ements  'interessent qu'mapaysm ayant  des iqupements  et nigligent 
les  pauvres  sont  devenus his pauvres. Les riches  continuent a S 'enrichir " ( group-d  respondent,  Woronx no1 5). 
430 E.g. "Lepauwepaysan a  toujours tort. 11 nepeur rien dire, rien faire et n'a rien" (group-crespondenf  Koloni 
no. 20). 
drficultds avec znrrhation et avec autres agents des services ... eut-itre que ma personne d'lmam influe  les 
services  techniques,  si non I e s  voisins  villageois ont des problimes 6 P 'arrondissementpour  la con$ection des cmtes 
d'identiti et d'autres papiers  administratifs" (group-a respondent Woroni no. 28). 
432 E.g. "Au dispensaire de Misseni,  il n 'y a pas de  midicaments. Quand tu vas on te donne de I 'ordonnance  ue tu 
cherche les produits  sont d Kadiolo ou au Cdte  dyvoire.  C'est  grave W grand  centre  de santi comme  c&i  de 
Misseni. Nous avons constat6  ue  les mkiicaments  disponibles  sont dom&  ata familles de fonctionnaires du 
village" (group-c  respondent, &&me no. 10). 
433 E.g Seulement quand tu n 'as pas d'ar ent tes besoim ne sontpas satisfiits. Partout si tu n 'as rien, tu n 'auras 
rien aussi" (group-c  respondent, N'golofasso no.15). 
4)4 An investigation of payment  for extension senjces was not  part of the  present  study,  but it is likely that Leonard's 
applies also to the Sikasso region  (Leonard, 1977 p.  188). 
fmding from the  study  on  an  extension  agency m Kenya  (that elite farmers  pay less offen than non-elite  fanners) 
E.g 'Ye n 'aipas encore  rencontri  deproblt?mes avec un service  seulement le centre  de santi est loin du village ... 
quandtu as ci faire avec les services il fauda les motiver, c 'est &m quelques  chose p e u t h e  de I ' q e n t  ou autre 
chose" (group-arespondent,  Woroni  no. 16). 
431 E .g. ''-F&+ en tout caspour mes servkes, j'aipas deproblimes. P m  contre  d'autres  villageois  ont des 
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10.5. Level of demand  satisfaction  conditioned by village  background 
Also the  village  background  of  respondents  was  found  to  clearly  influence  their  satisfaction w th 
government  agencies. 
Among the  ten  villages  included in the  survey,  variations  in  answers to questions  regarding  trust 
in  the  agencies are substantial,  and  again  it  is  interesting  to  note  that n = 3 1 1 )  in  answers  given 
by respondents  belonging to the  same  village are often  quite  limited.  Table  10.12  shows  that  in 
most cases  the share of respondents  in  each  village  declaring to trust in none  of  the  government 
agencies is either  insignificant (0-3%) or rather high (23-28%). 
Table 10.12. Share of respondents  from  each  *age  who  declare to have no trust in any of 
the  agencies  (when  asked  to mention the  agency in which  they  trust  the  most)  and  share of 
respondents  who  mention  lack of commitment  as  an  explanation  for  insufficient  assistance 
n=311) 
I TRUST IN NO AGENCIES LACK OF CO- 
Dossorola 
9% Kl6la 
68% 12% Molobala 
83% 23% 
54% 
Nafegue 
59% 3 yo Chieme 
59% 0% 
sink010 
47% 9% *) total 
3 yo OYO 
note: *) it should be  noted that there is a  difference  between  the  information  in  table 10.10 that  17% of all 
respondents  declare to have no trust in any of the agencies and  the information in this table  that  the  share is only 9%. 
This is explained  by the different way of phasing the questions, as answers in table 10.10 relate to a  question  about 
agencies  which  respondents trust the least, whereas  here  they are asked to mention  the  agency  that  they  tmst the 
most. 
The  same table also  indicates  the  share of respondents  in  each  village  who find that  lack  of 
commitment is  a reason  for inabiiity of government  agencies to satisfy their  needs.  Differences 
in answers are substantial:  whereas in Sincina no less than 93% of respondents  mention  lack of 
commitment  by  government  agents as a  factor  contributing to insufficient  service,  the  same 
answer is given  only  by 3% of respondents  in  Woroni  and  Sinkolo. 
Together  with  respondents in Dossorola, inhabitants in  Sincina appear to  be  particularly  negative 
towards  government  agencies. In the  other  end of the  spectrum,  respondents  in  Sinkolo  and 
Woroni express  an  overwhelmingly  favourable attitude towards  government  agencies. 
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Access to service is likely to be one  of the reasons  for the different  views.  As  showed  by  table 
10.5,  inhabitants in Sinkolo  and  Woroni  receive  considerably  more  assistance  &om  government 
agencies than inhabitants in other  villages436. 
The fact that Dossorola and Sincina are not among the villages receiving least assistance, 
however, con f i i s  that qualitative dimensions of demand satisfaction are as important as 
quantitative  dimensions  (the  frequency  of  contact).  Dossorola, thus, exemplifies  a  village  situated 
far from main roads and far &om arrondissement offices. In addition to difficult access, 
government  agents  are  discouraged  from  going  there  by  an  internal  conflict  in  the  village  which 
has given  it  a  reputation  for  being  difficult to work in. Personal  comments  by  respondents  show 
that the widespread  perception  by  government staff that  the  village is ‘conflict-ridden  and 
uninteresting’  negatively  influences  the  view  of  agencies  by  the  inhabitants437.  As  regards  Sincina, 
the  village  where the farmers’  movement  originated,  coni?ontations  with  CMDT in 199 1,  and  an 
ongoing  conflict with the  administration  have  considerably  sharpened  the  negative  attitude of 
many inhabitants to government  agencies. 
Conclusion 
Findings  from the survey on interaction  between  extension  agencies  and f ners in Sikasso  have 
painted an overall  picture  of  a  relatively  close  contact  between  the  two  parties.  Drawing on 
theoretical  discussions  in  chapter 2, the  relation  could  be  described  as  that  of  an  engaging  state 
interacting  with  farmers  eager  to  obtain its assistance. 
Thus, the immediate  conclusion  seems to be  that  the  situation in the Sikasso region is very 
different  from the mainstream  description  of  a  disengaging  African  state  forced by structural 
adjustment  reforms  to  retract  and  unable to do  very  much,  while  farmers tum their back to all  its 
representatives and concentrate on subsistence  production,  ‘informal  activities’,  migration,  etc. 
All  agencies  undertake  outreach  activities to a certain  extent,  and  it is telling  that  complaints  from 
fanners about government  agencies  regard  lack  of  assistance  rather  than the ki d  of  assistance 
provided.  Farmers  consider  extension  assistance,  and  notably  the  assistance  provided  by  CMDT, 
as a  means to economic  progress,  and  poor farmers deplore  the  situation  when  they are unable to 
get it. 
The  differentiation  of  strategies  by  both  extension  agencies  and  fanners,  however,  modifies this 
conclusion. 
To  begin  by strategiespursued by the four agencies, an  engagement  strategy  by  CMDT coexists 
with  a  strategy  by  CAC  best  described as a  disengagement  strategy.  Without  CMDT  the  situation 
in the Sikasso region  would not be much different from that found in other  parts  of  the  country, 
as the  livestock  service,  the  forestry  service  and  CAC all suffer from  cutbacks  of  resources. Thus, 
A particularly  contented  respondent in S i o l o  expresses his feeligs for overnment  agencies as follows: 3’ai 
confance 6 tow les services car chaque service jouent son rdle  indispens af  le” (Sinkolo no. 21) 
437 A respondent summarises the feeling of  being witten off by government  agencies as follows: “Notre village ne 
plait  pas am a  ents I1 y en a qui  disent  que c’est un village qui M s’entendpas, qui est his loin et n ‘est pas 
int6ressant Le c%f 8.arrondissement  n’est dmrr le  village quepow chercher dl ‘argent de I’impdt“  (Dossorola no. 
7). 
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the analysis  of  the  performance  of  each of the  agencies  made  in  chapter 9 has  largely  been 
confirmed by findings of the survey.  According  to  farmers,  CMDT  is  clearly  the  agency  that 
provides  the  most  extensive  and  most  useful  service,  while  the  ability of the livestock  service  to 
accommodate  farmers’  demands  seems  somehow  more  varying.  The  performance  of th f restry 
service  must  be  described as very  low, as it  accommodates  the  demands  only  by  a  small  group 
of  farmers.  And  finally,  the  extremely  poor  performance by  CAC has been  confirmed  by  answers 
from  farmers. 
While  differences  in  performance by the  four  agencies  correspond to what  could  be  expected  from 
the  analysis in chapter 9, the level of  service  provided  seems to be  considerably  higher. This 
particularly  regards  the  livestock  service,  the  forestry  service  and CAC  which all  appear  to be  able 
to undertake  outreach  activities to an  extent  that  seems  surprisingly  large,  considering  their 
limited  financial  means. 
As suggested  in  comments on findings,  the  reason  for this and for  marked  differences  in  the 
frequency  of  contact to the  various  villages  appears to be the  inclusion  in  the  survey of four 
villages benefiting  from  ‘Test  Zones’-funded  activities.  Extensive  activities  in  each  of  these 
villages  lead to a  somehow  distorted  overall  impression  of  the  level of assistance  in  the  region. 
The  finding is interesting,  though,  because it draws  the  attention  to  the  importance  of  project  and 
programme-funded  activities  even  in a privileged  region  such as Sikasso. It  may  seem  surprising 
that a relatively  modest  donor-funded  progmnme can make  such a big  difference  to the  assistance 
received  in  project  and  non-project  villages. In other  regions, almost entirely  dependant  on 
project-funded  activities,  the  distribution  of  services  between  villages can be  expected  to  be  even 
more  skewed. 
Also  farmers  simultaneously  pursue many  different  strategies  and  are  obviously  very  selective 
regarding  the  agencies with which  they  wish to collaborate.  Services  offered by the forestry 
service  and  the  cooperative  service ar considered  useful  only  by  a  small  minority  of  farmers,  and 
it seems  fair to describe  the  strategy by  most  farmers  vis-a-vis  these  agencies a disengagement 
strategies.  The  majority  of  farmers,  on  the  other  hand,  are  extremely  interested in contacts to 
CMDT,  and  many  are  interested  also  in  the  assistance  offered  by  the  livestock  service. 
The  most  important  finding  from  the  survey,  however, is that  there  is  a  marked  social  inequality 
in  the di&ibution  of  services,  and  that  assessments  of  performance  by the  agencies,  accordingly, 
depend on who  among  the  clients  are  being  asked. 
The  survey  shows  that  without  exception  extension  agencies  in Sikasso, similar to findings  from 
studies  undertaken  elsewhere,  tend  to  concentrate  on  better-off  farmers  at  the  expense  of  the  poor. 
It thereby suggests that the agencies under study contribute to increase the marked social 
inequalities  in  the  region,  described  in  chapter 7, rather than countering  them. 
Findings  also  indicate  that  different  farmers  pursue  different  strategies.  When  extension  agencies 
are providing  services to farmers,  they  do  not  meet a  group  of  people  equally  willing  and  able  to 
collaborate.  Farmers  constitute a very  heterogeneous  group both  with  regard  to  socioeconomic 
conditions  and  with  regards to the  strategies  pursued vis-a-vis government  representatives. In one 
end of the spectrum,  agencies  relate  to  better-off  farmers  eager to take  their  advice  and  able to 
apply it to  the  problems  they  have.  These  farmers  meet  extension staff with  a iirm belief  in  their 
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right to receive  assistance  and  their  possibility  of  paying  for  it  if  necessary.  And  in  the  other  end 
of  the  spectrum,  agencies  are  dealing with poor fanners who  lack  the  equipment  necessary to 
make  use  of  their  advice,  who  are  reluctant to sk  for  assistance  for  fear  of  being  turned  away,  and 
who are  less able  to  pay  for  services.  Apart  from CMDT none  of the  agencies  appear  to  have 
taken this heterogeneity  into  account  in  their  extension  strategies,  and  in  the  case  of  CMDT  the 
declared  policy to reach  all  farmers by providing  four  different  messages  to  farmers  in  different 
situations  seems  not to work. 
The  important  aspects  of  socioeconomic  and  geographical  inequality  in  the  interaction  between 
extension  agencies  and  fanners a e issues  that  are  considered  neither by the  interactive  approach 
nor  by  organisation  theories  discussed  in  chapter 3. 
As pointed  out  in  chapter 2, it  is  a  general  weakness  of  contributions to the interactive  approach 
that  they  tend to  invite  purely  political  interpretations  of  interaction  between  state  representatives 
and  societal  forces,  whereas  they  lack  reflections  about  influence  of  structural  conditions  on  social 
actors.  The  ultimate  consequence  of this may  be that  political  forces  are  analysed as completely 
autonomous  from  socioeconomic  and  geographical  conditions.  The  problem  may  seem  somehow 
surprising,  given  the  emphasis  put  on  the  need to disaggregate  not  only  the  state  but  also  societal 
forces.  The  reason  appears  to be that  the  majority  of  researchers  have  followed  the  mainstream 
move  away kom analyses  of  class  and  ethnicity  towards  studies of ‘civil  society’  defined  by its 
actions  rather than by its structural  position  (ref.  discussions  in  chapter 4). Findings  from the 
village  survey  show  that  structural  conditions  cannot  be  neglected  when  one  wants  to  understand 
the  interaction  between  state  representatives and  societal  forces. 
Similarly, in contributions  to  organisation theory which  have  inspired the analysis  of  factors 
conditioning  performance by  the  agencies,  clients’  structurally different position  is a ‘bliid spot’. 
The  farthest  they  reach is a  distinction  between  demand  pressure  generated  by  clients as opposed 
to  demand  pressure  deriving from other  actors  such as the  central  government,  donors,  etc. The 
goup of  clients  is  not  differentiated  to  allow  a  distinction of performance  regarding  services 
provided  to  e.g.  poorer  and  better-off  clients.  The  focus by some  of the researchers on the issue 
of trust is particularly  illustrative of the  problem.  Although  the  survey  confirms that personal 
relations  between  extension staff and  farmers  are  a  very  important  element  in  the  assessment  by 
farmers of the services provided,  it  does  not confirm that personal  relations - or trust - can  bridge 
otherwise  unequal  relations. Thus, condescending  behaviour  by  government  agents  and  requests 
for  bribes are mentioned as problems  mainly  by  poorer fanners,  whereas  better-off  farmers  seem 
to find it easier to develop  trust in relations  to  extension  staff.  Thus,  the  concept  of  trust  may 
constitute an important contribution to analysis of relations between extension agents and 
farmers.  Still,  the  difficulties of applying  the  concept are that  it  deals so explicitly  with  person-to- 
person  relations  that  one may  tend  to  forget  that these  persons  have  structural  positions.  Such 
positions may  strongly affect what  on the  face of it appears to be individual  strategies. 
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CHAPTER 11. ENGAGING THE STATE: SOCIETAL  FORCES WITH A PARTICULAR 
POLITICAL  POTENTIAL 
Introduction 
It is part  of  the  empirical  objective of the  dissertation  to  put  the  analysis of performance by the 
four  extension  agencies  in  perspective by  an  analysis  of  the  character  of  social  forces  which 
interact with and  influence  the  agencies. 
After  the  assessment  in  chapter 5 , 6  and 9 of factors  conditioning  the  performance of the agencies, 
and the  presentation  in  chapter  10  of  farmers’  assessment of their  ability  to  accommodate 
demands, the  present  chapter  deals  with  some  of  the  societal  forces  present  in  the Sikasso region. 
It  is not the  ambition  to  assess  the direct impact  on  each  of  the  agencies  of  particular  social  forces 
identified.  Instead,  the  chapter  aims at identifying  societal  forces  in  the  region  that may  have a 
particular  political  potential,  i.e. apotential  for  influencing  the  fundamental  relationship  between 
state  representatives  and  the  population. 
Analyses in the  chapter  are  guided by the  conceptual  framework  established  in  chapter 4.This 
chapter  suggested  three  entrance  points to the  identification of societal  forces  with  a  particular 
political  potential,  namely 
- to  look for civil associations, defined as organisations  independent  of  the  state  that  tend to 
engage  the  state, 
- to  look  for  a  particular set of ‘civil norms ’ expressing  a  perceived  ability  to  influence  public 
policy  (engage  the  state)  and 
- to  look  for  a class or ethnically-based political  potential. 
As will be recalled from discussions in chapter 4, the three approaches are considered 
complementary  rather  than  mutually exclusive,  and  it is stressed that they are not  fully  covering 
the  analysis  of all potentially  important  social  forces.  Together  the  approaches  form  a  conceptual 
framework  generating  a  series  of  relevant  questions  an  empirical  investigation,  but  they  do  not 
capture  the  multiplicity  of  identities  that  are  at  play  in  the  Sikasso  region.  Rather  than  an 
exhaustive  analysis  of  societal  forces  in S kasso, therefore,  the  chapter  should  be  considered an 
illustration  and  further  exploration  of  theoretical  points  made in chapter 4. 
While  the  choice  of  the  three  approaches is primarily  theoretically  motivated,  the  application  of 
them to an empirical investigation of social forces in the Sikasso region is supported by 
descriptions in chapter 7 and 8 of  marked  socioeconomic  differences  and a geographical  north- 
south  division  of  the  population,  and  of the indication  in  chapter 9 of  demands  put on CMDT by 
the  farmers’  movement. 
Thus, SYCOX the fmmers ’ movement, established in the Sikasso region in 1991,  presents  itself 
as the  most  conspicuous  candidate  to  the  designation of ‘civil  association’.  Drawing  both on 
various  attempts by researchers  to  summarise  the  experience of rural organisations  and  on  studies 
made of specific  organisations  elsewhere,  the fust section  contains  an  analysis of achievements 
by  the SYCOV movement,  conditions  which  favoured its emergence,  and  possible  threats  to its
successful  engagement of the  state. 
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The north-south division with regard to social and political organisation is expected to be 
reflected  in  different  views  on the state  held  by the population  in  different parts of the region. 
These  have  been  investigated  in  the  village  survey  with  a  view to identify  a  particular  set  of  ‘civil 
norms’. 
Finally, it seems reasonably to expect that the socioeconomic dzrerentiution, expressed in 
markedly  different  living  conditions  for  large-scale  mechanised  cotton  producers  and  small-scale 
producers,  constitutes  particular  identities  forming the basis for putting  demands  on the state. 
In addition  to  written  sources, the analysis  of the farmers  movement  (section  11.1)  draws  on 
interviews  with  representatives  of SYCOV, political  parties,  other  associations  and  resource 
persons in the Sikasso region  carried  out  in  late 1994 and  early  1996.  These are supplemented  by 
interviews  with  CMDT staffin Mali  undertaken in the autumn  of  1994  and in February  1996  and 
with CFDT staff in Paris in July 1996. 
Analyses  of  ‘civil  norms’  among  farmers  (section  1  1.2)  and  of a class  r  ethnically-based  political 
potential  (section  11.3) are based  on  the  village  survey  comprising  a  total  of  3  12  respondents  in 
ten  villages.  For  a M e r  description  of  fieldwork  methodology, see the section on ‘fieldwork 
methodology and literature  study’ in the annex. 
11.1. SYCOV as a  civil  association 
Achievements by the  movement 
SYCOV,  the  farmers’  movement,  emerged  from the inter-village  collaboration  among  AVs  which 
in the  late  1980s tarted to meet  on  a  weekly  basis to discuss  possibilities for putting  pressure  on 
CMDT. It  had  no  role in the  overturn  of  the military regime in March  1991  but  became  visible 
in May  1991  when  a  group  of  about  1,000 fanners presented  a list of 12  demands438  to the 
regional  CMDT  management in Koutiala. The  initial  failure  of the CMDT  management  to grasp 
the  extent of the  dissatisfaction  (discussed in chapter  9)  led  to  a  crisis in which  farmers  threatened 
to go on strike just as the  planting was to begin pingen, 1996 p. 2-3;  SYCOV, 1994;  Marchan& 
1991 p.  82-85;  Bader, 1992). 
In the turbulent  days uti1 the  minister  of  rural  development  intervened  and  calmed  down  the 
immediate  tension,  a  widespread  mobilisation of farmers  took  place. When  eventually  CMDT 
was  ready to negotiate, a movement  had  been  formed  throughout the region,  and  CMDT  had  to 
recognise SYCOV as the formal  representative of cotton producers439. This happened at a 
roundtable  held in September  1991  where  CMDT  had  invited  farmers’  representatives  together 
with representatives of CFDT and donors to discuss the establishment of a structure of 
consultation.  At he meeting  it  was  accepted  to  give SYCOV cosignatory  power to the  agreement 
between the government  and  CMDT  with  the right to influence both producer prices and  a  wide 
A  “Cahier de dolhces” included  12 demands concerning  both S ecific  and  long standing issues  regarding 
farmers’ conditions of production,  marketing  and  credlt  (Coultbaly,  1&4 p. 51-52; Michant, 1991  p. 84). 
439 %g confrontations with CMDT and  durmg the  process of establishing  the union, SYCOV received  practical 
D i m  President of Chambre  Rdgionale  d’Agiculture, Sikasso, Dec.1994 and  Feb.  1996;  Josserand & Bingq 1995 
assistance and advise  from  local  representatives of Chambre de 1’AgricultUre (Interv~ew with El Hadj Noumpounon 
p. SO). 
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range of issues of relevance to cotton  production  and  marketing.  It  was  agreed  that  SYCOV 
should be represented in all decision-making units such  as  the  CMDT  Management  Board,  and 
that  farmers'  representatives  should  be  allowed  to  participate as observers in the  classification of 
cotton(Bingen, 1994p. 62-63;  Bingen,  1995  p. 5; SYCOV, 1994p.l-2; Coulibaly, 1994~ .  17-18; 
Josserand & Bingen,  1995  p.  67-75;  interviews  with  the  regional  director of CMDT  Sikasso  and 
with  SYCOV  leaders,  Feb.  1996). 
Since  then,  CMDT has accommodated  a  range  of  demands  by  farmers  conceming  price  issues  and 
conditions for the  collaboration,  including  improved  accountability.  Cotton  prices  have  been 
raised at several  occasions,  the  rebate  given to producers  has  been  increased,  and in 1997  and 
1998  pressure  fiom  SYCOV  resulted in the  reintroduction of subsidies  on  fertilizers  despite he 
inconsistency  of  subsidies  with  structural  adjustment  policiesM0.  CMDT  and  SYCOV  have  had 
joint meetings  to  find solutions to the  problems  resulting  fiom  the  widespread  dissolution  of 
village  associations",  and  CMDT is considering ways to  comply  with  farmers'  requests for paid 
village teams to take  over  all  extension  activitiesa2. h addition  to  the  representation  of  SYCOV 
in all decision-making structures, attempts to improve accountability also include SYCOV 
participation in the annual audit of the  cotton  sub-sector  and  in  the  review  of  CMDT's annual 
performancea3  (Bingen,  1995  p. 6-7; Bingen et al., 1995  p.8;  CMDT,  1993b  p.  5-10; interviews 
with  SYCOV  leaders,  CMDT staff and  farmers,  the  autumn  of  1994  and  Feb.  1996). 
A range  of  unresolved  matters,  however,  remains.  Some  of  these  regard  the  wish  by  SYCOV to 
reduce  the  dependency on CMDT  regarding  input  distribution  and  purchase of cotton. Thus, 
SYCOV's wish that  input  distribution  be  liberalisedw and  that  other  agencies  than  CMDT  are 
allowed to purchase  cotton has not  been  accommodated4'. Also the  demand by  SYCOV that 
classification of cotton takes place at village  level  instead  of in factories  has  been  rejected,  and 
in early  1996  an  answer to the request by farmers  that  they  become  shareholders in CMDT  was 
'" Tor  Benjaminsen,  personal  communication,  based on interview  with staff from CMDT  Equipement  materiel, 
Bamako, April  1998. 
A  meeting to discuss  the  wides read dissolution of vill was  called  by  SYCOV inMay  1994,  and 
SYCOV's  initiative  the  criteria  for  acceDtance  of  a minimum of 45  exDloitations  and 50 
another  meeting  was  held  by C A T  in Sigou in 1994d;  Bingen  t al., 1995  p.  8). On 
T  cotton  (Interviews  with  CMDT stag  February  1996). 
The  issue was discussed  during  a joint seminar  for  CMDT staff  and  representatives of the farmers'  organisation 
out, the  issue remained unresolved  (Interviews  with  the  regional  director of CMDT, Sikasso and  SYCOV  leaders, 
SYCOV,  held in Sigou m March  1993 (CMDT, 1993b  p. 6). In February  1996  when the  last  fieldwork  was  carried 
February  1996). 
443 The  sensitivity of CMDT  to  pressures from SYCOV  for :m roved  accountability is illustrated  by  the  handling 
the internal audit and became known by producers, the regional director and all other staff involved were 
in 1996  of  a comption scandal at  the  regional  CMDT  office m ioutiala: as soon as uregulantles were  revealed  by 
immediately  transferred (Le Ripublicain 7 February  1996). 
The  reintroduction of subsidies on f e r t i l i i  in  1997  and  1998  may  (temporarily?)  have  put  a  damper  on  the 
otherwise strong wish  by  SYCOV  that  input  distribution be liberalised. In early  1996 the issue  was  subject to a 
contlict between  CMDT  and  SYCOV  in  Koutiala  who  had  encouraged  a  few  villages  to  buy  fertilizers  fkom  private 
that it  had  been  a success& experiment  demonstrating that better uality inputs  could he delivered  more tyely and 
suppliers in order to com are the experience  to  that of being  provided  by  CMDT.  While  SYCOV l e a d 7  argued 
cheaper  than in uts provided by CMDT,  CMDT was upset about  %e risk that  farmers  were  usmg  low  quallty  mput 
(Interviews wi& the regional  manager  of  CMDT, S i s o  and  SYCOV  leaders,  Feb.  1996). 
In the  early  1990s  when  cotton prices.wF low,  CMDT  introduced  production  quotas to limit the offer of cotton 
at the  world  market.  After the devalmon m 1994  the  sale has mcreased, and  CMDT, therefore, has been  able  to 
purchase the entire harvest.  International  trends may  change,  however,  and  lead  CMDT  to reintroduce  the  quotas 
(Interview  with  SYCOV  leaders,  February  1996). 
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still pendingM6  (Josserand & Bingen,  1995  p. 73-75; interviews  with  the  regional  director  of 
CMDT, Sikasso, and  SYCOV  leaders,  February  1996). 
Finally, it should  be  mentioned  that  while  the  collaboration  between  CMDT  and  SYCOV at 
regional  and  national  level is relatively  close,  tensions  still exist at  village  level in the  Koutiala 
area where  many  CMDT staff and  farmers  regard  each  other with scepticism  and  find  it  difficult 
to forget the confrontations in 1991”’ (Interviews with SYCOV leaders, CMDT staff and 
fanners, the  autumn of 1994  and  Feb.  1996). 
Conditions for  the emergence of a  politically forceful farmers’ movement 
SYCOV is one  of  many  Afiican rural organisations  having  seen  the  light of day  during  the  1990s. 
While  some  scholars  explain the recent  upsurge in the  number of rural organisations by a  range 
of favourable economic  and  political  conditions,  others  stress  that  changes in the political  and 
economic situation have forced farmers to organise mainly to protect themselves against 
worsening  economic  conditions and d e c l i i g  support from the  stateM8. 
There  seems  to  be  a  widespread  agreement,  however,  that  the  particular  kind  of rural organisation 
pursuing  a  strategy  of  engagement  of  the  state is most  likely  to  emerge  under favourable 
economic andpolitical conditions. Among  these, constitutional  conditions protectingfi.eedom 
of  organisation andspeech or at least  the  absence  of  active  persecution  by  an  otherwise  repressive 
state is often  mentioned as a  main  condition $la,  1990  p.  84-85;  Gentil & Mercoiret,  1991  p. 
883).  The  period  when  SYCOV  emerged was characterised by a  previously  unheard of measure 
of constitutional  protection and  political  legitimacy  (Bingen,  1995  p.  5). 
Favourable economic conditions for the achievement by an organisation of the necessary 
economic  autonomy  of the state may include  access  to  land  and  control  over  family  labour  and 
income from agricultural commodity  productionMg  (Bratton,  1994a  p.  235-236,  p.  238).  Bratton 
describes  a  favourable  environment as a  situation  where  agricultural  surpluses  can  be  disposed 
M In February  1996  the  issue  was  still  being  investi  ted  by CMDT.  According  to SYCOV leaders,  several  inquiries 
regarding preliminary conclusions had been i g n J b y  the CMDT  management  (Interviews with SYCOV leaders, 
Februruy  1996). 
As expressed  by  a fanner in Kl& met in February  1996: “Now regardons la CMDT comme un ennemi. Ils ont 
beaucoup faitpour lespaysans, mais ils sont des ennemis”. 
Some  scholars  mention  favourable  conditions  such as a sift in rural-urban terms of trade in favour of amicultural 
producers (Bratton & Bingq  1994 p. lo), the opening of an organisational S ace for emergence of state- 
mdependent  organisations &er the r&enc@ent of the  state  (Bratton  1994a p. 248 Gentil & Mercoiret,  1991  p. 
883), the o ening of a  political ace by regune shifts fought  for  by prodemocracy movements  (Bratton & Bingeq 
1994 p. 181 and the fact that dezining services fiom the  state  have sometimes created  a  feelmg  among farmers that 
‘we can do  it  lust as well as they’ (Bebbmgton,  1994 p. 215). Others, however,  stress  that he impact  of structural 
~~~ ~ ~ - ~ - ~ ~ -  ~ ~ 
adjustment  fogrammes in Afiica has beexi  very unecen  and  have  sometimes  resulted in worsenhg terms of trade 
Haubert, 1991 730-731). The retraction of the state been accompanied gy a tendency to offload ma y the for the  rura?population(Gibbon,  1993  p.  13-14;  Engber  Pedersen et al., 1996 30 37 L a c h e n m a  1994 2 ;  83 
uneconomic & on fanners, and in many countries services on which  farmers  relied  have  disappeared  altogether 
(Jacob & Delville.  1994 D. 1 0  Haubert.  1991 D. 733).  According  to these researchers.  manv of the  new  fanners’ 
&ga&atio& shodd be S& a i  having a ‘stop-bp’ inpose, f i l l i i  up the empty space  left 6y a  disengaging state 
(Lachenmann,  1994  p.  78,  p.  83;  Farrington & Bebtington,  1993 p.  120-121). 
449 Other scholars just refer to  a  need  for ‘a certain economic  ower’ of fanners (Gentil & Mercoiret,  1991  p.  868; 
Farington & Bebbington,  1993  p.  100; Suns & Leonard,  1980  p.  64-65). 
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of  at  a  profit  beyond the household,  i.e.  where cash crop production  dominates4s0. A particularly 
favourable  situation  exists  where  farmers  control  a  strategic  resource n which the state  relies as 
the  primary  source  of  foreign  exchange  (Bratton,  1994a  p.  248-250;  Sims &Leonard,  1990  p.  64). 
The situation in the  Sikasso  region  reflects  such  favourable  conditions: cotton is among the 
primary  sources  of  foreign  exchange,  farmers  have  considerable  incomes  fiom  cotton  production, 
and a diversified  production  structure  allows fanners (at least for a l i i t e d  period) to switch to 
other  crops than those  wanted  by  the  state  (Coulibaly,  1994  p.53). 
Other  favourable  conditions  mentioned in the literature  are a common  cause of an organisation 
and aparticular type of organisational experience. This may regard  shared  economic  interests, 
e.g. for service, credit or marketing,  and again cash  crop  production is highlighted as an  important 
driving  force for the  establishment  of  powerful  farmers’  movements451.  Furthermore,  Bratton 
mentions  a  tradition of collective  action in the agricultural  sector  and the availability of  models 
of economic  interest  organisations as two important  factors  (Bratton,  1994a p.  248;  Bratton & 
Bingen,  1994  p.15-16).  Malian  cotton  producers,  indeed,  have  a  set  of  important  shared  economic 
interests related to cotton production and marketing. And they have achieved a valuable 
organisational  experience  after  having  managed  village  associations and later also inter-village 
associations for years. 
Finally,  it  seems  to  be  commonly  agreed that a relatively high level of formal education is a 
favourable  condition  both  for  the  emergence  of  fanners’  movements and for the development of 
necessary  management  capacities  and  continued  support by members  (Bratton & Bingen,  1994 
p.  25;  Farrington & Bebbington,  1993  p. 100; Lachenmann, 1994 p. 81; Sims & Leonard,  1990 
p. 64). In the Sikasso region  literacy  courses run by  CMDT  have  provided  many  farmers with 
literacy  and  numeracy  skills,  and  some  researchers  consider this a  core  reason for SYCOVs 
continued  success  and  viability  (Josserand & Bingen,  1995  p. 7). 
All  authors  agree  that the role of the state in providing  the  above-mentioned  conditions  may  be 
very  significant.  At a general  level, the existence  of a favourable  political  environment  of  course 
depends  on the type  of  political  regime,  while  the  level  of  formal  education in a  c untry  depends 
A special  version  of  +is  hypothesis  about  a l i i  between  cash  crop  production  and  emergence of farmers’ 
movements can be summansed as ‘the  end of the lime’  argument:  James R. Bingen  and Gud~un Lachenmann  both 
discuss  situations in which  cash  crop  producing  farmers feel threatened  because state agencies are about  to  move 
out of  their  area,  either  because  the  crop  is no longer  profitable or because  yields are decliiing and  the state turns 
its  attention to newer more  fertile  areas. In this situations  farmers  have  little to lose by  a confrontation of the state 
by cash cm production. They argue  that  cash crop roduction is usually so impartant to the  government  that  it  will 
(Biigen,  1998 p.275;  Lachenmann, 1994  p.  84-85,  p.  89). Other scholars  have  questioned the positive  role  played 
not  allow #l e develoument  of  state-indeuendent P armers’  movements.  According to these  authors.  indeuendent 
organisations are more  likely  to  emer  e  inmarginal eogra bid areas  and  in sectoE that  do  not  attraci  the ittention 
government  attem ts to  control  the  emergence of independent  organisations in cash cro producing  areas  seems 
of the state (Gentil,  1986  p.  262; k m b  & Delvifie,  1984 p. 9; Haubert,  1991  p.  729). while the point  about 
highly valid, it is cfifficult to see how fanners’ organisations in marginal areas will  be  ab P e to put any &xe.ssure on 
the  state, i.e. adopt  a  strategy  of  state  engagement. It seems  more  robable  that  such  organisations wll  use  their 
independence  to  ursue  disengagement  strategies:  ’the  weapon oP the  weak’ as Bratton has called  this  strategy 
(Bratton,l994a ~ 3 3 6 ) .  
45’ Other common  causes  may  be common  cultural  and political interests not  directly  related to agricultural 
roduction as factors  that  ma  lead to the emergence  of  a  movement.  Anthony  Bebbmgton  glves the example  of %dians in the  Ecuadorian A d s  who  came  together in a farmers’ organisation to further  their  common  interest as
indigenous  peo  le  in  obtaining  equal ri ts wtb all other  citizens  (Bebbington,  1994  215) A similar  example is 
given  bv Gentifand  Mercoiret  who emf%  thd emagence of  the  ormnisation Six S inkrkina Faso bv the  interest 
Gf famiers in  conserving  traditional’values while-at the  same &e  get their share of  the ‘modem social  and 
economic  development  (Gentil & Mercoiret,  1991 p.  878). 
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on general  government  educational  policies.  Most  important,  however, the character ofthe 
specific  interaction between  state  agencies  and  farmers  in  a  given  area  may  play  a  crucial  role to 
the development of the capacities necessary for a farmers’ movement to embark upon an 
engagement  strategy.  Although  government  extension  programmes and state-sponsored  rural 
organisations  have  usually  mainly  considered  the  interests of  the  state in extracting the largest 
possible  surplus,  a  massive  state  presence  in  an  area has sometimes  unintendedly  benefited  rural 
organisational  capacities.  Thus, the organisation  by the state  of  cash crop production and large 
irrigation schemes may allow producers to obtain independent economic resources and to 
gradually  obtain  the  technical  knowledge  necessary to take  over the management  (Jacob & 
Delville, 1994 p. 9; Coulibaly, 1987 p. 71). The organisational experience derived from 
participating in state-controlled  cooperatives  and  village  associations  may  be  turned  into  new  use 
by  farmers  who  create  independent  organisations  (Gentil,  1986  p.  260;  Lachenmann, 1994 p. 75; 
Tendler,  1997 p.  152-153;  Haubert,  1991  p.  734).  A  particularly  important  role  has  sometimes 
been  played  by  government  agents  acting as catalysts  in  promoting  farmers’  shared  awareness of 
their  common  interests as producers4”  (Bratton & Bingen,  1994  p.  16;  Lachenmann,  1994  p.  78). 
More  indirectly, a period  of  significant  state  presence  in  an  area  may  foster  the  belief  that  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  state  to  give  support,  hence  encourage  farmers’  organisations to r ise  demands  on the 
state if the service is reduced  (Bebbington,  1994  p.  215). 
There is no  question  that the presence  of  government  agencies  and  notably  the  extensive  activities 
of CMDT  have  gradually  strengthened  the  technical  and  organisational  capacity of  farmers  in  the 
Sikasso region.  Farmers’  wish  to  take  over tasks previously  undertaken  by the state  reflects  their 
experience  of  being  able  to  manage  such tasks as the distribution  of inputs and  collection  of the 
harvest.  The fact that the collaboration  among  farmers  at  inter-village  level  emerged  from  the 
village  associations  illustrates  how  organisational  experience  gained  through  collaboration  with 
government  agencies may  be  turned  into  new  use  through  the  establishment of independent 
organisations.  Finally, also in the  case of the SYCOV  movement,  government agents  identifying 
with farmers’  interests  seem to have  played  a  role as catalysts in promoting  farmers’  shared 
awareness of common  interests453. 
Engagement of the  state? 
Having  concluded that SYCOV  has  emerged  under  favourable  conditions,  it st ll remains  to be 
discussed  whether the organisation is able  to  engage  the  state,  i.e.  whether  it  qualifies  for the 
designation of a civil  association. 
Recalling the definition  of a ‘rural civil association’ presented in chapter  4  (based  on the 
definition of a  peasant’  movement  proposed by Gentil  and  Mercoiret and on the definition of  a 
civil  association by  Chazan  and  Harbeson)  criteria  are: 
A similar catalytic  role has sometimes  been  layed  by NGOs (Bebbington,  1994  p. 22.0; Gena & Mercoiret,  1991 
When hers first mtested against  CMDT in 1974  fa Drotest against  the  dishonest  Dractices  of  CMDT  agents 
p. 875;  Farrington & Bebbmgton,  1993  p.  1 l!).
who  graded  and weighed cottonr,  they  received  help fioni a villag&based  CMDT ageh (Bin  en,  1994 p.  5g). In 
1991  the  demands  to  CMDT  were  carried by a  highly  educated  former  government  emp K oyee  who had left 
government service to  live as a  farmer. Also the fmt uresident of SYCOV. Antoine  Baba Berthh is a  former 
. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~~~~ 
- 
government  employee  (with the Cooperative  Service) (singen, 1996  p.  3). ’ 
210 
1)  independent  thinking  and  a  certain  financial  autonomy from the state  and  other  external 
funding  sources,  2)  a  set  of  well-defined  objectives (as opposed to the  multipurpose  economic  and 
social  activities  of  most rural organisations), 3) the active  attempt to influence  decisions by 
government  agencies  4)  a  certain sizeand  economic  and  political  power,  and  5)  a  well-established 
internal  organisation. 
The  criterion  of independent  thinking  and a certain financial autonomy represent  a difficult 
dilemma for a  farmers’  movement.  It  can  be  very  hard  to  strike  a  balance  between,  on the e 
hand,  establishing  necessary  relations  that allow political  influence,  access to information  and 
financial  resources  and,  on  the  other  hand,  keeping  a  distance to the state  and  other  external  actors 
that justifies the designation  ‘independent’  (Bratton, 1994ap. 250;  Bratton & Bingen,  1994  p.  23- 
24;  Gentil & Mercoiret,  1991  p.  884). 
SYCOV  is  clearly  facing  this  dilemma.  The  close  collaboration wi h CMDT is a  precondition  for 
its  access to information  and  influence  both on day-to-day issues such as the  classification  of 
cotton  and on more  general  policy  issues  such as price  negotiations.  At the same time  there is an 
inherent  risk  that he collaboration  will ead to a situation where  SYCOV  leaders  identify  more 
with  the  interests  of  CMDT  and the cotton  sub-sector than with  members’  interests. In the eyes 
of many farmers boundaries between the two are blurred. Thus, some fanners interviewed 
reported to have  been  informed  about SYCOV  by  CMDT  agents  and to  use  CMDT  agents to get 
in touch with  SYCOV  when  they  need  assistance  by the organisation  (Interviews with farmers 
in  February  1996). 
CMDT  makes it  abundantly  clear  that  the  agency is pleased  to  have  a  partner  organisation  which 
connects  it  to  farmers. In the  words  of  the  regional  director  of  CMDT in Sikasso: “if fanners had 
not  done  it  themselves,  CMDT  would  have d to invent  SYCOV”.  After the initial  mistake of 
rejecting farmers’ demands in May 1991, the agency has done a considerable effort to 
accommodate  demands  not  fundamentally  questioning  the  role  of the agency  and to ‘educate’ 
SYCOV leaders  to  understand the economic  considerations  behind CMDT’s  policy. As part  of 
the  education  SYCOV  leaders  have  been  offered  study  trips to France  and  training  courses  in 
financial  nd  organisational  issues  related to cotton production  and  (Bingen,  1998 
p. 276-279;  Josserand & Bingen,  1995;  interview  with the regional  director  of  CMDT Sikasso 
Dec.,  1994  and interviews  with SYCOV leaders in late  1994  and  February  1996). 
As regards the resistence  of  SYCOV against more or less  overt  attempt to co-opt  the  movement, 
it  may  give  reason to some  concern  that  its  president has described the partnership with CMDT 
as that  of  two  parties  facing  the  future  ‘hand in hand’45s.  Local  SYCOV  leaders  are  worried  about 
the  problem,  and  some  openly  accuse  regional  and  national  leaders  of  being  corrupted  by  CMDT. 
Whether  the  leadership  will  manage  to  keep  clear  of  such  accusations  and  not  least  keep  clear  of 
454 According to SYCOV  leaders, also more  tangible  personal  benefits  have  sometimes  been  offered - an  refused 
on the grounds that  leaders  do  not  want to get too close to CMDT  (Interviews with SYCOV  leaders  in  late  1994  and 
February 1996). 
455 In 1992 the newly elected resident of SYCOV,  Antoine  Baba  Berthe,  said  in  a  speech  that “  artir de  ce jour 
SYCOV sera au  cat6 de la C b T  dans un rap ort de partenariat  que nous souhaitons ficond .... {YCOV  marque 
avant  tout  la  reconnaissance  pour  tout ce que la 8 MDT, et avant elle la CFDT  ont fait pour  que nous arrivions a ce 
niveau ... Ainsi  la main dans la main, sans complexe aucun,  souhaitons  l’avenir avec confiance mal& les difficult& 
conjoncturelles  que connaTt  la filihe coton” (quoted fiom Josserand & Bingen,  1995 p. 69). 
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the  reasons  for  the  accusations  remains  to  be  seen  (Interviews  carried  out in late  1994  and 
February  1996). 
Concerning a set of welZ-dejned objectives, the 12 demands  presented  by  SYCOV in 1991  and 
still  pursued  evidently fulfil this criterion.  It may in fact be  argued  that  the  farmers’  movement 
sticks to a  limited  set  of  well-defined  objectives at the expense  of  maintaining  broader  interests 
of  the rural population in the region.  Despite  its  claim to represent  the  interests  of  both  cotton  and 
food  producers,  SYCOV  has so far  concentrated on issues  related to cotton  production  and 
marketing  and  hereunder  especially  price  issues. To a  certain  extent this has happened at the 
expense  of  defending the  interests  of grain producers,  vegetable  producers,  livestock  owners  and 
small-scale  cotton  producers  (the  latter  tend  to  be  more  interested  in  access to credit  to buy 
agricultural  equipment  than i  higher  cotton  prices)(Interviews  with  farmers  and  with E1 Hadj 
Noumpounon  Diana,  President  of  Chambre  Regionale  &Agriculture,  Sikasso,  Dec.1994). 
SYCOV  also fulfils  the  criterion of actively attempting to  influence decisions by government 
agencies. Its fight  for  representation atall levels  of  CMDT  decision-making  structures  and  its  role 
in negotiations of the  contract  between  the  state  and CMDT provide  it  with  a  considerable 
political  influence.  Its  tendency  to  address  economic  rather  than  political  issues,  however, may 
l i t  its real  political  influence. Only once has the  movement  been  involved in discussions  which 
questioned the fundamental relationship between the state and farmers: in December 1991 
SYCOV representatives together with farmers from other parts of Mali participated in a 
conference  on  the rural sector  that  produced  a  series of far-reaching  recommendations  concerning 
the future relationship to the state. The recommendations included the transfer of full 
responsibility  for  the rural development tax to  local  communes  and  devolution  of  authority  with 
regard to mtural resource  management  to rural communities44M  (Bingen,  1994  p.  63).  Apparently, 
this attempt  to  influence  the  political  agenda has not  later been followed up,  and  SYCOV has 
been  conspicuously absent  from  the  debate  about  decentralisation  and land tenure  issues which 
it  has  left  entirely  to  the  political  parties  (Interviews  with SYCOV leaders,  representatives  for 
political  parties  and  Chkibane  Coulibaly,  Feb.  1996). 
SYCOV’s size andeconomic andpoliticalpower was clearly  demonstrated  when  CMDT in 1991 
had to give  in  confronted by the  threat of a  cotton  strike.  Its  members  control  one  of  the  most 
important  economic  sectors in the  economy  (in  certain  respects the most economic  sector),  and 
the  mere  fact  that  the  possibility  of  a  strike has been  brought  up has considerably  strengthened 
its political  power.  The  priority  given to economic  issues,  however, has more  similarities  with  the 
typical  policy of small and  not so powerful  organisations than with  large  economic  and  powerful 
organisations  usually  more  inclined to address  more  fundamental  policy  issues4”. 
The fivedays conference, know as ‘h Etais Ghhux du  Developpement Rural‘ was receded  by  preparatory 
regional  meetmgs.  While  James  Bingen  describes  the  rocess as the  result of a  enuine  emand  by  fanners  to  be 
heard,  Cheibane Couliialy has a  different  opinion  and  &scribes  it as “run by civi servants  who  spoke  m  the  name 
of farmers”  (Coulibaly,  1994 p. 3 1; Coulibaly,  personal  communication, Oct. 1994). 
‘ence is that  small  organisations  tend  to  respond  to  the  pressure  from  members  by add .essing 
economic  rather polmd Issues.  They  are  preoccupied  with  gaining  ,access to  existmg agncu!tql s m c e s  or 
im roving  the terms upon which  such services are delivered rather than wth more hdamental pohcy ~ssues. Large, 
fecfsrated  and  commercial  f’armers’ organisations, on  the  other hand, qe,more able to e l l  for 
would  alter the mix of services and  allow  more  influence  over  the con&~ons of produdon an !?licy marketing change (Bratton which
p. 65-66), 
62 Bingen,  1994 p. 16; Gentil& Me~wire.t, 1991  p.  876-877,  p. 883 ; Bratton,  1994a  p. 238; Sims & Leonard,  1990 
‘i B 
457Thegen alex2 .. ’ 
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The fifth and  last  criterion is probably  the  one  that  SYCOV will  find it most difficult to fulfill: 
it is difficult to describe  its internal  organisation as well-established, and it is  clearly  threatened 
both  by  internal  cleavages  and by competition  from  other  actors  who speak in the name of 
fanners. 
A well-established internal organisation is usually equated with internal democracy in an 
organisation:  leadership  accountabiiity,  information  sharing,  transparent  financial  and  economic 
management,  and  active  involvement of members  in  important  decisions  are  factors  crucial  to  the 
continued  adherence by  members  (Bratton & Bingen,  1994  p.  24-25; Bigen, 1996  p.  4-5;  Gentil 
& Mercoiret,  1991  p.  868,  p.  883;  Farrington&  Bebbington,  1993  p.  112;  Fox,  1992).  Among  the 
most obvious threats to a  movement is the risk that  a divide  between  leadership  and  general 
members gradually g o w  larger.  Corrupt  leaders  pursuing  personal  economic or  political  interests 
represent an extreme form of the  problem, but also  dedicated  leaders  who ‘fail to establish 
accountability  to  their  members  may  experience  a  rapidly  deteriorating  membership  base  (Gentil 
& Mercoiret, 1991 p.  883; Lachmnann, 1994  p.  81;  Bratton & Bingen,  1994  p.  23).  The  problem 
can  be  severely  enforced if state  organisations  attempt  to  co-opt  the  movement.  Leaders,  seen  by 
members  to  have too close  contact o government  extension  organisations  and  official  marketing 
structures,  will be under  suspicion  for  corruption (Bratton, 1994a  p.  232;  Bratton & Bingen,  1994 
p.18). The  situation is particularly  difficult, if leaders  belong  to a small  educated  elite  not  well- 
understood  by  members,  or if leaders  are  former  executives  from  state  organisations  who  easily 
integrate  into  state  structures or international  aid  organisations  (‘those  who are  always  invited  to 
international  conferences’)  (Lachenmann,  1994  p.  81). 
In addition  to  the  divide  between  leadership  and  members,  other  forms  of  cleavages  that  may  have 
detrimental  impacts on a  movement are the  many social  conflicts which  often  characterise  a rural 
environment.  Ethnic,  socioeconomic,  gender-based,  Iiieage-based,  age-based and many  other 
cleavages may permeate  a  farmers’  movement. If large-scale  or  better-off  farmers  dominate  a 
farmers’  movement,  they  may  pursue  only  their own interests  possibly at the expense  of  poorer 
farmers (Sims & Leonard,  1990 p.  65-66;  Haubert,  1991  p.  738-739).  It  may  be reflected in a 
leadership crisis or in lack of support from either minority groups or larger parts of the 
constituency  (Jacob &Delville, 1994  p.13;  Lachenmann,  1994  p.  82;  Blundo,  1994  p.  107-1  18; 
Gentil & Mercoiret,  1991  p.  884).  The  emergence  of  a  wide  range  of  new  organisations  at 
community level in countries  where  democratisation  processes  are  ongoing may  have  contributed 
to the eruption of many  latent  conflicts and  thereby  to  the  breaking-up of what has appeared  to 
be the  former  unity of community-based  organisations  (Jacob & Delville,  1994  p.  11). 
SYCOV is facing a very  difficult ask to  establish  an  internal  structure  that  will  allow  it  to  survive 
the  threat from the  various  internal  cleavages. In fact  many  of its leaders do fit the  portrait  of  ‘a 
small  educated elite not  well-understood  by  members,  or  being  former  executives  from  state 
organisations’,  and  the  problem of keeping  close  relations to members is very real (Bingen,  1996 
p.  4).The  problem is partly  logistical  and  financial  (how  to  ensure  transfer of information to 
members  dispersed  over  a  very  large area4”),  partly  a result  to  the  general  tendency to person- 
‘s’ In early 1996, SYCOV still had no telephone  line, no employed staff and no  means of transport (Interviews 
camed out in Feb. 1996). 
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oriented  leadership4”,  and  partly  reflecting  what  may be a true  contradiction of interests. Thus, 
there  seems  to be an over-representation of large-scale  cotton  producers (‘gros producteurs’) 
among SYCOV leaders, and accordingly an emphasis put on thek interests. For lack of 
evidenceeo, the  surmise is based  mainly  on  complaints  by  small  farmers  that  SYCOV is letting 
them  down, on the  observation that at least in some  villages  there is an  overlap  between  SYCOV 
leaders and large-scale  producers461  and  on  statements by resource  persons in and  outside  the 
region with a  knowledge on the (interviews with SYCOV leaders,  farmers and 
resource  persons in the  autumn  of  1994  and  Feb.  1996). 
Other than this - probably  most  important - internal  cleavage,  conflicting interests between  the 
Koutiala area, where  SYCOV  emerged,  and  other  areas  less  integrated  into the  cotton  production 
may challenge  the unity of the  organisatione3.  And  finally  the  many  village-level  conflicts  among 
lineages,  generations,  quarters,  etc.  may  seriously  affect  the  organisation. 
Among the external  threats  the  emergence  of  the  many  new  political  parties  seems  to  represent 
the  most  important. In preparation of the  parliamentary  and  presidential  elections in 1997 it was 
observed  how in early  1996  the many new  political  parties  were  trying  to win the support of the 
rural population by  engaging in advocacy  related  to  rural  peoples’  rights.  Whereas in the  Koutiala 
area in the early 1990s people may have approached SYCOV for  assistance  with  specific 
problems, in the mid-1990s it had (aga in )  become common to contact a local member of 
parliament*  (Interviews with SYCOV  leaders,  representatives of political  parties  and  Chhibane 
Coulibaly,  February  1996). 
While  conditions for its emergence  have  been  favourable,  conditionsfor SYCOV‘s successjiiI 
engagement ofthe state look  a  bit  more mixed. SYCOV has the  potential to become  a  civil 
association that  engages  the  state and becomes  able to substantially  influence it. It is too soon, 
however, to say if it will be able  to  overcome  the  many  internal  cleavages  and  the  risk of co- 
optation by  CMDT.  Available  sources  may  suggest  that it is moving in the  direction of becoming 
During  the  fieldwork in 1996 I was  referred  to  SYCOV’s  president  for  clarification  of  questions  which  leaders 
at other  levels  were  not  able to answer.  It  turned  out  to  be  very  difficult,  though, t  get  access to the president  who 
seemed to be travelling  extensively  abroad. 
W To my howledge a study on the social background of SYCOV leaders has not yet been carried out. 
Unfortunately, it did  not  make  part  of the present  study  either. 
In  the  leadership  of  SYCOV’s  ‘secteur  de  Kldla’, many  members  were  at the same  time  members  of ‘la section 
de  mechanisation’,  i.e. they were owners of tractors  (belongin  to  group-m  in  the  DRSPR-typology)~  The  head of 
(Interviews  carried  out in Feb. 1996). 
section proudly reported to personally  account  for no less 8, 15% of  all  the cotton produced  m  the  village 
462 Cheibane  Coulibaly is among the resource  persons  who  are  not  afraid to confirm  that  many  SYCOV  leaders 
represent the interests of large-scale  producers,  whereas  he  describes  it as difficult to see the  interests  of  small 
producers in the organisation  (Interview  carried  out  in  February  1996). 
The election  in  1992 of Antoine  Baba  Berthe  from  Kadiolo  cercle  is  believed  to  reflect  attempts to ensure the 
support  also fkom the  southern  traditionally less mlltant part of the  region  (Bingen,  1996 p.3). 
an interview  in  February  1996 Sina Coulibaly,  member  of  Parliament  for UDD, explained how he had 
‘straight  to  the mster’ in order to mse concerns r rted  to him by  local  farmers,  whereas 
onlv to CMDT. There are maw former UDPMyders among the  leaders  of UDD.  and 
they  are  continuing  the traditional role ofparty leaders as ‘mediators’b.etween  farmers ana overnment  authorities. 
Interviews with farmers  in  the  Koutiala  area  confirmed  the  compehtwe  role of UDD to S COV,  whereas m the 
Kadiolo area the Droblem does  not seem to exist oartlv because  SYCOV  is  much less !mown (hence  few  farmers 
_. ~. ~ ~ ~ . .I ~- ~ ~~ ~ 
would addressxe or  anisation  in  case of troubi4 anyivay)  and  partly  because the competition among the parties 
is much less intense hterviews camed out m February  1996). 
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a  relatively  forceful  economic  interest  organisation  defending  the  interests  of  large-scale  cotton 
producers  rather  than  becoming  a  civil  association  that  has  the  objective of changing  relations 
between  state  and  society. 
11.2 Existence  of ‘civil norms’? 
The second  approach,  suggested  in  chapter 4, to the  identification  of  societal  forces with an 
important  political  potential  is  the  search  for uparticular  set of civil norms. Inspired  by  Hyden 
(Hyden, 1994), the  chapter  proposed  to  identify  such  norms  by  looking  for the perceived ability 
to  influence public  policy (engage the state). 
A distinction  was  made  between  1)  what  difference  people  see  themselves  being  able  to  make by 
trying  to  influence  the  state (‘civic competence ’), 2)  what  difference  they  see  government  being 
able to make without their cooperation (Ipoliticul authority’), 3) what difference they see 
themselves  being  able  to  make  without  the  cooperation  of  the  government (‘social reciprocities 
at the  community level’). 
In the  village  survey  the  issue  was  approached  by  asking  the  312  respondents  first  a se of  open 
questions  and  then a closed  question  on  the  role  of  the  state,  the  village  and  of  third  parties. 
In the  open  questions,  they  were  asked  to  describe  the main problems  facing  the  village  in  general 
and  the  problems  related  to natural resources  management  in  particular.  They  were  then  asked  to 
indicate 
1)  what  difference  to  the  problems  they  themselves  are  able  to  make. 
2)  what  difference  they  see  the  state  being  able to make. 
3)  what  difference  they  see  others  being  able  to  make. 
The  closed  question  regarded  the  preferred  division  of  authority  between  the  state,  the  village  and 
third  parties  concerning  a  range  of  specific tasks (e.g.  price  negotiations  regarding  producer  and 
input  prices,  extension  activities  and  definition  of  rules  concerning natural resource  management). 
11.2.1. Understanding  the  state:  three  different  perspectives 
Comments  by  respondents  to  the  open  question  on  how  to  solve the problems  they  are  facing 
suggest  a  classification  of  views  of the state in three main groups  that  could  be labelled 
1) ‘the  state  should  do  everything’  (reflecting  a  high  level ofpolitical authority) 
2) ’we can  handle  everything  ourselves’  (reflecting  a  high  level  of social reciprocities) 
3)  ’the  village  and the state  should  collaborate  and  third  parties  become  involved’  (reflecting  a 
high  level  of civic competence). 
In practice,  distinctions  between  such  views  are  of  course  not as clear-cut  as  indicated  by  these 
labels.  Thus,  the  same  individual  may  express  contradictory  attitudes,  e.g.  by  deploring  the 
limited  capacity  of  the  state  to  solve  any  problems  and  yet  suggest hat th   state  should  undertake 
all  kind  of tasks alone. In the  majority  of  cases,  however, a remarkable  consistency  characterises 
the statements  not  only by  single  respondents  but  also - as it will be  shown  in  the  following 
section - by respondents  from  the  same  village. 
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1) ‘The state should do everything’ 
Respondents  who  argue  for  the  need  for  a highly interventionist  state  mention  a  wide  range of 
tasks to  be  performed  by  the  state.  The  state  in  their  view  should  provide  their  village  with  social 
and  physical  infrastructure  such as roads,  health  centres,  schools,  water  supply,  agricultural 
equipment, dams, etc.  Some  respondents  even  mention  the  provision  of  food  aid  among  core  tasks 
of the  stateas.  Furthermore, it is considered  a task of  the  state  to  increase  producer  prices  and 
reduce  input  prices,  to  provide  the  population  with  credit  and  to  improve  marketing  conditions 
for  vegetables  and  fruit.  Others  mention  that  the  state  should  improve  extension  services  and 
provide  more  qualified sMto village  health  centres.  Some  respondents  would i e  to leave it to 
the  state  to  define  rights  concerning  management  of  natural  resources,  to  mediate in conflicts 
between  villagers  and  transhumant  pastoralists,  and to  protect  forests  against  wood  cutters from 
neighbouring  villages  and  urban  centresa6.  They t ink that  the  state  should  assist  the  village in 
maintaining its internal  social  order467  and i  solving  village-internal  conflicts  which  cannot  be 
solved  by  the  village  chief16*.  Finally,  many  respondents  consider  it  an  obligation  of  the  state to 
maintain  law  and  order4@. 
It is a common  feature  of  respondents in this group  that  they  explain  their  views by  referring to 
the limited organisational and financial capacity of their own village and to the lack of 
alternatives  to  the  state in the  form  of  private  or  inter-village  organisations. In addition  to this a 
moral  obligation  by  the  state to  care  for  its  citizens is sometimes  mentioned4”’. 
Respondents in this group  express  a  profound  fear of challenging  the  existing  social  order47’  and 
use words such as ‘chaos’  and  ‘social  disorder’  (‘l’anarchie’)  to  describe  the  possible 
consequences of lessening  the  control  by  the state4n. Typically,  they  regret the change of regime 
in 1991  and find that  everything was better  before.  They  fear  that  any  changes  in  the  division  of 
authority  between  the  state  and  societal  actors  will  eventually  result in a  situation  where  the  state 
‘” “L’Etatpew nousfaire dons  de ciriales  si non ca ne vapas” (Sinkolo  no.  16). 
466Se gouvernement peut nous  aider ci sanctionner  les no.  2) S’Etat doit 
renforcer le service a h  Emu ef For& et nous aider 6 renforcer nos 
r2gles  et  sanctions,  les  consoIider pour le 
“’ S’Etat doit  tout faire pour appuyer  notre  entente &m le village” (Sinkolo no. 25 ‘Z%tat dolt nous aider ci 
meme & l’qrdre dam les rtgles sociales  (les  sanctions  etc.) nous aider 6 nous discipdner nous-m~mes”(Smcma 
no.  20) Z ’Etat &it chercher ci now faire entendre &m le village” (Sincina no. 33). 
“Si nous mus entendons pas, now amenerons  le confit chez  le  chef  d’arrondissement.  S’il se houverait 
incapable  il  am2neroit 6Sikasso” (Klkla no. 27) 
“L ’Etat  &it  assurer la garantie  de la sdcuriti” (Sinkolo 110.12). 
‘’O The m o d  obligation was sometimes expressed as the  obligation  of  the  ‘good  father’ out of sheer pity  to  take care 
parcowirpour avoir le dispemaire de MPessoba” Dossorola  no.  24). In an official document, from the  Cellule 
of its ‘child’:S’Etat  doit avoirpitii de m en nous  alsant un dispensaire  dans le village. Nom avons 27 hm t. 
de  Planification et de Statistique under  the M.IXIIS~IY of Rural Development  and  Environment the plcture of the state 
as ,the  good  father is taken v far: ’ze disengagement ne &it pas sign@er  abandon  des collectivitis territoriales; 
I’Etat &it se  comporter enYonp2re de fmille” qui  assiste,  conseilIe  et  contrble” (MDRE- CPS,  1994). 
The existing  social  order - or rather the  order  prevailing untiJ 1991 - is summarised  by two respondents as 
follows: Toutes les &aires  de ce pays sont &m les mains  de  l’Etat, le gouvernement8  c’est lyi qui doit dicider 
supr2me de la hiirarchie despouvoir” (Smkolo  no.  23). 
tout” (Sinkolo  no. 1). Z%tat doit now ai+rfinanci?rement. h viIlage  a  toujours  besoin de I’Etat  qui est l’itape 
472 “Dicenhalisation veut  dire I ‘ina!ipendance du  village vis-ci-vis l’ktat. Je  sais ue ce  serait de I ’anarchie, 
dpsordre  total &m le pays car aucun village nepeut etre indipeendant de I’Etat” (goroni no.16). 
f ’  
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retreats  completely fiom their village. As the  village,  in  their  opinion,  has  neither  the  financial 
nor the organisational  capacity to become  responsible  for  tax  collection  and  investments,  they 
foresee  a  total  economic  and  social  collapse4”. 
In addition to the  lack  of  financial  and  organisational  capacity by  the  village,  their  lack  of 
knowledge of other types of  actors  influences  these  respondents. Thus, they  seem  to be  unfamiliar 
with  inter-village  organisations, NGOs or  private  enterprises474. hparticular it is  notable  that  the 
farmers’  movement  was  not  mentioned  by  any  of  these  respondents. 
2) ‘We can handle everything  ourselves’ 
Diametrically  opposed to the call  for a highly interventionist  state,  a goup of respondents  stress 
the  capacity  of  their  village  to  manage  without  any  assistance  at  all  fiom  the  state. 
Whereas  the  ‘state-dependent’  group  is  womed  about l i i ed financial  resources at village-level 
to  undertake  necessary  investments,  respondents  in th sgroup  stress  the  organisational  capacity 
of  their  village  and  hardly  mention  the  question  of iIlfiastruCtura1 investments. A closer  reading 
of statements,  however,  reveals  that  both  groups  in  fact  refer  to  the  same  issue,  namely  whether 
the village possesses the necessary social consensus to define common rules (e.g. on tax 
collection  and natural resource  management)  and  to  enforce  the  rules  without  risking  to  end  up 
in  a  situation  where  external  assistance  is  needed  to  solve  internal  conflicts. 
Thus, many respondents  in this group  refer  their  view  on  the  strength  of  the  village  to  the  fact  that 
so far all village-internal conflicts have been handled by the village management without 
involving any govemment  authorities: a powerhl village  chief is able  to  cut  through  conflicts  and 
make  decisions  which  are  respected  by  all  parties475.  Others  praise  the  qualified  management  of 
financial  resources by the village  association476,  the ecbnid competence  of  villagers  themselves 
‘l3 “on nous dit ,e I’Etat va  se  retirer  des &aim du  village. L ‘Etat ne &it pas se  retirer. Les villageois  sont 
incapables sans 9” ’Etat Nous n’avons pas les  moyensfinanciers - les imp&  ne serontpas payPS” (Molobala  8). ‘Ze 
village n’apas d‘wgent, ni dautres moyens. Si non on auraitpu faire quelques  chose  depuis  longtemfs. ..Sijamais 
1 ‘Etat se retire des daires des villages,  qui  va  aider  les  villages L? se  developper  a2sormais. Les V I  lageols  ne se 
respectent plus, il n ‘y a plus  obiissame  dam les rapports. Ce serait problkme d@cile. I1 faut que nous 
cherchions dabord a nous enteiuire  avant  tout“ @ossorola no. 20). ‘Z ‘Etat  ne &it as se  retirer. Si non, les 
villageois nepeuvent rien faire d’emm2mes. Nous n’avons pas assez dintellectuels B ans le village. M2me S ‘il y 
a des fils villageois  hors du villa e, il serait un eu dflcile m- aa de gdrer,  puisqu  ‘ils ne vivent pas avec nous< 
ils  rndconnaissent  les rialit+ 2 ’  es vll~ageois*’ &&la  no. & % e  village  ne peut rien. on nepeut que  souhaiter  la 
pluie chaque anne-e” (Kolom no. 1). 
5i ce n ‘est pas I ‘Etat j e  ne copais pas  celui qui pourrait  aider les villages a risoudre leurs robl2mes” 
payons les  imp6ts ’’ @ossorola no. 6). Rut-&e c ’est  Dieu yui pourrait faire uelques  chose pour nous. Si le 
(Dossorola  no.4). ‘3i ce n’estpas I‘Etatje  ne  sais pas celui qui va nous fiire quelque  chose.  C’est a i i  que nous 
gouvernement n’estpas capable de nous @ire  quelque  chose’ @ossorola  no. 13 .  
‘l5 ‘Ze villaFe n’a jamais asst! ses confits 2 l’arrondissement. I1 S ‘est toujours ddbrouilld ci arranger ses 
problkmes’ (Chihe no.ll.  Wos co$its sont rkglis entre nous &m le village. Nom n ‘mons jamais amend un 
confit villageois 6 I ‘avo J Issement” (CErnC no. 26). 
‘l6 ‘Ddj& nous krom nos daires avec lepeu d’wgent dans  la  caisse A Yet avec  bonne  entente.  La  caisse fait des 
credits m vi I f  ages  qui  rembowsent  samprobl2mes. L  Conseil du  village  avec les sages est un organe  precise de 
I’ora’re social” (Chl&m& no.18). 
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to undertake  extension  activities4=  and  the  capacity  of  the  village  branch  of  the  national  hunters' 
association to maintain  law  and  order478. 
While the capacity  of the village is considered  very  high,  these  respondents  have an extremely 
low  esteem  of  the  capacity  of  the  state.  The  state is m inly  seen as an  extractor  of  resources  from 
rural communities giving nothing in return, neither in terms of services, nor in terms of 
investment^^^. 
Third parties such as e.g.  inter-village  organisations  are  not  considered  potential  actors  able  to 
influence  village-level or more  general  problems in the area4". When  asked if any  others can do 
something to their problems,  the  only  village-external  actors  these  respondents  can hink of are 
their  migrant  relatives in C6te d ' h ~ i r e ~ ~ ' .  
3) 'The village and the state  should  collaborate  and third parties become  involved' 
A third  group of respondents  resembles  a  combination  of  the  two  other  groups,  but  it has some 
distinctive  features  that  justify a classification in a  particular  category.  They  share  with  the fist 
group  a  profound  scepticism  towards  possibilities  for  the  village of managing  without  assistance 
from the state.  And  they  share  with  the  second  group  a  very  critical  assessment  of  the  capacity 
of  the  state  to  make  a  difference to their  problems.  Unlike  the  two  other  groups,  however, th se 
respondents do not  see a solution in either  a  highly  interventionist  state  or  in  a  retreat  of  the state. 
Instead  they  suggest  a  collaboration  between  the  state  and  the  village  involving  also  third  parties. 
Various examples  of  collaborative  relations  between the state and  the village  are  mentioned. 
These include e.g. support by the state to  reinforcement  of rules defined  by the village, joint 
efforts  for  the  maintenance  of  law  and  order,  and  assistance  from  the  government  administration 
to tax  collection  organised by the  village4s2. 
Ye r6ne  la solidmiti au niveau  des  populations du village ... Quandmes b o d s  tombent  malade, jepriflre faire 
appeh la famille Sangari euhl) qui ont ass@ de bo& et quipossident des  techniques de traitement. La CMDT 
et l'ilevage n'ont jamaisgu? pied e mes  champs.  Je  me  ddbrouille sed  et  avec les iquipes techniques  de 
villageois formies  par les servrces technques" (Nafegue no. 7). 
patrouilles nocturnes. Si nous rencontrons  une  personne  qui ne  snit pas parler sinoufou, il aura des sirieux 
'" Ye  fais partie de I 'iquipe des  chasseurs du village, twus assurons la sicuriti du  village. NOUS organisons des 
problimes avec MUS" (Nafegue no. 4). 
Ye n 'attenah rien de I'Etat  car  ils sont l6 6 nous retirer  les  imp& sans u'on sache ou  va  cette somme... Now 
mons toujours risolu les conflits du tout genre  au  niveau de village. N&?ue n'a jamais transfiri un conflit ir 
l'arrondiss~ment. Jeprone la soliakiti au niveau des populations du  village' (Nafegue no. 7). TOUS n'aurons plus 
6 envier  I'Etat pourpous satisfaire ri nos besoins? no? pouvons  bien  reussir  pour MUS m2me et  grdce 6 now" 
(Chiem6 no. 5). S 'Etat ne fait rien  de  ce qu'il doit faue. NOUS payom I'impdt  depuis  que nous aistonsV now 
n'avons rien  eu de I'intpressrmi" (Molobala no. 8). 
Ye ne  vois pas quelqu'un  autre uipourrait nous faire quelque  chose. C 'est du  village de serrer  la  ceinture  et 
faireface 6 ses problkmes " golo%asso no. 6 Weme s 'il y a  d'autres  quipourraient nous aider, j e  n 5, vois as 
cela. Donc, pow m i  le  vi1 f " ' .  age  dolt  doubler .- 'tlffortpourfaire face 6 ses  roblimes" (W olo@so no.9) "&est 
now-mZmes quisommes respomables  de nos problimes. C 'est au village B e  trouver  une soktion a  ses  problames 
et non d'autrespersonnes" (N'golokasso no 27). 
48' Sesfils du village en C6te  d'lvoire nous aide  constammentpour lepayement de I'imp6t" (N'golokasso ~0.16) 
'!l $tat  dois WUS aider 6 redorcer nos r2gles et  sanctions, b consolider  pour  le  bien &re du village" (Sincina 
no. 16). Tow mons une association  des  chassem-S  qui  assure  la simili du  villa  e Nos chasseurs  collaborent  avec 
la endmmerie ir Sikasso. n n kxiste pas chez nom ici  de  cas des voles,  saufque&ues raresfois des ours  defoire, 
et 72 c'est de^ dtrangers" GldIa no. 4) %ais ilfaut que le Commadnt soit  present au moment d e ricupiration 
218 
NG0 activities are few  in  the Sikasso region,  but  it is worth  noticing that many  respondents  in 
this group  mention the experience  with NGOs when  asked  about  possible  third  parties that could 
assist  the  village483.  For  some  respondents,  experience with a  non-governmental  project  in  their 
village  seems  to  have  broadened  their outlook and  made  them  refer  more  generally to 'external 
partners'  or  'private  businesses' as possible  collaborating  parties4@. 
One  group of respondents  stand  out as particular,  namely  those  who  not  only  mention  third  parties 
when  specifically  asked  about  such  actors,  but  spontaneously  stress  the  need  for  third  parties 
when  asked  what he village can  do. In virtually  all  cases  these  respondents  refer to the  farmers' 
movement as a representative of village  populations  which  can  help  them  innuence  the  state. 
Thus,  price  negotiations  between  SYCOV,  CMDT  and  the  government,  undertaken  in  relation 
to the renewal  of  the  general  agreement  between  CMDT  and  the is  highlighted as 
an  example of how the  collaboration  between  the  population  and  the  state  can  take  place4". 
11.2.2. Village background conditioning views of the state 
In addition to the  open-ended  questions  that  provoked  the  free  comments  referred  to  above, 
respondents  were  presented  with a closed  question  on the preferred  division of authority  between 
the  state,  the  village  and  third  parties  concerning  each of a range of specific  tasks,  including:  a) 
price  negotiations  regarding  producer  and  input  prices,  b)  extension  activities,  c)  definition  of 
rules  concerning  natural  resource  management,  d)  mediation  in  conflicts  over natu al resources 
e)  mediation in other  village-level  conflicts  (e.g.  inheritance  conflicts), f )  maintenance  of  law  and 
order  and  g)  investments in physical  and  social  infrastructure. 
des  imp& dam le village. Si non le c h f  de village m a  des  d@cultds ricupirer les imp& totma" (h4olobala  no. 
10) 
Ye ne comptepas sur I*taE Je compte  surtout  sur les projets ONG Corps  de la Pair ui sont  sensibles  car  il y 
en a qui vivent parmi nous et  qui sonl capable'' (Sink010  no. 26). 'TI doit en avoir.. &utres ui pourrait nous 
assistw).. tel  que  HELVETAS i a aZjd fait quelques  chose &m le village" (Nafegue  no. 8). ous comptons su: 
les pro'ets comme  la  Vision ondzale, nous sommes aussiprt2 6 contribuerpour  les travam d'admons" (Kolonl 
no. 19{ "Le Dangroup a fait du bienpour  le  village  en & m t  au villageois  de  I'eau  otable. Si un autrepartenaire 
pourrait arre autant, on est  r&t ci collaborer" (Woronl no.  21). "Le ville jumelie e  'Cautance" de  France p a t  
nous ai er 6 fane quelque  c ose encore'' (Smcina  no.  32). 
'Des partenaires itrangers peuvent bel et bien nous venir  en aide techni  ue etfinancitre Nous  sommes  aussi 
pr& ir contribuer  avec e m  nancrtrement  et  en  ressources  humaines" g f s g u e  no. 5). Zes privds ressortissants 
du  milieu peuvent faire L .  dipdts de pharmacie,  vulgariser les tec zques de  soins, de traitement. Ils sont 
nombrem a  Sikasso  et  ils  sont  capable" (Woroni 110.8). 
48s For the first time the farmers'. movement  was  given  signatory  ower to the agreement,  when  it  was  renewed in
1994, a  few  months  before mterweys, we?  conducted  (CMDT, 1984b). This comment  and  answers eported in table 
1 1.1 below  concerning rice negobabons dustrate that  respondents  both  distinguish  between the state  and  CMDT 
and  perceive of CMDfas part of the  larger  state. 
'ze SYCOV &it avec le gouvernement et  la CMDTfixer I e s  d@rentspric.  C 'est le SYCOV  qui nous reprisente, 
nous le cotonnier et vivriers. Normalement c'est le SYCOV qui &it donner le prir avant les dela autres 
artenaires" (Sincina  no. 17). "Le SYCOVest un andespir ur nous sur  lequel nous comptons  beaucoup dam 
prir de I'engrais. Le SYCOVest notre espoirpour le moment" (Molobala no. 4). Wous attendons  notre comiti de 
f%ilioration de nos conditwns de travail" (Mogbala no. 28f?Wous attermbas le SYCOVpour la diminution  des 
SYCOV o w  bi&$zier dune rLduction du rir de l'en ais ela no. 13 . During a visit to  Sicina, the villa e 
where  S'z-COV  was  first  established,  the VI iage  chief 1 Y lustrate ..."!F the pomt ' a 2 out  a  close  collaboration between tf e 
state  and  SYCOV by clenching two fingem: '!La collaboration  entre nous doit &re comme  ca!" 
3. 74 
J .  . K L$ 
219 
Table 11.1. Preferred  division  of  authority  between  the  state,  the village and  SYCOV, 
according to village backround (share of respondents in YO of all respondents  from  the - - - - - 
village) (n=309). 
PRICE NEGOTJATIONS DEFUilTION OF NRM- 
BETWEENTHE 
GOVERNMENT AND STATE WITHOUT 
RULES*) BY THE 
CMDT INVOLVING THE 
WITHOUTINVOLVING  VILLAGE 
THE VILLAGE 
INVOLVEMENT OF 
SYCOV IN PRICE 
NEGOTJAnONS 
MEDIATION IN VILLAGE- 
LEVEL  CONFLICTS  BY THE 
VILLAGE  ALONE 
ChiLme 0% 0% 3% 90% 
Nafegue I 5% I 9% I 0% I 100% 
Molobala 0% 3 % 30% 68% 
KlCla I 0% I 0% I 9% I 57% 
I\ Koloni I 57% 1 33% I 0% I 90% II 
11 Dossorola I 43% I 80% I 0% I 63% I I  
Woroni 46% 46% 
~~ 
0% 
~ ~~ 
27% 
sink010 10% 0% 52% 48% 
~~~ 
- 
notes: *) nnn-rules= rules  concerning  natural  resource  management 
Some  of  the  answers  to  these  questions  are  shown  in  table  11.1  which  illustrates  substantial 
differences  among  the  villages  (for a geographical  situation  of  the  villages,  see the maps  in  the 
first  part of the  dissertation,  and  for  a s u m m a r y  of  their  characteristics,  see  the  section  on 
‘Characteristics  of  the  10  villages  under  study’  in  the  annex). Four villages,  situated  in  the 
northern  part  of  the  region  or  immediately  south  of  Sikasso,  distinguish  themselves  from  the 
others by a  considerable  share  of  respondents who prefer  that  the  government  and  CMDT 
undertake  price  negotiations  without  involving  the  villages  (i.e.  themselves)  (Koloni,  Dossorola, 
Woroni  and  Sinkolo).  Two  of  these  villages  further  distinguish  themselves by  a  remarkably  low 
share of respondents  who  find that mediation in village-level confiicts should take place in the 
village alone, without involving government authorities (Woroni and Sinkolo). In all other 
villages  the  majority  of  respondents  prefer  not  to  involve  the  state,  and in Nafegue all respondents 
without  exception  have  given this answer.  Finally,  three  villages  considered  strongholds  of  the 
farmers’  movement,  differ from the  others  by  a  certain  share  of  respondents  who  indicate that 
SYCOV  on  their  behalf  should  be  involved  in  price  negotiations  with the state  and  CMDT 
(Sincina,  Molobala  and Hela). 
Based  on  answers  reported in table  1  1.1  supplemented  by  answers  to  the  question  about  how  to 
solve  their  problems,  villages canroughly  be  classified  in  the  above-mentioned  groups as follows: 
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1) ‘The state  should do everything’:  Koloni,  Dossorola, Woroni, and Sinkolo 
Four villages  classified  in  the  first  &roup  are  all  situated in  the nodem part ofthe region  (Koloni, 
Dossorola  and  Sinkolo)  or  immediately  south of Sikasso (Woroni)  and  are  characterised  by 
various  levels  of  internal  conflicts.  Thus,  in  the  three  first-mentioned  villages  the  authority f 
village  chiefs is challenged,  and  village  associations  are  breaking  up. In Woroni  conflicts  have 
not  yet  enrpted but are  lurking  beneath  the  surface.  The  majority of respondents  in  these  villages 
prefer  that the  government  and  CMDT  negotiate  producer  and  input  prices Without  involving the 
village, that the state runs the extension service, defines rules concerning natural resource 
management, maintains law  and  order,  and  finances all investments. In Woroni  and  Sink010 the 
majority  of  respondents  even want the  state  to  mediate  in  village-level  conflicts  Without  involving 
the  village  population,  and  one  third  of  respondents  in  these  villages  want  the  state  to  mediate 
also  in  Conflicts  over nahlral resources Without involving  the  village. No respondents  in  these 
villages  mention  a  role  for  any  third  parties. 
2) ‘We can  handle everything ourselves’:  N’golokasso,  ChikmC and Nafegue 
Three  villages  classified in the  next goup are situated in the  southern  part ofthe region  and  are 
characterised by strong  internal  cohesion.  Village  chiefs  have  maintained  their  authority,  there 
is only one village association in each village, and the traditional hunters’ organisation is 
maintaining  law  and  order.  The  majority  of  respondents in these  villages  prefer that the  village 
alone  should  be  responsible  for  definition  of  rules  Concerning  natural  resource  management, 
enforcement  of  such  rules,  and  mediation  in  any  other  village-level  conflict.  They  suggest  that 
price  negotiations  and  financing  of  investments  should  involve  the  village  together  with  the 
government  and  CMDT.  The  majority  of  respondents i  Chikme  and  N’golokasso,  furthermore, 
suggest  that the village  should  undertake  all  extension  activities  alone. I  Chi6m:mC the  majority 
of  respondents  prefer  that  the  village  should  be  solely  responsible  for  maintaining l w and  order. 
No respondents in these  villages  mention  a  role  for  any  third  parties. 
3) ‘The  village and the  state should  collaborate and  third parties become  involved’: Sincina, 
Molobala and KlCla 
The three  villages  considered  strongholds  of  the  fanners’ movement are all  situated  in  the 
northern  or  central  part  of the redo& Sincina  and  Molobala are relatively  close  to  Koutiala  town, 
and  they are all characterised by serious  internal  conflicts.  The  villages  differ from the rest by a 
relatively  large share of  respondents  who  spontaneously  mention  SYCOV as a  preferred  partner 
in  negotiations  about  cotton  producer  prices (36% in Sincina, 30% in Molobala  and 9% in  KlBla, 
respectively). The majority of respondents in Molobala  and Klda suggest  a  collaboration  between 
the  village  and  the  state  concerning  mediation in village-level  conflicts  and  definition  of  natural 
resource  regulations.  The  enforcement  of  the  rules,  however,  should  be  taken  care  of by  the 
village  without  interference  by the state.  Concerning  the  financing  of  investments,  respondents 
in  KlCla  and  Molobala  prefer  a  collaboration  between  the  state  and  the  village,  whereas  in  Sincina 
a  collaboration  between  the  state,  the  village  and NGOs is  suggested. In KlCla  and  Molobala the 
majority  of  respondents want the  village  to be the  sole  responsible  for  extension  activities  and  for 
maintaining  law  and  order. 
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The  hypothesis  about  village  background  being  decisive  to  the  view of the  state is confirmed  by 
assessments by respondents of the  major  political,  social  and  economic  changes that took  place 
in  the  years  after 199 1 and  immediately  preceding  the  village survey. When  respondents  were 
asked to mention the three most important changes since 1991, very different views were 
expressed. 
Table 11.2. Most important changes after 1991, according to village background of 
respondents  (share of respondents in  each village having  mentioned the various  changes) 
(n=312)*) - 
PRICE  INCREASE 
AFTER 
POLITICAL SOCIAL REPRESSION BY  REDU ED TAx2S 
DEVALUATlON 
THE FORESTRY DISORDER FREEDOM 
SERVICE HAS 
STOPPED **) 11 Chiime 57%  40%  50%  3%  7% II 11 N’golokasso I 30% I 53% I 60%  17% I 3% II 
11 Nafegue 141% I 59% I 54% I 5% I 0% II 
Woroni 
20% 14% 3 1% 26%  26% Kltla 
21% 12%  41% 29% 44% Molobala 
3 % 0% 43% 43%  53% 
II sincina I 50% I 33% I 13% I 23% I 10% II 
Sinkolo 6% 23%  16% 39% 61% 
Notes: 
dominate the answers. In addition to these (reported in the table), 8 other changes were mentioned by 1-9 
*) Although  the  question  on  major  changes was phrased as an  open-ended  question, only five major types of changes 
respondents  each (a total of 35 respondents  corresponding  to 11% of all  respondents).  These  changes  were  a)  forced 
marriages  have  been  abolished  (9  respondents),  b)  the security situation has deteriorated (7 respondents),  c)  outbreak 
of a national school  crisis (5 respondents),  d)  cotton  prices  have  increased (4 respondents),  e)  repression  by  the 
government  administration has increased (4 respondents), f )  women’s tons have  been  established  in  certain  villages 
(3 respondents), g) social  differentiation has increased (2 respondents)  and  h)  outbreak of the Tuareg  rebellion  (1 
respondent). 
rather than to increasing  producer  prices.  The  positive  impact of the  devaluation of the CFA in the form of  higher 
**) It appears fiom  the  answers  that  respondents  refer to a  price  increase of wnsmer goods  and agricultural  inputs 
cotton  and  livestock  prices was not yet felt  in  late  1994  when the majority  of  the  interviews  were wried out  (Kkbe 
et al., 1995a p. 12, see also the  discussion of problems related to the timing of the survey in  ’Fieldwork  methodology 
and literature  study’  in the annex). 
While  mentioning of major  economic  changes  does  not  appear  to  follow  any  clear  village- 
determined  pattern,  descriptions of political  changes as either  ‘social  disorder’ or ‘political 
fieedom’  seem  influenced  by  the  village  background of respondents. It appears, thus, that  the 
assessment  mainly reflects the  level of social  cohesion in villages. In the  northern  conflict-ridden 
villages a relatively  large share of respondents  mention  social  disorder  (‘l’anarchie’)  among  major 
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recent  changes  (Sincina,  Koloni,  Dossorola  and  Sinkolo). In Koloni4”  and D o s ~ o r o l a ~ ~ ~  where 
conflicts  are  particularly  pronounced,  no  less than 57% and 30% of  respondents,  respectively,  feel 
than the  existing  social  order  is  challenged. 
In southern  villages  where  traditional  authorities  have  maintained  their  control,  on  the  other  hand, 
very  few  respondents  mention  ‘social  disorder’  among  the  major  changes (Chihe, Nafegue  and 
Woroni).  N’golokasso  is  an  exception  to this which  may  be  explained  by  an  ongoing  and  very 
violent  conflict  with  pastoralists  which  neither  the  village  leadership  nor  government  authorities 
have  been  able  to  solve. 
The tendency to a north-south  division in political  statements  seems  reinforced  by  the  crime 
wave,  mentioned in chapter 7, that has swept  the  northern  part  of  the  region  after  a  partial  retreat 
of the  gendarmerie,  while  in  the south, the  traditional  hunters’  association  to  a  large  extent  has 
been  able  to  take  over  the task of maintaining  law  and  order. 
Political  freedom  is  not  considered  a  change  (or  achievement)  worth  mentioning  by  the  majority 
of  respondents.  The  only  villages  where  a  certain  number  of  respondents  have  given this answer 
are  the  three  villages  considered  strongholds  of  the  farmers’  movement  (Molobala, Klda489 and 
Sincina). In these villages many inhabitants have personally experienced that inter-village 
organisation  and  conf7ontation  with CMDT  have  resulted in tangible  benefits4”. 
Finally,  the  mentioning  of  the  abolition  of  repression by the forestry  service  reveals  a  clear  south- 
north  pattern:  roughly  speaking,  the  further  south  the  village  is  situated,  the  more  abundant 
natural  resources are, and  the  more  often  the  change  of  the  forestry  service  is  mentioned.  While 
in the  southern  villages  Chikme,  N’golokasso  and  Nafegue 50-60% of  respondents  highlight  the 
stop  of  repression  by  the  forestry  service,  only  a minority in  northern  villages  such as Sinkolo, 
Sicina and  Dossorola  mentions this among  most  important  changes. 
It  seems,  thus,  that  the  hypothesis  about  different  views of the  state  being  held by the  population 
in  different  parts of the  region has been confiied. The  north-south  difference is reflected  in 
In Koloni an onping conflict  on inheritance of the  position  of  village  chief is dividing  the  village in two.  Personal 
comments  further  Illustrate  the  negative  assessment  of  the  situation:, D e  uis la chute du rigime de Moussa,  tout 
Ibrdre social  est  &stabilisi,  c ‘est d? trouble  social  partout” (Kolom no.4 Ye me ripzte: il n ) a pas de  cohdsion 
dnns le  village. Depuis la chute  de  regime Momsa, on n’a m vu  du  respect, on assiste setdement a des tiraillements 
des  ddsaccords.  m&encentesperp&uelles dam rout le vi P lage” (Koloni 110.21) 
In Dossorola a conflict between the lineage having established the village and late comers are seriously 
threatening  social  stability. Ye p a  due 9ue depuis  la  chute  du  rigirne  Moussa nous n ‘avons plus eu une air sur 
leplan iconornique. N m  nbonspas d entente dam le villa  e, m n’avom amsipas  dmgent”@ossoro&no.1). 
S’iI y a  l’entente dam le villa e j e  eta e s p i r ~  la &cenha%ationpeut  marcher. S‘il n ) apas d’eniente  tel que 
chez nous et que c ’est  le chef% v d g e  ou un vzllageoh  qui h i t  ricupprer les impts, ca va mal  tourner,  il y aurait 
des r&icents etfinalementpersonne ne vapayer. Avec  quoi les villageois vontgerer leur vie?’’ (Dossorola no.19). 
It  should be noted that the  time  lag  of  one y ar between interviews  in  Molobala  and Klda (early 1996) and in the 
other  villages (late 1994) may  have  affected  the results. The  process  of p 7  anng ,. , rural communes  during 1995 may 
have  made  the’inhabitants  in Klda and  Molobala  observe  an  increased o lhcal  mvolvement  of  the PO ulation  that 
was less visible  in the autumn  of 1994 (see also the  discussion of pro g lems  related  to  the timing of tR e  survey in 
’Fieldwork  methodology  and  literature  study’  in the annex). 
The new self confidence  of  villagers is reflected in the following  statement by a  respondent in KMlat ‘Zes 
villa eois n’ont plus p e w  depmler de certains  choses  au  chefd‘arrondissernent. Maintenant,  nous pouvons dire 
au c L f darrondissement de se patienter, nom a t t e d e  un peu avant de trouver de I ‘argent p o w  I’irnp6t” (Klda 
110.28). 
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opposing views held by on the one hand respondents in villages characterised by internal 
conflicts,  and  on  the  other  hand,  respondents  in  villages  characterised by ocial  cohesion.  While 
the first express  a  high  degree  of  political  authority,  the  latter  express  a  high  degree  of  social 
reciprocities at the community level. The most interesting finding from the investigation, 
however,  is  that  ‘civil  norms’  are  conditioned  neither by the  experience  of  a  large  degree  of 
uncertainty  nor  by  the  experience  of  social  stability.  Instead  it  seems to be  conditioned by  the 
experience  of  being  part of a movement  which has managed  to  put  organised  demands  on  the 
state  and  having  seen the demands  being  (partly)  accommodated. 
11.3. Existence of a  class or ethnically  based  political  potential 
The last  approach  suggested  in  chapter 4 to  identify  societal  forces  with  a  particular  political 
potential  is  to  carry  out an analysis  of class and  ethnic  relations. 
Overt ethnic tensions  appear  to be limited in the  region,  and  the  information  on  the  issue  is  very 
scarce:  in  the  available  literature  there  are  virtually  no  references to relations  among  the  various 
ethnic  groups. As fixthemore the  village  survey  did  not  investigate  the thnic background of 
respondents, it is  not  possible  to  carry  out  a  proper  analysis. 
A rough  estimation  of  the  issue,  however,  would  suggest that to  the  extent hat ethnic  differences 
affect  ongoing  political  changes  in  the  region,  it  is as a  factor  reinforcing  the  differences  between 
the  northern  and  the  southern  part  of  the  region. In chapter 8 it  was  described  how  increased 
conflicts  between  generations  in  the  Minyanka  community  dominating  the  northern part of the 
region  have  let  to  a  higher  rate of breaking  up  extended  families  into  smaller  units than it  is  the 
case in the  southern  Senoufo-dominated  area.  The  importance of lineage  structures as decision- 
making  units  in  the Minyanka  community  seems  to  be  on  the  decline,  while  in  the  Senoufo 
community  lineage  structures  are  still  very  important.  Authority  of  village-level  authorities is 
more  often  challenged  in  the  Minyanka  community  than in the  Senoufo  community,  and  the 
process of breaking  up  village  associations  is  considerably  more  pronounced in the  north. 
While a different  level  of  integration  into  the  cotton  economy  appears  to  be the major  reason  for 
the  striking  geographical  differences, it is most  likely  that  they  have  been  reinforced by the 
various  characteristics of the  social  organisation  among  the  two  dominating  ethnic  groups.  What 
seems  less  likely,  however,  is  that  ethnic  identities  play  a  role  for  political  mobilisation  in 
opposition  to  other  ethnic  groups.  There  are no political  parties,  thus,  with a clear  identity as 
either  Minyanka or Seno~fo-based~~~, and  although  conflicts  at  village-level  between  descendants 
of the first inhabitant  and  latecomers  may  reflect  ethnical  differences,  there  are  no  signs  that  these 
are  being  used to form  e.g.  a  Minyanka-based  movement  claiming  rights  vis-&vis  other  groups. 
As regards  the  possibility  of  finding class-basedpolitical identities, the  analysis  of  socioeconomic 
differentiation in  chapter 7 showed  that  marked  differences  exist  between  large-scale  cotton 
producers and poorer  households  which  for  lack  of  equipment  and  draught  animals  are  forced  to 
cultivate  manually. 
49’ The,politi,dparty UDD has its -&old in Koutiala and is considered an exam le of a  regionally-based arty 
There IS no mdmtlon, however,  that  It IS perceived of nelther  by its members nor g y  others as a Mmyanka-lased 
Party. 
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Moreover, the analysis  in  chapter 10 pointed to a  general  extension  bias  for all agencies  favouring 
better-off  households  at  the  expense  of  the  poor.  The  negative  assessment  by  poor  farmers  of 
extension  services  further  suggests  that  perceptions f the  state may be  class-conditioned,  hence 
class  might  be  an  identiw  used  for  political  mobilisation. 
And finally,  the  analysis  of  the  fanners'  movement  suggested  that  a  certain  divide  between 
better-off  and  poorer  farmers  may  characterise  the  movement.  Large-scale  cotton  producers  seem 
to  be  well  represented in the  board,  and  political  priorities  (i.e.  the  concentration  on  cotton  and 
input  prices)  mainly  reflect  their  interests. 
Class-based  differences  in  attitudes  towards  the  state,  however,  are  difficult  to  identify  in  the 
village  survey.  The  only  clear  tendency is  that group-d  respondents  generally  prefer  a  relatively 
more  interventionist  state  and a more  limited  role of the  village  than  other  groups.  Differences 
in  answers  given by the  three  other  groups  (group  a-c-respondents)  are  insignificant,  and  these 
are  therefore  presented  in only one  line  in  table 11.3 below. 
Table 11.3. Share of respondents in group a-c and group d who want  the  state o be  the sole - -  
For each of a range of tasks without involving the village 3opulation n= 319). 
PRICE E r n -  
ATIONS 
SION NEGOTI- 
MAN". OF INVEST- MEDIA- MEDIA- DEF. OF 
NRMRULES TKX'JIN TION IN MEWS LAW AND 
ORDER 
- -  
*) W*) OTHER 
CONFLICT CONFLICTS 
17-21% 17-22Yo  17-22Yo 13-14% 5-6Yo 18-23% 21-39% 
**) 
30% 40% 35% 35% 20% 50% 50% 
*) nrm=natural  resource  management 
to be the sole responsible  for  maintenance of law  and  order 
**) group-c respondents  differ fiom group-a and -b in this respect, as 38% of groupc respondents  want  the  state 
The  deviation  of  answers  given by  group-d  respondents from those  given  by  other  groups  of 
farmers  should  probably  be  explained  by  the  general  uncertainty  that  these  farmers  face.  Although 
the state  does  not  provide  them  with  very  much  assistance  and  although  their  assessment  of 
government  agencies is negative  (ref.  chapter lo), the alternative  that  the  state  should  retreat  or 
seek a closer  collaboration  with  village  populations  does  not  appear to be  very  attractive.  Group-d 
farmers  have  no  illusions  about  their own influence  in  village  power  politics  and  might  therefore 
prefer  that  a  village-extemal  agent  such as the  state  makes  decisions  about  management Of na ural 
resources,  conflict  resolution,  etc. 
Answers to the question  about the three  most  important  changes  since 1991 reveal a similar 
pattern where group-d fanners, to some extent together with group-c farmers, distinguish 
themselves from better-off  respondents.  It is notable  that  the  tendency  in  table 1 1.4 below  is 
exactly  the  inverse of the  tendency  in  table 11.2 where  answers to the same  question  were 
grouped  according to village  background  of  respondents. h table 11.4, thus,  the  mentioning  of 
political  changes  does  not  seem  to be  influenced  by  socioeconomic  background,  whereas  the 
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mentioning  of  economic  changes  (price  increase  and  reduced  taxes)  varies  according to the 
socioeconomic  background  of  respondents. 
Table  11.4.  Most important changes  after  1991,  according  to  socioeconomic  background of 
spondents (S 
group-a 
group-b 
group-c 
~ 
group-d 
I It appears fiom 1 
are of the  group in % of the  total  group) ( ~ 3 1 2 ) .  
PRICE  INCREASE  REDUCED TAXES REPRESSION BY 
DEVAJSJATION 
FREEDOM  DISORDER AFTER THE FORESTRY 
POLITICAL SOCIAL 
*) 
41% 46% 3 6% 
11% 21%  39%  39%  39% 
6%  16% 
SERVICE HAS 
STOPPED 
51% 31% 38% 
: answers that respondents refer to a  price  increase of consumer goods and  agricultural  inputs 
0% 20%  65% I 30%  10% 
9%  17% 
As seen  from  table 11.4, a  very  large  share  of  poorer  farmers,  and  notably of group-d  farmers, 
mention  the  price  increase  after  devaluation  of  the CFA in  January 1994. Poorer  farmers  are 
believed  to  have  been  particularly  hard  hit  by  the 50% devaluation  because  they  are  forced  to  buy 
a  large  share  of  the  food  consumed,  and  because  the  compensation in th   form of  increased  cotton 
prices has  benefited  mainly  larger  producers @kb6  et  al., 1995a). In addition to this they  are 
generally  more  vulnerable to major  economic  changes  because  of  the  lack  of ef icient coping 
mechanisms  in  the  form  of  diversified  income  strategies,  etc.  (ref.  the  discussion in chapter 7). 
The difficult  economic  situation of  group-d  and  group-c  farmers  makes them less inched to 
mention  the tax reduction  decided by the  new  democratic  government  among  the  major  changes. 
The  reduction is obviously  more  appreciated  by  better-off  farmers  who  generally  have  larger 
households  and  therefore f el the impact  of  a  reduced  person-based tax much  more. 
While  the  village survey constitutes an insufficient  basis  for  drawing  any  clear  conclusions  about 
the  existence  of  a  class  based  or ethnically based political potential, it seems to suggest  that o the 
extent  such  a  potential  exists,  it is rather to be  found  among  better-off than among  poorer  farmers. 
Although  poor  fanners  have  a  negative  assessment  of  government  agencies,  they  do  not  express 
any interest in changing  present  state and society  relations. As an interest group they have  a 
limited  potential  for  putting  demands  on  the  state  and  a  limited  interest  in  replacing  state  authority 
by a  larger  involvement  of  village-level  decision-making  structures  where  their own 
representation is poor.  Better-off  fanners,  on  the  other  hand, may have  achieved an economic 
position  that  no  longer  makes  them  accept  to  be a politically marginal group.  Their  present  focus 
on economic  issues may  develop  into an interest in political  influence  either through the  farmers’ 
movement  or through the  various  political  parties  trying  to  gain  support in rural  areas. 
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Conclusion 
The  application  of  the  conceptual  framework  suggested in chapter 4 to  the  investigation  of  social 
forces  in the Sikasso  region has resulted  in  the  identification  of  several  sets  of  societal  forces 
which  appear to have  a  potential  for  influencing  state  and  society  relations. 
The  farmers’  movement  has  an  obvious  potential  for  becoming  such  a  force.  Conditions  for  its 
emergence  have  been  favourable,  and  achievements by  SYCOV  are  already  significant. As it 
appeared  both  from  descriptions in this chapter  and  from  the  analysis  of  CMDT  in  chapter 9, 
organised  demands  put  on  CMDT  by  the  organisation  have  forced  the  agency  to  change  the  way 
it  relates  to  farmers.  Even  before  the  emergence  of  SYCOV as an  organised  force,  farmers  were 
able  to  influence  CMDT  and  take  advantage  of the gradually  increased  openness ofthe agency 
towards demand pressures. Whether the farmers’ movement will be able to follow up the 
immediate  successes by continuously  putting  pressure on CMDT to accommodate the interests 
of  farmers,  also  when  they  differ  from  those  of the agency,  depends  on  its  possibility  of  keeping 
a  certain  distance to CMDT, i.e. avoid  co-optation,  and of its  possibility  to  stay  united.  None  of 
these  conditions can be  taken  for  granted, and in particular the analysis  suggested  that  there  may 
be a  risk of  an  internal  division in the  organisation  between  better-off  farmers  who  dominate  the 
leadership  and  poorer  farmers  who  do  not  feel  that  their  interests  are  being  represented. 
Whether  SYCOV will qualify for  the  designation  of  a  civil  association  in  the  sense that it  ngages 
the state depends  on  whether  it  will  manage to  widen  priorities.  What  presently  seems to be a 
focus  on  economic  issues  must  be  extended  to  include  also  broader  political  issues  concerning 
relations  between  state  and  farmers. A very  close  collaboration  between  its  leadership  and  CMDT 
would  tend  to turn priorities  away  from  more  fundamental  political  demands,  whereas  a  certain 
autonomy  may  allow  the  economically  powerful  cotton  producers  to  transfer  their  economic 
power  into  demands  for  more  political  influence. 
While it still  seems  difficult to  assess  the  potential  of  SYCOV as an association  of  influencing 
more  fundamental  relations  between  state  and  society, it appeared  from  the  analysis  of  views  of 
the  state that its  more  indirect  influence  may  be  significant. Thus, the  experience  of  some  farmers 
of  having  successfully  been  able to put  organised  demands  on  a  government  agency has generated 
a view  of the state that may be  described as ‘civil noms’, i.e. the view  that it is possible  to 
influence the state through collaboration  with  its  agencies. 
The  north-south  difference  expected  to  affect the views of the  state  was  clearly  reflected  in  the 
results  of  the  village  survey,  but  answers  obtained  did  not  suggest  that  any  of  the  two  population 
groups as such  have  a  particular  potential  for  changing  relatiom be een state  and  society. Thus, 
the  high  level  of  political  authority  expressed by respondents in northern  villages  does  not  point 
to much  more than a  demand  for  maintenance of status quo or  maybe  even  a  wish  for  a  reversal 
of time to reintroduce  the  highly  interventionist state of the former  regime. The high  level of 
social  reciprocities  expressed by respondents in southern  villages,  on  the  other  hand,  points  to 
preferences for disengagement  strategies  which,  although  influencing  the  relationship  between 
state  and society, do  not  increase the political  influence  of  those  who  apply  the  strategies. 
The  analysis  of a class  or  ethnically  based  political  potential  was  made  difficult  by  lack  of 
substantial  data.  Results  from  the  village  survey,  however,  seemed  to  suggest  that to the  extent 
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such  a  potential  exists,  it  is  rather  to  be  found  among  better-off  farmers  than  among  the  poor. 
Poorer farmers  have  a l i i t ed  potential  of  putting  demands  on  the  state  and  a  limited  interest  in 
replacing  state  authority  by  village  power  politics,  and,  therefore,  do  not  express  any  interest  in 
changing  present  state  and  society  relations.  Better-off  farmers  did  not  distinguish  themselves  as 
a  particular goup when  asked  about  the  role  of the state,  but  the  existence  of  large-scale 
producers  who  apparently  have  found  their  way into the  leadership  of  the  farmers  movement ay 
suggest that a  group  having  achieved  a  strong  economic  position  is no longer  willing  to  accept 
being  politically  marginalised. 
While  the three entrance  points to the  analysis  of  social  identities  were  meant  to  guide  analyses 
in  three  different  directions,  a  rough  interpretation  of  their  results  points  at  a  certain  overlap.  It 
could  be  argued,  thus,  that  they  all  seem  to  support  the  perception  that  a  particular  forceful goup 
is  constituted  of  better-off  farmers  coming from the  heart  of  the  cotton-cultivation  zone,  they  have 
gained  a  leading  role  in  the  SYCOV  movement,  and  they  express  the  view  that  it  is  possible  to 
change  relations  to  the  state by  collaborating  with its  representatives. 
This uniformity  of  results can be  seen as an  indication  of liitations of  the  three  approaches.  The 
fieldwork  methodology  and  analysis  of  results  have  concentrated on ‘engagement’  whether  acted 
out  by  a  civil  association  or  expressed  as  civil  norms,  and  although  a  direct li between  norms 
and  strategies  cannot  be  established, it is  maybe  not  surprising  that  it  leads  to  the  identification 
of  the  same  social  forces. 
Against this it can be  argued  that  the  problem  relates  more  to  lack  of  appropriate  data han o  the 
usefulness  of  guidelines  suggested by  the  three  approaches.  Thus,  had  it  been  possible to  carry 
out a thorough  analysis  of  class  relations  instead  of  confining  the  analysis  to  views  on  the  state 
expressed by farmers  in  different  positions, it is  quite  likely  that  the  investigation  could  have 
resulted in a  more  differentiated  picture  of  societal  forces  in  the  region.  For  example  a  study  of 
the  dependency by poorer  farmers  on  better-off  farmers  for  employment  and  for  borrowing 
equipment could have been related to their shared identities expressed maybe through 
membership  of  the  same  religious  or  other  type  of  associations. An analysis  of  the  class  and 
ethnical  composition  of  SYCOV  members  and  notably  of  the  SYCOV  leadership  would  have 
allowed a test  of  the  hypothesis  about  an  internal  cleavage  between  better-off  and  poorer  farmers, 
and  it  could  possibly  have  resulted in the  identification  of  ethnically-based  societal  forces  despite 
the  lack  of  apparent  signs  of  their  existence.  Finally,  analysis  of  other  associations  than  SYCOV, 
e.g.  women’s  groups,  parents’  associations  and  the  hunters’  association,  could  have  resulted  in 
the possible  identification  of  societal  forces  that  are  not  related  to  class in the  sense of shared 
identities developed around conflicting interests and lifestyles resulting from income and 
occupation  (ref.  the  discussion i  chapter 3). 
Despite  the  limitations,  however,  the  analysis  in  the  present  chapter has M stressed  the highly 
heterogeneous  character  of  societal  forces  in  the  region  which  neither  the  interactive  approach  nor 
organisation  theory  provide  any  appropriate  tools  to  deal  with.  Chapter 7 and 8 described  the 
different  conditions  for  the  population  with  regard  to  agro-ecological  conditions,  socioeconomic 
situation,  and  political  and  social  organisation. I  chapter 10 it  was  shown  that  extension  agencies 
contribute  to  both  socioeconomic  inequalities  and  differences  among  villages,  and  it  was  found 
that  different  people  relate  differently  to  the  agencies.  Analyses  is thi  chapter  have  suggested  that 
different  conditions  have  implications  not just for the direct  relationship  between  individual 
228 
farmers  and  the  agencies  but  also  for  the  more  general  perception  of  the  state  held by various 
groups  of  the  population. Thus, when  extension  agencies as state  representatives  provide  services 
to the  population,  they  meet  people  whose  willingness  to  collaborate  differ  considerably.  While 
some  consider the state  the  sole  source  of  wealth  and are eager  to  get as much  assistance as 
possible,  others  consider the state and its agencies  parasites  on  the  rural  population  unable  to 
provide  anything useM to  farmers.  And stil others are willing  to  collaborate  on  the  condition  that 
they  can  influence  the  way  the  interaction  takes  place. 
The different  pressures  from  societal  forces  have  implications  both  for  the  agencies  and  for  the 
more  fundamental  relations  between  state  and  society.  They  are  partly a result  of  previous 
interaction  with  the  state  such as in  the Sikasso case  the  integration into the  cotton  economy 
promoted  by CMDT and the support by the same  agency  to he development  of  organisational  and 
technical  capacities  of  farmers  to  put  a  new  type  of  pressure  on  state  representatives.  But  societal 
processes,  e.g. the rapid  social  and  political  changes  at  village-level  in  the  Koutiala  area,  also 
have  their own dynamics  and  significantly  influence  both  perceptions  and  strategies  vis-&-vis  the 
state. 
229 
CONCLUSION TO THE  EMPIRICAL  SECTION 
The  empirical  objective  of  the  dissertation has been  to  illustrate  and  further  explore  the  theoretical 
fiamework  established  in  the first section. This has been  done  by  identifying  explanations  for  the 
different  experience  of  interaction  between  farmers  in  the Sikasso region  and  four  extension 
agencies  all  referring  to  the  same  government  ministry. 
The  objective has been  dealt  with by studying  pressures  put  on  street-level  bureaucracies  in  each 
of  the  four  agencies and by assessing  how  these  pressures  affect  the  performance of the agencies 
(i.e  their  ability  to  accommodate  farmers’  demands). 
Subsequently this analysis  has  been  put  in  perspective  by an analysis ofthe character  of  social 
forces in the  Sikasso  region  which  interact  with and  influence  the  four  agencies. 
The research questions which  have  guided the analysis  are: 
Is the  Malian  action  environment  dysfunctional to development  in the sense  that  government 
agencies  are  doomed  to  poor performme, regardless  of  their  various  organisation-specific 
characteristics? 
2) Is the institutional  context  of  the  public  sector  in  Mali  dysfunctional  to  development? 
3) What  are the constraints  imposed  on  government  agencies  by  the  task  network? 
4) For  each  of  the  four  agencies  under  study:  what  are  their  characteristics  with  regard to  the  six 
performance-conditioning factors:  authority,  rewards,  organisational  identification,  peer  pressure, 
work  satisfaction and  demand  pressure? 
5) To what  extent  are  the  agencies  able  to  accommodate  farmers’  demands? 
6) What  is the economic,  social and  political  context of  the  Sikasso  region? 
7) What  are  the  societal  forces  of  particular  importance  in  the  Sikasso  region? 
In the following these questions are answered by summarising conclusions to each of the 
chapters. This account  together  with  the summary of  conclusions  to  the  theoretical  section 
provide the basis  for  the  final  conclusion.  Instead of  repeating  the  chapter-by-chapter s u m m a r y  
of conclusions, the final conclusion presents conclusions concerning main points of the 
theoretical  framework  for  analysis  of  state-society  relations  and  illustrates  them  by  reference  to 
empirical  findings. 
In chapter 5 the first question has been answered negatively: although the Malian action 
environment is far  from  favourable,  present  positive  trends in both  the  political  and  economic 
development  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  it  is  not  completely  dysfunctional  to  development.  The 
general  legitimacy  of  the  government  has  been  challenged by difficulties in the  recent  election 
process, but in a historical perspective the present regime appears to enjoy a legitimacy 
considerably  above that fallen  to  the  lot of its predecessors.  The  most  serious  challenge to public 
sector  performance  derived  from  the  action  environment  is  the  low  level  of  human  resource 
development,  reflected  in  health and  educational  standards  among  the  poorest in the world. 
The  conclusion  to  the  next  step in the  analysis  of  the  shared  environment  of the agencies,  the 
analysis  of the  institutional  context of the public sector in chapter 6 is  less  promising.  The 
budgetary  support  is  very  low and is  likely  to  negatively  affect  the  general  performance  of 
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government  agencies.  Low salaries and  retrenchment of staff resulting in poor  motivation  and  in 
a  relatively  widespread  corruption  are  critical  parameters  which  individual  agencies  may find it
extremely  difficult  to  overcome. A historical  heritage  in  the  form  of  a  generally  centralised  and 
hierarchical institutional set-up provides a poor basis for responsiveness by the various 
government  agencies  to  demands  raised by their clients. In chapter 9 it was  found  that  the 
institutional  context  of  the  public  sector is seriously  constraining  the  performance  of two of  the 
agencies,  the  forestry  service  and  the  livestock  service,  while  it  is  detrimental  to  the  performance 
of  the  cooperative  service.  Only CMDT is  not  seriously  affected  because  its  mixed  status as both 
a  public  agent  of  the  Ministry  of Rural Development  and  Environment  and  a  private  sector  actor 
gives it access to more plentiful resources and possibility to define its own performance- 
enhancing  employment  conditions. 
The  portrait  in chapter 7 and 8 of  the economic,  social andpolitical context of the S i h s o  region 
has questioned  the  widely  held  picture  of  it as one of  the  most  prosperous  regions in the country 
having  favourable  conditions  for  agriculture  and  income  levels  above the national  average. 
Whereas the position as the leading cotton- and food producing region in the country is 
undeniable,  and  very  high  incomes  in certain households  have  been  documented,  social  inequality 
and  the  existence  of a group  of  poor  fanners are reflected in relatively  modest  social  indicators. 
The  two  chapters  describe two main  lines  of  division  of  the  population:  a  geographical  division 
between the northern  Koutiala  area  and  the  southern  Kadiolo  area,  and  a  socioeconomic  division 
which  cuts  across  the  region  and  reflects  the  highly  different  situation  of  large-scale  mechanised 
cotton-producers  and  small-scale  producers  who  cultivate  manually. 
Socioeconomic  differentiation  processes  to a large  extent  seem to be l i e d  to  the  integration  into 
the  cotton  economy  that has left  small-scale  producers  in a vicious  circle:  for  lack  of own 
equipment  they  have  to  borrow from better-off  households  against  repayment  in  the  form  of 
manual  labour. This reduces  their  already  limited  labour  force  and  thereby  their  income  from 
cotton  cultivation.  Large-scale  producers,  on the other  hand,  usually  have  both  a  high  level  of 
mechanisation  and  better  access  to  labour. 
Also the  north-south  division  seems l i e d  to the integration  into  the cotton economy, as the 
earlier  introduction  of  commercial  cotton  cultivation  in  the  northern  part of  the  region  has 
reinforced differences relating to availability of natural resources, population pressure and 
characteristics of the social  organisation  by the Minyanka in the north and the Senoufo in the 
south. A marked  reflection  of  the  differences is that  presently  changes  in  family  structures, 
lineage structures and in village-level relations are very rapid in the northern area where 
authorities  at all levels  are  being  questioned,  whereas  in the southern  area  village  and  family 
leaders  to a large  extent  have  maintained  their  authority. 
The  brief  assessment  of  the task  network of the four  agencies  in chapter 9 found that it  is  very 
poor. This is  reflected in the virtual absence  of  collaboration  among  the  agencies,  many  overlaps 
in  their  activities  and  many  gaps  not  covered  by any of  them. 
The  thorough  analysis  in chpter 9 of organisation-specijc factors conditioningperformance has 
generally  confirmed  that  the  factors  tend ‘to go together’:  while  in CMDT many  of  the  factors are 
present  and the performance is believed  to  be  relatively high, the other  agencies  are  suffering 
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from  varying  levels  of  poor  performance  because  the  existence of  one  or  a  few  of  the  factors 
cannot  compensate  for  lack  of  the  rest. Thu , a  high  level  of  discretion  of  front-line staff without 
demand  pressure (m the  livestock  service  and  the  cooperative  service)  does  not  necessarily  result 
in increased  performance,  and  if  all  other  conditions  for  good  performance  are  absent,  the 
experience  of  the  forestry  service  shows thata sudden  demand  pressure will result in little  more 
than  perplexity. 
Exceptions  to this are the  cases  where  only  a  few  performance-enhancing  conditions  are  found, 
and  where  agencies or particular  parts of  the  agencies  me  able  to  perform  well  against  otherwise 
hard  odds.  The  most  notable  example is the  cooperative  service  where a previously  strong 
organisational  identification by staff has survived  the  comedown  of  the  organisation  and  has  the 
potential  of  being  converted  into  new  work  satisfaction  for  the staff, once  they  obtain  the  financial 
means  to  reestablish  relations  to  clients. Also the  work  satisfaction  of  livestock  agents  based  in 
villages demonstrates this. Despite the absence of a performance-related reward system, 
organisational  identification  and  peer  pressure,  village-based  livestock  agents  often  find  a  basic 
work  satisfaction  in  having  close  relations  to  clients,  and  apparently  they  are  able to accommodate 
farmers’  demand. 
A comparison  of the four  agencies  shows  that  a  core  organisational  structure  based on the 
mechanical  model m y  develop in many  different directions, depending on the  resources  available 
and  the  demand  pressure  faced.  CMDT  illustrates  a  mechanical  model  which  has  gradually 
become  less  mechanical by incorporating  some  learning  from  farmers  and  experience  of  field 
agents. The livestock service and CAC represent organisations which have become less 
mechanical mainly by default, because the management level does not have the resources 
necessary  to  maintain  authority. And the forestry  service  represents an extreme  example of a 
mechanical  organisation  which  has  not  developed  at  all  during  very  many  years.  The  total  absence 
of external pressures has allowed it to settle into a mechanical rut and left it completely 
unprepared  for  any  demands  to  adjust. 
It is believed that a main reason  for the difference  between CMDT and the other  agencies is the 
fact  that it has an economic  imperative  to  produce  cotton  at  low  costs  and  provide  a  service  that 
farmers  request  because  of  their  economic  interest in cotton  cultivation.  The  other  agencies  have 
until  recently  have  been  ensured  a  certain  allocation  of  funds  regardless  of  their  performance,  and 
only  the  livestock  service  offers  an  assistance  that  farmers  perceive  of as economically  useful. 
The particular  type of pressure on CMDT has forced  it  to  be  more  flexible  and  open  to  demands 
by farmers  than  other  agencies.  Whereas  part  of  the CMDT success  story  is  explained by its 
access  to  resources  which  the  other  agencies  do  not  have  due  to  their  dependency  on  a  poor  state, 
the  other  part  of  the  story  relates  to the particular  character  of  demand  pressures  on  the  agency. 
The  analysis  confirms  the  understanding of the  state as a  complex  structure  composed  of  many 
different  parts  all  pulling  in  different  directions.  The  four  agencies  illustrate how different 
strategies  are  pursued by different  parts of the  state  not just with  regard  to  their  day-to-day 
activities  but  with  regard  also  to  their  more  fundamental  relation  to  societal  forces.  While CMDT 
is pursuing an engagement  strategy  aiming  to  influence  virtually  every  possible  aspect  of rural 
lie, the  strategy  of  the  cooperative  service  exemplifies  a  disengagement  strategy.  Even within the 
same  agency  different  strategies  may  be  pursued.  Livestock  agents  based  in  villages  actively 
232 
address  the  population  and  are  available  for  requests  any  time,  day  or  night.  Office-based  agents, 
on the other  hand,  have  given  up and have  to  be  given  ‘incentives’  to  work. 
At  the  same  time  the  analysis  confirms  that  it  is  not  appropriate  to  treat  government  agencies  only 
as  individual  organisations. In addition to the dependency by three of the agencies on the 
institutional  context  of  the  public  sector,  they  all  share  a  dependency  of  the  overall  legitimacy  of 
the  state.  To  a  varying  extent all agencies  have  been  affected  by  the  change  of  regime  in  1991  and 
the subsequent  challenge  of  state  authority.  The  forestry  service  obviously  represents  the  most 
outstanding  case, as it virtually  collapsed  when  the  regime that protected it was toppled. The 
general  upsurge  in  popular  manifestations  and  the  countrywide  prosecution  of  forestry staff 
contributed to inspire confrontations between farmers and CMDT a few months after ‘les 
bvbements’ in March 199 1. Less  spectacular  expressions  of  agency  dependency  on  the  overall 
legitimacy  of  the  state  are the complaints by  all  agencies  that it has become  more  difficult  to  make 
farmers  attend  extension  sessions and  comply  with  their  advice. 
The presentation in chapter 10 of farmers’ assessment of the ability of the agencies to 
accommodate  their  demands  largely  confirms  the  conclusions  with  regard  to  performance  of  the 
agencies  made in chapter  9.  According  to  farmers,  CMDT  is  clearly  the  agency  which  provides 
the most extensive and most useful service, while the ability of the livestock service to 
accommodate  farmers’  demands  seems  somehow  more  varying.  The  performance  of  the  forestry 
service is poor,  and  the  performance by the  cooperative  service  is  extremely  poor. 
In l i e  with their assessment  of  services,  farmers  simultaneously  pursue  many  different  strategies 
and are obviously  very  selective  regarding  the  agencies  with  which  they  wish  to  collaborate.  The 
strategy by most  farmers  vis-&vis  the  forestry  service  and  the  cooperative  service  are  best 
described as disengagement  strategies,  whereas  the  majority  of  farmers  are  extremely  interested 
in  contact to CMDT,  and many are  interested  also  in  the  assistance  offered  by  the  livestock 
service. 
The most important finding from the village survey is that there is a marked social and 
geographical  inequality  in the distribution  of  services:  without  exception  extension  agencies in 
Sikasso tend to concentrate on better-off  farmers  at  the  expense  of the poor.  Furthennore,  all 
agencies  tend to favour  and  disfavour  the  same  villages.  Assessments  of  services  provided  by  the 
agencies,  accordingly,  depend  on  who  among  the  clients  are  being  asked. 
The  social  bias  in  service  provision  is  believed  to  reinforce  the  already  marked  socioeconomic 
differences in the  region.  Farmers  constitute a very  heterogeneous goup both  with  regard  to 
socioeconomic  onditions  and  with  regards  to their  strategies  vis-&vis  government 
representatives. In one end of  the  spectrum,  agencies  relate  to  better-off  farmers  eager  to  take  their 
advice  and able to  apply  it  to  solve  the  problems  they  have.  These  farmers  meet  extension staff 
with a firm belief in their right to receive assistance and the possibility  of  paying  for it if 
necessary.  And  in  the  other  end  of  the  spectrum,  agencies ar  dealiig with  poor  farmers  who  lack 
the  equipment  necessary  to  make  use  of  their  advice,  who  are  reluctant  to  ask  for  assistance  for 
fear  of  being  turned  away,  and  who  are  unable  to pay  for  services.  Apart fiom CMDT  none  of  the 
agencies  appear  to  have  taken this heterogeneity  into  account  in  their  extension  strategies,  and  in 
the  case  of  CMDT  the  declared  policy  to  reach  all  farmers  by  providing  four  different  messages 
to  farmers in different  situations  seems  not  to  work. 
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The  concentration  of  extension  contacts  on  certain  villages  is  explained by the  inclusion of four 
villages  in  a  donor-funded  natural  resource  management  project.  The  fact  that  a  relatively  modest 
donor-funded  programme can make a significant  difference  to  the  assistance  received  in  project 
and  non-project  villages  draws  the  attention to the  importance  of  project  and  programme-funded 
activities  even in a  privileged  region  such as Sikasso. In other  regions,  almost  entirely  depending 
on  project-funded  activities,  the  distribution  of  services  among  villages  can  be  expected  to  be 
even  more  skewed. 
Chapter I 1  which  puts  the  analysis  of  the  performance of  the  four  agencies  into  perspective  by 
discussing societal forces  ofparticular importance  in  the Sikasso region found that many such 
forces  are at play. 
The  analysis  of  SYCOV,  the  farmers’  movement  shows  that  it has an  obvious  potential  for 
becoming such a force.  Conditions  for its emergence  have  been  favourable,  and  its  achievements 
are already significant. An assessment of possibilities for describing SYCOV as a civil 
association in the  sense  that it engages  the  state,  however,  points  to  the  conclusion that this 
depends  on  a  number  of  decisive  factors.  These  include its ability  to  avoid  being  co-opted by 
CMDT, its  ability  to  avoid  an  internal  cleavage  between  leadership  and  members,  and  its  ability 
to  widen  priorities  from  what  presently  seems  to  be a focus  on  economic  issues  to  include  also 
broader  political  issues  concerning  relations  between  state  and  farmers. 
In the search for social forces with a particular set of ‘civil norms’ it was found that the 
population in the northm part  of  the  region  generally  express a high  level  of  political  authority, 
whereas  respondents  from  southern  villages  express  a  high  level of social  reciprocities. This is 
explained  partIy by the  dependence of the  population  in  the  north on cotton  production  and 
thereby  on  government  price  policies  and  services  provided  by  extension  agencies,  and  partly  by 
the  general  social  turbulence  in this part of  the  region  which  has  made  many  people  doubt  the 
capacity  of  village  level  structures. Contrq to this, the  population in the  southern  area  is  still 
economically oriented towards Cate d’Ivoire, hence less dependent on the Malian state. 
Moreover, the fact  that  traditional  authorities  have  maintained  their  position  make  respondents 
in  these  villages  more  inclined  to  believe  that  they  can  do  without  the  state. 
While  none  of  the  two  groups  express  ‘civil  norms’ in the  sense  that  they  believe  that  they  can 
intluence  relations  between  state  and  society b  collaborating  with  government  agencies,  such 
norms  were  found  among  respondents in  villages  which  have  an  experience  with e farmers’ 
movement,  SYCOV. 
Finally,  results from  the  village  survey  seem  to  suggest  that  to  the  extent  a  class or ethnic  based 
political  potential  exists,  it s rather to be  found  among  better-off  farmers than among  the  poor. 
Poorer  farmers  have a limited  potential  for  putting  demands  on the state  and a limited  interest  in 
replacing  state  authority by  village  power  politics.  Therefore,  they  do  not  express  any  interest  in 
changing  present  state-  society  relations.  Better-off  farmers  do  not  distinguish  themselves a  a 
particular  group  when  asked  about  the  role  of  the  state,  but  the  existence  of  large-scale  producers 
who  apparently  have  found  their  way  into  the  leadership  of  the  farmers  movement  may  suggest 
that a group  once  having  achieved  a  strong  economic  position w ll no  longer  be  willing  to  accept 
to  be  politically  marginalised. 
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CONCLUSION 
The theoretical objective of  the  present  dissertation has been  the  establishment  of  a  conceptual 
framework to  explain  differences  in  interaction  between  government  agencies  and  their  clients. 
In the introduction it was  formulated  as  a  hypothesis  that  differences  result  from  a  variety  of 
pressures  being  exerted  upon  each  of  the  agencies.  Thus,  interaction  processes  and  outcomes  are 
seen  as  being  determined by individual  agency  characteristics, by their  characteristics as being 
part  of  the  abstract state, and by the social forces with which  they  interact. 
It has  been the  empirical  objective to  illustrate  and  further  explore  the  theoretical  framework by 
identifymg  explanations  for  the  different  experience  of  interaction  between  farmers in the  Sikasso 
region  and  four  extension  agencies  all  referring  to  the  same  government  ministry. 
The empirical objective has been dealt with by studying pressures put on sireet-level 
bureaucracies  in  each  of the four  agencies  and  by  assessing  how  these  pressures  affect  agency 
performance  (i.e.  their  ability to  accommodate  farmers’  demands). This analysis has been  put in 
perspective by  an  analysis  of  the  character  of  the  societal  forces  in  the  Sikasso  region  which 
interact with and  influence  the  four  agencies. 
Systematic  accounts  of  conclusions  to  each  of  the  chapters are given  in  the  two  conclusions  to  the 
theoretical  and the empirical  section,  respectively.  While  drawing  on  these, this chapter  is  not 
structured as a  chapter-by-chapter  presentation  of  findings.  Instead,  conclusions  concerning  main 
points  of  the  theoretical  framework  for  analysis  of  state-society  relations  are  presented  and 
illustrated  by  reference  to  empirical  fmdings. 
Five main points of the framework are highlighted: 1) the concept of interaction, 2) the 
engagement-disengagement  framework, 3) the  perception  of  the  state as both  a  multiplicity  of 
structures  and a symbolic  totality, 4) the  framework  for  analysis  of  performance by  government 
agencies,  and 5) the  understanding  of  societal  forces as characterised by a wide  variety of 
movements,  networks,  groups,  cells  and  formal  and  informal  organisations of which  those  trying 
to  engage  the  state  have  a  particular  political  potential. 
After  the  presentation  of  conclusions, an assessment is made of the basis  for  conclusions.  Thus, 
limitations  of  the  theoretical  framework as a  guide  to the empirical  analysis  are  discussed,  and 
subsequently  limitations  of the empirical  case  for  illustration  and  further  exploration  of  the 
theoretical h e w o r k  are  debated.  Finally,  broader  theoretical and empirical  perspectives  of 
research  results  are  discussed. 
1. Conclusions  to  theoretical and empirical  objectives 
1.1.  The  concept of interaction 
The  point  of  departure  for  the  present  theoretical  considerations  about  African  state-society 
relations has been  dissatisfaction with the  tendency  in the general  debate  to  simpli@  issues 
(chaptev l). 
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State-oriented  theories  which  have  strongly  influenced  the  general  debate,  and  notably  the  debate 
about  Francophone  West  AIXca,  contribute  valuable  insights  to  analysis  of  the  African  state. By 
concentrating  on  the  inner  dynamics  of  the  state  and  by  explaining  societal  processes  only as 
reactions  to  state  policies  and  strategies,  however,  they  tend  to  ignore  the  influence  of  societal 
forces  on  the  state.  Furthermore,  their  assumption  that  public  employees  are  motivated  only by 
personal  interests  implies  that  state  agents  (or  in  a  wider  perspective:  state  organisations)  cannot 
be  expected  to  generate  any  major  changes  in  state-society  relations.  When  combining  the two 
assumptions, hardly any  scope  is  left  for  major  changes  in  Ajiican  state-society  relations.  society- 
oriented  theories,  on the other  hand,  suffer  from the opposite  problem: either t h ~ y  consider  the 
state  a  product  of  societal  relations  and  downplay  the  importance  of  state-internal  dynamics,  or 
they  concentrate  on  studies  of  community-level  issues  that  are  not  related  to  the  role  of  the  state. 
Also  theories  focussing  on an unfortunate  degree  of  state  autonomy  or  on  the  capture  of  either 
state  or  society  have  severe  limitations.  The  view  in  these  theories  of  state-society  relations as a 
zero-sum  game  makes it difficult  for  them  to  explain  how  social  changes  occur.  Furthermore,  they 
share  with  state-oriented  or  society-oriented  approaches  the  tendency  to  portray  the  state as an 
entity  which  relates  to  society  in  an  unequivocal  way. 
The problem  of  a  simplified  picture  of  state-society  relations is not  solved  by  contributions 
informed  by  the  strategic  relation  approach.  The  suggestion by these  theories  not  to  distinguish 
between  the  analytical  concepts  of  ‘state’  and  ‘society’  avoids  the  problems  encountered  by  the 
state  or  society-oriented  approaches  but  confuses the possibilities of identifying  interrelations. 
Agency-oriented  approaches  do  not  bring  the  analysis  much  further  either. On the  contrary,  many 
agency-oriented  contributions  narrow  the  analytical  perspective  on  state-society  relations  to 
studies  of  the  interplay  among  individuals  only. This is  seen  both  in  theories  analysing  state- 
internal  dynamics as determined  mainly by actions of  individuals  motivated by personal  interests, 
and in studies on the interplay between state representatives and farmers emphasising the 
importance  of  personal  relations  between  the  two  parties. 
The concept ofinteraction suggested  by  the  interactive  approach is considered  a  fruitful  attempt 
to  overcome  many  deficiencies  found in the  above  theories (chapter 2). The  dissertation  has 
argued  for an u n d m d m g  of the  notions  of  ‘state’  and  ‘society’ as analytically  separable  but 
deeply  interrelated  concepts.  The  state is anchored in society,  and  societal  forces  are  influenced 
by the  state,  but  they  are  not  related in any simple  and  predictable  way.  Actions  of  state  agents 
have  implications  for  society,  and  actions  of  societal  forces  have  implications  for  state  structures 
and policies. However, also ‘state-internal‘ dynamics are important factors in shaping state 
structures  and  policies,  while  ‘society-internal’  dynamics  may  occur  independently  of  the  state. 
Instead  of  a  priori  perceiving  of  state  and  society  relations as dominated  either by  the  state  or  by 
societal  forces, it is considered fiuitfid to analyse  their  mutual  interaction as being  open  to  many 
different  outcomes. 
In the  empirical d y s i s  this perception of state-society  relations was found  useful  to  understand 
the  interplay  between  extension  agencies  and  farmers in the Sikasso region.  The  analysis of  each 
of  the  four  agencies  illustrates  the  impact  of  fanners’  strategies,  but  it  also  shows  that  a  set of
important  conditions  for  the  interaction  are  defined by  state-internal  factors  related  to  budget 
allocations,  organisational  set-up,  etc. (chapter 9). Similarly,  the  impact  of  state  interventions  on 
local  communities,  most  obvious in the  form  of  integration  of  the  population  into  the  cotton 
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economy,  is  undeniable,  but  societal  forces are shaped  also by society-internal  dynamics  such  as 
the  social  and  political  Organisation at village,  lineage  and  family  level (chqter 7, 8 and 11). 
Thus, the  marked  difference  between  the  experience  of CMDT  and  that ofthe forestry  service 
represents the clearest  illustration of the importance  to  government  agencies  of  interaction w th 
societal  forces (chapter 9). Whereas  CMDT has been  met  by  demands fiom  farmers  to  adjust  and 
incorporate their experiences into its  extension  strategy,  farmers  have  shunned  the  forestry  service 
and  thereby  deprived it of the possibility  to  gradually  adjust  and  improve.  At  the Same time  a 
comparison  of  the  two  agencies  illustrates  the  importance of  onditioning  factors  not  related  to 
the  interaction  with  societal  forces.  Given  its  mixed  role as both  a  public  agent ofthe Ministry 
of  Rural  Development  and  Environment  and  a  private  sector  actor,  CMDT  has  access  to  more 
plentiful  resources,  and the agency can define its own performance-enhancing  employment 
conditions. The forestry  service,  on  the  other  hand, has experienced  a  dramatic  cut  in  resources 
and is able  to  carry  out  only  a  very  modest  donor-funded  extension  programme. 
Differences  between  the  northern  Koutiala  area  and  the  southern  Kadiolo  area  are  believed  to 
have  been  reinforced  by  the  early  integration of the  northern  part  of  the  region  into  the  cotton 
economy,  while in the  southern  part  the  production  of  cotton  only  recently  has  gained  the  same 
economic  significance as remittances  fiom  migrants  in  C6te  d’Ivoire.  These  differences,  however, 
are  not  mere  products  of  variations i  government  interventions, as the two areas differ  also with 
regard to  geographical  conditions  (the  proximity  of  the  Kadiolo  area  to  C6te  d’Ivoire),  availability 
of natural  resources,  population pressue and  not  least  social  organisation  of  the  two  different 
ethnic  groups  dominating  the areas (chapter 7 and 8). 
The  village  survey  found that the  population  in  the  north tends to have  a high degree of ‘political 
authority’, in the  sense  that  they  expect  the  state  to  solve  their  problems  and  doubt  their own 
ability  to  make  a  difference (chapter U). Respondents f?om  the south, on the  other  hand,  express 
a  high  degree  of  ‘social  reciprocities’  reflected in the  view  that  they  can  do  without  services  and 
regulation  provided  by  the  state,  while  relying  instead  on  the  capacity  of  village-level  structures. 
The  variation  of  answers  is  partly  explained by different  levels  of  actual  dependence  by  the  two 
areas on  government  agencies  for  input  and  credit  provision,  extension  services,  marketing,  etc. 
It seems to be an  equally  important  reason,  however,  that  the  northern  part  of the area is 
characterised by rapid changes in family structures, lineage structures and in village-level 
relations. This is  reflected in general  questioning  of  all  authorities  and  serious  difficulties  for 
many  village  chiefs  of maintaining their  credibility in the eyes  of  fellow  villagers. In consequence, 
many  respondents  express  doubt  about  the  ability of village-level  structures  to  become  involved 
in tasks presently  undertaken  by  government  representatives.  Contrary  to this, village  and  family 
leaders in the southem  Kadiolo  area to a large  extent  have  maintained  their  authority.  The 
population in this area,  therefore,  consider it possible  and  preferable  to  solve  most  problems  at 
village  level  without  involving  the  state. 
NSO the  socioeconomic  differentiation  cutting  across the region  is  both  a  product  of  interaction 
with  government  agencies  and  a  result  of  local  social  and  political  organisation  at  village  level 
(chapter 7). social inequalities  are  reflected  in highly different  income  situations  for  large-scale 
mechanised  cotton-producers  and  small-scale  producers  who  for  lack  of  equipment  have to 
cultivate  manually.  Not all farmers  have  the  same access to  credit  for  purchasing  equipment  and 
to  assistance from extension  agencies.  Credit  is  allocated through village  associations  and  based 
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on  a  group  guarantee  to  ensure  the  repayment  of  loans. This appears  to  result  in  a  relentless  social 
screening  of  applicants  for  credit  which  makes is extremely  difficult  for  poorer  households to  be 
considered. Concerning access to extension services, the village survey found that for all 
extension  agencies  without  exception  there  is  a  clear  tendency  to  concentrate  services  on  better- 
off  farmers  at  the  expense  of  the  poor (chapter IO). While  government  intervention, thus, seems 
to  have  reinforced  social  inequalities,  socioeconomic  differentiation  is  not  a  recent  phenomenon. 
It has  existed  long  before  the  integration  of  the  region  into  the  cotton  economy,  and  it  is  related 
also  to  societal  processes  of  change  such as t e  disintegration  of  lineage  structures  that  used  to 
ensure  a  certain  redistribution  of  wealth  between  poorer and  better-off  members  of a lineage 
(chapter 7 and 8). 
1.2. The engagement-disengagement framework 
While the concept of interaction  appears  to be  both  theoretically  satisfactory  and  empirically 
useful the  engagement-disengagement framework, developed  by  the  interactive  approach, is 
found  to  provide an appropriate  tool to point  out  some  main  tendencies  in  the  way  society  and 
state  can  relate  to  each  other (chapter 2). The  notions  of  engagement  and  disengagement  refer  to 
the  possible  strategies  pursued by  the  two  parties,  where  engagement  describes  attempts  to 
influence  the  other  party,  and  disengagement  refers  to  attempts  to  avoid  it.  Many  combinations 
are  possible:  the  state  can  adopt  engagement  strategies by  trying to regulate  social  behaviour,  and 
it can disengage from society by reducing  its ervices or  physically  withdrawing  fkom  its  territory. 
Societal  forces  can  engage  the  state  by  trying  to  influence  it  and by  demanding  services, and they 
can  withdraw from the  state  by  avoiding  contact  with  its  representatives  or  refusing  to  follow 
rules  and  regulations  issued by the  state. 
Contrary  to  the  limited  perspective  applied by theories  that  view  state  and  society  relations as a 
zero-sum  game  where  ‘one  has  to  lose  to  let  the  other  party win’, the  framework  opens  the 
possibility  of  mutual  engagement  of  state  and society, a win-win situation. It M e m o r e  
contributes  to  an  understanding  of  how  actions  by  one  party  may  generate  particular  reactions by
the  other  party. 
In the  Malian  case  the  framework  can be  used  to  portray  general  lines  of  historical  development 
in relations  between the state and the rural population (chapter 5). In the  first years after 
independence,  part  of  the  peasant  community  could  be  counted as at  least  half-hearted  supporters 
of the new  regime.  Strategies by the  state in this period  were  characterised  by  attempts  to  ensure 
social  control by ideological  mobilisation through national  and  party  identification  and  affiliation, 
i.e.  engagement  strategies.  When  government  policies  became  increasingly  exploitative  and 
repressive,  however, mutual engagement  was  replaced  by  disengagement  strategies by the rural 
population in the  form  of  black  marketing  of  agricultural  produce,  concentration  on  subsistence 
crops,  changing  the mix of  crops,  switching  to  other  income  strategies  including  migration,  etc. 
A situation  of  engagement by  the  state  and  disengagement  by  the rural population continud until 
the  economic  crisis  and structural adjustment  policies  in  the  late 1980s forced  the  state  to  retract. 
The  emergence  in  the 1990s of a number  of  farmers’  organisations,  among  these  the  SYCOV 
movement in Sikasso,  may  indicate  a  new  willingness  among  part  of  the rural population  to 
engage  the  state  with a view to change  overall  state-society  relations.  Based  on a  assessment  of 
organisational  characteristics  and  the  strategies  pursued by  SYCOV, its  character as a  ‘civil 
association’  ready  to  engage  the  state  cannot  be  fully  established.  The  village  questionnaire 
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survey,  however,  found  that  respondents  ffom  villages  considered  strongholds ofthe SYCOV 
movement  express  views  on  the  state  fairly  similar  to  those  considered  conditions  for  societal 
engagement  strategies,  i.e.  willingness to  collaborate  with  the  state  and  belief  in  possibilities  to 
influence it (chapter 11). 
Also for analysis of relations between individual extension agencies and their clients, the 
Mework  is considered  usefid (chapter 9). Strategies  pursued  by  the  four  agencies  under  study 
vary considerably  and  may  be  described  by  the  notions f e gagement  and  disengagement:  while 
CMDT is pursuing an engagement  strategy  aiming  to  influence visually every  possible  aspect  of 
rural life,  the  strategy Of the  cooperative  service  exemplifies a disengagement  strategy.  Even 
within  the  same  agency  different  strategies  may  be  pursued.  Village-based  livestock  agents 
actively address the population and are available for requests any time, day or night. 
Arrondissement-based agents, on the other hand, have given in and expect to be given 
‘incentives’  to  work. 
Like  government  agencies,  farmers  simultaneously  pursue  many  different  strategies  and  are 
obviously  very  selective  regarding  the  agencies  with  which  they  wish  to  collaborate (chap r IO). 
Services  offered  by  the  forestry  service  and  the  cooperative  service  are  considered  useful  only  by 
a  small  minority  of  farmers,  and  it  seems fair to  describe  the  strategy  by  most  farmers  vis-&vis 
these  agencies as disengagement  strategies.  The  majority  of  farmers,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
extremely  interested  in  contact  to  CMDT,  and  many  are  interested also in  the  assistance  offered 
by the  livestock  service. 
The  relationship  between  CMDT  and  the  fanners’  movement  SYCOV  illustrates  the  positive 
impact on both  state  and  societal  forces  of  mutual  engagement (chapter 9 and  chapter 11). The 
support by CMDT in the  form  of  literacy  training,  technical  assistance  and  support  to  the 
organisation  of  village  associations  has  gradually  strengthened  the  technical and  organisational 
capacity of farmers  in  the Sikasso region. Farmers’ wish  to  take  over tasks previously  undertaken 
by the  state  reflects  their  experience  of  being  able  to  manage  such tasks as the distribution  of 
inputs and collection  of  the  harvest.  The  fact  that  the  collaboration  among h e r s  at  inter-village 
level  emerged  from  the  village  associations  illustrates  how  organisational  experience  gained 
through collaboration with government agencies may be turned into new use through the 
establishment  of  independent  organisations. As explained  above,  demands  put  on  CMDT  by 
farmers,  on  the  other  hand,  have  gradually  strengthened  the  agency  by  forcing  it  to  adjust  and 
improve. 
1.3. Understanding  the  state as both  a  multiplicity of structures  and a symbolic  totality 
Understanding  the  variety of strategies  pursued  by  different  parts of  the state is facilitated by the 
perception of the  state as both a  multiplicity of siructures  and a Jymbolic totality. The  suggestion 
by the interactive  approach to disaggregate  the  concept  of  the  state  constitutes  a  useful  tool  to 
identify  its  different  parts  and,  thereby,  to  understand  the  complexity  of  the  interplay  between 
state  and  societal  agents (chapter 4). 
The  interactive  approach  suggests an ‘anthropology  of  the  state’  that  distinguishes  between  the 
different  agencies  of  the state, the  different  levels  of  the  state  apparatus,  and the individual  state 
agents,  because  pressures  exerted  upon  each  of  these  ‘state  components’  vary.  Thus,  pressures 
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faced  by front-lie M i n  the  bottom  of  the  hierarchy  differ  considerably  from  pressures  exerted 
upon the top executive  leadership.  Similarly,  each  agency has its specific  characteristics,  and 
different  conditions  are  reflected  in  different  strategies  pursued  in  the  interaction  with  societal 
forces. 
While  the  state  is  a  complex  and  multifaceted  structure, where  different  elements  are  pulling  in 
different  directions,  it  is  at  the  same  time  a  symbolic  totality.  It  is  a  discursive  construct  resulting 
from  a  combination  of  people’s  encounters  with  state  representatives  (such as e.g.  extension 
workers)  and  a  more  general  image  of  the  state  which is not  directly  related  to  its  specific 
agencies  but  can  be  based  on  experiences  with  more  indirect  interventions,  e.g.  in  the  form f 
price  and tax policies,  or  derived  from  the  handling by the  government  of  regional  conflicts  or 
international  issues.  The  particulaity of the  discursive  construct  of  the  state  relates to  its  special 
character as an organisation  that differs from  all  other  powerful  decision-making  structures  in 
society  by its claim to  represent  the  public  good,  its  request  for  hegemony,  and  its  entitlement  to 
exercise  the  powers  and  authority  needed  to  implement tha claim  (for  example amonopoly  of 
legitimate  coercion,  international  sovereignty  and  the  powers  to tax and conscript). 
The  state  depends  on  a  certain  amount of legitimacy  in  the  eyes  of  the  population  in  order  to  be 
sustained,  and  being  part  of  the  state,  each  of  its  agencies  depends  not  only on its own legitimacy 
but  also on the  overall  legitimacy of the  state  as  such. 
Disaggregating  the  state  concept  avoids  the  tendency of many  theories  to  endow  the  state  with 
an image  of  unity as a  policymaking  actor  standing  apart  from  society.  While  these  often  result 
in general  conclusions  about  ‘strong  states’  and  ‘weak  states’,  the  interactive  approach  adds  some 
much needed light and shade to analysis of the state and facilitates the understandmg of 
contradictory  state  strategies.  The  insistence  that the state is at the same time  a  totality  counters 
the  inbuilt  risk  in  organisation  theory  of  an  overly  focus  on  agencies.  If  a  state  agency  is  analysed 
as any  other  organisation,  the  analysis  will  not  be  able  to  capture  actions and  reactions  to  agency 
strategies  which  cannot  be  referred  to  its own characteristics  but  relate to the  experience by 
societal  actors  of  interacting  with  other  state  agencies  or  to  their  general  image  of  the  state. 
In the  analysis  of  the  four  extension  agencies  under  study, this understanding of the  state  proved 
very useful (chapter 9). As summarised  above,  the  four  agencies  illustrate  how  different  strategies 
are  pursued  by  different  parts  of  the  state  not just with  regard  to  their  day-to-day  activities  but 
with  regard also to their  more  fundamental  relation to societal  forces. The agencies  differ  with 
regard to access to resources,  the  specific  organisational  set-up,  and  a  range  of  other  organisation- 
specific  characteristics. 
At  the  same  time  the  analysis  confirms  that it is  not  appropriate  to  treat  government  agencies  only 
as individual organisations. In addition to the dependence by three of the agencies on the 
institutional  context  of  the  public  sector  (the  forestry  service,  the  livestock  service  and  the 
cooperative  service),  they  all  four  share  a  dependence  on the overall  legitimacy  of  the  state. To 
a  varying  extent  all  agencies  have  been  affected by the  change  of  regime  in 1991 and the 
subsequent  challenges  to  state  authority.  The  forestry  service  represents the most  outstanding 
case, as it  virtually  collapsed  when  the  regime  which  protected  it  was  toppled.  The  general 
upsurge in popular  manifestations  and  countrywide  prosecution  of  forestry aff contributed  to 
inspire  confkontations  between  farmers  and CMDT a  few  months a f h  ‘les  6v6nements’  in  March 
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1991.  Less  spectacular  expressions  of  the  dependence  of  agencies  on  overall  legitimacy  of  the 
state  are  the  complaints  by  all  agencies  that  it has become  more  difficult  to  make  fanners  attend 
extension  sessions  and  comply  with  their  advice. Also positive  examples  were  found  of  the 
mutual  influence  of  agencies’  legitimacy. The interest  of  farmers  in Sikasso in  getting  assistance 
from the livestock  service to grow  fodder  crops  and  from  the  forestry  service  to  plant  fruit  trees 
relates to their  experience  of  having  received  a  much  appreciated  assistance  from  CMDT. 
Whereas in other  parts  of  the  country,  fanners  have  learned  not  to  expect  anythiug  useful  from 
government  agencies, the experience  in  the Sikasso region  is  that  their  assistance  may,  indeed, 
be  useful. 
1.4. Framework for analysis of performance  by  government  agencies 
The conceptual  framework  offered by the  interactive  approach  is  very  sketchy  and  does  not 
provide  guidelines that are  directly  applicable  to  an  empirical  investigation.  While  the  framework 
represents  a  constructive  starting  point  for  further  theoretical  analysis, it is considered  necessary 
to fill it in by theories at a  lower  level  of  abstraction  in  order  to  generate  appropriate  research 
questions  for  empirical  studies. 
It has been  found  that  a  number  of  contributions  to  organisation  theory  constitute  relevant 
elements  to  substantiate  the  framework  by  providing  more  specific  guidelines  for  an  analysis  of 
performance  conditioning  factors  for  government  agencies (chapter 3). Performance  is  used as 
an  operationalisation  of  the  concept  of  interaction  between  government  agencies  and  their  clients, 
and  it  is  defined as the ability of an  organisation  to  accommodate  client  demands. This definition 
has been chosen because it assigns an active role to both parties in the interaction: the 
organisation  tries  to  accommodate  a  demand,  and  clients  raise  a  demand  and  subsequently  assess 
the level  of  their  satisfaction. 
The relevance  of  organisation  theory  in  analysis  of  organisations  in  developing  countries  is  a 
much debated issue, and the application of organisation theory to analysis of government 
organisations in developing counties is even more controversial. Theories emphasising the 
importance in Africa  of  patron-client  relations  and  basing  their  analysis  on the view  of  civil 
servants as purely  self-interested  point  to  a  completely  different  functioning  of  agencies  in 
developing  countries  and  in  industrialised  countries.  Contrary t  this, a range  of  authors,  inspiring 
the  use  of  organisation  theory  in  the  present  study,  all  base  their  contributions  on  the  assumptions 
that distinctive  features of ‘A~%can  behaviour’  derive  from an essentially  universal  mode of 
response to the particularities of the African  environment.  They  are  interested in cases of good 
performance  and in identifying  factors  encouraging  good  performance.  By  assuming  that  people 
everywhere may express ‘unself-interested’ behaviour if allowed to do so, they define the 
challenge as understanding  how  the  particular  environment  may  sometimes  limit  possibilities  for 
letting  it  thrive. 
The  overall  framework  for  the  analysis  of  factors  conditioning  performance by government 
agencies consists in a  model that makes it possible to distinguish  between  situations  where,  on 
the  one hand, government  agencies are inevitably  doomed  to  poor  performance  due  to  problems 
outside  their own control,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  situations  where  general  problems  may  be 
overcome at the level of individual agencies. Three sets of agency-external factors are 
investigated, namely ‘the action  environment’ (i.e.  the  degree  of  political  stability  and  legitimacy 
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of the  government,  the  rate  and  structure  of  economic growth, and  the  human  resource  profile  of 
the  country), ‘the public sector institutional context’ (i.e.  the  budgetary  support,  the  overall 
institutional  set-up  of  the  public  sector,  its  management  practices  and  existing  structures  of  formal 
and informal influence), and the ‘task network’ of government agencies (i.e. relations of 
collaboration  and  coordination  among  the  agencies).  The  action  environment  and  the  institutional 
context of the  public  sector  may  be  dysfunctional  to  development  in  the  sense  that  government 
agencies  are  doomed  to  poor  performance,  regardless  of  their  various  organisation-specific 
characteristics. 
This  model  is  combined  with  a  range  of  contributions  to  theories  about  organisation-specific 
factors conditioning performance (revised agency theory and more recent contributions 
concentrating  on  work  satisfaction  and  demand  pressure).  They  point  to six fact rs ofparticular 
importance  to organisationalper$ormance: ‘authority ; ‘rewards ‘orgmisatioml identifcation ; 
‘peer  pressure ’, ‘work satisfaction ’ and ‘demandpressure ’. 
Discussions of each of these factors point to the conclusion that the ‘mechanical model’, 
characterised  by a high  level of complexity,  of  formalisation  and  of  centralisation  and  constituting 
the  basic  organisational  feature of the  four  agencies  under  study,  has a et  of  characteristics  that 
can  be  expected  to  negatively  influence  performance. 
The  framework has been  applied  to  the  analysis  of  the  four  agencies  under  study (chapter 5, 6 and 
9). The analysis of the Malian action environment concluded that although it is far from 
favourable,  present  positive  trends  in  both  the  political  and  economic  development  suggest  that 
it  is  not  completely  dysfunctional to development (chapter S). Contrary  to this, the  analysis ofthe 
institutional context of the public sector found that this may in fact be dysfunctional to 
development (chapter 6). This applies  to  the  case  of  the  cooperative  service  being so crippled by 
lack  of  resources  that  it  is  virtually  unable  to  carry  out  any  activities (chapter 9). Also in  the  case 
of the forestry  service  and  the  livestock  service,  the  institutional  context  of  the  public  sector  is 
constraining  their  performance.  Only  CMDT  is  not  seriously  affected  because  its  mixed  status as 
both  a  public  agent of the Ministry of Rural Development  and  Environment  and  a  private  sector 
actor  makes  it  less  dependent  than  the  other  agencies  on  the  institutional  context f the  public 
sector. 
The  analysis  of  organisation-specific  conditions in each  of  the  four  agencies  has  found  that  the 
six performance-conditioning factors  suggested  by  the  framework  tend  ‘to  go  together’:  while in 
CMDT  many  of the factors are present  and the performance  is  believed to be  relatively high, the 
other  agencies  are  suffering  from  varying  levels  of  poor  performance,  because  the  existence  of 
one  or a few  of  the  factors  cannot  compensate  for  lack  of  the  rest.  Thus,  a high level  of  discretion 
of  front-line staffwithout  demand  pressure (inthe  livestock  service  and the cooperative  service) 
does not necessarily result in increased performance, and if all other conditions for good 
performance are absent,  the  experience  of  the  forestry  service  shows  that a sudden  demand 
pressure will result in little more than perplexity. 
Exceptions  to this are  the  cases  where  only  a  few  performance-enhancing  conditions  are  found, 
and  where  agencies  or  particular  parts  of  the  agencies are able  to  perform  well against otherwise 
hard odds. The most notable example is the  cooperative  service  where  a  previously  strong 
organisational  identification by staff has survived  the  comedown  of  the  organisation  and has the 
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potential of  being  converted  into  new  work  satisfaction  for  the staff, once  they  obtain  the  financial 
means  to  reestablish  relations  to  clients. Also the work  satisfaction of village-based  livestock 
agents demonstrates this. Despite the absence of a performance-related reward system, 
organisational  identification  and  peer  pressure,  village-based  livestock  agents  often  find  a  basic 
work satisfaction  in  having  close  relations  to  clients, and  apparently  they  are  able to accommodate 
farmers’  demands. 
A comparison  of  the  four  agencies  shows  that a core  organisational  structure  based  on  the 
mechanical  model  may  develop  in  many  different  directions,  depending  on  the  demand  pressure 
faced.  CMDT  illustrates a mechanical  model  which has gradually  become  less  mechanical by 
incorporating  some  learning ftom fanners  and  experience  of  field  agents.  The  livestock  service 
and  CAC  represent  organisations  which  have  become less mechanical mainly by  default,  because 
the  management  level  does  not  have  the  resources  necessary to maintain  authority.  And  the 
forestry  service  represents  an  extreme  example  of  a  mechanical  organisation  which  has  not 
developed  at all during  many  years. The total  absence  of  external  pressures ha allowed it to settle 
into  a  mechanical  rut  and  left it completely  unprepared  for  any  demands  to adjust. 
It is  believed  that a main reason  for  the  difference  between  CMDT  and  the  other  agencies  is the 
fact that it has  an  economic  imperative  to  produce  cotton  at  low  costs  and  provide  a  service 
requested  by  farmers  because  of  their  economic  interest  in  cotton  cultivation.  The  other  agencies 
have  until  recently  been  ensured  a  certain  allocation  of fundsregardless  of  their  performance,  and 
only the livestock  service offers an  assistance  considered  economically  useful  by  farmers. The 
particular  type  of  pressure  on  CMDT  has  forced it to be more  flexible  and  open  to  demands by 
fanners  than  other  agencies.  Whereas  part  of  the  CMDT  success  story  is  explained  its  by  access 
to  resources  which  the  other  agencies do not  have  due to their  dependence  on  a  poor state, the 
other  part of the story  relates  to  the  particular  character of  demand  pressures  on  the  agency. 
Conclusions regarding agencies’ performance have been largely confinned by  farmers’ 
assessment  of  the  ability  of  the  agencies  to  accommodate  their  demands (chapter 10). According 
to fanners,  CMDT is clearly the agency  which  provides  the  most  extensive  and  most  useful 
service,  while  the  ability of the livestock  service  to  accommodate  farmers’  demands  seems 
somehow  more  varying.  The  performance of the  forestry  service is poor,  and  the  performance 
of  the  cooperative  service is extremely  poor. 
The  analysis  of  farmers’  assessment  of the agencies,  however,  added  an  important spect to the 
discussion  of  performance,  namely  the  issue  of  inequality  in  the  distribution  of  services. In 
addition  to  the  concentration  of  services  on  better-off  fanners  mentioned  above,  the  survey  found 
that  all  agencies  tend to favour  and  disfavour  the  same  villages.  The  concentration of  extension 
contacts  on  certain  villages is explained by the  inclusion  of  some  of  the  ‘survey  villages’  in  a 
donor-funded  natural  resource  management  project.  The  fact  that  a  relatively  modest  donor- 
funded programme  can  make  a  significant  difference  to  the  assistance  received in project  and  non- 
project  villages draws the  attention  to  the  importance  of  project  and  programme-funded  activities 
even in a privileged  region  such as Sikasso. In other  regions,  almost  entirely  depending  on 
project-funded  activities,  the  distribution  of  services  among  villages  can  be  expected  to  be  even 
more  skewed. 
243 
Inequalities in the distribution  of  services  imply  that  assessments of  the  assistance  provided 
depend on who  among  the  clients  are  being  asked. 
1.5. Disaggregation of the concept of society 
As a  perspective  on the analysis of  agency  performance,  a  conceptual  framework f r the analysis 
of  societal  forces  which  interact  with  and  influence  government  agencies  has  been  established 
(chapter 4). 
The  framework is based on the  assumption  that  similar  to  the  notion of the  state,  there  is  a  need 
to  break  down  the  concept  of  society  to  understand  how  different  elements  pull in different 
directions.  Instead  of  looking  for  social  forces  (or  identities  binding  together  these  forces)  which 
can  generally  be  defined as particularly  important  to  influencing  state  and  society  relations, it is
considered  useful  to  assume  that  people  have  multiple  identities,  and that the  relative  importance 
of  each  of  these  identities  depends  on  the  particular  context. 
While it is suggested  that all social  forces  have  a  certain  impact  on  relations  between  state  and 
society through their  mutual  interaction  and through their  interaction  with  state  representatives, 
the search  for  forces  with  a  particular  political  project,  i.e.  forces  which try to  influence  the 
fundamental  relationship  between  state  and  society,  may  follow  many  different  paths,  depending 
on the  context.  The  framework  identifies threepossible entrance points to an empirical  analysis 
of  societal  forces  with  a  particular  political  potential,  namely 1) unaZyses of class and ethnic 
relations, 2) studies  of  the  strategies  and  organisational  characteristics  of a particular  part  of  the 
associational  scene ( ‘civil  associations 3, and 3) studies  of  norms  guiding  the  strategies of various 
social  groups  with  a  view  to  identify  a  particular set of ‘civil norms ’. 
The three  approaches  are  considered  complementary  rather than mutually  exclusive,  and  it  is 
stressed  that  they  are  not fully covering  the  analysis  of  all  potentially  important  social  forces. 
Together the approaches  form  a  conceptual  framework  which  generates  a  series  of  relevant 
questions  to an empirical  investigation,  but  they  do  not  capture  the  multiplicity  of  identities 
existing in a particular  empirical  context. 
The  application  of the b e w o r k  to  the  analysis  of  social  forces in the Sikasso region found  that 
many different  forces are at  play (chapter 11). SYCOV,  the  farmers’  movement, has an  obvious 
potential  for  becoming  a  ‘societal  force  with  a  particular  political  potential‘,  i.e. a forc   that  tries 
to  influence the fundamental  relationship  between  state  and  society.  Conditions  for its emergence 
have  been  favourable,  and its achievements  are  already  significant. An assessment  of  possibilities 
for  describing SYCOV as a  civil  association i  the  sense  that  it  engages  the  state,  however,  points 
to the conclusion  that this depends  on  a  number  of  decisive  factors.  These  include  its  ability  to 
avoid  being  co-opted by CMDT, its  ability  to  avoid  an  internal  cleavage  between  leadership  and 
members, and its ability to widen  priorities  from  what  presently seems to be a  focus on economic 
issues  to  include  also  broader  political  issues  concerning  relations  between  state  and  farmers. 
In the search for social  forces with a particular  set  of  ‘civil  norms’ it was  found  that  neither  the 
population in the  northern  part  of  the  region  nor  respondents from southern  villages  express  ‘civil 
norms’ in the  sense that they  believe that they  can  influence  relations  between  state  and  society. 
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However, as noted  above,  such  norms  were  found  among  respondents  in  villages  that  have an 
experience  with  the  farmers’  movement, SYCOV. 
Results  from  the  village  survey  seem  to  suggest  that  to  the  extent a class  or  ethnic-based  political 
potential  exists,  it  is  rather  to  be  found  among  better-off  farmers  than  among  the  poor. 
1.6. Final conclusion 
Based on the  above, it can be  concluded  that the dissertation  has  established aframework  to 
explain dferences in patterns of interaction  between  government  agencies  and  their  clients.  The 
framework explain  dafferences as results of a  variety  of pressures being exerted  upon the 
agencies from their  characteristics as being part of the  abstract  state, from their specific 
organisational  characteristics, andfrom the social forces with which they interact. 
Theoretical  conclusions have been illustiated andjuther explored by  an empirical  analysis of 
four extension  agencies  working  in  the  Sikasso  region  and  by  assessing  how pressures exerted 
upon the agencies affect agencies’ performance (i.e.  their ability to accommodate farmers’ 
demands).  This  analysis  has  been put in perspective by an analysis of the  character of the social 
forces  in the  Sikasso region that interact with and  influence  the four agencies. 
2. Discussion of theoretical and empirical basis for conclusions 
In the following  an  assessment  is  made of the basis  for  conclusions,  i.e. an assessment of 
limitations  of  the  theoretical  framework  to  guide  empirical  analysis  and  of  limitations  of the 
empirical  case  to  illustrate  and further explore  the  theoretical b e w o r k .  
2.1. Limitations of the theoretical  framework 
Operationaliiation of the concept of interaction 
Although the focus on interaction is stressed as the qualitatively new and constructive 
contribution by the  interactive  approach,  theoretical  discussions  by  authors  applying the approach 
tend  to  concentrate  either  on  analysis  of  the  state  or  on  analysis  of  society. The  approach is still 
very new, andguidelines forfialher theorising  are  not  very  elaborate. This particularly regards 
the core issue of interaction, as the  framework  for  identifying  and  analysing  interrelations 
between  state  and  society  mainly  consists in the  rather  sketchy  engagement-disengagement 
framework.  The  lack of guidelines  for  investigation  of this issue  is  reflected in a bias  also in 
empirical  studies  towards  analysis of either  state  or  society. 
Given the particular character of the state as an organisation which differs from other 
organisations in society by its  claim  to  represent the public  good  and its entitlement  to  exercise 
powers  and  authority  needed  to  implement  that  claim,  researchers  may  be inched to analyse the 
interaction  by  taking the point of departure in state structures  and state actions. This tendency 
is  reinforced  by the structural manifestation  of  the  state as one  organisation as opposed  to  the 
multiplicity  of  societal  organisations. In most  cases  it  will  be  easier  to  define  actors  and  structures 
under  study  and to  get  relevant  data  for  analysis  of  the  state  than  for a study  of  more  intangible 
societal  forces. This particularly  applies  to a study  of  interaction  between  state  representatives  and 
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the  heterogeneous  group  of  farmers  whose  differences  in  terms  of  socioeconomic  situation, 
strategies  and  perceptions  of  the  state  are  often  poorly  described  and  understood. In a  study  of 
interaction  between  state  representatives  and  more  well-established  organised  groups  of  society 
such as e.g.  trade  unions,  on  the  other  hand, it might be possible  to  carry  out  a  more  balanced 
analysis  of  strategies  and  conditions  of  both  parties in the  interaction. 
h the  present  dissertation  the  bias  towards  analysis  of  the  state  is  further  reinforced  by  the 
selection  of  organisation  theory  to  operationalise  the  framework  provided by the interactive 
approach.  Attempts  to  operationalise  the  concept  of  interaction  through  a  study ofperformance 
by government  agencies  orient  the  analysis  towards  state structures and state actions.  Even if the 
definition  of  performance as ‘ability  of  an  organisation  to  accommodate  client  demands’  is  meant 
to  ensure  the  consideration  of  both  parties  in  the  interaction,  it  takes  the  point  of  departure  in 
actions  and  conditions  relating  to  the  state,  while  the  role  of  societal  forces is largely  confined  to 
that of  demanding  services  and  reacting to  initiatives  taken  by  government  agencies. 
The  problem is clearly  reflected  in  the  empirical  analysis  of  interaction  between  extension 
agencies  and  farmers  in Sikasso. The  analysis  is  structured  by  taking  the  point  of  departure  in 
conditions  relating  to  the  state,  while  societal  forces  are  analysed  only as a  perspective  on  the 
main  analysis  of  agency  performance.  Apart  from  the  discussion  of  implications  for CMDT of 
SYCOV’s demands, it has not  been possible to aualyse  the  influence  by  specific  social  forces  on 
the four agencies under study. For the other agencies, the analysis is limited to a general 
discussion  about  demand  pressure  where  no  distinction  is  being  made  between  demand by 
different  groups  such as rich  or  poor,  farmers  in  the  north  and  farmers in the south,  organised 
versus  unorganised  farmers,  etc. 
Emphasis on structural aspects of the state 
The  next  problem  to  be  mentioned is the  tendency of the interactive approach to  emphasise the 
analysis of the state as a  structure at the  expense of an  understanding of it also as a symbolic 
totality. The  definition of the state as ‘an organisation within the society’  and the interest  in 
disaggregating  the  state  in  order to understand  how  its  different  parts  are pulliig in  different 
directions,  is  an  inspiring  point  of  departure  for  empirical  analysis  of its agencies.  There  is  a  risk, 
though,  of overemphasising the diversity of the state and to downplay  the  importance  of  other 
state  manifestations  which  may  significantly  condition  interaction  with  societal  forces.  Aspects 
of the  state  not mfliciently dealt  with  include  e.g.  price  policies,  market  regulations  and  the  legal 
h e w o r k .  Also the  issue of overall  legitimacy  of  the  state  tends  to  be insufficiently considered 
when  the  state is ‘unpacked‘,  and  analyses  are  made  of  its  different  parts. 
Also in this case  the  problem is considerably  aggravated  when  organisation theory is  selected  for 
operationahsation of the  framework.  Organisation  theory  deals  specifically  with  the  study of 
organisational  manifestations  of  relations  among  various  actors,  and  only  few  contributions 
attempt  to  widen  the  perspective  to  include also aspects  of  relations  which are not  reflected  in 
organisational structures. The framework established for analysing agency-external factors 
conditioning  performance  represents  such  an  attempt  to  widen  the  perspective.  Even in this case, 
however,  emphasis  is put on  structural  conditions  at  the  national  level  (e.g.  the  economic  situation 
and the budgetary support for the public sector), whereas it does not sufficiently consider 
discursive  aspects  of  the  state. 
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TO counter  an  overly  focus  on  state  diversity, a contribution  particularly  dealing  with  the  issue 
of  legitimacy  has  been  used  to  supplement  the  framework.  Still,  lack  of  clear  guidelines  and  the 
intangibility  of  the  issue  of  legitimacy turn the  empirical  analysis in the  direction  of  structural 
aspects  which  are  more  easily  identified  and  discussed.  Thus,  the  analysis  of  the  four  agencies  has 
generated  considerably  more  findings  on  their  diversity than on  their  shared  characteristics  of 
being  parts  of  the  same  state. 
Another  consequence  of the structural  orientation  of  the  analysis  is  the Zimited consideration of 
person-based relations within the state apparatus and  between  state  and societal agents. It has 
been  formulated as a specific  ambition  of  the  dissertation  to  move  beyond  the  tendency  in  many 
analyses  of  the African state  to  explain  state-internal  dynamics a determined  mainly by  actions 
of  individuals  motivated  only by  personal  interests.  Similarly,  the  study  of  interaction  between 
state structures  and  societal  forces  is  considered a more hitful approach  to  analysis  of  state- 
society  relations than the  prevailing  tendency  to  describe  these  relations as person-based  relations 
between  state  bureaucracies  and  their  allies in clan or  ethnic-based  networks. 
Whereas findings  summarised  above  demonstrate that it is, indeed,  fruitful  to  apply  a  structure- 
oriented  approach  rather than focussing  on  actors  defined  only  by  their  strategies, thi  approach 
has certain  limitations  when it comes to explaining  issues  such as the  scale  of  corruption  and  the 
problem  of  nepotism  both  of  which  constitute  significant  aspects  of  the  poor  performance  of  the 
Malian  state.  Also the issue of power  politics in and  around  agencies’  central  administration  in 
Bamako is  difficult  to  capture by use  of  a  structure-oriented  approach. In the  analysis  of  the  four 
agencies it appears that important conditions for  their  functioning  are  defined by decisions  taken 
by  top-level  management  in Bamako. Examples of this include  the  various  structural  reforms  such 
as the  reorganisation  of  the  Ministry  of  Rural  Development  and  Environment,  the  decision  to 
transfer  the  livestock  service  fiom  CMDT  to  the  department  of  livestock,  and  the  recent  transfer 
of  the  forestry  service  to a new ministry whereby it is beiig detached from the  other  agencies  and 
avoids  being  part  of  an  integrated  extension  service. In all  cases  it  seems  that  individual  actors 
have  been  pulling the strings,  and  power  struggles  among  a  handful  of  core  players  have  had 
substantial  implications  for  the  agencies  also  at the field  level  in  the Sikasso region. 
The  structure-oriented  approach  is  only  one  reason  for  not  considering  these  issues,  while  another 
reason  is  the  ambition f moving the  analysis  out of  the  sphere  defined by the  presidential  palace 
and  government  central  administration,  in  order to capture  the  interaction  between fiont-lie staff 
and  local  populations.  Disaggregation  of  the  state  not just according to agencies  but also with 
regard  to  its  hierarchical  layers  has  turned out to  generate  very  interesting  insights  into  the 
interplay  between  state  representatives  and  societal  forces.  Still,  the  focus  on  the  lowest  level  of 
the  state  hierarchy has implied  that  less  attention is being  paid to  superior  levels  which  may be 
equally  important o the actual  outcome of the  interaction. 
Contributions  focussing  on  person-based  relations  provide  excellent  entrance  points  to  the  study 
of  phenomena  such as corruption,  nepotism  and  person-based  power  struggles  and  could  have 
complemented  analyses.  Given  their  analytically  unsatisfactory  explanations of overali  state- 
society  relations,  however,  it has been  decided  not  to  attempt  to  integrate  them  into  the  theoretical 
framework  established. 
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Limitations of the framework for analysis of societal  forces 
Whereas the  interactive  approach  tends  to  focus  on  structural  aspects  in  analysis  of  the  state,  there 
is a  tendency  to  lack  structural  considerations in analysis of  societal  forces.  Generally, the 
framework offered by the  interactive approach for analysis  of societal forces must  be described 
as rather weak. It  appears  that  many  researchers  have  followed  the  mainstream  trend  and  have 
replaced  a  previous  focus  on  class  and  ethnic-based  relations by a  focus  on  the  still  very  vague 
concept  of  civil  society.  Methodological  guidelines  for  empirical  analysis  of  civil  society are few 
and  do  not  indicate  how  to  relate  actions  of  societal  forces  defined as civil  society  to  their 
influence  on  the  state. 
It is a weakness of the interactive approach, thus, that it ten& to invite purely political 
interpretations of interaction between state representatives and societal forces, because main 
societal actors are defined by their  actions  rather than by  their  structural  positions. The ultimate 
consequence  of this may  be  that  political  forces are analysed as completely  autonomous  from 
socioeconomic  and  geographical  conditions. 
Also in contributions  to  organisation  theory,  clients’  structurally  different  positions  are  ‘blind 
spots’. The  farthest these contributions  reach is a distinction  between  demand  pressures  generated 
by clients as opposed to demanding  pressures  deriving  from  other actors such as the  central 
government,  donors,  etc.  The  group  of  clients is not  differentiated  to  allow  a  distinction  of 
performance  regarding  services  provided  to  e.g.  poorer  versus  better-off  clients. 
For contributions to organisation theory focussing  on  the  importance of personal relations 
between  front-line s t a f f  and  farmers,  the  problem  is  particularly  pronounced. By dealing  with 
interaction as a person-to-person relationship in which trust is considered decisive to the 
motivation  of  government staff to  perform  and  to  the  inclination  of  clients  to  respond,  these 
contributions shift focus away from structural conditions and apply a purely actor-oriented 
perspective  with all its limitations. 
The  survey has confirmed  that  personal  relations  between  extension taff and  farmers  are  very 
important  elements  in  the  assessment by farmers  of  the  services  provided.  Furthermore,  the 
insistence  on  work  satisfaction  and trust as factors conditioning performance is considered 
refreshing  in  a  debate  which  otherwise  has  concentrated  on  organisational  explanations  and  has 
reflected the mainstream view of civil servants as purely self-interested. The perspective, 
however,  cannot  stand  alone.  The s w e y  has not confirmed  that  personal  relations - or trust - can 
bridge  otherwise  unequal  relations. On the  contrary,  condescending  behaviour  by  government 
agents  and  requests  for  bribes  are  mentioned as problems  mainly  by  poorer  farmers,  whereas 
better-off  farmers  seem  to  find  it  easier  to  develop trust in relations  to  extension staff. 
As  demonstrated  by findings from  the  village  survey, structural positions  may  strongly  affect  what 
on  the  face  of it appears  to  be  individual  strategies  and  therefore  cannot  be  neglected  when  one 
wants  to  understand  interaction  between  state  representatives and societal  forces. 
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Lack  of  consideration  of  international  factors 
The  last liitation of  the  theoretical h e w o r k  to be  mentioned is the internationulperspective 
which is cut off in the interactive approach as well as in organisation theory. Given the 
dependence of the  Malian  state on international  conditions  beyond  its own control,  e.g.  the 
international  cotton  market  and  the  economy  of  C8te  d’Ivoire, it could  be  argued  that a study  of 
state-society  relations  concentrating  on  Mali-internal  conditions  misses  some  very  important 
points. An analysis of relations between extension agents and farmers taking the point of 
departure  in  structures  and  policies guidmg the  international  cotton  market  would  probably  have 
generated a completely different outcome. In such an analysis the role of CFDT in the 
international  competition  and  the  particular  relationship  between  CFDT  and  CMDT  would  be 
core  issues,  whereas  the  Malian  state  and  cotton  producers in Sikasso  would be seen as mainly 
responding  to  internationally-defined  conditions. 
Also the role of international donors in establishing conditions for strategies pursued by 
government  agencies  could  have  been  taken  up as a  separate  issue. In the  case  of  CMDT  the 
importance  of  external  capital  is  obvious,  but  also  for  the  three  other  agencies  donor  funding, 
donor influence on reform initiatives, and mutual donor competition appear to constitute 
significant  aspects  of  their  basic  functioning. 
An international perspective is neither more nor less relevant than the one applied by the 
interactive  approach,  but  it  is  different  and  leads  to  different  results.  It  could  be  argued,  therefore, 
that  a  combination of an  international  perspective  and  a  state-society  perspective  would  have 
resulted  in  a  more  balanced  analysis.  While this seems  plausible,  the  reason  for c o d i n g  the 
analysis  to  Mali-internal  relations is a wish to limit its scope to something  manageable. An 
analysis  combining  state-society  theories  and  organisation  theory  is  already  fairly  complex  and 
integration  of  international  factors,  although  relevant,  would  have  resulted in a  highly  complicated 
framework  which  might  have drawn attention  away  fiom  the  main  research  interest  in  relations 
between  state  and  societal  forces. 
2.2. Limitations  the  empirical  analysis 
Focus on farmers 
Given the difficulties of striking  a  proper  balance  between  analysis of the state  and  analysis of 
societal  forces  discussed  above,  it  could  be  argued  that  an  empirical  focus  on  relations  between 
extension  agencies  and  farmers  is  not  the  most  appropriate  to  illustrate  the  framework  established 
by the interactive  approach.  Organised  societal  forces  such as the  students’  movement,  trade 
unions,  or  the  Tuareg  liberation  movement  would  have  been  easier  to  identify  and  easier  to 
analyse  because  more  data  would  be  available. 
Furthermore, a study  concentrating  on  some  of  these  groups  would  have  the  advantage  of dealiig
with  societal  forces  which  in  the  recent  past  have  clearly  and  visibly  affected  relations  between 
state  and  society as opposed  to  the  more  indirect  impact  of  fanners’  strategies. Thus, the rural 
population had no  role in the  overturn  of  the Traore regime  in 1991, whereas  the  change  of  regime 
was the direct  result  of  battles  fought  mainly  by  organised  urban  groups. 
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The  argument  is  plausible,  but  similar to the  decision  not  to  include  international  factors,  the 
choice  of  focus i  based on research  interest  rather  than on the  identification  of  issues  providing 
the  most  satisfactory  methodological  framework. 
Limited  data  on  societal  forces 
Even  if the choice  of  empirical  focus  on  farmers is  accepted, it could  have  been  ,expected  that 
more  specific data on  the  population  in  the Sikasso region  had  been  generated  by  the  study. 
It  must be considered  a  serious  limitation  that  more  tangible  data  on  income  distribution  among 
households  and  on  income  distribution on various  sources  have  not  been  available.  Lack of data 
on  the  role  of  cotton,  livestock  and  forestry  in  household  incomes  makes  it  difficult to come  to 
a  clear  conclusion  concerning  the  role f cotton  in  processes  of  socioeconomic  differentiation. 
This again has implications  for  assessing  the  role  of  government  agencies  in  societal  dynamics. 
A similar  problem  is  represented  by  the  lack  of  clear  data  on  the  general  level of w alth  in  the 
Sikasso region as compared  to  other  regions.  While it is  generally  believed  that Sikasso belongs 
to the  most  prosperous  regions  in  the  country, this perception is challenged  by the  limited  (and 
unfortunately  very  old)  data  available on social  indicators.  It  would  have  been  interesting  to  be 
able to establish  if high levels  of  political  mobilisation  and  demands on the  state  in this region 
are  related to an  over-average  level  of  wealth  or  rather to a  more  pronounced  process  of  social 
differentiation. 
The  issue  of  ethnic  relations ha  not  been  dealt  with.  It  did  not  make  part  of the  village  survey  to 
identify  respondents’  ethnic  background,  and the  question  of  possible  political  mobilisation  along 
ethnic  lines  was  not  pursued  in  interviews  with  resource  persons. 
Concerning  the  analysis of SYCOV,  the  farmers’  movement,  data  allowing an assessment  of  its 
socioeconomic  constituency  would  have  made it possible to better  approach  the  issue  of  the 
influence  of  societal forces on  the state. Thus, the  hypothesis  about  better-off  farmers  dominating 
its leadership is not based on substantial data but only on impressions gained during the 
fieldwork.  Furthermore, the movement is still  young,  and  it is still very  early to assess  its  potential 
as a  ‘civil  association’. 
Entrance  points  to  the study 
The  interview  study  with staff from  the  four  agencies has been c d e d  out in a  period  where  three 
of  the  agencies (viz. the  forestry service, the  livestock  service,  and  the  cooperative  service)  have 
found  themselves  in  an  impasse  between  the  old  order  characterising  the  time  before  the  change 
of  regime  and  a  new  structure  defined  by  the  reform  of the Ministry of Rural  Development  and 
Environment. 
During  interviews,  a  donor-funded  natural  resources  management  project was used as an  entrance 
point  to  approach  issues  believed  to  condition  agency  performance  (for  a  further  discussion  of thi  
methodology,  see  the  section  on  ‘Fieldwork  methodology  and  literature  study’ in the  annex).  It 
would  seem  that  the  ongoing  reform of the  ministry  would  have  provided a more  obvious 
entrance  point, as problems  related to the reorganisation  would  have  been  highly  revealing  for 
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existing  practices  and  conditions  in the four  agencies.  The  reform,  however,  was  still  at  the 
planning  stage,  when  interviews  were  carried out, and  only  few staff members  at  arrondissement 
level  were  informed  that  changes  were  going  to  take  place. 
Also the  ongoing  administrative  reform  meant  to  decentralise  authority  to  elected rural councils 
would  have  been an interesting  entrance  point  to  a  study  of  changing  state-  society  relations. 
Issues which  could  have  been  investigated  by  such  a  study  include  the  role  of  traditional  powers 
in  relation to rural councils,  the  influence  of rural councils  on  practices  of  government  agencies, 
the  impact  of the reform  on  the  discretion  possessed by front-line  staff,  and  the  role  of  political 
parties  vis-a-vis  other  organised  groups  such as the  farmers’  movement,  the  hunters’  association, 
etc. Similar to the case of the reform of the ministry, however, implementation of the 
administrative  reform  started  only  after  the  fieldwork  had  been  finalised. 
3. Perspectives 
The  experience  of  interaction  between  extension  agencies  and  farmers  in  the  Sikasso  region 
contradicts  the  prevalent  view  of  cash  crop  production as a  sophisticated  form  of  exploitation  of 
farmers  who  have  no  choice  but to accept  conditions  imposed  on  them by a  ‘predatory’  state. 
First,  as  demonstrated  in  the  empirical  analysis,  farmers  pursue  many  different strategies and 
cotton  production  is  but  one  of  them.  Second,  farmers  are  not  forced  to  react  in  particular  ways 
to  conditions  imposed  on  them,  but  they  are  highly  selective  regarding  the  assistance  they  want, 
and  they  are  influencing  both  the  agencies with which  they  directly  interact  and  overall  state- 
society relations by their strategies. Third, socioeconomic and geographically-conditioned 
differences  among  farmers  make it less  relevant  to talk about  ‘farmers’  strategies’  vis-a-vis 
government  agencies, as farmers  in  different  structural  positions  react  very  differently.  Fourth, 
capacities of farmers  to  influence  government  agencies  cannot  be  understood  without  analysing 
their  relationship to these very same  agencies.  Thus, in the  case of SYCOV the  organisational  and 
technical  capacity to raise  demands  to CMDT is  very  much  a  result  of  the  support  received from 
the  agency.  Even in cases  where  commercial  cotton  production  is  introduced  only  with  a  view  to 
extract  the  largest  possible  surplus  from  the  agricultural  sector,  the  interaction  between  extension 
agencies and farmers may generate  an  outcome  completely  different  from  that  intended by the 
government  (and  in  the Sikasso case:  foreign  private  interests). 
While  farmers in the  northern  Koutiala  area  seem  to  possess a larger  potential  for  political 
influence than farmers  in the south, the analysis of  societal  dynamics  also  shows that factors 
threatening this potential  are  related  to  the  more  advanced  integration  into  the  cotton  economy 
in  the  north. Thus, the  widespread  dissolution  of  village  associations  in  the  Koutiala  area m y 
eventually  undermine  the unity of the farmers’  movement  which  originally  grew  out  of  inter- 
village collaboration  among these associations.  Other conflicts which  may  threaten the position 
of  the  farmers’  movement  include  the  many  conflicts,  e.g.  among  generations,  lineages,  and 
individuals,  allowed  to  erupt  because  village  chiefs  in  the  area  no  longer  possess  the  authority 
necessary  to  keep  them  down. 
The  double  impact  of  the  cotton  economy  in the form  of  strengthening  fanners’  capacity  to  put 
demands  on  the  state  and  undermining this same  capacity  illustrates  that  state-  society  relations 
are  never  simple  and  unambiguous.  Future  development  of  relations  between  state  representatives 
and fanners in the Sikasso region  may  follow  many  different  paths,  depending  on  i.a. the extent 
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of  social  conflicts, SYCOV's ability  to  remain  united  and  avoid  co-optation by CMDT, the 
impact  of  the  decentralisation  process on the  role  of  the  state,  the  outcome  of  the  administrative 
reform  and  particularly CMDT's role  after  the  reform,  national  and  international  economic  trends 
and  possible  changes  in the institutional  context of the  public  sector. 
Concerning  capacities  of  government  agencies,  the  analysis  has  pointed to the  conclusion  that 
exposure  of  the  agencies  to  increased  demand  pressures  will  not  necessarily,  improve  their 
performance  unless  changes  are  taking  place  in  other  parts of the  organisations  at  the same time. 
Conditions  for  their  performance  do  not  only  relate  to  the  character  of  social  forces with which 
they  interact  but  are  defined  also  by a range of  agency-internal  factors  and by factors  relating to 
their  characteristics as being part of the state.  Therefore,  decentralisation of government  agencies 
as  a  possible  solution to present  difficulties  of  making  them-respond to demand may be a 
questionable  strategy  unless  the  more  general  capacity  of  the  state to respond  to  increased 
pressures is also  strengthened. 
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ANNEX 
FIELDWORK METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE STUDY 
Throughout the dissertation I comment - usually  in  footnotes - on  the  character  of  data  that 
provide  the  basis  for  descriptions  and  analyses.  However, it is found  useful to have  a  coherent 
account  of the data used  and  a  thorough  discussion  of  reservations  for  its  validity  and  coverage. 
To  allow the readers to assess  the  appropriateness  of  the  way  data  has  been  collected, the 
fieldwork  methodology  and  the  literature  study  are  described  and  discussed,  and  some  of the 
ethical  considerations  related to the  collection  and  presentation  of  data  are  explained. 
The  four  main  components  of  the  collection  of data for  the  present  dissertation  are: 
1. Interviews  with staff of  the  four  agencies  under  study. 
2. A village  questionnaire  survey  in  10  villages  in  the  Sikasso  region. 
3. Interviews  with  various  resource  persons. 
4. Literature  study. 
The  three  first-mentioned  activities  have  taken  places  during  a  total  of  six  months  of  fieldwork 
in Mali (August  1993,  September-December  1994  and  February  1996),  while th  literature  study 
has been  carried  out  throughout  the  process  of  preparing  and  writing  the  dissertation  until  the f nal
editing  in the spring  of  1999. 
1. Interviews with staff from  the  four  agencies  under  study 
1.1. Timing and  entrance  point o the  study 
Before  the  initiation of the  first  field  work  in  August  1993,  my  major  worry  was  how  to  be 
allowed  to cany out  interviews  with staff of  the  four  agencies  that I wanted to study. Questions 
on  internal  working  procedures,  on  the  relationship  between  front-line staff and superior  levels 
of the  agencies  and  not  least  on  the way  the  agencies  relate o local  populations  would  most  likely 
be  considered  controversial. I knew  of  only  one  study from a  Sahelian  country that had  dealt  with 
similar  issues in interviews  with  government staff, namely the study  by Jacob  and  Margot on 
relations  between  the  government  administration  and  local  organisations  in  Burkina Faso (J cob, 
J.-P. & F. Margot,  1992). In this  case,  however, the study  was  carried  out  by  a  large  research  team 
in  close  collaboration with Burkinabe  authorities  and  not  by an individual  researcher  who  offered 
nothing  in retum but  a  copy  of  a  Ph.D.  dissertation t  be  written  sometimes in the future. I have 
later  learned  that  other  researchers  have in fact  been  discouraged  to  carry  out  studies  on  the 
interaction  between  the  forestry  service  and  villagers  in  Sahelian  countries o  the argument  that 
it  was  too  sensitive.  While  they  experienced  a  general  problem in several countries,  the  resistence 
was found to be greatest in Mali (Wiersum & Deprez, 1995; Freerk Wiersum, personnel 
communication,  October  1996). 
Two  factors  explain  that I was spared  the  expected  difficulties  and  have  generally  found  it 
remarkably easy  to get  very  open  and ank discussions  with  government staff at  all  levels:  one 
is  the  timing  of  the  fieldwork  relatively  soon  after  the  change  of  regime,  and the other is  the  fact 
that I had the opportunity to use  a  donor-funded  natural  resource  management  project as an 
entrance  point to the  study. 
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The first  and  most  obvious  advantage  of the timing ofthe fieldwork was that  the  democrafisation 
process  initiated  in  1991  had  considerably  lessened formal restrictions  on  research. Thus, the 
unsuccessful  afiempt  made by other  researchers  to  study the interntion between  the  forestry 
service  and  villagers  was  made  before  1991  when  the  authoritarian  regime  was  still  in  power 
(Freerk  Wiersum,  personnel  communication,  October  1996).  Second,  the  abolishment  of  the 
previously  widespread  repression  and the introduction  of  freedom  of  speech ad resulted  in  a 
general  lack of fear  by  virtually  all  respondents  to  express  themselves.  Whereas  before  1991 
government staff and  other  people  were  always  afraid  to  make a false  step,  in  the  early  1990s 
there  was  a  euphoric  feeling  that  everything  was  now  allowed. This was  reflected  in  all sorts of 
antiauthoritarian  manifestations  from  refusal  to  wear  safety  helmets  and  pay t x to a hithertn 
unknown courage  to  criticise  those  in  power.  And  third, the impasse  between an old  and  a  new 
order  had  left  many  government  employees,  notably  at  lower  levels  and  notably i  the  forestry 
service,  in  a state of confusion  and bsbation that  made  them  happy  to  be asked their  opinion by 
an outsider who cared to listen. In fact sometimes the need to talk turned out to be so 
overwhelming that it could  be diffkult to  make  an  end  to  an  interview  because  the  respondent 
wanted  to  continue. 
Regarding  the  use  of a donor-funded  project as an  enhance point to the study, I was  fortunate  to 
be  offered the possibility  to  participate  in a review  for the World Bank of  the  so-called  ‘Test 
Zones programme’ funded by Norwegian trust funds, just as I was about to leave for the 
preparatory  field  work  in  August  1993  (see a later  section of this annex  for  a  brief  description f 
this project).  Already in my initial  research  proposal I had  decided  to  use this project as an 
entrance  point  to  the  fieldwork. First, because  it  involved an attempt  to  increase  the  collaboration 
on ~ t ~ r a l  resource  management  activities  among  the  four  agencies  that I wanted  to  study,  hence 
it would  provide an excellent  opportunity to compare  their  different  modes of  operation.  And 
second,  because  the  project had the aim of  granting  arrondissement  levels  an  increased  influence 
on decision-making and fmancial management. Thereby, it would allow a study of the 
relationship  between the various  hierarchical  levels  in  each  of  the  agencies. 
While it might  have  been  difficult  for  me as an  individual  researcher  to  establish  the  relevant 
contacts  to  get  close  enough  to  the persons involved  in  the  project,  the  participation in the  review 
mission  threw  the  door  wide  open  for  me. In a  team  of  three  persons, I was  given  the  task of 
canying  out an institutional  analysis  of  exactly  the  issues that were of interest to my own study, 
and I had ample  opportunity  to  establish  the  contacts  necessary  for  my uture research  (the  review 
is  reported  in  N’Djim  et  al.,  1993). Thus, when I came  back for  the  major  fieldwork in September 
1994,  my  previous  contacts  to  the  coordination  unit  of  the  project in the Ministry of  Rural 
Development  and  Environment  (Cellule  de  Planification et de  Statistique)  provided me with  a 
letter  of  introduction  that  allowed  me to approach  all staff members in the  four  agencies  for 
interviews. In cases  where I had not  previously  met  the  persons  to  be  interviewed,  the  letter  was 
a  considerable  help,  but in many cases I could  simply  draw  on  my own contacts  established  in 
1993. 
In addition to the  letter of introduction  from  the Ministry of Rural Development, I was  given  a 
similar  letter  from  the  CMDT  headquarters in Bamako that smoothened my  contacts  to  CMDT 
staff. This was  usefid  because  CMDT  stafftended  to be  more  concerned than staff from  the  other 
agencies  that  not  just a general  permission  by  the min is t ry  had been  given,  but  that  also  their own
management  had  approved of my  research. 
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Finally,  my  opportunity through personal  contacts  to  employ  a  former  Directeur  du  Cabinet  of  the 
Ministry  of  Territorial  Administration  and  Security, M r . M.S. Sokona, as research  assistant  turned 
out  to  be  a  significant  advantage.  Personal  friendships  and  an  extensive  knowledge  on  the  inner 
workings  of  the  Ministry  of  Rural  Development  and  Environment  made  it  possible  for Mr. 
Sokona  to  arrange  interviews  for  me  with  top-level staff in  the  ministry. 
1.2. Selection of the  region of Sikasso, of cercles, of arrondissements  and of respondents  to 
be included  in  the  study 
The  ‘Test  Zones  programme’  covered  a  total  of  three  cercles  of  which t o in the Sikasso  region 
and one in the Mopti  region. I decided to concentrate  on  the two cercles in the Sikasso  region, 
Kadiolo  and  Koutiala, as Sikasso  appeared  to  offer  a  unique  possibility to study  the  interplay 
between  government  agencies  and  a rur l population in  the  process  of  raising  organised  demands 
to  the  state.  The  inclusion  in  the  study of both  Kadiolo  in  the  south  and  Koutiala  in  the  northern 
part of the  region  opened  the  possibility  of  an  interesting  comparison  of  the two cercl s  that  differ 
in  a  number  of  respects  of  which  the  level  of  integration  into  the  cotton  economy  is  among  the 
most  important. 
Within the two cercles  a  total  of seven  arrondissements were selected  three  in  Kadiolo  (Kadiolo 
Central,  Loulouni  and  Fourou)  and  four in  Koutiala  (Koutiala  Central,  Kouniana,  Zangasso  and 
Molobala).  The  choice  of  arrondissements  was  based  on  the  experience  in  August 1993 of  visiting 
a  total  of  nine  arrondissements  in  the two cercles.  Thus,  among  the  arrondissements  already 
known a  more  limited  number was selected  with a view to ensure a certain  geographical  spread. 
For each  of  the  agencies it was attempted to have stufut all levels represented. Ifthere were  more 
than two staff members  in  the  office  at  arrondissement  level,  the  head  of  the  agency  was  selected, 
and if  he  could  not  be  found, I talked to the  deputy. In case of CMDT  that  operates  at  different 
administrative  levels,  it  was  attempted  to  include  both  chefs  secteur,  amenagistes,  chefs  ZER, 
chefs  ZAER  and  chefs SB in the  study. In each  of  the two cercles,  the  head  of  the  agencies or the 
deputy  head  was  selected,  and at regional  level I interviewed  the  four  regional  directors.  At 
national level, I talked to the national director of forestry, the deputy national director of 
livestock, two members of the MDRE Cabinet  (advisors  to  the  minister)  and  to  the  deputy 
General  Manager  of  CMDT  Direction  Technique  du  Dbveloppement  Rural. 
During  the  months  September-  December 1994 a  total of 64 staff members  of  the  four  agencies 
were  interviewed. In addition to these, a number  of staff were  met  during  the  participation  in 
extension  sessions  and staff meetings, and finally some were met only for more informal 
discussions (e.g. a visit to CMDT staff in Bougouni cercle and a few visits to staff in 
arrondissements  different  from  those  included in the  study). 
1.3. Preparation and undertaking of interviews 
In preparation  of  the  interviews, I participated as an  observer in a  number  of  village  extension 
sessions  held by arrondissement  and  cercle staff in relation  to  the  Test  Zones  programme. 
Furthermore, I participated in meetings held by local development committees (where all 
government  agencies  are  represented by  their  head) at  arrondissement  and  cercle  levels,  and 
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finally, I was  allowed to be  present  at a number  of  joint  meetings  between  arrondissement  and 
cercle st&. 
Based on this experience, I prepared  a  semi-structured  interview  guide  that  before  each  interview 
was  adjusted  according  to  the  agency  and  position  of  the  respondent.  The  main  issues  dealt  with 
were: 
- the  working  programme  (main tasks in  relation to the  Test  Zones  programme  and  the  general 
working programme, who defines the working programme, possibilities of responding to 
unforseen  requests  for  assistance). 
- resources  (number  of staff, means  of  transport,  allowances,  importance of project  funding, 
distribution of resources among the various hierarchical levels, implications of scarcity of 
resources). 
- performance of the agency (share of the population that is not reached by the agency, 
performance of front-line staff, competence  of M, training  needs, staff motivation,  constraints 
to improved  performance). 
- relations  among  the  various  hierarchical  levels  (access  to  assistance  from  superior  levels, 
information received from and given to superior and subordinate levels, decisions on staff 
transfers,  rewards  and  punishment,  experience  of  granting  more  discretion to front-line staff in 
the  Test  Zones  programme). 
- relations  to  peers  (how  much  contact,  division  of  labour). 
- relations  to  other  agencies  (experience  of  working  together  in  the  Test  Zones  programme, 
interest  of  the  agency in increasing  the  collaboration  with  other  agencies,  performance  of  other 
agencies). 
- relations  to the population  (changes  in  relations  &er  the  change  of  regime,  new  demands  by  the 
population,  need  for  extension  services/competence of the  population to take  over  part  of 
extension tasks themselves,  main  constraints  to  improving  relations). 
- assessment of future prospects for the agency (reform of the MDRE, decentralisation 
perspectives,  privatisation,  new  demands  from  the  population). 
All interviews were conducted by me in French and reported by notes taken during and 
immediately &r the  interview.  Although this method  of  reporting  has  obvious l i ta t ions 
(Kvale,  1996  p.  160-166), it was  preferred to the  alternative  of  taping  the  interviews  on  the 
grounds that a  tape  recorder is a very unusual and  spectacular  item in Malian rural settings. Had 
a  tape  recorder  been  used, it might  have  attracted  all  attention  and  probably  also  scared  many 
respondents  from  freely  expressing  their  opinion. 
1.4. Data processing and analysis 
The  structure of analysis was provided  by  the  distinction  between  six  main  factors of importance 
to  the  performance  of  a  government  agency  resulting  from the  theoretical  discussions  in  chapter 
3, namely 1) authority 2) rewards 3) organisational  identification 4) peer pressure 5) work 
satisfaction. and  6) demandpressure. For  each  of  the  agencies  all  relevant  statements  on  these 
issues  reported in the  notes on the  interviews  were  compiled  and  analysed. 
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1.5. Ethical  considerations 
Ethical considerations  in  relation  to  an  interview  study as the  one  carried  out  with s aff of  the  four 
agencies  mainly  regard two issues: informed consent and confidentiality. Informed consent 
implies  that  respondents  participate on a  voluntary  basis  after  having  been  informed  about  the 
overall  purpose  of  the  investigation  and  the main features  of  the desip as well as of  any  possible 
risks  and  benefits  from  participating  in  the  research  project.  Confidentiality  implies  that  private 
data  identifying  the  subjects  will  not  be  reported  (Kvale,  1996 p.  109-123). 
It  may  be  argued  that  I  have  not  fully  respected  the  principle  of  voluntary  participation  by 
obtaining the consent  from  the  management  level  of  the  agencies  and  thereafter  presenting 
subordinate staff with  a  letter  that  demanded  their  participation. In hieranhid organisations  like 
those  under  study  there  is  not  much  leeway  to  refuse  such  a  demand.  Against  this  objection, 
however, it can  be  argued  that  the  general  willingness by  respondents  to  engage in elaborate 
discussions of the  issues  raised  is an indication  that  their  participation  was in fact  quite  voluntary. 
More  problematic  is  the  fact  that I used  the  Test  Zones  programme as an  entrance  point,  and  later 
considerably  toned  down  its  role  in  the  study. My shift of  role  from  a  consultant to the World 
Bank who  reviewed  a  particular  project  to  a  researcher  with  a  different  agenda  may  not  have  been 
absolutely  clear  to  all  respondents.  Whereas  they  would  have  understood  that  the  research  project 
was  mainly  about  explaining  the  achievements  of  the  Test  Zones  programme,  the  final  version 
of  the  dissertation  hardly  mentions this project  and  instead  concentrates  entirely  on  analysing  the 
various  information  on  each  of  the  agencies.  While I acknowledge  that this approach  is  open  to 
challenge, it was  not  the  result  of  a  calculated  strategy  of  misinforming  respondents. In my 
original  research  proposal  and  still  in  the  preparation  of  the  field  work I expected  the  Test  Zones 
programme to provide  not just a  practical  entrance  point  but  also  an  adequate  structure  to  the 
analysis of the relationship  between  government  agencies  and  the  local  population.  It  was  only 
after  having  started  the  interview  study  that  I  realised  that a focus  in  the  dissertation  on  a  donor- 
funded  project  with  all  its  limitations would  force  me to discuss  issues  such as e.g.  funding 
conditions  and  project  preparation that are entirely  different from the main interest of my  analysis. 
Having  said this, it should  be  noted  that  it is a  very  well-known  experience  of  most  researchers 
that access to what may be  considered  controversial  data  is  considerably  easier to get if the 
researcher is acting as a consultant or use the insight obtained for instance during project 
employment than if her  identity  is that of ‘a  researcher  from  a  university  somewhere  in  Europe’ 
(e.g. Nico von der Liihe, personal communication Feb. 1996; James Thomson, personal 
communication,  May  1995). 
Before  each  interview  at  cercle  and  arrondissement  level  I  promised  the  respondent  that  all 
information  given  would  be  treated  confidentially  in  the  sense  that  their  name  would  not  appear 
in  the report in relation to their  statements. I have  respected this by avoiding  references  to 
individual  statements and instead just  referred to e.g.  ‘interviews  with  forestry staff‘. 
Staff at  regional  and  national  level  were  not  promised  confidentiality as the  must  be  considered 
decision-makers  who  are  expressing  official  view  points  rather than individual  assessments. In 
cases,  however,  where  these  respondents  have  obviously  gone  beyond  their  mandate  and  given 
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controversial information or assessments, I have avoided to relate the statements to any 
individual. 
In all  cases  where  higher  level  staff  are  cited as the  source  of  specific  information, they are 
referred to by  their  position  instead  of  their  name.  Names of all respondents  can  be  found  in  the 
‘list  of  persons  met’.  It hasbeen  considered  necessary  to  present this list  in  order  to  live  up  to  the 
basic  principle  of  scientific  research of  telling  who  participated in a study  and  when  and  where 
it  took  place.  For  subordinate s affthe lack  of  explicit  references  in the text  should  still  guarantee 
their  anonymity. 
As a final remark on confidentiality  it  can  be  mentioned that probably  the  best  insurance  that  the 
present  study  is  not  doing  any harm to  the  respondents  is  the  regrettable  fact  that  it  is  reported  in 
English  which  very  few  people in Mali  read. 
2. Viage  questionnaire  survey 
2.1.  Purpose of the  survey 
The  village  survey  had  two  purposes: 
1) to  obtain  farmers’  assessment  of  the  ability  of  the  agencies  to  accommodate  their  demands,  i.e. 
an  assessment  of  the  performance by the  agencies  (reported  in  chapter 10) and 
2)  to  obtain  an  indication of the  more  general  view  of  the  state  held by farmers  (reported  in 
chapter  11). 
In the  questionnaire  found  later in this amex, a series  of  questions  was  first  asked to  identify  the 
background  of  the  respondent  (question  1-7). In addition  to  these,  five  main  types  of  questions 
were  asked  of  which  four  dealing  with  aspects  of  demand  satisfaction  (ref.  the  discussion  in 
chapter 3): 
- a  question  concerning  frequency  of  contact  to  the  agencies  (question 8). 
- questions  Concerning  reliability of services  provided  (question  9-10) 
- questions  concerning  the  usefulness of  services  provided  (question  11-12  and 14). 
- a  question  Concerning  personal  relations  between  extension  agents  and  farmers  (question 13) 
- and  finally,  questions  asked  to  approach  the  issue  of  how  farmers  perceive of  th   more  general 
relationship  between  themselves  and  the  state  (question  15-  22). 
2.2. Preparation of the survey 
In preparation  of  the  survey, goup interviews and individual interviews based on a semi- 
structured  guideline  were  undertaken  in  three  villages  (Woroni, Sink010 and  Koloni). 
It  was  the  purpose  of  these  visits  to  get  a first impression  of  the  contact  between the villages  and 
the  various  govemment  agencies  and  to  find out how  the  more  abstract  question  of  the  perception 
by  the  village  population  of  the  role  of  the  state  could  be  approached. In addition  to this, the visits 
served the purpose  of  obtaining  some  background  information  on  each  of  the  villages  concerning 
their history, the main problems faced and their situation with regard to resources (scarce 
or  abundant,  subject  to  conflicts,  etc.). Tools used  during  these  visits  included  simple  Venn 
diagrams, problem  tree  mapping  and  rough  wealth  ranking  exercises. 
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In addition to the experience  gained €-om the  initial  village  study,  inspiration  for the preparation 
of  a draft questionnaire  was  gained  from  various  written  sources,  interviews  with  resource 
persons  and  interviews  with  staff  of  the  four  agencies  that had gone on for  about  a  month  when 
the  village  survey  was  prepared.  Especially  a  study  on  the  frequency  and  character of contacts 
between  farmers  and  the  livestock service and CMDT and  an  interview ith its main author  gave 
rise to some  very  useful  methodological  considerations  (Coulibaly  et al., 1993). 
Concerning  the  most  difficult  questions  on  general  relations  between  farmers  and the state,  a 
study  from  Tanzania by  Goran  Hyden  was  found to suggest  an  interesting  approach  (Hyden, 
1994). The theoretical considerations  behind the formulations of questions  are  further  discussed 
in  chapter 4, but  here  it can briefly  be  mentioned  that it  was  attempted to get  an  indication  of  the 
civic  competence, the political authoriw and social  reciprocities at the  community level by  asking 
1)  what  difference  people  see  themselves  being  able to make  to  their  problems  by  trying to 
influence  the  state (civic competence), 2) what  difference  they  see  government  being able  to make 
without  their  cooperation (political authority) and 3) what  difference  they  see  themselves  being 
able to make  without  the  cooperation  of  the  government (social reciprocities at the  community 
level). 
The draft questionnaire was tested  in  Nafegue  village  by  me  with  the  research  assistant  acting as 
interpreter.  After a revision, the research assistant carried  out  all  remaining  interviews  alone, 
while  my  role  was  confined to that  of  visiting  the  villages  before  the  survey  to  hold  discussions 
with  the  village  leadership  and  ask  their  permission  to  undertake  the  study,  and to currently  check 
the  questionnaires as they  were  filled  in. 
2.3. Role of the research  assistant 
The  research assistant,  Ibrahima  Sogodogo  @sycho-p6dagogue,  based  in  Sikasso) was given  a 
very  large  responsibility as he  was  carrying  out  most  of  the  village  survey  alone.  He  lived  up to 
the  responsibility,  indeed, by  conscientiously  following  the  agreements  we  had  made  and  by 
carefully  reporting  the  very  detailed  comments  given  by  many  respondents. 
As the  interviews  were  carried  out  during  the  busy  period  when  cotton is harvested, the research 
assistant  lived  in  each  village  for  about  a  week  or  ten  days  and  approached  the  respondents  either 
early  in the morning  or  late  in  the  evening. 
During  daytime  when  most  people  were  in  the  fields,  he  collected  background  information  on  the 
villages  from  old  people  and  others  who  were  not  involved  in  the  cotton  harvest.  Informal  chats 
late  in  the  evening  with  young  men  at  his own age  supplemented  the  information  received  from 
the  old. 
The majority of interviews  were  conducted  in  Bambara  which  most  people  in the region  speak. 
In  some  cases,  however,  he  had  to  rely  on  assistance from Minyanka-  or  Senoufo-speaking 
interpreters. 
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2.4. Criteria for selection of villages 
A total  of  10  villages  were  included  in  the  survey  of  which  8  were  visited  in  1994  (Sinkolo, 
Woroni,  Koloni,  Nafegue,  N’Golokasso,  Chi&me,  Dossorola  and  Sincina)  and 2 were  added  in 
the  spring  of  1996 (Klda and  Molobala). 
As the  interest  of  the  survey  was  to  identify  possible  patterns  in  the  way  the  village  population 
relate  to  government  agencies  rather than establishing  a  picture of the  interaction  in  an  ‘average 
village’, criteria for selection of villages emphasised the inclusion of villages in dyerent 
situutions instead  of  attempting  to obtain a sample  representative  of the villages in the region. 
The  eight  villages  first  included  were  selected  according  to  the  following  criteria: 
- a certain  geographical  spread,  variation  in  the  distance  to  administrative  headquarters  and  in  the 
distance  to  major  roads. 
- representation  of  different  experience with government  assistance:  four  villages  involved  in  the 
Test  Zones  programme  and  four  villages  not  involved  were  selected. 
- one  village,  Sincina, known to be a  stronghold  of  SYCOV,  the  farmers’  movement, was selected 
to  see  if  answers  given  by  respondents  in th s village  would  differ  from  those  given  by  others. 
When a  first  processing of data indicated,  that the pattern  of  answers  in  Sincina  in  fact  differed 
rather  markedly  from  that  found  in  other  villages,  the two villages  added  to  the  survey  in  1996 
(Klda and  Molobala)  were  selected  with  the  purpose  of  including two more  villages known to 
be  supportive  of  SYCOV. 
2.5. Selection of respondents 
The  survey  includes  a  total  of 3 12  respondents in the 10 villages. An average  of 30 respondents 
in  each  village  were  selected  at  random by taking  e.g.  every fifth household  in  the  membership 
list  of  the  village  association (AV). For  each  of  the  households  selected,  the  position  in  the 
DRSPR-typology  (the  a-d  classification,  explained  and  discussed  in  chapter 7) was  copied  from 
the  list. 
Within  the  households,  the  head of household  was  usually  selected  (about  half  of  all  cases),  and 
if  he was not  available, a younger  brother  or  son was interviewed.  Only  11  women  were  included 
in  the  survey. 
This  methodology  may  invite  at  least  three  points  of  criticism  that  will  be  discussed  in  the 
1)  it  may be  problematic  to  select  respondents by taking  the  point  of  departure  in  households. 
2) the virtual absence  of  women  in the survey  may  have  important  implications  on  results. 
3) random  selection  of  households  is  not  the  best way to ensure the  representation of respondents 
in  different  socioeconomic  position. 
1) An extensive  literature  exists  on  the  problem of using the  household m a unit of unaZysis in 
studies of e.g. food production and nutrition, farming systems and farmers’ responses to 
government  policies  (e.g.  Guyer,  1981;  Folbre,  1986;  Berry,  1986;  Peters,  1995).  The  approach 
is  criticised  for  overlooking  both  important  internal  relations in the  households  (notably  the  role 
following: 
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of  women as independent  economic  actors),  transfers  of  resources  among  households  (e.g. 
according to lineage structures) and for downplaying the problem of defining households 
membership  in  societies  with  high  mobility. 
In the  present  study  households  have  not  been  used as a  unit  of  analysis  but  only as a  means to 
identify  individual  respondents.  The  criticism  that  regards  its  inadequacy as a unit with  well- 
defined  borders  is,  therefore,  less  relevant,  but  the  point  about  a  risk  of  overemphasizing  its 
character as an entity  has  to  be  acknowledged.  By  selecting  only  one  member  per  household,  there 
is an implicit  assumption  that his person is speaking  for all its members.  The  inclusion in the 
survey of  a  certain  number of  younger  brothers  and sons of  the head of  household  partly  makes 
up  for the problem,  and  it  is  worth  noticing  that  the  survey  has  not  found  any  significant 
differences  in  the  answers  given  by  men  in  different  position.  It  remains  a  limitation,  however, 
that  women  have  not  been  heard. 
2)  The absence of women from  the  survey  was  not  a  result  of  a  deliberate  choice.  Initially  it  was 
intended  to  let  every  second  respondent  be  a  woman,  but  already  during  the  preparatory  visits  to 
the  three  villages  and  notably  during the test  of  the  questionnaire  a  serious  problem was faced. 
Women in the  Sikasso  region  constitute  an  important  part  of  the  agricullmal  labour  force,  but 
their  role  in  agricultural  decision  making  and  their  contact  to  government  extension  agencies  is 
virtually  nil  (see the section  on  ‘gender  inequalities’  later  in  the  annex ). When  asked  about  their 
contact  to  government  agencies,  their  assessment of the  quality of service and their  opinion on 
the role  of  the  village  vis-a-vis  government  representatives,  women,  therefore,  simply  referred 
to their  husbands.  The  same  problem  was  faced by the  study  carried  out  by  Coulibaly  et  al. 
(Coulibaly  et al., 1993),  and  while  in this study  it  was  accepted  that  the  share  of  respondents  able 
to  provide  meaningful  answers  was  very  low, it as  decided  in  the  present  study  to  concentrate 
on men  and  include  only  the  handful  of  women  met  who  seemed  able to  answer. 
Implications  of the omission  of  women  are  believed  to be  rather  limited, as far as the  questions 
dealing  specifically  with  the  contact  to  extension  agencies  are  concerned  women  do  not  have 
these  contacts  and  it just did not  make  sense  to  pursue  the  issue.  For  questions  on  the  general 
relationship  between  the  village  and  the  state,  however, it is  quite  likely  that i would  have  made 
a  difference to the results  obtained  if it had been  possible to include  women. In the  study  by 
Hyden  on  Tanzania  referred  to  above,  women  were  identified as one  out  of  four  groups  of 
respondents,  and  their  answers  differed  substantially  from  those  given  by  other  groups  and  added 
significant  insights  to the overall  results. In the  present  study,  however,  it  would  have  been 
necessary  to  develop  a  special  questionnaire to women that took  into  consideration  the  special 
character  of  their  contacts  to  government  representatives  (concentration  of  contacts  on  health 
staff). For  reasons  related  to  time  and  resources, thi  option  was  not  pursued. 
3) It  may  be  argued  that selection of respondents  based on a wealth-ranking  exercise rather than 
on a  random  selection  of  members of the village  association (AV) would  have  ensured a better 
representation  of  households  in  different  situations. This is probably  true,  and  it  has  to  be 
admitted  that  the  reason  for  preferring the random  selection  was  that  it  was  considerably  faster 
and  could  be  undertaken by the  research  assistant  without  my  presence. A properly  done  wealth- 
ranking  exercise is quite  demanding  in  terms  of  time  (Grandin,  1988),  and  it  is  believed  that  a 
rough  wealth-ranking  exercise  would  not  be  much  better  than  the  random  selection. Thus, the 
categories  resulting  from  a  simple  wealth-ranking  exercise  carried out in relation  to  the  Test 
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Zones  programme in Sink010 are  not  very  different  from  the  a-d-categories (ME, 1993).  The 
major  difference  is  that  the  wealth-raking  exercise  generated a M e r  differentiation  of  the  large 
middle groups (group-b and group-c), whereas the groups of ‘very rich’ and ‘very poor’ 
correspond  quite  well  to  group-a  and  group-d,  respectively.  Results  from  the  simple  wealth- 
ranking  exercises  carried  out  during  the  preparation  of  the  questionnaire  confirm this conclusion. 
2.6. Data  processing  and  analysis 
Given the many open  questions  in  the  questionnaire and the  careful  reporting  by  the  research 
assistant  of  comments  given  by  respondents  on  answers  to  closed  questions, data processing  and 
analysis  turned  out to be a sizable task. It was further complicated by the fact that many 
respondents  combined  answers in an  unforseen  way  or  introduced  new  categories  in  answers to 
closed  questions. As an  example  can  be  mentioned  the  question  on  the  preferred  division of 
labour among the state, the village, CMDT and private actors (question 22), which most 
respondents  answered  by  indicating  whom  they  wanted  to  collaborate  on  the ask, e.g.  ‘the  village 
and the government  together’,  or  ‘CMDT  and SYCOV’. 
In order  to  identify  main  patterns  of  answers  the  excel  spread  sheet softwarewas used  to  produce 
cross tabulations of answers. In case of open questions and new categories introduced by 
respondents,  answers  were  classified  in  a  set  of maincategories  before  the  data  was  entered  into 
the  programme. 
Most of  the data resulting  from  the  survey  is  presented  in  tables  and  discussed in chapter  10  and 
1 1. In a few  cases  where  cross  tabulations  did  not  generate any clear  patterns,  the  findings  are  not 
presented. This mainly  regards  the  various  cross  tabulations  of  answers  to  questions  8-22  with 
identi-  characteristics  of  respondents  such as age,  position  in  the  household  and  the  existence 
of literate members of the household. For a presentation of identi@ing characteristics of 
respondents,  see  the  table  C-F  later  in  the  annex. 
The  question  about  whether  the  village  technical  team can be  replaced  by  government  agencies 
(question  14)  seems  not  to  have  been  well  understood by respondents,  and  answers are therefore 
not  reported. 
Finally,  it was found that 1994  was  too  early  to ask respondents  what  they  understood  by  the  word 
‘decentralisation’.  It was only with  the  preparation  of  the  establishment  of mal communes  in 
1995  that  the  population in the Sikasso region  were  informed  about  plans  to  decentralise  the 
administration. In late  1994  the  majority  of  respondents  answered  that  they  had  never  heard  the 
word  being  mentioned. 
Many of the  statements,  whether  answers  to  open  questions  or  comments,  could  not  appropriately 
be  processed in a  computer  programme.  Instead  they  were  copied  from  the  questionnaires  and 
classified  according to main topics.  Wherever  an  analysis in the  text  draw  on  such  statements,  the 
statement  itself  is  quoted  in  a  footnote.  It has been  decided  to  present  these  statements  in  French 
rather than translate  them  into  English.  Although it is  acknowledged that this may  reduce  the 
undemtanding  by  some  readers,  the  argument  is  that  the  statements  have  already  been  translated 
once  by  the  research  assistant  from  Bambara  into  French.  While  the  vernacular is Clearly  shining 
through  the  quotations  in  French,  because  the  research  assistant  has  managed  to  make a v ry 
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direct  translation  rather than transform  the  statements  into  ‘good  French’,  it  is  feared  that this 
would  get lost in a  second  translation. 
Quotes  of  statements by  government staff interviewed,  on  the  other  hand,  are  translated  fiom 
French  into  English,  because  in this case I feel  more  sure  to  be  able to convey  the  exact  meaning 
of  what has been  said. 
2.7. Reliability of the answers obtained 
It is  appropriate  to  discuss  at  least  five  issues  concerning  the  reliability  of  the  answers obtained 
1) use  of  a  questionnaire survey to  obtain  complex  discursive  replies. 
2)  use  of  hypothetical  questions. 
3) the  concept  of the state. 
4) the concept  of  trust. 
5) the  timing  of the survey. 
1) Traditionally a questionnaire is considered an appropriate tool to obtain quantitative 
informafion, i.e. measure the prevalence  and  generality  of  variables thathave  already  been  deiined 
(how  many,  how  often,  etc.).  Questions liiely to  result  in  complex  discursive  replies,  on  the  other 
hand, are  most  often  dealt  with by  use  of  qualitative  techniques  such as in-depth  interviewing. In 
the  literature  on  research  methodologies,  however,  there  is  a  growing  interest  in  ‘mixing  methods’ 
by combining  quantitative  and  qualitative  methods  and data (e.g.  Brannen,  1992;  Kvale,  1996; 
Grsnmo, 1982). This may  be  done  for  instance  by  identifying a set  of  opposing  views  on  a 
particular  phenomenon through interviews  and  subsequently use questionnaires  to  assess the 
prevalence  of the views.  Whereas  the  obvious  advantage  is  that  more  general  information  is 
obtained than if the researcher  had to  reply  only  on  a  limited  number of in-depth  interviews, the 
weakness  of  the  method is that there  is  less  possibility  to ask follow-up  questions  and  clarify 
doubts  on the spot. This implies  that  a  larger  task  of  interpretation  is  left  to  the  researcher  and this 
again  increases the influence  of  the  subjective  views  held  by  the  researcher. 
While  obviously this problem  is  present in the interpretation  of  the  village  survey, it was modified 
somehow by  my  possibility  during  the  fieldwork in February 1996 to  revisit  a  number of the 
villages  and  test my  interpretations through individual  and  group  interviews. 
2)  Some of  the  questions  in  the  questionnaire  have  a hypothetical character as they are inviting 
personal  assessments  of  an  ideal  situation,  e.g.  ‘what  could  the statedo  to  solve  your  problems?’ 
(question  18)  or  ‘who  should  be  responsible  for  the  following  tasks?’(question  22).  It  could  have 
been  feared that such  questions  would  make  little  sense  to  people  not  used  to  be  asked  their 
opinion  even  about  basic  everyday  problems,  let  alone  abstract  political  issues.  Nevertheless, 
answers  and  comments by  respondents  reveal  that  they  in  fact  handle  such  hypothetical  questions 
without  major  problems.  It  is,  thus,  a  common  feature  of  many  answers  that  they star  by pointing 
out  how it ought to be  and  then  add  that this is,  however,  not  how it is in  the  present  situation. 
3) Also  questions  that  refer to the concept ofthe state might  be  expected  to  challenge the 
analytical  capacity  of  farmers  of  whom  many  are  illiterate.  The  questionnaire  both  refers  to  ‘les 
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services  itatiques’ as all  the  agencies,  including  CMDT,  that  intervene  in  the  village  (question 
S),  and  later it suggests  a  distinction  between  ‘le  gouvemement’  and CMDT (question 22). 
The wwers obtained,  however,  do  not  suggest  that  respondents  have  had  any  major difficulties 
understanding  each  of  the  government  agencies as both  independent  actors  and  part ofthe state 
(‘1’Etat’).  It  seems,  though,  that fanners  similar  to  the  point  made by Gupta  have  a  practical 
knowledge  of  the  state as fi-agmentary  and  yet  a  unit  (Gupta, 1995). ‘L‘Etat’ is an important 
aspect  of  everyday  realities  in rural areas  and  generally  people  do  not  find t ifficult to  discuss 
its actions, merits and demerits4”. 
What may be  difficult,  though,  is  the  distinction  between  government  agencies  and  other  external 
agents  who  intervene in a village.  During  the  preparatory  study  in  three  villages,  it  appeared  that 
anybody  ‘from  outside’  tended  to  be  associated  with the state.  Thus,  researchers,  NGOs  and 
donor-funded-projects were mentioned together with CMDT, the health service and the 
administration.  Each  of  these has a  separate  identity  but  they  tend  to  be  lumped  together  when 
questions  regard  the  role  of  the  state  versus  that  of  the  village. 
This may  have  implications  for  the  questions  on  what  the s ate can do to solve  the  problems of 
the  villages as compared  to  what  the  village  and  ‘others’  can  do  (question 17-19). The  many 
respondents  who  have  answered  that  there  are  no  other than the  state or themselves,  who  can 
solve  their  problems,  may  simply  have  associated  anything  ‘non-village’  with  the  state. 
4) The concept of hut constitutes  a  problem  not  only  because  it is always  dangerous  to  use 
unclear  concepts  in  a  questionnaire  survey  where  the  precise  interpretation is left  to  respondents, 
while in the  next  step  the  interpretation f answers  is  left  to  the  researcher. In this particular  case 
the  potential  confusion  was M e r  increased  by  the  mistake  of  using  the  concept  in two different 
meanings. Thus, the  issue of usefilness of the services was  approached  by asking in which  agency 
respondents  trusted  most  and  least. In the  local  context,  the  French  word  ‘confiance’  is  often  used 
in  relation  to  organisations, firms, or persons  that  come  up  to  expectations,  i.e. ar  useful  in  the 
broad  sense  of  the  word.  At  the  same  time  the  issue of personal relations between extension 
agents  and f m e r s  was  dealt with by a  question  about  ‘confiance’  in  relation to i dividual  agents 
(village-based  agents vs. agents  based in arrondissement  headquarters,  young  vs.  old,  etc.).  The 
two  different  applications  of  the  concept  transgress  the  theoretical  distinction in chapter 3 
between  ‘compliance  for utilitarian reasons’  and  ‘compliance  because  of  normative  obligations’. 
This is regettable, and  a  more  straightforward  question  about  usefulness  would  have  been 
preferable. This could  have  taken  the  point of departure  in a specific  question  to  respondents 
about  the  type of problems  that  they are unable to solve  themselves  followed  by  their  assessment 
of  what  agencies are able to do  to  the  problem ascompared  to  the  assistance  obtained  from  others 
such as neighbours,  private  veterinarians  (in  the  case of livestock),  etc. 
452 In French  a  linguistic  distinction  is  made  between l’Etat’ and ‘le  gouvernement’  very  similar  to  the 
conceptual  distinction roposed by Chazan et al, when they define  ‘the  state’ as a set of  associations  of  agencies 
clairmng control over B e k e d  !-ones and then p dation and ‘the,  government’ as the ecific  occupants of 
public office who are in a posltlon  to  make  bmding%cisions  at  any  tune  (Chazan et al., 1% p. 39). In English 
the  notion of ‘government‘ is often  used  interchangeabjy  to,the,notion,of  ‘state’  (e.g.  ‘government  agencies’ 
instead of ‘state agencies’).  The  latter IS reflected  also m thls dlsserta’non. 
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While  it  has to be  acknowledged  that  using  the  concept  of  trust  invites  misunderstandings  and 
erroneous  interpretations of answers,  the  many  personal  comments by respondents  are  believed 
to some  extent  to  have  reduced  the  dimensions  of  the  problem. 
Another  problem  relates  more  generally to questions  about  demand  satisfaction:  despite an 
understanding  of  the  questions in accordance  with  the  meaning  intended  by  the  researcher, 
respondents  may  have  various  motives  to  exaggerate  their  satisfaction  or  dissatisfaction  with 
services  provided.  It is mentioned  in  chapter 3 that  the  reason  for  approaching the issue by four 
specific type of questions, is that any questions to clients  conceming their satisfaction  with 
services  provided  are  likely to be  answered  negatively, as needs  tend  to  be  indefinite  and  therefore 
never  properly  satisfied.  The  opposite  problem has been  raised by N’Golo  Coulibaly  who has 
mentioned the  risk  that  people  perceive  of  a  survey  like  the  present as a  study on the  performance 
of  individual  agents  and  therefore  express  more  satisfaction than actually  felt  (N’Golo  Coulibaly, 
personal communication, September 1994). While it is too simple to argue that these two 
problems  may  have  counterbalanced  each  other,  it is quite  likely  that  they  have  enforced  the 
differenced  found  between  (better-off)  farmers,  who  express  satisfaction  with  the  services,  and 
(poorer) farmers,  who  have a negative  assessment  of  the  services.  Thus,  those,  who  have  a  limited 
contact to extension  agencies and find it difficult to obtain assistance, have little to lose by 
savagely  criticising  their  performance,  whereas  those,  who  have  a  relatively fkqu nt contact  and 
find  services  useful,  want to protect  the  agents  providing  the  services. 
5 )  Given  the  political  character  of  many  of  the  issues  dealt  with  in  the  questionnaire,  the  timing 
of the  survey  may  have  affected  the  results.  The  major  part  of  the  field  work  was  carried  out in 
late 1994 when farmers were subject to cotton production quotas and the impact of the 
devaluation  of  the  CFA  in the form of higher  cotton  prices was not  yet  felt  (Giraudy,  1996; Kib6 
et al., 1995a  p. 12). In many  villages in the  northern  part of the  region, there was  a  general 
frustration  about  the  ‘changing times’  that  had  a  number  of  negative  consequences in the  form 
of  social  turbulence at village  level  and  increased  crime  rates,  but  had  not  yet  yielded any tangible 
improvements in the  everyday  life. 
In the  southern  part  of  the  region,  on  the  other hand, the  dependency  on  cotton  production is less 
pronounced  and the social  order at village  level  not  yet  challenged. In this area the changes  may 
have  been felt mainly as a loosening  by the state of its grip  of  the  villages  (less  repression, 
reduced tax payment). 
It is possible,  therefore, that the timing of the survey has resulted  in  a  picture  of  considerably 
larger  differences  between the northern  and the  southern  part  of  the  region than those  found if the 
survey  had  been  carried  out a few  years  later  when  benefits  of  the  devaluation  were  more 
generally  felt. 
The  fact  that  two  villages,  Molobala  and Kikla were  only  included in the survey in early  1996  may 
also  have  affected  the  results.  Together  with  Sincina  these two villages  are  pointed  out  in  the 
analysis as representing  a  particular  type  of  village  with  a h gh level  of  civic  competence,  defined 
as a  willingness to engage the state  (chapter  11). 
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2.8. Ethical considerations 
The  informed  consent by respondents  was  ensured  by  obtaining  the  permission  by  the  village 
chief  to  carry  out the survey.  Usually this happened  in  relation  to  a  meeting  where  many  of  the 
men  of the village  were  present  and  invited  to  ask  questions  and  comment  on  the  survey. 
Like in the case of interviews with government staff it could be argued that individual 
respondents  might  have  felt  under  pressure  to  participate  after  the  village  management  had  given 
its  consent. Again a counter  argument  would  be that respondents  who  felt  under  pressure  would 
be  unlikely to  comment so extensively as it turned  out  to  be  the  case. 
The  confidentiality  of  respondents  has  been  ensured by referring  individual  statements  only to 
their survey number and their village (e.g. N’golokasso no. 15), and in cases where their 
socioeconomic  position  is  decisive  to  interpret  their  statements,  to  their  position  in  the  a-d- 
typology  and  their  village  (e.g.  group-c  respondent  Chikme  no.9). 
As it is  believed  that his method  sufficiently  conceals  the  identity  of  respondents,  no  attempts 
have  been  made to disguise identifying  features  of  the  villages. Thus, all villages  are  referred  to 
by their  real  names  because in the  interpretation of statements  considerable  importance  is  attached 
to the village-background. If fictive names had been used, the value of findings for other 
researchers  working  in  the  area  would  be  substantially  reduced,  and  any  possibility  to  crosscheck 
information  would  be  lost. 
3. Interviews with resource  persons 
3.1. Persons  met  and  purpose of the  interviews 
Given the importance  attached  to  establishing  the  context of  the  interaction  between  government 
agencies  and  farmers  and  the  lack of literature  dealing  with  core  issues  of  the  study  (see  below), 
a  considerable  number of resource  persons  have  been  interviewed.  They  can  be  divided  into  six 
main groups: 
1) government  administrative staff 
2) other  government staff 
3) donor  representatives 
4) researchers  and  project staff 
5) representatives  of  the  farmers’  movement 
6 )  representatives  of  political  parties 
1)  At  each  administrative  level I had to pay a  courtesy  call  to  the  head  of  the  government 
administration  (chefs  d’arondissement,  commandants  de  cercle or their  deputies  and the governor 
of Sikasso and  some of his core staff). I decided  to  use  the  occasion  to  ask  a  series  of  questions 
on  general  relations  between  government  representatives  and  the  population  in  the  area  and  on 
social  changes  at  village  level.  The  questions  concerned  the  type  of  problems  presented  to  the 
administration  and  those  solved  by  village  chiefs  themselves  (special  emphasis  was  put  on  land 
tenure cases), the development of tax payments, the reaction by the administration to the 
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dissolution of AVs (in Koutiala) and the  attempts by  the  administration to make  the  various 
government  agencies  collaborate. 
2) In addition to staff of  the  four  agencies  and  administrative  staff,  other  government  staff 
interviewed  include  representatives  of  the  various  planning  and  coordination  units in the central 
administration in Bamako  with  influence  either  on  the  existing  relationship  among  the  four 
agencies or on future  reform  plans.  The  Cellule  de  Planification et de  Statistique in the MDRE 
was the most  important  of  these, as it  was  responsible  of  coordinating all initiatives within the 
field  of  natural  resource  management  (including the Test Zones programme), and thereby 
constituted  the  main  link  between  the  agencies  at  national  level. CAMOPA, la Mission  de 
Decentralisation and staff  from  the  various  national  environmental  programmes  and  planning 
units were  visited  to  obtain  information  on  ongoing  reform  plans. 
3) Also as part of the  attempts to establish  an  overview of  ongoing  reform plans of importance 
to the four  agencies  under  study,  the  main  donors in the  field  of  natural  resource  management 
were  visited.  These  included  the  World Bank, La  Caisse  Franqaise, USAID, GTZ  and UNSO. 
4) Although Sikasso region has relatively  fewer  donor-funded  or NGO-run projects  than  other 
regions in the  country,  there  are  quite  a  number,  and  many  of  the  most  important  resource  persons 
turned  out o be sociologists  or  socioeconomists  working  in  these  projects.  Assistance from the 
regional  coordinator of the  Test  Zones  programme  made  it  possible to establish  an  overview of 
activities  and  visit  most  of  the  projects  within  the firstfew  weeks  of  the  fieldwork. This provided 
me with  valuable  background  information  before  the  initiation of the  interview  study and the 
village  survey. In addition  to  these  interviews,  researchers  from  ESP-GRN  were  a  major  source 
of information  on  the  general  context in the Sikasso region,  while  Bamako-based  researchers, 
notably from IMRAD and  AVES,  shared  with  me  their  analyses  of  overall  political  changes i  
the country.  At  the  end  of the fieldwork  in 1994 I had the  opportunity  to  present  preliminary 
findings  to some of these resource  persons  at  a  seminar  held at ESP-GRN. 
5 )  When I left Mali in 1994 I intended to use  the  last  part  of  the  fieldwork  (February 1996) to 
concentrate on SYCOV,  the  farmers’  movement.  While  preparing  for this fieldwork,  however, 
I decided to broaden the scope to study also other  expressions  of  the  emerging  ‘civil  society’ 
including the many political parties that had increased their importance at local level in 
preparation  of  presidential  and  parliamentary  elections  in 1997. The  time  spent on the  farmers’ 
movement was therefore  cut  down  to  a  few  interviews  with  representatives  of  SYCOV,  Chambre 
Rkgionale  d’Agriculture in Sikasso and  Kafu  Djigenk  to  supplement  those  undertaken in 1994. 
In retrospect, I deeply  regret his decision as it would  have  been  considerably  more  useful for my 
analysis  to  have  obtained  more  information  on  SYCOV - not  least  on  the  profile of its members. 
6 )  I had  expected that the  interviews  with  representatives of political  parties  carried  out in 
February 1996 would  have  provided  me  with an improved  understanding  of  societal  forces in the 
Sikasso region.  At this time  it  seemed  that  the  parties  were  taking  over  the  role  from  SYCOV of 
mediating between the village population and government representatives, and it was my 
impression  that  the  parties  were  playing  central  role in challenging  existing  authorities  at  village 
level  (in  the  Koutiala  area). I must  acknowledge,  however,  that  these  interviews  contributed  very 
little to my  analysis.  With  a few interesting  exceptions  local  party  representatives  met  were 
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generally  not  very  well-informed  about  conditions of the rural population,  hence  unable  to  offer 
any  analysis  of  ongoing  changes. 
3.2. Ethical  considerations 
In relation  to  interviews  with  resource  persons  ethical  considerations  mainly  regard  the  issue of 
confidentiality.  They  all  participated  on  a  purely  voluntary  basis and unlike staff of the four 
agencies  they  were  not  questioned  about  issues  in  relation  to  their  employment  situation  but  rather 
asked  to  provide  information  on  and  assess  general  development  issues  in  Mali. 
Instead of confidentiality many resource persons - and other researchers who have later 
commented  on draft chapters - have  a  right  to  be  quoted as the source  of  particular  information 
or  insights  that  otherwise  would  wrongly  be  credited  me. As a general  rule  their  names,  therefore, 
appear in the text when  they  have  provided  what  may  be  described as 'original  information',  i.e. 
information  that  is  not easily accessible  from  written sources or  other  resource persons. 
Like  in  the  case  of  regional  and  national  level  st&  of  the  four  agencies,  exceptions  to  the 
principle  of  indicating  the  source  are  cases  where  resource  persons  have  given  controversial 
information or assessments that might give  them  difficulties  if  spread  to awider  audience. As an 
example  can  be  mentioned  information  on  personal  controversies  among  donor  representatives 
that  (sadly)  might  be  of  importance  to  national  planning  processes  and  thereby  represent  an 
interesting  angle  on  the  study  of  the  four  agencies,  but  which  is  considered  too  sensitive  to  be 
attributed  to  identifiable  individuals. 
4. Literature  study 
4.1. Library  studies 
The excellent library at ESP-GRN in Sikasso has provided me with the largest and most 
important part of the literature used in the present study. It has a very good coverage of 
socioeconomic  and natural resource  management issues in the S i s o  region  and  also  contains 
a  considerable  number  of  official  Malian  documents.  The  librarian  at  ESP-GRN was so kind  to 
continue  sending me lists of new  acquisitions  after  the  fieldwork had been  finalised. 
Other  Malian  libraries  visited  include  Centre  de  Documentation  of Istitut d'Economie  Rurale, 
the  library  of  Institut  des  Sciences  Humaines  and  la  Biblioth6que  Nationale  du  Mali  (all in 
Bamako). 
In  Paris I have  visited  OECD  Antenne  de  Documentation, la Documentation  Franqaise  and  the 
library of ORSTOM. In Holland  I  have  visited  the  libraries of Royal  Tropical  Institute  in 
Amsterdam  and  of  Institute for Social  Studies in the Hague.  And  in  Norway  I  have  visited the 
library  of  Centre  for  Environment  and  Development  at  the  University  of  Oslo. 
The  availability  in  Denmark  of  literature  on Mali is  very limited, but  the  excellent  facilities  at  the 
library of University  of  Roskilde  for  searching  on  the  internet  and  the  connections  of th s library 
to a wide  range  of  other  libraries  in  Europe  have  provided me with a considerable  amount  of 
relevant  literature. 
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4.2. Other sources of literature 
During  the  fieldwork in Mali I benefited  from  the willigness of  many  researchers  and  project 
Winterviewed to  share  with  me  their  literature.  Government staffat regional  and  national  level 
allowed  me to photocopy  official  documents,  and  a  letter  from the  Governor  of Sikasso gave  me 
access to development  plans,  statistical data and  budgets  at  cercle  and  arrondissement  level. Also
in my search  for  literature,  my  research  assistant, Mr. M.S.  Sokona,  was an excellent  help  to 
establish  relevant  contacts. 
After the fieldwork I have  had  the  advantage of an  extensive  exchange  of  literature  with  other 
Mali-interested  researchers.  My  colleagues  at  University  of  Oslo  and  NORAGRIC in Norway are 
among  the  most  important,  while  other  contacts  have  been  established  through  researchers  at 
ESP-GRN in Sikasso and  through  my  participation  in  various  seminars  and  conferences. 
Subscriptions  on  a  weekly  Malian  newspaper  ‘Cauris’  and  on the ‘Malinet’  discussion  group  on 
the  internet  which  refers i.a AFP telegrams  and  Malian  newspapers  have  kept  me up  to  date  with 
the  political  and  economic  situation  in  the  country. 
4.3. Gaps in the available literature 
In the  available  literature  on  Mali  there  are  two  lacunae  of  special  importance to the present  study. 
First,  the  literature  on  institutional  issues  such as the  functioning  of  government  agencies  and 
their  relations to local  populations is very  scarce  and  second,  theoretical  analyses  of  recent 
developments in  relations  between  state  and  society are visually nonexistent. This has  forced  me 
to  a  large  extent  to  rely  on oral sources  in  the  form of interviews  with  government  staff,  farmers 
and  resource  persons  and  on  my own interpretation  of  findings.  And  it has liited my  possibility 
of  challenging my own results  and  interpretations by comparison to studies  made by  other 
researchers. 
As it has already  been  mentioned, I have  not had access to studies on Malian  government  agencies 
that  take  up  issues  such as internal  working  procedures,  the  relationship  between front-lie staff 
and  superior  levels  and  the  way  the  agencies  relate to local  populations. 
A  number of the  planning  documents  made to prepare  the  reform  of  the  Ministry  of  Rural 
Development  and  Environment  briefly  touch on some  of  the  issues  but  emphasis  in  descriptions 
and  analyses  are  put  on the  mutual  collaboration  among  the  various  agencies  rather  than  on  the 
characteristics  of  each ofthe agencies  (e.g.  MAEE,  1991;  MAEE,  1992e;  MAEE, 19924 MDRE, 
19928). 
In Sikasso the ‘farming  systems  approach’  applied  by  ESP-GRN  implies  that  while  very  detailed 
information  can  be  found  on  issues  such as e.g. cropping  pattern,  the  cotton  economy  and  the 
gender  division  of  labour,  only  one  study on the  interaction  between  extension  agencies  and 
farmers has been  made  (Coulibaly  et al., 1993). This study has been  very  useful as a  frame  of 
reference for  results  obtained  from  the  village  questionnaire  survey  on  the  direct  contact  between 
agencies  and  farmers - and as mentioned  above  also  inspired the  preparation  of  the  questionnaire. 
But  the  concentration  of  the  study  on  mapping  the  interaction  (frequency  of  contact,  who  takes 
the  initiative,  which  members  of  the  household are contacted,  etc.),  rather  than  explaining it, has 
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again  forced  me to rely on interviews  (including  interviews  with  the  main  author  of  the  study) 
rather than on  written  sources  for  interpretations. 
Considering the unique character of CMDT and its successful attempts to increase cotton 
production  in  southern  Mali,  the  absence  of  a  thorough  organisational  analysis  of this agency 
seems  surprising.  Many  studies on the Sikasso region  deals  with  aspects  of  the  way  CMDT 
operates,  and  it  is  possible to draw  part of a  general  picture  by  piecing  together  analyses  from 
various  sources  written  with  other  purposes  such as studies  on  the  farmers’  movement  (e.g. 
Bingen et al., 1995;  Marchant,  1991)  and  studies  of  cotton  production in he regon (e.g. Sanogo, 
1989;  Guindo & van  Campen,  1994).  Publications  by  CMDT  and  CFDT  supplement  the  picture, 
but  none  of  the  sources  available  report an analysis  similar  to  the  one  attempted in this study. 
Some of the consultancy  reports on the  forestry  service  made  on  request  by  donors  discuss  the 
problematic  relations  between  forestry s t a f f  and  local  populations  and  also  touch  on  problems 
derived from the  organisational  set-up  of  the  agency (e.g.  Brinkerhoff & Gage,  1993;  Mclain, 
1992).  Whereas  these  reports  have  been  very  useful  for  crosschecking  my ow  findings,  they  tend 
to focus  on  legal  and  land  tenure  issues  and  only  deal  with  organisational  aspects  in  passing. 
While  in  the  case of the forestry  service  and  CMDT  it  is  possible to draw  on  some  written 
information on the  agencies,  very  few  sources  dealing  with  the  livestock  service  and  CAC  have 
been  found. 
In order to compensate  for  the  lack  of  possibilities  for  crosschecking  findings  and  challenging 
interpretations I have  discussed a first  (and  very  rough)  version  of  the  analysis  (Degnbol,  1996a) 
with  a  large  number  of  researchers  with  insight on Mali as well as with  researchers  interested  in 
African  state-society  relations. 
Concerning  theoretical  analyses  of  relations  between  state  and  society in Mali, the few  existing 
publications  date  some  years  back  and re all based  on  a  theoretical  approach  very  different  from 
the  one  applied in this dissertation  (Meillassow,  1970;  Amselle,  1985;  Bagayogo,  1987;  Amselle 
& Gregoire,  1987). The recent  literature on democratisation  and  decentralisation  processes  often 
contains  some  general  considerations  about  changing  relations  between  state  and  society (e.g. 
Smith,  1997;  Faye,  1995;  Kassibo,  1997; B&idogo, 1997). But  a  genuine  attempt to identify 
various  types of societal  forces  and  analyse  their  interaction  with  the  state ha  not  been  found. 
For my purpose the most useful contributions are the few publications that discuss the 
relationship  between  the state and the rural population  (e.g.  Coulibaly,  1994;  Bingen,  1994, Cisd 
et al., 1981).  It  is  a  limitation  however,  that  these  publications  do  not  attempt  a  differentiation 
between the various groups  of the rural population.  Moreover,  they  are  mainly  empirical  and 
contain  very  little  theoretical  reflection. 
Thus,  attempts  made in chapter 11 to  identify  various  types  of  societal  forces in the Sikasso 
region  and  explain  them  both as a result  of  the  interaction  with  government  agencies  and as an 
important  conditioning  factor  for  the future interaction  find  very  little - if any - support  in  the 
literature. 
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For  lack  of  possibilities  to  challenge  findings  and  interpretations  by  use  of the existing  literature, 
I have  discussed  also this d y s i s  with several  other  researchers, but unfortunately the draft has 
been  written  up so late  that I have  not  received  comments  from  researchers  with  particular  insight 
on the Sikasso region. 
A last gap in the literature to be  mentioned is more  general:  given  the  concentration  of the 
collection  of  literature in the  years 1993-1996 when the fieldwork  was  carried out and  libraries 
in  other  European  countries  were  visited,  the  majority  of  references are from the early 1990s to 
early 1996. Despite  my  attempts  to  get  access to more  recent  publications through exchange  of 
literature  with  other  researchers  and  search in various libmy data bases,  the  existence of relevant 
recent  publications  not  included in this study  cannot  be  ruled  out. This is particularly  likely to 
regard recent studies of decentralisation processes, e.g. in the form of Master theses or 
consultancy  reports.  It  may also regard  recent  studies on the  ongoing  reform  of the Ministry  of 
Rural Development  and  Environment  that  would  have  provided a v ry  interesting  perspective  on 
the  analysis of the four  agencies. And finally,  studies  of  recent  developments i  relations  between 
the SYCOV farmers’  movement  and CMDT may exist  without my  knowledge. 
4.4. Statistical data 
Important  reservations  must  be  made  for  the  reliability  of all statistical data on a  country  such  as 
Mali  characterised  by  a  large  informal  economy,  extensive  smuggling  of  agricultural  produce, 
livestock and goods  across  the  borders,  lack of a  recent  population  census  and  lack of data on 
social  indicators  such as health  and  education.  Under  such  circumstance  statistical data must  be 
considered  rough  indications  of  tendencies  rather  than  reliable  information  on  specific  amounts, 
sizes and shares. 
Having  said this, it has been  attempted  to  use the best  possible data available in descriptions of 
both the national and the regional  context of the study. In chapter 5 and 6 on ‘the  action 
environment’  and  ‘the  institutional  context of the public  sector’  most  statistical data are  derived 
from the Economist  Intelligence U& the  World Bank, IMF and UNDP statistics.  Data  from  these 
sources  are  supplemented  by  information  obtained from usually  well-researched  magazines  such 
as Marchis Tropicaux,  Jeune  Afrique,  Bulletin  de  I’AiZque  Noir  and  the  Courier. 
Concerning statistics on the Sikasso region,  chapter 7 and 8 mainly  draw on data  collected by 
researchers from ESP-GRN, data published  by CMDT based on  reports  produced  by the extensive 
network  of  village-based  ‘enqusteurs’  and  data  from  the  regional  statistical  department (DRPS). 
Data  collected  by  local  projects  and  data  from a recent  monograph on the region  (Loosvelt et al., 
1995) supplement the information.  It is a serious problem that available data on social indicators 
in the Sikasso region are very  old. 
The meliability of much  of the data  available is reflected by large  discrepancies  between 
information  given  by  different  sources  on  the  same  phenomena. In cases  where  deviations  are so 
significant  that  doubt can be  raised about  the  usefulness  of  the data even as rough  indicators, this 
is  commented in the footnotes,  and  data from more than one  source  are  quoted. 
In addition to the low reliability  of  available data, also  lack  of  data  on  important  issues is a 
problem. This particularly  regards the characteristic  of the Sikasso region in chapter 7 where  lack 
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of tangible data on  income  distribution  on  various sources and  on  income  differences  among  the 
various  types of households  makes it difficult to come to a  clear  conclusion  concerning  the  role 
of cotton  in  processes  of  socioeconomic  differentiation. This again has implications  for  the 
interpretation of the  questionnaire  survey  reported  in  chapter 10 and 11. Thus, the  marked 
difference  in access to extension  services,  reported  by  households of type  a  and  type  d,  suggests 
that the  various  agencies  play  a  role  in  increasing  social  inequalities. As the particular  role of 
cotton,  livestock and  forestry  in  household  incomes  is  not known, however,  dimensions  of  the 
influence by the  agencies  cannot  be  established. 
A similar  problem  is  represented by the  lack of clear  data  on  the  general  level of wealth  in  the 
Sikasso region as compared  to  other  regions.  While it is  generally  believed  that Sikasso belongs 
to the most  prosperous  regions  in  the  country, this perception  is  challenged by the l i i t e d  data 
available  on  social  indicators.  It  would  have  been  interesting to be  able  to  establish if high levels 
of political mobilisation  and  demands  on  the  state  in this region  are  related to an  over-average 
level of wealth  or  rather to a  more  pronounced  process of social  differentiation. 
Consequences of these  and  other  problems  resulting  &om  lack  of data are  discussed  in the text 
and  taken into consideration  in  the final conclusion. 
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LIST OF PERSONS MET DURING THE FIELDWORK IN 1994 AND 1996 
(Dates of meetings  are  indicated in brackets) 
1. Staff of the  four agencies under  study 
1.1. National level 
MDRE. Direction  Nationale  des  Eaux et ForetS.  Bamako 
Yafong  Berth6 - Directeur  National (I4/12 1994) 
MDRE. Direction  Nationale de I'Elevage.  Bamako 
Habib  Coulibaly - Adjoint  au  Directeur  National  de  l'Elevage (15/12  1994) 
Souleyemane  Ouattara (several  meetings, 1994) 
MDRE  Cabinet.  Bamako 
Abdoulaye Tow2 - Conseiller  Technique  au  Ministre du  Developpement  Rural et de 
1'Environnement.  Agriculture (l  511 2  1994) 
Hamady  N'Djim - Conseiller  Technique  au  Ministre du  Dkveloppement  Rural  et  de 
l'Environnement,  Genie  Rural (several  meetings 1994 and 1996) 
CMDT. Bamako 
M. Kassim  Dembele - Adjoint  au  Directeur  General,  Direction  Technique  du  Developpement 
Rural (619 1994,  2/2  1996) 
M. Jean-Pierre  Derlon - Chef de Service  Gestion  des  Terroir (7/9  1994, 2/2 1996) 
M. Sakary Mal6 - Chef de Service  des  Ressources  Humaines (14/12  1994) 
1.2. Regional level 
Direction  Repionale  des Eaux et Fogts. Sikasso 
Hammid  Ag M. Lamine - Directeur  Regional des Eaux et For& (19112 1994) 
Soumaila  A.T.  Coulibaly  -Adjoint  au  Directeur Regional(IY9 1994) 
Direction  Rkgionale de l'$evape/PAAP.  Sikasso 
Ibrahim  Ayouba MaYga - Directeur  Regional  de  1'Elevage (19/12 1994) 
Mamadou  Berth6 - Intirim du Directeur (I4/9 1994) 
CMDT. Region de Sikasso 
Ousmane  Guindo - Directeur  Rigional(5/12 1994,12/2 1996) 
Mamadou  B. Dembelt - Chef  Division  Administrative  et  Sociale (8112 1994) 
Fusseini  Togola - Superviseur  Programme  Zones  Test ( everal  meetings 1994 and 1996) 
Brema  Konk - Vulgarisateur/animateur/formateur (149 1994) 
Direction  Regionale  de  CAC, Sikasso 
Samba  Sissoko - Directeur R&ional(9/12 1994) 
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1.3.1. Koutiala  Cercle 
Ibrahima  Doumbia  -Chef  Cantonnement  Forestier  until  1  October  1994 (1 /9  and 15/9 1994) 
Acougnon  Dolo - Chef  Cantonnement  Forestier after 1 October 1994 (28/11  1994) 
Mdiga - Adjoint  au  Chef  Cantonnement  Forestier (15/9  1994) 
Lasina G o b  - Responsable du projet  Siwaa,  Cantonnement  Forestier (24/10  1994) 
Mamadou I Dembeie - Chef  Secteur de 1'EIevage (25/11  1994) 
Leye  Sidebk - Adjoint  au  Chef  Secteur  de  1'Elevage (25/11  1994) 
Ibrahima Y .  Mdiga - Chef  d'Amenagement  Hydraulique  Pastorale,  Secteur  Elevage (several 
meetings  1994) 
Lasana Ba - Amknagiste,  CMDT  Koutiala (several  meetings,  1994) 
Negeba  Fan6 - Chef de Div.  de  D6fense  et  Restauration  des  Sols,  CMDT  Koutiala (7/12  1994) 
Sekouba  Synayoko - Directeur  CAC,  Koutiala (16/9 and  1/12 1994) 
1.3.2. Kadiolo  Cercle 
GoRa - Chef  Cantonnement  Eaux et Forets  until  1  October  1994 (19/9 1994) 
Mamadou  Berth6 - Chef  Cantonnement Eaux et For&  from  1  Octobre  1994 (6/12 1994) 
Drissa  Coulibaly - Chef  Secteur  Elevage (2319 and  7/12  1994) 
Nouhoum Gork  Cissk - Chef  Secteur  CMDT (7/12 1994,  15/2 1996) 
Dauda  Sanogo - Amhagiste CMDT (23/9  and 3/10 1994, 1 Y 2  1996) 
Sedou A.  N'Diaye - Directeur  CAC (23/9  and 3/10 1994) 
Andre  Sanayogo - Interim  au  Directeur CAC (642 1994) 
1.3.3. Bougouni Cercle 
Amadou  Daou - CMDT  Chef  SAT (14/12  1994) 
Karim Dembele - CMDT (14/12  1994) 
1.4. Arrondissement level 
Arrondissement  Kadiolo  Central  (Kadiolo  Cercle) 
Bayayogo - Chef  de Poste Eaux et For& (20110 1994) 
Adama  Sangark - Chef  de  Poste  V6t6rinaire (9/11  1994) 
Dauda  Sanogo - Am6nagiste  de la CMDT, Secteur Kadiolo (20/10  1994) 
Mamadou  Namou - Chef CAC (2011 0,1994) 
Arrondissement  Fourou Kadiolo Cerclel 
Cletaut  Sanogo - Chef  de Poste Eaux et Forets (3/10 and  9/1 l 1994) 
Amadou  Tour6 - Deuxi6me  Adjoint au Chef de Poste V6terhaire (8111 1994) 
Arrondissement  Loulouni Kadiolo Cercle) 
Yaya Fomba - Chef de Poste  Eaux et Forets (Y10 1994) 
Dauda  Fomba - Adjoint  au  Chef  de Poste V6tkrinaire (18/10 1994) 
Kolaka Kasambara - CMDT  Chef  ZER ( m 0  1994) 
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Coulibaly - CMDT  Chef  ZER (19/10 1994) 
Woransa  Kone - Chef  CAC (19/10 1994) 
Arrondissement  Koutiala  Central  (Koutiala  Cercle) 
Adama KonC - Chef  de  Poste  Forestier (15/9 and 24/10  1994) 
Alou  Dembele - Chef  de  Poste VCtCrinaire (2619,  2719  and 24/10  1994) 
Mentaba Berth6 - CMDT  Chef  ZER (26/9  1994) 
Arrondissement Zangasso (Koutiala  Cercle) 
Mahamane Cisd - Chef  de Poste Forestier (15/9,  16/9 and 7/10  1994) 
Sanogo - Chef de Poste  V6t6rinaire  (28/9  1994) 
Togo - CMDT  Chef SB, Sink010 ( M I  1994) 
Coulibaly - Chef  CAC (7/10 1994) 
Arrondissement  Kouniana Koutiala Cercle) 
Dramane  Traore - Chef  de Poste Forestier (15/9 and 29/9  1994) 
Tiecoura  Didcete - Adjoint au Chef  de  Poste  Veterinaire (21/Il 1994) 
Mamadou Siaka  Coulibaly - Chef  de  Poste  Vkterinaire,  Koloni (2911 0 1994) 
Adama  Diabat6 - Amenagiste  CMDT (29/9  1994) 
Brema Diana - Chef  Secteur  CMDT (21/111994) 
Mohammed Soumar6 - Secretaire  Technique  CMDT (21/111994) 
Mamadou  KonatC - CMDT  Chef  ZAER,  Koloni (29/I 0 1994) 
Arrondissement  Molobala Koutiala Cercle) 
S. Sanogo - Chef de Poste Eaw et  Forets (28/9  1994) 
Jean-Marie  Dembele - Chef de Poste  VCt6rinaire (2819  and IO/II  1994) 
Tangara - Chef  Secteur  CMDT (28/9  1994) 
Lasine  Coulibaly - AmBnagiste  CMDT (2819  and lO/ll 1994, 912 1996) 
A D o d  - Secgtaire Technique  du  Secteur  CMDT (2819 1994) 
Mamadou  Coulibaly - CMDT  Chef  ZER, Kansasso (28/9  1994) 
Abdoulaye MaTga - Chef CAC (l I/l I 1994) 
Arrondissement MPessoba CKoutiala Cercle) 
Sidebe - Chef  de  Poste  Forestier (1519 1994) 
Arrondissement  Konsermela  (Koutiala  Cercle) 
Lamine KonatC - Chef  de Poste Forestier (15/9  1994) 
2. Government  administrative staff 
Gouvemerat.  Sikasso 
El  Hadj  Selcou  Dembele - Gouvemeur (2W9  1994) 
Bocary  Sanessekou - Directeur  du  Cabinet (12/9  1994, 5/2 1996) 
Maro  Diabate  -Comeiller  au  Developpement  (1994) (12/9 and 8/12 1994) 
Sagou Dolo - Conseiller  au  DCveloppement  (1996) (512 1996) 
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Koutiala  and  Kadiolo cercles 
Issa  Tieman Diana - Commandant  de  Cercle,  Koutiala  from 1 November 1994 1994  (23/1 l 1994) 
NN - Premiere  Adjoint  au  Commandant,  Koutiala (1112  1994) 
Ibrahima Samake - Commandant  du  Cercle,  Kadiolo  until 1 October 1994 (19/9 1994) 
Amadou  Dolo - Commandant  du  Cercle,  Kadiolo from 1 October 1994  (7/12  1994) 
Bobacar KoYta - Premiere  Adjoint au Commandant  du  Cercle,  Kadiolo (19/9  1994) 
Arrondissements 
Abdoulaye  Bocar  Tour6 - Chef  &Arrondissement,  Kadiolo  Central (9111  1994) 
NN - Chef  &Arrondissement,  Fourou (8111 1994) 
Abdoulaye  Doumbia - Chef  &Arrondissement,  Loulouni (19/10  1994) 
Abdoul  Kader  Sisseko - Chef  &Arrondissement,  Koutiala  Central (U1 1 1994) 
Mamadou  Kon6 - Chef  &Arrondissement,  Zangasso (16/9 and 7/10  1994) 
Mamoutou Traori - Secretaire au Chef  &Arrondissement,  Zangasso (16/9  1994) 
Seydou Samba SidebC - Chef  &Arrondissement,  Kouniana (21/111994) 
Oumar Gendou - Secrktaire  Administratif,  Kouniana (29/9  1994) 
Bocarit  dit  Samba  Tour6 - Chef  d’Arrondissement,  Molobala (23/1 I 1994) 
3. Other  government staff 
MDRE  Cellule  de Planification et de Statistiaue.  Bamako 
Moussa  Kalifa  Traork - Directeur 1994  (7/9  1994) 
Mamadougou GoYta - Directeur 1996(2/2  1996) 
Mahamane TraorC - Juriste foncier (several  meefings 1994 and 1996) 
Br6hima  N’Diaye - Amenagiste (25/11 and 13/12  1994) 
Ousmane Sangark - Ingenieur des Eaux et For& (25’1 l 1994) 
MDRE. Direction  Administrative et Financiere.  Bamako 
NN - Directeur (16/12  1994) 
Mission de Dkcentralisation 
Ousmane Sy - Chef de  la Mission (l 7/11  1994) 
Noel D i m  - Adjoint au Chef de la Mission (l 7/1 l 1994, 2312 1996) 
Mamby  Diaby  K6lCtigui - President  du  GREM,  membre de la Cellule  de  Coordination Regional 
de la Mission de Decentralisation, Sikasso (712 1996) 
CAMOPA  (Cellule  d’Auuui A la Mise en Oeuvre du Plan  &Action  du MDRE). Bamako 
Mohammed El Mackyou  Diallo - Chef de CAMOPA (16/111994) 
Moussa  Leo  SidebC - Cadre de  CAMOPA (16111 1994) 
Aboumediane Tour6 - Assistant a la CAMOPA (2212 1996) 
Promamme  National de Gestion des Ressources  Naturelles  (PGRN).  Bamako 
Porna Bengaly - Conseiller  Technique (819 1994) 
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Plan  National #Action Environnementale  (PNAE)  Bamako 
Salif  KanoutC - Directeur  PNAE/CID  (23/2 1996) 
Progamme National de Vulgarisation Agicole (PNVA).  Bamako 
Aly Kontao - Coordinateur National de PNVA (16/11  1994) 
Sokona - Chef des Activites  Feminines (l 7/11  1994) 
Centre  National  de la Recherche Scientifiaue et Technologiaue  (CNRST).  Bamako 
Mahamane Diallo Iam - Directeur (212  1996) 
Aly  Yero  Mdiga - Directeur  General  Adjoint (2/9  1994) 
Ismail Ouattara (219 and 8/9  1994) 
Centre  Regional  de  Recherche  A+cole (CRRAJ, Sikasso 
Siaka  Dembele - Directeur Regional(22/12 1994) 
Direction  Regionale  de la Jeunesse.  des S~orts. des Arts et  de  la  Culture.  Sikasso 
Karamoko  Kone - Directeur  Regional (l219  1994) 
4. Donors 
Banaue  Mondiale.  Bamako 
Agadiou  Dama - Responsable  des  projets  et  programmes  gestion  des resources naturelles (10/10 
1994) 
La Caisse Francaise.  Bamako 
V. Papazian - Responsable des projet et programmes  gestion  des resources naturelles (14/12 
1994) 
USAID.  Bamako 
Abdoulaye  Dagamaissa - Responsable  des  projet programmes  gestion  des resources naturelles 
(l  8/1 l 1994) 
_. GTZ 
Ekkehard  Dudeck - Conseiller  Technique au  PGRN (l 711 l 1994) 
UNSO. Bamako 
Kalfa Sanogo (13/12 1994,23/2 1996) 
5. Project staffhesearchers 
AVES.  Bamako 
Samba Soumare - Sociologue (11110 1994) 
Ousmane Traore - Juriste (12110 1994) 
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IMRAD.  Bamako 
Cheibane  Coulibaly - Sociologue (10/10 1994, 22/2 1996) 
Institut des Sciences  Humaines.  Bamako 
Klina Sanogo - Directeur (9/9  1994) 
Felii  Koni - Sociologue (1 619 and 16/1 l 1994) 
Institut du  Sahel. Bamako 
Dolo - Interim  du  Directeur CERPOD (W9  1994) 
Alcha  Boucenna  -Responsable  de  la  Banque  Regionale  de donnie, PFIE (11/10  1994) 
Ba  Moussa  Batchily  -Coordinateur,  PFIE (IV10 1994) 
Ibrahima Djire - Documentaliste, PFIE (11/10  1994) 
Rabby  Wene - Economiste (15/12 1994) 
Institut  d'Economie  Rurale. Bamako 
Bacacy  Skkou  Coulibaly - Chef  Programme  Economie  des  Filikres (IO/lO  1994) 
DRSPR - ESP/GRN  (Equipe  Systkme ProductiodGFW), Sikasso 
Bocary  Kaya - Amenagiste (2019 1994) 
NGolo Coulibaly - Sociologue (2119 1994) 
Thea Hilhorst - Socio-econome (several meetings 1994 and 1996) 
Demba Kebi - Coordinateur (26/IO 1994) 
Toon Defoer - Chef  d'Assistance  Technique (several meetings 1994) 
"Pie Bengaly - Agronome (15/2  1996) 
Amadi  Coulibaly - Amenagiste (1Y2 1996) 
CAT/CRN  (Cellule  Amenagement  du  Territoire/Gestion  Ressources  Naturelles), Sikasso 
Yaya Sidebi - Directeur/sociologue (12/9 and 6/10  1994) 
PADREF, Sikasso 
Bocary  Barry - hnomiste (l  911 2 1994) 
Proiet  Gestion  de  Terroir  (FAC), Sikasso 
Olivier  Lefay (l 4/9 1994) 
Mahamadi  Diawara (14/9  1994) 
Proiet Inventaire des  Ressources Ligeuses - FAO. Sikasso 
Souleymane  Ouattara - Sociologue (2/11 and22/12 1994, 1412 1996) 
Yaya Ballo - Amenagiste  pastoraliste (1419 1994) 
Kam~saxiDang~ouD. Sikasso 
Patricia Boussone - Sociologue (several meetings, 1994) 
Demba  Sam&& - Sociologue (1110 1994) 
Observatoire de Foncier. Sikasso 
Tinougou Sanogo - Juiste (1312  1996) 
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Intercooueration A.R.F.S.. Sikasso 
Pascal  Cuny - Assistant  technique  et  chercheur (2112 1996) 
Eqipe Diagnostic sur la formation  foresti6re.  Sikasso 
Sory Samassekou - Chef  du  Section FormatiodDivision Projets et Programmes, Dir. Nat.  des 
Eaux et For& (1319 1994) 
Akougnon Dolo  -Directeur  du  Centre de Formation  Pratique  Forestier,  Tabakoro (13/9 1994) 
AFVP. Kadiolo 
Adama  Cissouma - Aminagiste (W11 1994) 
Vision  Mondiale.  Koloni 
Zakaria  Sidebe - Directeur  local,  Koloni (2911 0 1994) 
Pro-iet Gestion  Terroir.  D6velopuement Local San-Koutiala 
Pierre  Brasset - Chef de Projet (23111 1994) 
Projet ATD2. S+ou 
Luc  Togo - Chef  Unite  Socio-Bconomiste (2511 0 1994) 
Gauchio  Coulibaly - Ingenieur  Genie Rural (25/10 and 26/10 1994) 
6. Farmers'  organisations 
SYCOV 
Abdoulaye  Dembele - President  du  bureau, secteur de Koutiala (26/9  1994, 9/2 1996) 
Charka Kon6 - Vice-uresident.  secteur de Koutiala f26/9 1994) 
David  Dauda  Dembele - Secrktaire  charge aux relations extinews, secteur de Koutiala (26/9 
1994) 
Moussa  Traor6 - Commissaire au compte, secteur de Koutiala (26/9  1994) 
Amadou  Traor6 - Trksorier,  secteur de Koutiala (26/9  1994) 
Sidiki  Coulibaly - Organisateur  Adjoint,  secteur de Koutiala (26/9  1994) 
Moussa  Bamba - Tresorier  adjoint,  section de Klda (II/2 1996) 
Chambre  Regionale  d'Amiculture.  Sikasso 
El Hadj  Noumpounon D i m  - President (2112 1994,  13/2  1996) 
Bokary  Sountoura - Secretaire G6n6raI (2/12 1994) 
K&  Djigenk 
L a s h  Djabatk - Dklkgue rigional(19/2 1996) 
7. Political  parties 
US-RDA 
Abou  Bamba - Secretaire G6n6al de la Commune  de Sikasso et  Secretaire  Politique de la Cercle 
de Sikasso  (6/2  1996) 
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ADEMA 
Abdoulaye  Traork - Secrktaire  Gkneral  de la section de Sikasso et membre du Comite  Exkcutif 
du parti (612 1996) 
Nasanga  Drissa - Skcretaire a la communication,  section de Sikasso (6/2  1996) 
Ladji  Konatk - Secretaire  Gkneral,  section  Kadiolo (16/2  1996) 
BDIA Faso DiiFi 
Moustapha  Bamba - Prksident  de la section,  Sikasso (7/2  1996) 
Oumar Baba  Diarra - Secrktaire a l'organisation, Sikasso  (7/2  1996) 
Seko  Ouattara - Deuxi6me  secrktaire a l'organisation, Sikasso (7/2  1996) 
PARENA. Sikasso 
Mamadou  Drissa  Traore - Prksident de la section, Sikasso (II/2 1996) 
m 
N'Golo  Sanogo - Prksident de la section Sikasso(7/2 1996) 
Sina  Coulibaly-  Prksident de la section  Koutiala,  Depute au Parlamant (14/2 1996) 
Abubacar  Tidiane  Diarra - Secretaire  General de la section  de  Koutiala (1812 1996) 
m 
Youssouf Berth6 - Secrktaire  Gknkral,  section de Kadiolo (15/2  1996) 
8. Others 
CFDT. Paris 
Franqois  Bkroud - Directeur  du  Dkveloppement Rural (15/71996) 
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QUESTIONNAIRE POUR VETUDE DES VILLAGES 
No. Date de l’interview 
1. Nom de  l’interviewk 
2. H o m e   U F e m e  
3. Age n 2 0 - 3 0  30-40 n 4 0 - 5 0  0 50- 
4. Classification de l’exploitation A O B  D C  OD 
5. Positiondans l’exploitation 
6 .  Village/quartier/arrondissement 
7. Est-ce-qu’au  niveau de votre  exploitation  on  trouve  des  nio-alphab6tes Oui O N o n  
8. Quels  sont les services itatiques avec qui vous avez un contact 
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Friquence de 
contact sur 
votre  propre 
initiative 
l 
9. Est-ce-que les services anivent a vous  assister si vous  avez  besoin  d’eux 
Toujours 
E a u  et For& 0 
Elevage 
CMDT 
CAC 
Administration 
Santk 
h o l e  
Autres 
Autres 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Souvent 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Rarement 
0 
U 
17 
0 
0 
17 
U 
0 
0 
Commentaires 
10. Si les services  n’anivent  pas a vous  assister,  est-ce-que  c’est  par 
OUi Non 
a.  manque  de  moyen  de  transport 
b. manque de ressources 
c. manque  de  personnel 
d. manque  de  compktence 
e.  manque  de  comprkhension 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
de  la vie  paysanne 
f. manque  de  bonne  volonte 0 0 
g. d’autres  raisons 
11. Quels est le  service  auquel  vous  avez  le  plus  de confance? pourquoi? 
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12.  Quels est le service  auquel  vous  n’avez  pas  de  confiance?  pourquoi? 
~~ ~ ~~ 
13.  Quels sont les agents de services  en  qui vow avez confiance 
a. Les jeunes b. Les  vieux 0 c. r a g e  n’a pas  d’importance 
d. Ceux qui U 
ont  eu  beau- 
coup de postes 
g.  Ceux qui 0 
sont bases 
au  village 
k. Ceux qui 0 
parlent 
minyanka 
e.  Ceux qui 
ont  dure sur 
la poste 
h. Ceux  qui 
sont bas& a 
I’arrondisse- 
ment 
1. Ceux  qui 
parlent 
senoufo 
0 i. Ceuxqui 0 j. ~asd’importance 
sont bases 
au cercle 
0 m. ceuxqui 0 n. pas $importance 
parlent 
bamanan 
0. ceuxqui 0 p. Ceuxqui 0 q. Pascimportance 
viennent viennent 
individuellement en groupe 
Pourquoi? 
14.  Est-ce-que  l’iquipe  technique  de I’AV pourrait  remplacer un ou plusieurs des services 
techniques? 
0 Non OU~ - quels  services? 
15.  Quels  sont les trois problimes majeurs au village  (selon  ordre  d’importance)? 
1. 
2. 
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16.  Quels  sont  les trois problemes  majeurs lies a la gestion  des  ressources  naturelles  (selon  l’ordre 
d’importance)? 
1. 
2. 
I )  
17.  Qu’est-ce-que le village  peut faire pour dsoudre ces  problkmes? 
18.  Qu’est-ce-que  I’Etat  peut  faire  pour  r6soudre  ces  problkmes? 
19.  Est-ce-qu’il y a  d’autres  qui  pourraient  rCsoudre  ces  problhmes?  (qui?  comment?) 
20.  Quels  sont  les  changements les plus  importants aprks 1991?  (selon  l’ordre  d’importance) 
21.  Qu’est-ce-que vous comprenez  par le mot ‘dCcentraiisation’? 
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22. A votre avis qui doit  prendre  la  responsabilite  des  &hes  suivants 
Le  Gouveme-  l   village la CMDT  lesprives  d‘autres 
ment  /qui? 
a.  Fixation  des  prix cl cl U U U 
d’intrants  et  prix 
des  produits  agri- 
coles 
b.  Conseils U 
techniques 
c.  Definition  des 0 
r6gles  concernant 
la  gestion  des 
ressources  naturelles 
d. Intervention  e  cl 
cas  des  conflits ur 
la  gestion  des  res. 
naturel.  (litiges,etc.) 
e.  Intervention en o 
cas  d’autres  conflits 
au village  (conflit 
sur le  droit  de 
succession,  etc.) 
f. Garant  de la 0 
securite 
g.  Investissement cl 
en infrastructwe 
physique  et  sociale 
23. Commentaires 
cl 
0 
cl 
0 
U 
0 
U 
U 
U 
0 
cl 
cl 
U 
U 
U 
U 
U 0 
U 
U U 
U U 
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CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TEN VILLAGES UNDER  STUDY 
Table A. Basic characteristics of the ten village S at the time when the survey was 
:en  (late 1 
GEOGRA- 
PHICAL 
SITUATION 
94 for eig 
DISTANCE 
TO 
ARRONDI 
S-SEMENT 
HQ 
35 km 
27 km 
5km 
O h  
12 km 
O h  
5 h  
12 km 
25 km 
8 h  
for M( -
NAL 
INTER- 
CON- 
FLICT 
- 
Yes 
t of the  villages, ant 
GRAM- 
difficult 
VerY no 
difficult 
early 1991 
NUMBER 
OF 
TANTS 
INHABI- 
(AF’PROX) 
1,680 
720 
2,820 
11,700 
1,870 
10,700 
1,790 
820 
760 
630 
Coloni 
- 
)ossa- 
,ala 
far  north 
far  north 
present 
not vresent I no II 
jincina north veryeasy I no 
vlolo- 
lala 
3inkO- 
- 
0 
north 
north not 
present 
ging 
ging 
emer- 
- 
emer- 
no 
- 
no 
- 
no 
- 
middle 
south 
present 
present 
Vgo- 
. O h .  
south 
difficult 
VerY no 
far south 
~~~ ~ 
far south 
a)  Vision  Mondiale 
b)  Friendship  association  ‘Coutance’ in France 
c) 1 Peace  Corps  volunteer in Sink010 and  2  volunteers in Molobala. 
d)  Helvetas 
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Table B. Geographical  distance  from  the  base  of  operation  of  agencies  to  each of the ten 
villages in the survey (in km). 
CMDT EDUCA HEALTH ADMIN CAC FOREST WESTOCK 
C h i h e  I 0 (S) 1 8km Iskm I 8 k m  I s h  
Koloni 
I I 
0 (R)  35 km(TZ) 35km(TZ)  35km *) 0 
(TZ) *) *) 
0 
- 
0 (R) 0 0 0 0 0 
2km (Z) 25km(TZ)  25km(TZ)  25km(TZ) 25km 25 km 2km 
(TZ) **) 
12km (R) 1 2 h  12km  12km 12km 
5km (R) 5km 5 km (P) 5 h (P) 5 km 0 0 
sink010 0 
(TZ) 
0 0 12km 12km(TZ) 1 2 h ( T Z )  1 2 h ( T Z )  (S) I 
l’ I 
notes: 
0 =the agency  operates  from the village 
- = the  agency  has no activities in the  village 
(S) CMDT is represented  by  a  Chef SB 
(Z)  CMDT is represented  by  a  Chef  ZER 
(R) CMDT is represented  by  a  Chef  ZAER 
(TZ)  the  agency  participates in the Test  Zones  programme in the village  and  therefore  visit it more f’requently than 
other  villages. 
(p) the  agency runs a  project in the  village  and  therefore  visit  it  more  frequently han other  villages  (the  ‘Siwaa 
project’) 
*) during the rainy season the  direct  road  from  Koloni to the  arrondissement  HQ inKouniana is impassable  and  the 
real distance  via Koutiala is 93 lan An ‘agent de l’Etat civil’ in Koloni handles simple  administrative  matters  which 
reduces the need  for  travels to the arrondissement HQ: 
**) A CMDT  zoo-technician in a  nearby  village  (2 km from  Nafegue) is often contacted  instead of the livestock 
service in the  arrondissement  HQ in Kadiolo.  Most  farmers  do  not  make th  distinction and may well  have  referred 
to  the  zoo-technician  when  commenting o  the  livestock  service. 
***)An “agent de 1’Etat civil’ m Woroni handles  simple  administrative  matters  which  reduces th  need  for  travels 
to the  arrondissement HQ. 
I l I l I 
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Brief  presentation of shared  characteristics  of the villages. 
Like  information in table  A,  the  following  brief  presentation ofthe ten  villages  under  study  refers 
to  the  time  when  the  survey was undertaken  (i.e.  late  1994  for  eight  of  the  villages  and  early  1996 
for  Molobala  and U6la). The  villages  have  been  grouped  to  highlight  the  shared  characteristics 
within  each of the goups that are reflected  in  results  from  the  survey  (reported in chapter 10  and 
11). 
Chierne and Nafegue are situated  in  Kadiolo  cercle,  while N’golokasso is situated  a  little m e r  
north just across  the  border to Sikasso  cercle.  Access to Nafegue  is  relatively  easy as the road 
from  the  arrondissement  headquarters  in  Kadiolo is fairly goo4 but  the  distance is long  (25 km). 
Access to Chikme  and  N’golokasso  is  very  difficult  due  to  the  poor  condition of roads.  The 
involvement in cotton cultivation dates only about 10 years back, and in all three villages 
remittances  from  relatives  in  C6te  d’Ivoire still play a significant  role.  They are  small  villages 
(600-800 inhabitants) characterised by social stability, ethnical homogeneity (they are all 
Senoufo-dominated)  and  strong  leadership.  The  power  of  village  chiefs is uncontested,  and  there 
is only one village  association in each  of  the  villages.  The  traditional  hunters’  association  is 
strong and maintains security, and in Nafegue it is believed that the village chief controls 
supernatural forces that can keep all unwanted visitors away. In Chikme and N’golokasso 
conflicts  with  transhumant  pastoralists  are  on  the  increase,  and  in  N’golokasso  the  conflict  has 
costed  lives. This has strained  relations to the  government  administration  that  has  imprisoned 
young  people  from  the  village  involved  in  the  bloodsheds. 
Woroni and Sinkolo are  situated  in two different  cercles  (Woroni  in  Kadiolo  and  Sinkolo  in 
Koutiala).  They  further  differ  by  the  level of integration  into  the  cotton  economy, as in  Sinkolo 
cotton  cultivation has been  the  major source of  income  for  at  least  20  years,  while  the  dependence 
by  Woroni  on  cotton  sales  is of a more  recent date. Moreover,  in  Woroni  the  Senoufo  population 
dominates,  whereas  Sinkolo is Minyanka-dominated.  The  villages,  however, share a  number  of 
common  characteristics.  They  are  situated  close to a national  road,  close to arrondissement 
headquarters,  close  to  a  larger town (Sikasso and  Koutiala,  respectively),  and  they  are  relatively 
large  (1600-1800  inhabitants).  Village elites have  strong  informal ties to powerful  groups  in 
Sikasso and  Koutiala,  and  village  chiefs  appear to have  held  important  positions  in the former 
unity  party,  UDPM.  Both  village  chiefs  have  maintained a  certain  authority,  and  there  is  only  one 
village  association  in  each  of  the  villages. In Sinkolo,  however, an internal  conflict  is  erupting, 
and  also  in  Woroni  the  existing  social  order  is  increasingly  threatened as economically  powerful 
groups  claim their share of political  power. 
Koloni and Dossorola are both  situated  in  the  northern  part  of  Koutiala  cercle  (Dossorola  cannot 
be  found  on a  map, as government  authorities  consider it a  quarter of the village of Zanzaouni). 
Distances  to  arrondissement  headquarters  are  long,  and  due  to  poor  roads  both  villages  are 
completely  cut  off  from  the  outside  world  during the rainy  season. The villages  have been 
involved in cotton  cultivation  for  three  decades  and  depend  entirely  on  income fiom cotton 
cultivation.  ‘While  several  ethnic  groups  are  found in the  villages,  the  Minyanka  population 
dominates.  Both  villages  suffer h m  serious  internal  conflicts  opposing  decedents of the  first 
inhabitants  and  decedents of late comers. In Koloni  (approx.1700 inhab.) the  conflict is reflected 
in an intense fight over  the  hereditary  right to the  position  of  village  chief  that  is  related  to  the 
intervention  by  French  colonial  power in selection of village  chiefs. In Dossorola  (approx.  800 
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inhab.)  the  conflict is explained by the demand  by  economically  better-off  latecomers that they 
take over the village  leadership. In Koloni the conflict  has  resulted  in the split of the village 
association in three, while in Dossorola  it is considered  a  question  of time before the village 
association  will have to split. 
Sicina, Molobala and KEla are all situated in the h&  of the  cotton  cultivation  zone:  Sincina 
and  Molobala in Koutiala  cercle,  and KlCla in Sikasso cercle.  The  three villages have  been 
integrated  into  the  cotton  economy  for  three  decades.  Sincina is situated so close to the town  of 
Koutiala  that it can  be  considered a suburb  to the town.  Molobala and KlCla are arrondissement 
headquarters  and  have  close  relations to Koutiala  and Sikasso, respectively. All three  villages  are 
very  large:  Molobala  and Klda have  about 11,000 inhabitants each while Sincina is smaller  but 
still an over-average  village with 3,000 inhabitants.  The  villages  are  well  equipped with social 
and  physical  infras.tructure,  which  in the case  of  Sincina  has  been  funded  mainly  by a French 
fiendship organisation.  Internal  conflicts are profound in Molobala  and  Sincina  where  they  are 
related to interventions by the  French  colonial  power  and  the  government  administration  of  the 
Traore  regime,  respectively, in selection  of  village  chiefs. In Klda an  emerging  conflict is 
expressed  in the fight  between  different  families  over th  hereditary  right o the position of village 
chief. In Molobala  there are five  village  associations, in Sincina  there  are two and in KlCla there 
is  one.  The  three  villages are considered  strongholds  of SYCOV, the  farmers’  movement:  the  first 
SYCOV  meeting  ever  was  held  in  Sincina,  and the sections in Molobala and Klela  are  very 
active. 
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CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS IN THE  VILLAGE SURVEY 
Table  C.  Socio-economic  background of respondents in each of the f i e  villaees  belonein2 
to  the  CMDT-defmed  ‘Koutiaia  region’  and  average  for the region. 
I I -  
group-a n total in% group-m group-d  C  group-b 
Koloni 30  100% - 3% 33% 30% 33% 
Average 
region’ *) 
‘Koutiala 
5% 13% 42% 40% l%**) - 101% **) 
notes: 
region’  by  CMDT  (CMDT,  1995b  p. 4). For a defmition of the five  groups,  see  chapter 7. 
*) Overall  distribution  of  cotton-producing  households in the northern part  of Sikasso region,  called  ‘Koutiala 
**) According to DRSPR,  group-m makes up  an eshated 1% of the  households  in  the  ‘Koutiala  region’  (Coulibaly 
et al., 1993  p.23). This share is not included in the average  given by  CMDT,  1995b. 
***) for 3% (=l respondent) the position in the DRSPR-typology has not  been  noted on the questionnaire. 
Table D. Socio-economic  background  of  respondents in each of the five villages  belonging 
Average 
region’ *) 
‘Sikasso 
- 100% - 19% 11% 38% 32% 
notes: 
*) Overall distribution  of  cotton-producing  households in the southem part of Sikasso region,  called ‘Sikasso region’ 
by  CMDT  (CMDT,  19951,  p. 4. For a  definition of the five  groups, see chapter 7. 
**) for 3% (=l respondent) the position in the DRSPR-typology has not  been  noted on the questionnaire. 
***)for 5% (=l respondent) the position in the  DRSPR-typology has not  been  noted on the questionnaire. 
Comment to both tables: the distribution of respondents  on  the  five  groups  varies so significantly  between  the 
villages  that  it  questions  the  usefulness  of  calculating  an  average of a  larger area such as the  CMDT-defmed 
Nafegue the share of respondents in the  better-off groups (a  and  b) are considerably  below the average  for the area. 
‘Koutiala region’ or ‘Sikasso region’. It is notable  that in all the  villages  under  study  except  N’golokasso  and 
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Table E. Position in the  household of respondents in each of the  ten  villages  included in the 
survey. 
Chikne 
Total 
100% 10% 23% 67% 
100% - 1%  3% 19% 21% 56% 
29 1 
Notes: 
*) for 10% (=3 respondents)  the  age has not  been  noted  on  the  questionnaire. 
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WOMEN IN THE SIKASSO  REGION 
It is found  relevant to explain  the  conspicuous  absence  of  women in the  questionnaire  survey  as 
well as in  the  main text of the  dissertation  by  briefly  describing  the  role  of  women in agriculture 
and  their  limited  contact to government  extension  agencies. 
Role of women in the  agricultural  production 
There is a  considerable  disagreement  among  researchers  regarding  women’s  situation  in  general 
and  their  involvement in the  agricultural  production in particular. 
One aspect of the  disagreement  regards  the  impact  on  women’s  situation  of  the  dissolution  of 
extended  families.  On  the  one  hand  Jonckers  argues  that  women  in  small  households  consisting 
of  only  a  husband  and his wife (wives)  have  substantially less leisure time than women  living in 
extended  households. In extended  households  women  can  take turns to cook,  and some of  them 
can  avoid  participating  in  the  agricultural  work,  whereas  the  only  woman in a  h usehold will have 
to  cook  every day and  participate  much  more  actively in the agricultural  work493  (Jonckers,  1994 
p. 127).  Furthermore,  members  of  a  small  household  have  limited  time to participate in the 
various  mutual  labour  associations,  hence  receive  a very  limited  support  from  the  associations 
in return  (Jonckers,  1987  p.  148). This is supported  by a  study by Tounkara on women’s  role in 
the  cotton  economy  that  concludes  that  women in extended  families  have  more  time  than  other 
women to  work on their  individual  fields (Tounkara, 1994  p. 28). Rondeau,  on  the  other  hand, 
argues that  although  more  time is spent  on  cooking in a  small  household,  these  women  have 
gained  an  increased  control of their  working  time  and  have  more  leisure  time4%  (Rondeau,  1994 
p. 112). 
Disagreement  also  exists  regarding  the  general  consequences  for  women f the  integration  into 
the  cotton  economy.  Tounkara  mentions that before  the  introduction  of  cotton, the contribution 
by  women to the  agricultural  work on the  common  field  mainly  consisted in their  participation 
in the manual  weeding. After the  introduction  of cotton, they  have  become  involved in an 
extensive  range  of  agricultural  tasks  and  have  less  time to concentrate on their  individual  fields 
(Tounkara, 1994 p. 18-19). Also other studies stress the active involvement of women, in 
particular  young  unmarried  women i  the  Senoufo  community, in all  kind  of  agricultural  work 
on  the  common  field  (Coulibaly  et  al.,  1993  p.  43,  p.  3 in the  annex;  Kebk & Brons,  1994  p.  14; 
Sanogo,  1989 p. 246). 
A study by Sissoko  on  the  impact of  CMDT’s  activities on women’s situation  introduces  some 
light and shade into this clear-cut  picture  of  an  increased  work  load of women.  The  study 
concludes that although women may participate in virtually all agricultural tasks, their 
involvement in most tasks has been reduced after the mechanisation of the agricultural 
493 “...la plupart des unites sont de dimension  r6duite et certaip~ ne  comptent  qu’une ou deux  femmes. Celles-ci 
ont alors la ch e  quondlenne des repas  et  sont en  plus mobll!sees, comme les homes?  par les cultures 
commerciales. ”ri E les ne peuvent plus se h e r  a toutes  leurs actwtes culiiaires m se driver une  parcelle 
personnelle” (Jonckers, 1994  p. 127). 
4M “I1 est clair  que l e s  femmes  ont  maintenant un meilleur  conlr6Je de leur  temps de travail: elles peuvent 
diposer de  plus  de  temps pour elles mhes .  Par contre, elles dolvent  consamer  plus  de  temps  qu’avant  la 
cusine” (Rondeau, 1994 p. 112). 
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production.  The  important  exception is their  participation in the  harvest  which  has  been  increased 
given  the  extension of the area cultivated, hence the longer duration of the harvest. Most 
importantly,  however,  the  study  stresses  the  need to istinguish  between the situation of  women, 
according to the level of mechanisation of the  household, the size of the household  and  their 
ethnicity  (Sissoko,  1994  p.  14-21). 
Rondeau  further  qualifies  the  picture  of  a  highly  varying  situation of women. She totally  rejects 
the idea of describing  ‘the  general  situation of women’  and  instead  introduces  a  typology of 
villages  according to the  historical  and  present  involvement of women in the wcultural work 
on  the  common  field of the household.  Her  typology  shows  that ll options  are  possible:  women 
may  ‘always’  have  been  actively  involved in the agricultural  production  and  may  have  either 
continued  their  involvement  or  decreased  it. They may  have  been  involved  only in the harvest  and 
may  have  either  maintained the l i i t e d  involvement or increased it4’’ (Rondeau,  1994  p.  197). 
In addition  to  the  village  tradition,  Rondeau  mentions  a  range of other  factors that influence the 
situation of a  woman:  her  age, the number  of  women in the household,  the  number  of  small 
children, the attitude  of her mother-in-law  towards  the  division of labour in the household, the 
religion  and  last  but  not  least  the  wealth of her  household496  (Rondeau,  1994  p.  168-169,  p.  197- 
198).  Zuidberg & Djire and DembBe et al. both  support the view  that  many  women  contribute 
to cover the food  consumption of the household  by  cultivation  on  individual plots and  have 
considerable  incomes  from  various  non-agricultural  activities  (livestock  raising,  gathering of 
plants,  trade  and  processing of agricultural  products)497  (Zuidberg & Djirk,  1992 p. 19;  Demb8C 
et al., 1997 p. 19-28). 
Contact of women to government agencies 
Regardless  of  their  view  on  the  involvement  of  women in agriculture, available  sources  all  agree 
that  women  have  a  very  limited  say in decisions  regarding the management  of the farm and the 
use of  incomes  from the common field. Women are generally described as a labour force 
submitted to the decisions  of  the  men  and  very  little  informed  about  the  various  technics  applied 
on the farm4’* ( T o m  1994 p. 19, p.29;  KCbe & Brons,  1994 p. 14; Crowley,  1991b  p.  51; 
DembCl6 et al., 1997 p.  33-35;  Hilhorst & Coulibaly,  1998 p. 14). 
Also, the  contact  of  women to the  various  government  agencies is very  limited. Thus, more  than 
half of the  women  interviewed  in  a  study  by  Coulibaly  et al. in th   Koutiala  and Sikasso area  were 
49s “ ... village  (de  e A) oh les  femmes  ont  toujours ettt r5sentes dans le  cham S collectif, ceux (de  type B) ou 
elles l’ont quia6 P .  epuls quelques  temps,  ceux  (de  type  Cy ou elles  ont  toujours P unit6  leur  participation a la 
p6riode de rkoltes ...ceux (de  type  D),  autrefois de e C, ou l e s  femmes  ont  accepte  d’investir  plus  de  temps 
qu’auparavant dans le  champs  collectif’  (Rondeau,?(994  p. 197). 
496 Based  on  a  recent  study  in  the  region DembelC et al. mention  many of the  same  factors (DembClC et al., 1997 
p. 10). 
”’ Zuidber  and  Djirtt  criticise  both  CMDT  and  researchers  DRSPR  (now  ESP-GRN)  for  having  totally 
neglectedze irhportance  of  women’s  individual  lots  and  non-agricultural  incomes.  According to them, the 
focus on cash a0 S production  on  the  common R eld  and the view of the household as a  homogeneous  unit 
controlled  by the &ad of the  household  have  made  CMDT  and  the  researchers  miss  an  important  aspect of the 
economic situation both  of  women  and of the  household as such (Zuidberg & Dj%,  1992  p.19-20). 
498 As an  example  it can be mentioned that only  11% of 62 women  interviewed in a study undertaken in the 
CMDT  area  were  able to able  to  distinguish  between the three most cotton  varieties used in  the area (Dembtl6 
et al., 1997 p. 29,  see also Tounkara,  1994 p. 29) 
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unable  to  tell the names  of the agencies  working in their  village  (Coulibaly et al., 1993 p.  2). The 
women interviewed explained that they got virtually all their information on agricultural 
production  from  their  husband  and  other  relatives,  while  government  agencies  were  reported  to 
play an insignificant  role  (Coulibaly  et al., 1993  p.  32). This has  been  confirmed  by a more  recent 
study in which none  of the 62 women  interviewed  reported  to  receive  any  information from 
CMDT agents. Instead they cited relatives as the most important source of agricultural 
information  (Dembele,  1997  p.  30-31). 
Even  indirect  relations  of  women  to  government  agencies  seem  limited.  The  study  by  Coulibaly 
et  al.  found  that  only  a  minority  of  11% of the men  interviewed  used to discuss  issues of 
importance  to the household with their  wife  before  a  meeting i  the  AV,  whereas  18%  of  the  men 
would  give their wife  a  report  after the meeting”’ (Coulibaly et al., 1993 p. 39). 
The  only  major  exception  to the general  lack  of  contact  between  government  agencies  and  women 
is the  women’s  programme run by  CMDT. After  having  totally  ignored  women  during  the  first 
decades  of  its  activities,  the  CMDT  initiated a women’s  programme in 1983. In the period  1987- 
1990 it was strengthened  under  the  name of PAAF (projet d’Appui 9 1’Animation  F6minine)  and 
after  1990 it has been known as PROFED (le Projet  Femmes et Developpement).  It  has  three 
main  fields of activities: 1) activities  meant to ease the work load of  women  (introduction of 
millet grinding mills,  improved  water  supply,  improved  stoves,  etc.) 2) activities  supporting  the 
income  generation  of  women  (credit  provision,  gardening  activities,  small-scale  livestock  raising, 
etc.)  and 3) educational activities (literacy  courses,  health  education,  etc.).Although  in  theory 
women  have access to credit via the AV,  in  practice  their  access i  extremely  limited.  Since  1987 
the women’s  programme  has  provided  short  and  medium  term  credit to women for income- 
generating  activities  (Zuidberg & Djirk,  1992  p.  28; De Groote et al., 1995a p.  21-22).  While  the 
programme has previously  been  criticized for being  limited in scope  and its activities  said  to be 
too  scattered to have  any real impact on the  situation of women in the region  (Zuidberg & Djiri, 
1992  p.  39;  Rondeau,  1994  p.  213-223),  recent  changes aimat  an  integration of gender  aspects 
into  all  activities  undertaken by  CMDT  @embe16 et al., 1997 p. 5). 
In  addition to this CAC has small  gardening  and  sheep-fattening  projects for women  in  a  few 
villages  in the  regioq funded  by  the  Test  Zones  programme. 
499 Interestingly, the study  found that men  who reported to their  wife  were  usually  from  households  without 
households  have more influence on their  husband than women  in  extended  families  (even if Rondeau  mainly 
other  male  members  (Coulibaly,  1993 p. 39). This supports the view of Chantal  Rondeau  that  women  in  small 
refers  to  the  influence of women on their  working  hours in the common field)  (Rondeau,  1994 p. 198). 
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THE ‘TEST ZONES PROGRAMME’ 
Because the ‘Test  Zones  programme’ was used as an  entrance  point  to  the  study  of  the four 
agencies  and  because  the  project is affecting  the  results  of  the  village  survey  reported in chapter 
10, a brief  presentation  of  the  project is made in the  following. 
The  ‘Test  Zones  programme’(‘le  Programme  Zones-Tests’)  was  an  environmental  project  funded 
by Norway through  the  World Bank. It was  officially  initiated in late  1990,  but  due to the 
turbulence  after  the  change  of  regime  activities  only started during  1993. The  funding  stopped in 
1995. In addition to Kadiolo  and  Koutiala  cecles in the  Sikasso  region  the  project  had  activities 
in  the  Djenn6  cercle in the  Mopti  region  (N’Djim et al.,  1993  p.  4-5). 
The  idea  of  the  project  was to assist  a  total  of  20  villages  in  the  three  cercles to prepare  local  land 
management plans - the so-called ‘schima d’amhagement de terroir’. This demanded a 
coordinated  effort  by  the  forestry  service,  the  livestock  service,  CMDT  and  CAC  that  were 
supposed to undertake joint extension  sessions in the  villages  involved  and  share  a  common 
budget  for  the  activities  funded  by  the  project.  It  made  part  of  the  ambitions of he  programme 
to improve the  integration  of  efforts by the  various  agencies,  increase  the  discretion  by the 
arrondissement  level,  and  change the traditional  top-down  approach by government  agents  into 
a  role as advisors to the  rural  population (MAEE, 1992a). 
In its early  phase  reference  was  sometimes  made  to  the  project as an  example  of  a  new  and 
promising  approach to collaboration  between  the  agencies in MDRE and  even as a  pilot  test  of 
the  institutional  reform  of MDRE (ref. chapter 9.1) (e.g. World Bank, 1992a  p.12-14). The 
project,  however, was characterised  by  a  wide  range  of  problems  and canhardly  be  described as 
a success. Based on my participation in August 1993 in a  World Bank review  of  the  project  and 
on  interviews  carried  out  with staff from  the  four  agencies  in  late  1994,  the  following  account  of 
the  main  problems can be  made: 
First,  instead  of  providing an example  of  how to improve  the  collaboration  between  the  various 
agencies,  the  ‘Test  Zones  programme’  was  itself  suf€ering h m the  compartmentalised  structure 
of MDRE. It turned out to be  very  difficult o make  the  four  agencies  meet, let alone  carry  out 
joint extension  sessions at village  level.  The  major  interest  of  the  agencies  was to get access to 
project  funds  dedicated  to  accompanying  activities  (‘mesures  incitatives’)  meant to i crease  the 
interest  of  the  population in the  project  and  thereby  facilitate  the  introduction  of  the  idea  of  land 
management plans. Rather than being used for joint activities, a major part of the funds, 
therefore, was shared  between  the  agencies  and  used  for  ordinary  activities in their  various  fields 
(e.g. the forestry  service  used the funds for tree planting, the livestock service used it  for 
cultivation  of  fodder  crops,  etc.).  Exceptions  to this picture  were  a  few  positive  examples  of  close 
collaboration  between the agencies in the  Kadiolo  cercle  where  some  field staff experienced  a 
hitherto unknown work  satisfaction by working in teams  for  a  common  cause. 
Second,  instead of granting  increased  discretion  to  the  arrondissement  level,  the  project  was 
caught in the  traditional  hierarchical  structure  of  the ministry, and front-lie staff had  a  very 
limited  say on project  activities. The project  was  prepared by the  central  level,  and  lower  level 
staffwere simply told to cany  it out.  Information to those  supposed to execute  the  activities on 
the  objective of land  management plans was very scarce, and  many h n t - l i e  staff never  grasped 
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the idea.  For those who  did,  it  was  a  source of  constant  frustration that their  reservations  with 
regard to time  schedules  and  priority  of  activities  were  usually  neglected.  When for example  they 
insisted that it  would be impossible to hold  meetings  with  farmers to prepare  land  management 
plans in the middle of the cotton  harvest,  they  were just told to do as it had  been  decided in 
Bamako. 
Third, the project by no means managed to establish a new relationship with farmers, but 
government staff addressed  farmers in the usual topdown manner.  The  population  in  the  selected 
villages  were  never  asked  if  they  were  interested in pr paring  land  management  plans.  When  they 
very  clearly  said that they  were  not  but  wanted  only  the  ‘mesures  incitatives’, thi  did not make 
the project management in Bamako  change  its  mind.  Instead  of  an  active  participation  by the 
population in the preparation  of the plans,  government staff did  most  of  the tasks themselves,  and 
consequently the sketchy  plans  developed  were of very  limited  use. 
Fourth, the project  ran in to many  of the problems so often  related to donor-funded  activities. 
There was no real  ownership  of  it n the ministry,  and the coordination unit responsible for its 
implementation had no power  to  make the various  agencies  cooperate.  Cumbersome  funding 
procedures by the World  Bank  repeatedly  blocked  activities  in  the  field  and  created  animosity  by 
disappointed  populations.  And in the  preparation  of  the  project  priority  seems to have  been  given 
to getting the activities off the ground  rather than ensure  that  an  appropriate  project  design  was 
made.  While  official  criteria  for  selection  of  villages  considered  geographical  and ago-ecological 
conditions,  the  project  management  accepted  that  real  criteria  were  purely  political.  The  position 
of the village chief in the former unitary party, UDPM, appears to have  been  decisive for the 
choice  of  villages  which  implied that the majority  of  villages  included in the programme  were 
very  little  suited to the  preparation of land  management  plans:  e.g. one  village  had no  land  itself 
but had borrowed from a  neighbouring  village,  in  one  village  situated  close to a  mine the 
population  were  not  interested in agricultural  activities  at all, several  villages  were so affected  by 
internal  conflicts that it was  impossible to prepare  a  common  plan,  etc. 
The  various  problems  implied that achievements in terms of  environmental  improvement  by  the 
project  have  been  negligible.  However,  it  provided  some  much  needed  funding to three of the four 
agencies otherwise crippled by a difficult financial situation (viz. the forestry service, the 
livestock service  and  CAC). It was possible for the  agencies to finance activities  part  of  their 
regular  programme by funds for  the  ‘Test  Zones  programme’,  and  the  project  provided  them  with 
transport  and  allowances for visits to the village.  It is this impact  of the project  that is reflected 
in the village  survey  presented in chapter 10. 
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